

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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ARMISTICE AT MUNICH

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

FUTURE historians, distributing praise and blame for the Munich "settlement," will of course take into account the long chain of things done which ought not to have been done, and of things left undone which ought to have been done, that winds itself through all the last twenty years of European history. In the light of this inheritance some of them will conclude that the policy which Chamberlain began unfolding early in 1938 was inevitable, and that Daladier and Bonnet too were inevitably forced, first to recognize that they could not balk that policy, then to adopt it with all the fervor of the convert. Others will think that with foresight and determination British and French statesmen could even in 1938 have maintained a balance of power on the Continent.

We cannot discuss here the more remote links in the chain. We cannot discuss who was responsible for errors in the Treaty of Versailles; for the League's inability to meet the heavy tasks laid upon it; for the deterioration of the world's economy; for the French and British failure to make a better effort to achieve disarmament; for Britain's subsequent neglect to rearm effectively through a long period when cabinet members were frequently assuring Parliament that all necessary steps were being taken;¹ for delays in reforming the French social structure; for the failure of French *aéroplane* production from 1936 to 1938; and for all the other mistakes of commission and omission (on both sides of the Atlantic) during the past twenty years.

¹ Speaking in the House as long ago as March 8, 1934, Prime Minister Baldwin said that if his hopes of an air convention failed, "then any Government of this country — a National Government more than any, and this Government — will see to it that in air strength and air power this country shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores." Throughout the Baldwin régime and into Chamberlain's there were uniformly reassuring government replies to attacks by Winston Churchill and others who questioned the efficiency with which Baldwin's promise was being executed.

Our task is to make a chronological examination of the Czech-German crisis of 1938. We shall try to set down, before all the details are known, but on the other hand while what we do know is still vividly in our minds, just one single chapter of the story which future historians will have to write in full. We shall see how what started as a two-sided negotiation between the Czech Government and the German minority in Czechoslovakia became an international negotiation under the auspices of an English "mediator," Lord Runciman. And we shall see how the mediation ended in a series of international ultimata — from Hitler via Henlein to Beneš, then from Hitler to Chamberlain, then from Chamberlain and Daladier to Beneš, and finally from Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini to Beneš.²

It is not for an American to say that Englishmen or Frenchmen should fight and die for causes which do not seem to them vital. The moral issue, then, will be touched on in these pages only incidentally. But this country has been profoundly affected by the destruction of the balance of power in Europe. So great a shift portends, if it does not register, a shift in the balance of power in the world. The results for the United States — economic, political and strategic — in both of the bordering oceans and in Latin America, are incalculable. So also are the results for international law, the observance of treaties and the concept of sovereignty in a world of which the United States, much as it wishes the contrary, is more and more inexorably shown to be a part. We are entitled, then, and indeed are in duty bound, to examine the political conceptions and the day-by-day actions which gradually led Britain and France to Munich. It is the expediency of those actions that concerns us here. Ethical aspects will be touched on only incidentally, and then, I hope, not in a moralizing vein; for I have too much fault to find with much of our own foreign policy from 1919 onwards to feel the inclination to utter any moral reproach.

Investigation of the "immediate origins" of the Czech-German crisis must begin with the events of February 1938. Hitler had just joined issue with the high command of the German Army and with the old German diplomacy over his intention to press his expansionist plans regardless of all risks. Inevitably he had won. With his record of easy victories in the past, who could oppose

² I am indebted to the indispensable "Bulletin of International News," founded in London in 1924 by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett; and, among the dispatches from many competent newspapermen in Prague, in particular to those from G. E. R. Gedyé of the *New York Times*.

what he promised would be easy victories again? As a result, he had taken direct control of all Germany's armed forces and of the conduct of foreign policy. On February 20 he decided to try out the mettle of his foreign opponents. He had deduced from Lord Halifax's disclaimers of interest in Danubian affairs during a visit to Berchtesgaden three months earlier that no very stiff British opposition would be encountered. Having disposed of potential domestic opposition he now announced that he considered himself the guardian of the ten million Germans living in foreign states along the German frontiers — a remark plainly aimed at the approximately seven million Germans of the Austrian Republic and the approximately three million Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. He was feeling his oats. It seemed a time for statesmen abroad to show prudence. Sir Austen Chamberlain once told me, "Germans can't take oats." His half-brother, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, evidently had another opinion.

On the same day that Hitler spoke, Neville Chamberlain accepted Anthony Eden's resignation as Foreign Secretary. The next day, February 21, Parliament listened to Eden explain why he could not continue in the Chamberlain cabinet. He said he parted with the Prime Minister not over the narrow issue of whether or not to negotiate with Italy while Italian troops were still fighting in Spain, but because of "a real difference of outlook and method." "Within the last few weeks," he said, "upon one most important decision of foreign policy which did not concern Italy at all, the difference was fundamental." He could not approve of allowing it to seem that Britain would constantly yield to pressure, and he must resign. Replying, Chamberlain denied that there had been a "now or never" threat by Italy, and complained that Eden had not been quite fair. But in an obvious hint that he wanted a Four Power Pact, he declared that the peace of Europe depended upon the attitude of Germany, Italy, France and Britain; if they would understand and take account of each other's aims, he said, they would save the peace of Europe for a generation. The resignation of a British Foreign Secretary under such circumstances was widely likened to the fall of Delcassé in 1905. The comments of his chief accentuated the underlying cause. The Italian press gloated, and the German press shared its joy that Eden, symbol of collective security, had been forced out of office.

Such was the prelude to some further and very significant remarks made by Chamberlain on February 22 in the course of replying to a Labor motion of censure. He said: "If I am right, as I am confident I am, in saying that the League as constituted today is unable to provide collective security for anybody, then I say we must not try to delude ourselves, and, still more, we must not try to delude small weak nations into thinking that they will be protected by the League against aggression and acting accordingly, when we know that nothing of the kind can be expected." This was all very different from the attitude Mr. Chamberlain had taken in his pre-election campaign in 1935.³ Having handed Mussolini the head of the Foreign Secretary on a charger he handed Hitler two buckets of oats — the suggestion that the Four Powers take charge of Europe, and the still more blunt statement that Britain was through, for all practical purposes, with the system of collective security. The outlines of the "policy of appeasement" were beginning to take shape.

Germany was elated. The press noted with satisfaction that Chamberlain had "smashed" Geneva. In Austria, where acute anxiety already existed as a result of Chancellor Schuschnigg's visit to Berchtesgaden, there was corresponding gloom. Schuschnigg had felt constrained to accept Hitler's demand that a Nazi, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, be put in the cabinet as Minister of the Interior, and the Austrian Nazis, encouraged thereby, had already begun to demonstrate afresh in many provincial cities. A show-down seemed imminent. Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to accept it boldly. He announced that "the threats which can be connected with the Berchtesgaden agreement cannot intimidate me," and summoned the Austrian people to a plebiscite on March 13 to decide whether they wished the maintenance of a free Austria. Before national feeling could thus be tested (indeed, to prevent it from being tested, although Hitler had often demanded a plebiscite on the question of *Anschluss*), Schuschnigg was presented with a Nazi ultimatum to resign or face invasion and bloodshed. Mussolini, his mentor and erstwhile protector, was too engaged elsewhere to consider offering him effective sup-

³ "The preservation of the League is the keystone of our policy because the first object of that policy is the establishment of settled peace and the League alone can give us peace by the collective action of its members. We have, therefore, made it clear that, while we shall take no action apart from others, we intend to fulfil our obligations under the Covenant in common with our fellow-members. Only in this way can we make it plain to would-be aggressors that it does not pay to attack another nation in violation of engagements solemnly undertaken." (Neville Chamberlain at Birmingham, November 2, 1935.)

port. It crossed nobody's mind to appeal to the League. On the afternoon of March 11, the same day he received the ultimatum, Schuschnigg resigned. Hitler's troops nevertheless marched in the next morning and Austria disappeared as an independent state.

Just twenty days had elapsed since Eden's resignation and Chamberlain's notice to Hitler that Britain considered the League helpless to prevent treaty breaking and violence. Are we not justified in suspecting that the other "important decision of foreign policy" about which Eden said he differed "fundamentally" from Chamberlain touched precisely the future independence of Austria? He doubtless had pointed out to Chamberlain that it would simply encourage Hitler to intimate that if he moved into Austria the protests of London and Paris would merely be *pro forma*. And of course he entirely rejected the Chamberlain thesis that once Hitler had come into possession of Austria he would keep quiet. In both respects Eden was right.

The annexation of Austria brought under Hitler's rule two-thirds of the ten million Germans to whom he had alluded on February 20. Prague asked itself what was to be the fate of the other third. The German Government, its hands still full in Austria, hastened to give Czechoslovakia official assurances (March 11 and 12, 1938) that it had no designs against her. These assurances were communicated to the British Government and, indeed, were made public by Mr. Chamberlain. In taking this action the German Government underlined specifically the general position which Hitler often had taken up, notably when on March 7, 1936, addressing the Reichstag, he said: "Thus after three years I believe that today I can look upon the struggle for the restoration of German equality of rights as now concluded. . . . In Europe we have no territorial claims to put forward." True, the very action on which he predicated this statement — the military occupation of the Rhineland — had been taken that same day in repudiation of another promise, the Treaty of Locarno. And only a year earlier (May 21, 1935) Hitler had said of Locarno that it was "the most definite and most really valuable treaty of mutual assurance in Europe."⁴ Regarding Austria, too, Hitler's disclaimers of expansionist designs had been frequent and specific (January 30, 1934; May 21, 1935; etc.). There seemed reason indeed, then, to reassure Prague. At any rate the assurances were given, and doubtless the Prague Government

⁴ Approved English translations (M. Müller & Sohn, Berlin).

assessed them at their proper value. More significant in its eyes, perhaps, was the fact that the German press soon began writing in a very hostile tone about Czechoslovak matters; for in a totalitarian régime the press is as much an agency of policy as any other branch of government, and often its utterances portend future events more accurately than do official pronouncements.

A second phenomenon noted in Prague was the increased activity of Konrad Henlein's Sudeten German Party. This group, formed in 1933 as the Sudeten "Home Front" and organized more formally in 1935, had at first merely demanded a larger share of state offices. It condemned totalitarianism and anti-Semitism, and disclaimed interest in "any kind of frontier revision." As recently as November 18, 1937, Henlein could speak as official leader of his party as follows: "The Sudetic German Party's stand toward the Czechoslovak State always has been positive and unequivocal. We do not fight against the State but against the ruling conception of the State. We are in opposition to the present government and the present system of foreign and domestic politics, but we fight on the basis of the State for a just order within it and for organic democracy and a foreign policy which meet the historic economic and geographic position of Czechoslovakia." He added: "I have always declared that we stand unequivocally for a democratic republican form of a Czechoslovak State." And again: "The Sudetic German Party is not an appendage of either National Socialism or Fascism, but wholly a native movement of long standing."⁵ The Party nevertheless held aloof from legitimate political life and opposed bitterly the German "Activists" who had entered the Czechoslovak Parliament and taken positions in the cabinet. And as the prestige and expansionist power of Nazi Germany grew more and more impressive it became more and more totalitarian in program and action.

Germans and Czechs have lived intermingled in western Bohemia for generations. But when top dog and bottom dog change places there are difficult psychological as well as physical readjustments to be made. Germans and Czechs alike are made of stubborn stuff. Neither is very adaptable. Despite the equality of both before the law, the Germans found plenty of occasions for resentment against Prague. Some of it originated in the world economic crisis and was largely beyond the Government's control. Politically and culturally, the Sudeten Germans enjoyed the

⁵Interview with Otto D. Tolischus, *New York Times*, November 19, 1937.

same rights as other citizens of the Republic. They had exact proportional representation in Parliament and in municipal activities; they had their own primary and secondary schools, their own technical high schools and their own university; and they were free to use their language in courts and in all intercourse with government authorities in districts where they exceeded 20 percent of the population. Altogether, they were the most decently treated minority in Central and Eastern Europe.

Yet the Czechoslovak Government admitted that the Sudeten Germans had grievances, and, beginning in 1936, started serious negotiations with them for the accord of "reasonable decentralization, with economic and administrative regionalism." The chief grievance of the Germans was that they did not have their full share of government posts. This was partly because until 1926 the Germans not only did not ask to participate in the government but refused to do so when asked; partly because it was difficult to give top positions in diplomacy and the army to persons not of certain patriotism. After 1926, when a German Agrarian and a German Christian Socialist took places in the Cabinet, progress was made in admitting Germans to the state bureaucracy, even in very responsible positions. But it is fair to say that the procedure was too slow. Even after 1936 President Beneš and Prime Minister Hodža found themselves hampered in negotiating with the Sudeten German Party. They could not in decency throw over suddenly the so-called "Activists," the Germans who had worked with them in the Government since 1926. Besides, an attempt to do so would have angered the Czech leftist parties and brought down the coalition government. Above all, their efforts at conciliation were constantly being upset by the way the Henleinists raised their ante whenever specific concessions were suggested.⁶

Little by little, as will appear in a moment, Henlein dropped all pretense that he was a loyal Czechoslovak citizen asking redress of grievances rather than that he was Hitler's agent; and little by little the vituperation against Czechoslovakia in the controlled German press augmented. This caused alarm not merely in Prague but in all countries committed by their League membership to preserving peace and assisting Czechoslovakia, a League member, to defend herself against attack. France repeated cate-

⁶ For a description of the agreement on procedure reached between the Government and the "Activist" Parties on February 18, 1937, and of six bills presented in Parliament in May 1937 by the Sudeten German Party, see "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia," by R. W. Seton-Watson, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1938.

gorically that she would carry out her special treaty obligations to her ally. The British Government did not conceal its dislike of the prospect that if she did so England must speedily become involved, either through obligations under the Covenant or as a practical matter of helping France on the Rhine.

For England this was a decisive moment. She either could take a firm stand for a European order based on collective security; or she could assume an equivocal position which, while possibly leaving her free to remain aloof for a time from any conflict which developed on the Continent, risked encouraging the dictatorial Powers to continue in the heart of Europe the methods of blackmail and power politics which had already worked so well in Manchuria and Ethiopia and were meeting with new success in Spain. Risks lay either way. Which way was least risky?

It is fair to Prime Minister Chamberlain to note that many of his Conservative supporters, including, probably, members of his own Cabinet, felt more community of interest with Fascism than Communism and also instinctively preferred Germany to France. Among British reactionaries, liking for Germany and fear of Germany blended curiously. They pictured Hitler as a guardian of capitalism, intensely disliked the idea of lining up on the same side as Soviet Russia, even inside the League of Nations, and glossed over the fact that whatever one thought of the Communist theories to which the Soviet rulers still paid lip service, and however repugnant the Stalin tyranny, Soviet Russia was for the time being a factor on the side of international peace. They professed themselves to be enormously impressed by accounts of German air superiority and stressed the mainly defensive value of the French fortifications. They discounted Soviet military power following the wholesale purge of army and navy chieftains, and asserted that in the circumstances Litvinov's influence in Moscow was to say the least uncertain. There obviously was some truth in these claims, though the prowess they attributed to the German air force grew to fabulous proportions and though many air experts continued to consider the Soviet air force, despite the purge and despite Soviet industrial dislocations, a formidable instrument of attack. In these circles little or nothing was said about the well-trained and patriotic Czech army, its "Maginot Line," and its wealth of modern armaments backed by one of the world's greatest arms factories. Little was said about Britain's undisputed control of the seas, or about the favorable

manner in which, given that fact, the American Neutrality Law would work for Britain and her allies in time of war. Also ignored was the unfinished condition of Germany's defenses in the west; her insufficiency of raw materials needed to fight a war and feed a wartime population, despite frantic efforts to lay up supplies and produce *ersatz* materials; her unfavorable financial position; the resistance inside the German Army to steps involving risk of general war in such disadvantageous conditions; or the covert dislike of great sections of the German people for many Nazi policies — racial, religious, economic and political.

Prime Minister Chamberlain was subject to the insistent pressure of this whole point of view, repeatedly emphasized in speeches by members of his own party, in pontifical leading articles in the *London Times*, and in the busy talk of London hostesses. His own character and background inclined him to regard it sympathetically. He has described what a nightmare war has always been to him. As a business man he saw the disadvantages of rearming to a degree and at a tempo which would seriously disturb the British economy and antagonize the City. And even as a business man, a colleague is reported to have characterized him as "a fellow with a retail mind in a wholesale line." A naïve or obstinate streak probably would make him believe that what Hitler said to him was meant, whereas the contrary things which were being said to others were not meant. His repugnance for war as such would be sincere, and certainly understandable; and he would be cautious enough by nature to feel that postponement of an issue is safer than facing up to it — which may be so often, but is not so always. He would of course share the prejudice of the English upper middle-classes against France, and their sense of shame at having won the World War. An instinct for fair play would make him anxious to throw the under dog a bone, even somebody's else. And when suddenly he discovered that it was a top dog not an under dog with which he had to deal, he would be credulous enough to hope by successive bones to reduce its hunger and make it friendly and innocuous rather than stronger, greedier and bolder.

Such warnings as Chamberlain received came from persons like Eden and Churchill, whom he looked on as rivals inside his own party, or from Liberals and Laborites who were open political antagonists. It is possible that if he had seen even dimly ahead to the final developments of late September he would have prepared

the British people to resist a capitulation along so wide a front. Lacking the sixth sense of foresight, he did not combat the influences to which I have referred, neither those external nor those within his own being.

In a most important speech in Parliament on March 24 Chamberlain foreshadowed the temporizing policy which he was to adopt throughout the new European crisis that followed close upon the Nazi annexation of Austria. This speech alternately blew hot and blew cold, appealing first to noble sentiment and then to less noble expediency. One thing Chamberlain did not do was speak plainly. "Peace," he announced, "is the greatest interest of the British Empire." He added that there were, however, certain things for which Britain would fight — "the defense of British territory and the communications which are vital to our national existence," and "our liberty and the right to live our lives according to the standards which our national traditions and our national character have prescribed for us." Having made this declaration he turned to the League of Nations. He admitted that his "original belief in the League as an effective instrument for preserving peace has been profoundly shaken," but cautiously said that Britain's general obligations under the Covenant "may have no less significance" than her "definite obligations to particular countries," *e.g.* "defense of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression," and "obligations by treaty to Portugal, 'Iraq and Egypt.'" In this connection, however, he refused flatly to give a "prior guarantee" to help Czechoslovakia in case of attack, or to help France in case she executed her pledge to do so. As he uttered these words, wrote the correspondent of the *New York Times*, "a roar of cheers went up from the packed Conservative benches behind him." Then he backtracked somewhat in an apparent effort to dissuade Germany from undertaking a fresh adventure at Czechoslovakia's expense by warning that what he had said was not to be interpreted as meaning that Britain "would in no circumstances intervene" to restore peace or maintain international order. "Legal obligations," he said, do not alone determine a nation's policy; and war, if it broke out, "would be unlikely to be confined to those who have assumed such obligations." He dismissed the Soviet Government's suggestion of a conference to discuss "practical measures" on the ground that it appeared to him to aim less at a consultation towards a settlement than "a concerting of action against an eventuality

which has not yet arisen." He ended by saying that his Government "in no way underrate the definite assurances given by the German Government," congratulated the Czech Government on elaborating practical steps to be taken "within the framework of the Czechoslovak constitution to meet the reasonable wishes of the German minority," and urged that there was "no need to assume the use of force, or, indeed, to talk about it" in connection with the relations of the German and Czechoslovak Governments. "Such talk," he announced, "is to be strongly deprecated."

Prime Minister Chamberlain spoke on several subsequent occasions in similar vein. But we cannot find a more complete guide to the attitude, half monitory, half defeatist, which he took up alike toward foes and friends throughout the ensuing months, first of anxiety, then of alarm.

II. THE MAY CRISIS

Hitler's victory in Austria increased Nazi prestige throughout Eastern Europe, and nowhere, naturally, more than among the Germans of Czechoslovakia. Symptomatic was the resignation of the German "Activists" from the Cabinet. As for the German Social Democrats, Henlein showed what political minorities might expect in case of transfer to Germany by announcing that they no longer were to be considered members of the German race group. Despite the unfavorable turn of the tide, Prime Minister Hodža had been pressing ahead with a phase of his problem which was almost as difficult as his negotiation with the Sudetens — the task of hurrying the Czech and Slovak coalition parties, varying in social and political shading from reactionary Agrarians to Social Democrats, into firm accord on some plan for conciliating the German minority. This he achieved on March 19, and soon thereafter he was able to announce in a broadcast that a "Nationality Statute" was to be drawn up, codifying existing rights for all minorities as well as incorporating new ones. The Henleinists rejected it in advance. So did the German press, which, one cannot repeat too often, is an organ of the German Government.

On April 24, only six weeks after Hitler's triumphant entry into Vienna, Henlein put forward the current demands of his party. His statement, made at Karlsbad, contained "eight points." They may be summarized as follows:

1. Full equality of status for Sudeten Germans and Czechs — that is,

abandonment of the conception that there is a Czechoslovak State containing a German minority.

2. A guarantee of this equality by recognition of "the Sudeten group of the German race" as a unified "legal personality."

3. Determination of the German area in Czechoslovakia, and legal recognition of its boundaries.

4. Full autonomy throughout this German area in every department of public life.

5. Guarantees for those living outside the area of their own race.

6. Removal of "all injustices done to the Sudeten Germans since 1918 and reparation for all damage they have suffered thereby."

7. Recognition of the principle of German officials in all German districts.

8. Full liberty for Germans to proclaim their Germanism and their adhesion to "the ideology of Germans."⁷

These demands went far beyond anything formerly suggested; and the last in particular seemed like a Trojan Horse to the Czechs. The Czechoslovak Republic was a democracy, the German Reich a dictatorship. To give the German minority liberty to profess German nationality and political philosophy meant giving it liberty to propagate the current Nazi theory of race and the Nazi conception of totalitarian government.

But Henlein also asked something that in Prague seemed even more presumptuous. In addition to the "eight points," he called for "a complete revision of Czechoslovak foreign policy," *i.e.* the abandonment of the alliances with France and Russia and, presumably, the gravitation of Czechoslovakia into the German political and economic orbit. The Government refused to negotiate on this basis. But it announced the intention of pressing ahead with the Nationality Statute on which the coalition parties had agreed. Hodža's hope was to push it through Parliament and have it on the books by July.

In Germany the moment seemed one to exploit. There had just been another cabinet crisis in France, the second within a month. Hitler was preparing to visit Rome. Following Henlein's Karlsbad speech, then, the German press received its signals to begin a fresh outburst of abuse against Czechoslovakia. Information from all directions made the British and French Governments feel that the situation was becoming more and more dangerous. Hitler was said to be preparing some action for the end of May or early June. At the end of April, then, the new French Premier and Foreign Minister, MM. Daladier and Bonnet, went over to London and arranged to coördinate the military forces of the two nations

⁷ Based on reports in the *New York Times* and *London Times*, April 25, 1938.

and in general to strengthen the London-Paris axis against the Berlin-Rome axis. They also agreed that Prague should be advised to pursue negotiations with Henlein as actively as possible, though both Governments were in accord that Czechoslovakia must not be expected to jeopardize her sovereignty or independent foreign policy. The French ministers stated their intention to live up to the terms of the Franco-Czech Treaty of Mutual Guarantee of October 16, 1925. The terms of this were specific. Each nation undertook to lend the other "immediate aid and assistance," in consonance with the League Covenant, in case Germany failed to observe the Locarno agreement and made an unprovoked attack. It was supplemented by the Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet Treaties of Mutual Assistance of May 2 and May 16, 1935. The latter contained a stipulation that the help which Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia each promised to give the other in case of unprovoked attack was contingent upon France carrying out her prior pledge. In reaffirming that France would do this, MM. Daladier and Bonnet assumed responsibility for initiating whatever action might become necessary in that connection.

In due course (May 7) the British and French Ministers in Prague expressed to Foreign Minister Krofta the interest of their two Governments in seeing the Sudeten question solved peacefully within the Czechoslovak constitutional framework, and of their willingness to be of any possible help towards that end. They urged greater concessions than Hodža had included in his proposed Nationality Statute; and thereby, without of course meaning to cause delay, did in fact dissuade him from achieving at once the legislative program behind which the various governmental parties had been lined up. Hodža agreed to embark on fresh negotiations with these, as well as to negotiate further with the Sudetens. Looking back, we see that psychologically it might have been better had he put the new Statute on the books at once, and left talk about other concessions till afterwards. But Hodža and Beneš were confident of the good intentions of their friends in London and Paris and thought it wise to take their advice.

True, reports of another sort were also in circulation concerning real British aims. One was to the effect that at a British Cabinet meeting in May there had been support for the view that if war broke out over the Czech question Britain ought not to participate unless Italy joined the Reich. If true, the report throws

interesting light on how consistently certain British minds have viewed the European scene. Another report was given currency by a cable from Mr. Joseph Driscoll, London correspondent of the New York *Herald Tribune*. This dispatch, printed May 15, said that the writer was "now privileged to shed what can truly be called official light on the real British attitude." To the query, "Will France and Russia fight for the Czechs?" the British answer is: "How can they fight?" Both France and Russia are geographically separated from Czechoslovakia. "Besides, the Russians have shot their best generals." Furthermore, Czechoslovakia lacks ground facilities for receiving a large additional force of airplanes from Russia. Mr. Driscoll comments: "Nothing seems clearer than that the British do not expect to fight for Czechoslovakia and do not anticipate that Russia or France will either. That being so, the Czechs must accede to the German demands, if reasonable." Mr. Driscoll's informant did not seem sure just what those demands would be. Nor had he yet made up his "official mind" as to whether the introduction of a cantonal system would be the wisest way of meeting them. Commenting on the suggestion that maybe the Sudetens could be gathered into one bloc, which might be administered autonomously, Mr. Driscoll wrote: "Instead of cantonization, frontier revision might be advisable. This would entail moving the frontier back for some miles to divorce this outer fringe from Prague and marry it to Berlin. A smaller but sounder Czechoslovakia would result." So remarkable a forecast of the mind of the so-called "Cliveden set," as revealed in the famous London *Times* editorial of September 7, as well as of Mr. Chamberlain's own subsequent actions, makes one wonder whether before he wrote his prophecy Mr. Driscoll may not have had contact with the Prime Minister, perhaps in a certain London drawing-room. Even his words about the German "fringe" in Czechoslovakia, used here in the middle of May to describe the "real" British attitude, find their counterpart in the editorial of the *Times* four months later.

The British attitude described by Mr. Driscoll as the "real" one did not, however, dominate Anglo-French action in the critical days just ahead. The Czechoslovak Government welcomed warmly the representations from London and Paris, and during the so-called "May crisis" it enjoyed the close coöperation of both capitals. This coöperation, together with the Government's own prompt action in mobilizing in reply to reports of a concentration

of German troops near the Czechoslovak border, carried Europe through the weekend of May 21. Germany said that such movements of her troops as had occurred were merely "routine." But Beneš had learnt something from watching the fate of Austria after "routine" movements of German troops and shifts in the German command. He determined to be in a better position for instant resistance than Schuschnigg had been. He was supported whole-heartedly by the French General Staff, which had decided that French weakness in face of the reoccupation of the demilitarized Rhineland zone had been a mistake and opposed giving way to Germany any further.

War probably was nearer at this moment than it had yet been at any time since the Armistice. Actually, nothing irremediable happened — nothing worse, in fact, than a crescendo of German press imprecations against Czech "violence" and British "duplicity." As at Nyon, when the British and French Governments took a determined and united stand and announced their intention of maintaining it regardless of consequences, there were no consequences.

By the end of May there was, on the surface, a general détente. Prague informed London and Paris that a formal invitation had been sent to Henlein to change his mind and negotiate on the basis of Hodža's Nationality Statute. Czech reservists had for the most part been sent home. The German press had quieted somewhat. June saw a series of talks between the Sudeten leaders and the Czech Government. On June 14 it was announced that both sides accepted as a basis for negotiations the draft Nationality Statute and a Memorandum, not as yet published, submitted June 7 by the Sudeten Party in amplification of the Karlsbad demands. The first round-table conference between cabinet members and Sudeten representatives took place June 23.

But actually^{*} the gulf between the two sides had already been seriously widened. The Sudetens in their Memorandum demanded that the State be reorganized into racial areas, that each area have virtual independence (meaning the establishment of a German, *i.e.* Nazi, state within the Republic), and that at the same time each have an equal voice in the affairs of the central government. Hodža would find it hard indeed to persuade the coalition parties to start along any such dangerous road. More important, Hitler, smarting under his rebuff in the May crisis,

^{*} As publication of the Sudeten Memorandum revealed on July 19.

had taken "serious measures" to ensure that there should be no further interference in his projects in the east. Several months later he revealed in his great Nuremberg speech how on May 28 he had given orders to increase the German air force and immediately start extending the fortifications in the west.

The atmosphere obviously began changing following a visit by Henlein to Hitler on July 9. German press and radio attacks on the Czechs were resumed. Deputy Leader Frank of the Sudeten Party said the negotiations which had been going on were not "real" but were merely reconnoitering. About this time word began spreading — cause or result of the stiffening Sudeten position? — that the determination shown in London and Paris in May had again given way to nervousness and vacillation. News of the new German armaments was spreading. England was supposed to have notified France that she could not be expected to go beyond the blow-hot-blow-cold position taken by Chamberlain on March 24, and that the common front presented to Germany during the May crisis was to be counted an exception and not a precedent. In consequence, it came to be believed generally in inner governmental circles throughout Europe that France might not feel able to carry through her promises of help to Czechoslovakia in some new test of strength. This was particularly the case in the capitals of smaller states delicately poised on the fence separating the two great ideological camps. In Belgrade, for example, Premier Stoyadinovitch found means to let President Beneš know that he thought the zero hour had come when Czechoslovakia must follow Yugoslavia's example and make the best terms possible with the new dominant forces in Europe.⁹ The reply was that Czechoslovakia had a firm alliance with France, that she had profited from it in the past by receiving French loans and political support, that she considered she was performing a useful European function in serving as a bridge between Paris and Moscow, and that she would continue to rely on the word of her friends. Prime Minister Daladier on July 12 took occasion to repeat that France considered her solemn engagements towards Czechoslovakia sacred and beyond dispute.

⁹ The first intimation that Stoyadinovitch would approve such a development in Czechoslovak policy came during the Little Entente meeting in the spring of 1937, following the signature of the Italo-Yugoslav Treaty. Then on Easter Day, 1938, a leading article in the Belgrade newspaper *Vreme*, the director of which is Stoyadinovitch's brother, pointed out the wisdom of Yugoslavia's course vis-à-vis Italy and implied that Czechoslovakia would be wise to adopt a similar attitude toward Germany.

III. NUREMBERG

Just a week after Premier Daladier had stated once again the continuing vitality of the Franco-Czech alliance the British King and Queen arrived in France on a much-heralded visit of state. On Monday, July 18, on the eve of setting out for Paris with his Sovereigns, Lord Halifax had received Hitler's personal deputy, Captain Wiedemann. The precise nature of their conversation is of course unknown. But it seems to be a fact that before starting for France, Lord Halifax sounded out Prague as to whether a British adviser would be acceptable in connection with the Sudeten dispute. Britain intimated that if the offer were not accepted, the fact that it had been made and rejected would be published. The inference was that the British public would thereupon demand that their government wash its hands entirely of all risks in connection with the Czech problem. To excuse what otherwise might have seemed interference in the domestic affairs of another state, the British Minister in Prague referred to President Beneš's suggestion, made in the spring while the German press was telling of Czech "atrocities" in the Sudetenland, that British observers be sent to the spot to ascertain for themselves that the German allegations were false; and indeed at that time the British staff in Prague was augmented so that this might be done. Using this as a precedent, London now asked Prague to accept an adviser or arbitrator in the whole Sudeten affair. While in Paris, Lord Halifax had a long private conversation with Daladier and Bonnet, much commented on at the time. None of the permanent officials of either foreign office was present — not even a stenographer. Perhaps this secret conference planned the procedure of the Runciman Mission in detail. France declined a British suggestion to participate in the mission. To do so might make Czechoslovakia worry about the fidelity of her great ally; and the impression might also be given that France did not have full confidence in *her* great ally.

Perhaps President Beneš felt that the manner in which he was asked to receive Lord Runciman constituted polite blackmail. But besides having no real alternative to acceptance, he probably saw compensations, for the plan promised to commit England much more definitely to participation in Danubian affairs. He could not have foreseen that the rôle actually played by Lord Runciman (announcement of whose mission was made in London

on July 25) would be little by little to whittle down the Czech position until the Government could no longer present a determined and unified front against any change in the fundamental position taken by England and France at the London meeting of April 28 — namely that Prague ought to do everything possible to satisfy the wishes of its German citizens but that it was not to be expected to go beyond reforms within the framework of the Constitution.

A revealing statement was made by Chamberlain in Parliament the day after the announcement of the Runciman Mission. Replying to a criticism by Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Prime Minister denied that he had been “hustling the Czech Government,” and said, “The very opposite is the truth.” He continued: “Our anxiety has been rather lest the Czechoslovakian Government should be too hasty in dealing with a situation of such delicacy that it was most desirable that the two sides should not get into a position where they were set, and unable to have any further give-and-take between them.” Sir Archibald’s information was a few days out of date. The Germans had been voicing impatience and Chamberlain had been hustling the Czechs before it was decided to send Runciman to Prague. Thereafter time was needed to break down Czech resistance from within. Inside of two months the British Minister in Prague and his French colleague were asking for a midnight audience with President Beneš in order to exact from him acquiescence forthwith in Hitler’s complete demands — complete, that is, as known on that date!

On the day Runciman started for Prague, an American correspondent in London, Mr. Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., noted that though the May 21 crisis had perhaps served as a warning to Germany it also had put Chamberlain in a strategically stronger position vis-à-vis Prague; he now could say that as Britain had stood by Czechoslovakia in one crisis Czechoslovakia must reciprocate by making terms with the Sudetens before another developed. Mr. Kuhn wrote: “The dramatic weekend of May 21 has left the ball at Mr. Chamberlain’s feet; it is possible for him to lose the game for the Czechoslovak Republic.”¹⁰

This aspect of the matter must have occurred to Hitler, and may have led Captain Wiedemann to tell Lord Halifax in July that his master accepted the idea of sending someone like Lord Runciman to Prague. Did the development of German policy

¹⁰ *New York Times*, August 3, 1938.

from now on proceed according to prearranged schedule? Or did Chamberlain's admission that the Sudeten dispute must not be dealt with hastily bring home suddenly to Hitler the possibility of a British "plot" to postpone any crisis until too late in the autumn for his troops to march? At any rate, only a day or so after Runciman's arrival in Prague on August 3, information began reaching the British Government that German reservists were being called up, that men in service were to be held beyond their normal period, that vast armies of laborers were being conscripted for work on German fortifications in the west, and that military authorities were preparing to conscript civilian goods and services. We now know (speech of Mr. Chamberlain in Parliament, September 28) that in these circumstances the British Ambassador in Berlin was instructed in the middle of August to point out that these abnormal measures must be interpreted as threatening Czechoslovakia and might compel the Government of that country to take precautionary measures on its side; and that this would destroy all chance of successful mediation by Lord Runciman and "perhaps endanger the peace of every one of the Great Powers of Europe." He was sharply rebuffed. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop refused to discuss the military measures mentioned, and expressed his opinion that British efforts in Prague "had only served to increase Czech intransigence."

At Lanark, on August 27, Sir John Simon made a speech which had been heralded as intended to clarify the British position. If that was the intention it was altered. Sir John merely drew notice to what Chamberlain had said on March 24, and added a few ambiguous similes of his own. The March 24 statement, the reader will recall, had said that questions involving peace and war are not settled by legal obligations alone, and that if war broke out, "it would be unlikely to be confined to those who had assumed such obligations." As the reader will also recall, the statement in addition minimized the possibility that the League in a moment of crisis would attempt to protect small states from aggression, and — to the cheers of Conservative Members of Parliament — specifically withheld any "prior guarantee" to Czechoslovakia. The crisis now was at hand. The British Government still did not seem to know how to meet it. It had dropped its pose of optimism; it was preparing the Home Fleet to proceed to its fighting stations in Northern Scotland; but if it had already made up its mind precisely what it would do if Hitler adopted a com-

pletely irreconcilable position at the approaching Nuremberg Party Congress it was ashamed to take either the British public or the Czechoslovak Government into its confidence.

Simultaneously with Simon's speech at Lanark, Hitler started a tour of German frontier fortifications, carrying him from opposite Belgium down to opposite Basle and thence eastward along the Swiss border. Back in Berchtesgaden, he received Henlein on September 1 and again on September 2. Between those two conferences Henlein apparently paid a flying visit home, and the communiqué issued after the second interview said he had been able to give the Fuehrer "elucidations." The subject of all this fevered discussion was the compromise on the basis of cantonal self-government which had been worked out by Lord Runciman and Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin in consultation with President Beneš, and which had been presented to Henlein on August 28. The Czech tactical position was bad. President Beneš could not even tell the mass of his Sudeten citizens how far he wanted to go to meet their wishes for fear that if he did he would lose the last chance of securing the collaboration of the Sudeten leaders by impairing the possibility of their later on announcing a glorious triumph. Beneš was said to feel that a proclamation detailing the government proposals would close all line of retreat for Henlein, besides leaving nothing which later on he could point to as the fruits of victory. He therefore opposed making public the full Czech offer until after negotiations had been formally renewed.

As by now Henlein obviously was only a messenger boy, Lord Runciman considered it necessary to know whether the August 28 project would receive the seal of Hitler's approval. The most interesting thing about Henlein's resulting visits to Berchtesgaden was that they marked the transformation of Lord Runciman's rôle from that of mediator between two sets of Czech citizens to the rôle of mediator between the Czechoslovak Government and Chancellor Hitler. Did this happen on instructions from London, or did it merely seem to Lord Runciman a good idea to "bring Hitler in"? On the whole, foreign newspapermen in Berlin and Prague thought the latter. But however the inquiry originated, the reply which Henlein carried back to the British negotiators was most unfavorable. Hitler interpreted the approach as a sign of weakness and decided on a showdown. This became plain from Sudeten speeches and, of course more important, from the

tone of the German press. One frank Sudeten deputy stated that the demands which his party had so far made were merely preliminary and indicated that the more Sudeten demands were granted the more would be produced.

The Czechoslovak Government nevertheless decided to go further, to make a new offer. They knew that many of the Sudetens — including some of the deputies — were much more moderate than Henlein and would really prefer autonomy inside the Republic to annexation to Hitler's Reich. They of course realized that in making one concession after another to the Sudetens while maintaining a strong stand against Hitler they were continuing a risky play; but the time for any other sort of tactics seemed past. Months back, they had decided on their policy: satisfaction of minority grievances; a strong stand against Nazi interference from outside. Everything about the Nazi political, economic and social system was antipathetic to them. They knew that an attitude of complaisance towards it, carried far enough, would bring them trade rewards and perhaps the same sort of temporary political security which Yugoslavia had won by making her peace with Italy. They had decided to do without those benefits. They realized that Germany's fortification of the Rhine would make it more difficult than formerly for the French Army to give them help effectively and promptly. But they knew the efficiency, gallantry and fidelity of the French High Command; also that it still considered vital what Foch had considered vital, namely the erection and maintenance of a strong bastion in the Bohemian mountains, recognized by all technicians as the military key to Eastern Europe. They knew France had nearly a million men under arms, that the British Home Fleet was about to assemble at its fighting stations in northern Scotland. They were being called on for greater sacrifices, the stakes were getting higher. But Beneš felt that he must make every possible concession, in the same spirit in which Serbia in July 1914 had accepted nearly the whole of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. Would the Czechs then not have nearly the whole world on their side, as opinion everywhere had rallied to the Serbs? He knew all this was something of a gamble. But he felt the gamble was no more desperate than it had been in March or in May or at the time of Lord Runciman's arrival. He realized that in average English eyes Czechoslovakia represented nothing vital. He had read Chamberlain's defeatist statements with profound anxiety. But

he believed that by going to the limit at British and French urging to satisfy the Sudetens he had put his country in an impregnable moral position. He did not see how in the end England could fail to say: "You have demonstrated that you want to meet any just grievances of your German citizens. You cannot be asked to go further. Stand here. We will back France if she backs you. Others will back you too." Of the French attitude, assuming British support, he presumably had no doubts.

The Czechs believed that, in the circumstances outlined, not only would France and Soviet Russia stand with them as they were treaty-bound to do, but Poland, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Turkey also. Italy they counted on to take up a bargaining neutral rôle, as in 1914. Even if Jugoslavia did the same, she would at the least keep Hungary quiet. But the Czechs were convinced that a military decision would never be necessary; that Hitler was a blackmailer much more than fighter; that in face of the coalition which could be formed against him he would not dream of making war. However, should he resort to arms in the circumstances which they foresaw, they were confident that he was doomed, and fairly quickly, no matter how much damage German airplanes might meanwhile inflict on foreign populations. They knew they would suffer first, and more than anyone else, if resistance led to this terrible result. For themselves, they preferred that risk to putting themselves by their own act irrevocably into Hitler's power.

The new Czechoslovak plan handed the Sudeten leaders on September 6, often called the "Fourth Plan," was intricate and, like all these successive demands and plans, is hard to summarize briefly. It provided that all nationalities should share proportionately in state offices and in state enterprises, monopolies, institutions and other organizations. This aim was to be realized gradually over a ten-year period, since the immediate wholesale dismissal of present officials was obviously impossible even if trained persons were immediately available to take their place, which they were not. The same proportionate principle would be observed in placing all government orders for supplies. A loan of a billion crowns would be raised immediately by the Government to aid areas badly hit by the crisis; and of this sum 700,000,000 would go to German districts. Maintenance of public order would be divided between the State police and the local police. The Language Laws would be modified to give full and universal

equality with the Czechoslovak language to German and the other minority languages. The principle of national self-government would be established through a system of cantons. Public administration would be assured by State and local organs. The local organs would be elected by general, equal, direct and secret suffrage. They would deal with all matters not concerning the community of the State. The territorial basis of the regional organs would follow the lines of the declared nationality of the population, with due regard, however, to geographical and economic considerations and means of communication.¹¹

Lord Runciman considered that this Fourth Plan "embodied almost all the requirements of the Karlsbad 8 Points, and with a little clarification and extension could have been made to cover them in their entirety." But, as he pointed out later in his report, that would not at all "suit the policy of the Sudeten extremists."¹² It so little suited Henlein that without waiting to receive the text he departed on the morning of September 6 to attend the Nuremberg Congress as Hitler's guest. Mr. Gedye, cabling the *New York Times*, reported the Henleinists as determined to continue stalling until after Hitler had declared himself publicly and irrevocably at Nuremberg. The Prague correspondent of the *London Times*, on the other hand, reported "strong hopes" in Government circles and in the Runciman Mission that the Germans would treat the plan as a basis for serious negotiation. He added: "Both London and Paris have given the plan their blessing and advised both sides to agree on it."

On the same day (September 7) that the *Times* correspondent reported British and French governmental support for a plan to reorganize the Czechoslovak State by cantons, the same paper suggested editorially that "it might be worth while for the Czechoslovak Government to consider whether they should exclude altogether the project, which has found favor in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous State by the secession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation with which they are united by race." Such a great storm was raised by this proposal, coming at so delicate a moment in the negotiations, from a paper identified with the so-called Cliveden clique, that the Government hastened to an-

¹¹ Based on the official summary, published in the *London Times*, September 10, 1938.

¹² Lord Runciman's report of September 21 to the Prime Minister, Document No. 1 in the British "White Paper" (Cmd. 5847), published September 28.

nounce there was no connection between its own policy and the course suggested to Czechoslovakia by Mr. Geoffrey Dawson. But the harm had been done. The defeatists in France had been given new ammunition. So had Ribbentrop. Hitler had been shown that he could count on the insistence, in season and out, of the Britishers who had urged Chamberlain to adopt and follow through to its logical conclusion what they called a "realistic" policy of appeasement and peace.

In plain fact, however, the Sudetens had already decided to act in the sense foreseen by Mr. Gedye. They found their occasion in a small fracas which occurred September 7 in the town of Moravská Ostrava. Nobody was hurt, but the affair served as a pretext for breaking off negotiations. Henlein rushed back from Nuremberg to Czechoslovakia, then once more to Nuremberg for further orders.

As September 12 approached — the date set for Hitler's Nuremberg speech — the situation was full of contradictions. Was it to be *Der Tag* at last? That Mussolini thought so is indicated by a communiqué of the *Informazione Diplomatica* which could hardly have been issued with any motive except to prepare Italy for a rôle of neutrality. The communiqué stated that though Italy favored autonomy for the minorities in Czechoslovakia, she never had suggested that they ought not to continue forming part of the fabric of the Czech State. The Rome correspondent of the London *Times* commented on "the impression conveyed during recent weeks that the Italian Government, while giving moral support to the German claims, wishes to hold aloof from the dispute." Nor did any mobilization of troops take place in Italy. In Czechoslovakia, President Beneš made a level-headed broadcast describing the new minorities plan as "conceived in the spirit of true democracy." "It guarantees the individual against the whole," he said, "the minority against the majority, freedom of thought, nationality rights, and equitable conditions for political, cultural and economic activities." And direct contact was resumed on September 10 between Prime Minister Hodža and two leading Sudeten deputies. On the other hand, rioting broke out again in various parts of the Sudetenland. In Germany, Goering, trying evidently to anticipate the note that he thought Hitler would strike, denounced "those ridiculous dwarfs in Prague," and wittily, in the circumstances, elaborated on the theme that the Czechs are "devoid of culture." The British Cabinet was reported

split, one group, supported by the high permanent officials of the Foreign Office, favoring a plain statement that Czechoslovakia had gone far enough in her concessions; the other wishing to continue the old policy of "letting events take their course." In France, the Government announced that its military forces were ready — fleet equipped and provisioned, 1,500,000 men under arms. Both the *C.G.T.*, speaking for five million French workers, and the British Trades Union Congress, representing a similar number of British workers, asked their respective governments to stand firm, and promised coöperation.

It was in these circumstances that the British Foreign Office on September 11 invited foreign correspondents to assemble there for enlightenment regarding the British position. The announcement made to them was detailed and surprisingly strong. As reported by the Associated Press, it called attention to the Chamberlain and Simon statements of March 24 and August 27 respectively, and continued: "It was clear from the first statement that they [the British Government] contemplated the possibility not only of other countries but also of this country being involved and that Great Britain could not stand aside from a general conflict in which the integrity of France might be menaced." Across Downing Street, Chamberlain simultaneously was receiving representatives of the British press. His own interpretation of his position from March 24 to date must have been far less firm than the interpretation presented at the Foreign Office to the foreign newspapermen. At any rate, these latter almost at once received hurried word that no mention should be made of the Foreign Office in connection with the story just given them; they should say merely that the expression of view came "from a responsible source." The trained staff of the Foreign Office, and with them one faction of the Cabinet, had been defeated; Chamberlain "realism" prevailed.

The next day Chancellor Hitler committed himself to seeing the Sudeten issue through to a victorious conclusion. "I say," he shouted to the Nuremberg crowd, "that if these tortured creatures cannot obtain rights and assistance by themselves, they can obtain both from us." He avoided mentioning a plebiscite, but invoked the law of self-determination. As Chamberlain pointed out later (September 28), "for the first time, this speech promised the support of the Reich to the Sudeten Germans if they could not obtain satisfaction for themselves, and for the first time it publicly

raised the issue of self-determination." Hitler expressed the hope that "foreign statesmen" would be convinced that what he said was "not mere words." And to reinforce the implicit threat he announced that half a million men were at work on the western fortifications — "the most gigantic that ever existed" — and that behind them stood a people in arms.

IV. BERCHTESGADEN AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH PLAN

With Nuremberg the crisis proper begins, though with lines tending to form differently from what might have been the case if the balance in London had not tipped in the afternoon of September 11 onto the side of caution and retreat.

Poland still was on the fence; but Colonel Beck felt himself strengthened as against his pro-French and pro-British colleagues. Insistent demands began appearing in the Polish press that the final settlement in Czechoslovakia must not subject the Polish minority there to "discrimination" in comparison with the German minority. The Polish appraisal of how events probably would move was evidently being modified rapidly from the opinion indicated on September 9 by a paper as friendly to the Government as the *Kurjer Polski*, which then could still write in a strong tone about the necessity of understanding and opposing Germany's "game of blackmail and menace" without another moment's delay. Blackmail, it began to seem, was going to work again; and Poland was not above taking a cut on the side.

Till Nuremberg, inner circles in both camps had put down Italy as potentially a neutral. She now moved over towards Germany. Mussolini's policy is understandable. It was incumbent on him to keep repeating that he was entirely, absolutely and irrevocably with Hitler — up to the moment when he spoke and acted in a precisely contrary sense. There could be no grey zone of indecision in an affair like that! The judgment that at least until Nuremberg Mussolini intended to be neutral is obviously hard to substantiate. It can be based only on personal information, on comparatively small concrete indications, on a realization of how galling it had been for him to be reduced to the rôle of brilliant second, and on an understanding of the historical background which made the Italian people increasingly restless after they saw their traditional foes arrive in force on the Brenner. But when Hitler took a strong stand at Nuremberg, and England and France proceeded to take a weak one, Mussolini decided there

would not be a war. He must give up his idea of being a neutral, receiving offers from both sides and benefits from the winner. In a long period of blackmail one side only would have any concrete payment to offer for his services: Germany. On September 12 the *Tribuna* labelled the firm statement of policy just issued from the British Foreign Office as "diplomatic bluff." The next day *Informazione Diplomatica* showed the new trend still more clearly by retracting its earlier stand and calling on Beneš to give up the Sudeten areas to Germany if he wished to maintain peace.

Such were the two chief results in Europe generally of Hitler's Nuremberg speech and the manner in which it was received in London and Paris — a weakening of Polish confidence that the Allies would resist Germany; and a strengthening of the Berlin-Rome axis. Rumania's fundamental interests had not changed, nor her resolve to allow the passage of Russian troops going to the aid of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia still could not conceivably be taken into a war in partnership with Germany and Hungary against Czechoslovakia, France and England; Premier Stoyadinovitch would be thrown into the River Danube if he attempted anything so repugnant to every Serb and Croat tradition. With Rumania, Yugoslavia still could be counted on to keep Hungary quiet. She even might help at the right moment, for Belgrade had felt German pressure more and more uncomfortably since the annexation of Austria. Of course, if war did actually come, Poland might still at the eleventh hour revise her policy once again. Even, at the last moment, so might Italy.

September 13 was an important day. The Nazi rioting which had begun in the Sudetenland two days earlier reached such a pitch of violence that the Czechoslovak Government decided it was revolution and declared martial law in the affected districts. Lord Runciman has revealed that the incidents were, in his own words, "provoked and instigated" by the Sudeten extremists to prevent the resumption of negotiations, scheduled by Dr. Kundt for this very date, precisely as the Moravská Ostrava incident had been used by them to excuse the suspension of negotiations a week earlier. Responsible American journalists, among them Mr. John T. Whitaker of the *Chicago Daily News*, gave first-hand testimony that the Government did not permit Czech troops to help the police deal with the armed rebellion fomented in the Sudetenland by *Gestapo* agents and Henlein "legionnaires" from across the border. To this wise

restraint the foreign observers attributed the fact that the rebellion, having little support among the populace, petered out without affording Hitler a pretext for open intervention.

Prague's declaration of martial law brought an ultimatum from Sudeten headquarters — Henlein himself was in Germany with Hitler — that the measure must be revoked by midnight. A deadlock ensued, for though the Government said they would consider revoking martial law as soon as order had been reestablished they declined to do so under existing conditions. Sudeten leaders announced that from now forward they stood for "self-determination" — the Nuremberg instead of the Karlsbad formula.

Learning of the Sudeten ultimatum, the rioting in the Sudeten area, the rupture of negotiations, and finally Henlein's flight across the frontier to escape arrest for treason, Paris begged London somehow or other to establish direct contact with Hitler. London did not need persuasion. Chamberlain has told us that at the moment of Henlein's flight Hitler "was contemplating an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia." On September 13 there had been a meeting in London of the Prime Minister with the Defense Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff to marshal all Britain's naval and military might to meet the threat of a sudden Nazi coup. But again, as throughout August and the first half of September, the French Government failed utterly to understand its strong position vis-à-vis Britain. French defenses were fully manned. The French General Staff was confident of the Army's ability to fulfill its tasks. But the Government hesitated to give firm effect to the April agreement, the keystone of which had been the assumption that France would discharge her military obligations to Czechoslovakia in case of need. That agreement placed responsibility for the final decision on France. The Cabinet was split. Bonnet was against ordering the strong diplomatic stand favored by Paul Reynaud and others, counselled by the General Staff, and dictated by the whole post-war history of France. Daladier, torn between two rival conceptions, shirked compelling him to do so.

For France, this decision was critical. It set Chamberlain free to do what he had not been free to do in the spring — take positive steps to meet Hitler's demands. He thought that it would be enough to accept the Nuremberg formula of self-determination, *i.e.* annexation in a nice wrapping. Without delay he opened communication with Berlin, and on the evening of September 14

issued a laconic communiqué that he would leave for Berchtesgaden the next morning, the result of Hitler's acceptance of his proposal to "come across" for a talk "with a view to trying to find a peaceful solution." It was a plan which, he subsequently stated, he had had in mind for some time "as a last resort." Even the British Ambassador had not been able to reach Hitler personally at Nuremberg, though certain unofficial Britishers were more fortunate. He would go himself, man to man.

The Prime Minister went to Munich by air, the first time in his 69 years he had been up in a plane, and thence by train to Berchtesgaden. What were Hitler's thoughts as he watched his own private motor, containing the British Prime Minister, draw up at the gates of the Berghof? Probably that those who had always advised him to be violent, to take risks, were right, that Neurath, Schacht and the other "moderates" were old-fashioned, wrong, and that Fritsch, Beck and the rest of the "Potsdam crowd" of generals who wished to avoid the risks of war were cowards or fools. A colorless communiqué at the end of the meeting merely announced that Chamberlain would return to London to consult his advisers (he had taken with him neither the Foreign Secretary nor the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government nor any leading Foreign Office official), and that discussions would be resumed in a few days. For the moment the public knew nothing positive as to what had happened. Had Chamberlain gone over to give Hitler a categorical warning or an ultimatum? This was the first idea. For if he had made up his mind to capitulate, would he have flown over so spectacularly, would he not have done it at home in a corner? We now know that he thought he had "come across" to chat about a compromise. But as he approached Hitler, hand outstretched, he found a pistol at his temple. The Sudeten Germans were to "return" to the Reich under the principle of self-determination; Hitler would help them do so, if necessary; "and he declared categorically that, rather than wait, he would be prepared to risk a world war."¹⁸ Hitler threatened war so frankly that Chamberlain asked him why he had allowed him to travel so far, "since I was evidently wasting my time." The Fuehrer replied that if Britain would accept the self-determination formula he was willing to discuss ways and means to carry it out; and he agreed to refrain from active hostilities until Chamberlain could talk with his

¹⁸ Chamberlain speech of September 28.

ministers — provided nothing happened meanwhile in Czechoslovakia to “force his hand.” So on this basis Chamberlain started back to London the next day, September 16. Landing at Croydon in the afternoon he announced that he would return to Germany in a few days and that when he did so Hitler had promised to “come half way” to meet him. So he drove off, cheers in his ears, to talk with Runciman and the “Inner Circle” of the Cabinet and to be received by the King.

As the Cabinet met the next day the press was full of rumors. Already the prevalent opinion was that Chamberlain had been so overcome by Hitler’s vehemence that he had given up hope of trying to reconcile a program of compromise with a program of peace. Hitler must have the substance of what he wanted, and promptly. The rumor was that in order to preserve peace Chamberlain had adopted the famous *Times* proposal of September 7 — the partition of Czechoslovakia — though with a counterbalancing feature added, namely a guarantee of the resulting new Czechoslovak frontiers. Was it to be a direct and immediately effective guarantee or an offer to enter into some sort of undertaking like the one which had shown itself merely so much window-dressing in the case of Austria? On this subject as on everything else the Cabinet was reported to be divided. But the “Inner Circle,” if divided, was divided three to one — Chamberlain, Hoare and Simon against Halifax, titular Foreign Secretary, true, but a modest Christian gentleman, no match for such a dogged “realist” as Chamberlain and for the two statesmen who had filled his shoes at the Foreign Office before him and perhaps hoped by doing so again to vindicate their “realistic” abdications before Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Ethiopia.

In Paris the Cabinet was rumored to be even more sharply divided than before Chamberlain’s trip. Daladier himself was now said to have set a limit on concessions to Hitler. Some Cabinet members, in the words of the Paris correspondent of the *Times*, advocated concessions, “with or without the consent of the Czechoslovak Government,” far beyond what other members like Reynaud or Mandel felt “either honorable or desirable.” Nobody mentioned Foreign Minister Bonnet among the ones disquieted at the way the “program of appeasement” was developing. On the contrary, his rôle throughout was to press for surrender. Perhaps his determination to carry it through at whatever cost sprang merely from nervousness and caution. He had gone to

Geneva on September 11 for hurried talks with Foreign Minister Litvinov and the Rumanian Foreign Minister. That was before Berchtesgaden. No neutral foreign correspondent then in Geneva reports that the position of Rumania at that time, though cautious (as events proved her right to be), was not satisfactory from the French viewpoint. She informed both Soviet Russia and France that in case of a general war she would fulfill her duty as a League member in permitting the passage of Russian troops en route to the assistance of Czechoslovakia if that state — her ally in the Little Entente — became the victim of aggression within the terms of the Covenant. The same correspondents agree that the course advocated by Litvinov to Bonnet was clear: resistance to Germany in execution of the French and Soviet plan and in accord with the League Covenant, and immediate joint consultations by the French, Russian and Czechoslovak General Staffs as to how best to organize that resistance. As long ago as May the *Manchester Guardian* had reported that Litvinov was complaining to Bonnet in Geneva about French reluctance to undertake military conversations. Litvinov would naturally urge the same course now. He had built up his whole foreign policy on coöperation with the western democracies, he had worked hard to strengthen the Geneva system, and he stood (and stands) to lose his prestige and perhaps his head as a result of the failure of his policy. Did Bonnet faithfully and fully report the results of his talks with the Rumanian Foreign Minister to his cabinet colleagues in Paris? As to Russia, did he report, as now his friends allege, that the only concrete help Litvinov could promise was 200 airplanes and one division in 20 days? Or did he report much more important promises, and perhaps even a Soviet statement (since corroborated from German sources) that 500 Russian planes already were installed on the Czech flying fields long prepared for that purpose? There are many critics who say he simply emphasized his fears, shared by many Frenchmen and Britishers, that Stalin's purge had reduced the Soviet Army to chaos and that whatever Foreign Minister Litvinov might say was merely his own unsupported opinion.

On Sunday morning, September 18, the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister flew over to London and were in consultation all day and all evening with Messrs. Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon and Hoare. Just after midnight a communiqué announced that they were in agreement as to the course to follow. What that

course was to be the Czech Government foresaw only too well. Its representatives in London presented a note during the afternoon reminding the negotiators that Czechoslovakia's life was at stake in the discussions and warning that she would not accept responsibility for decisions reached in her absence, even by her alleged friends. Mussolini meanwhile had begun gallivanting around Italy, emitting verbal skyrockets twice daily. The Sudeten "legion" was gathered in Germany along the Czech frontier. A tornado of provocation and abuse was streaming out against Czechoslovakia from the German radio and press.

Through all this the Czech people and government held their nerve. In the Sudetenland, contrary to German descriptions of a "Czech hell," newspaper observers reported things quiet to the point of dullness. Czech radio and press restricted themselves to dignified statements of fact and to the texts of statements from all sources. Premier Hodža gave over the radio an outline of the Government's position. Repression of revolt, he said, was not persecution. "We have only fulfilled the task which naturally devolved upon an organized state system." As to the demand for a plebiscite in which Hitler's demand for annexation was now concealed, he said that if it had been practicable as a means of settling the complicated ethnographic problems of the areas in question it would have been used by the Peace Conference; but it would solve nothing and would merely produce a new set of problems of the same sort already in existence. Despite Henlein's refusal to negotiate, despite attempts at insurrection, the Government would continue trying to reach an understanding with all minority groups, and especially with the Sudeten Germans. The London *Times* rather deprecated this speech as too "uncompromising." As the editor wrote the word he knew of the decision already reached at Downing Street.

On Monday morning the blow feared by the Czechs fell. France, Czechoslovakia's ally, and Great Britain, whose representative had been leading the negotiations in Prague, presented a note at Prague bluntly informing the Government that the maintenance of European peace and what they interpreted as Czechoslovakia's own vital interests demanded that "the districts mainly inhabited by Sudeten Deutsch" must now be transferred to the Reich. Chamberlain and Daladier were dictating to Beneš what Hitler had dictated to Chamberlain.

Prague was told that the territory in question might be handed over either directly or as the result of a plebiscite. It probably would have to include areas where the Germans numbered more than 50 percent of the inhabitants. The two governments hoped to be able to arrange adjustments of the frontiers, where advisable, by some international body, "including a Czech representative." That same international body might also be charged to take up the question of the possible exchange of populations "on the basis of right to opt within some specified time limit." There followed the famous British offer to provide the Czechoslovak Government with some assurance of future security. It read: "Accordingly, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared, as a contribution to the pacification of Europe, to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. One of the principal conditions of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of existing treaties which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character." As Prime Minister Chamberlain wished to resume conversations with Hitler by Wednesday the 21st, "and earlier if possible," a reply was asked "at the earliest possible moment."¹⁴

V. THE CZECH PROTEST AND ACCEPTANCE

Prague, since its experience with Lord Runciman, and having seen the results of Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden, had by now lost hope and confidence in London. But what about Paris? Had Foreign Minister Bonnet's colleagues in the French Cabinet been told the details of the Anglo-French note? President Beneš was not at all sure, nor did he know whether French friends like M. Herriot had been informed and had been persuaded to give their consent. There was difficulty in establishing communication with the Czech Legation in Paris, in charge of one of the country's most experienced and able diplomats, Stefan Osusky. Telephone connection across Germany (and France) was unsatisfactory; telegraphic communication was delayed; all through the discussions of September 20 Beneš had to do without counsel or advice from the personal friends in France with whom he had worked so often at Geneva. When the full story finally reached

¹⁴ For the text of the Anglo-French plan see the "White Paper," Document No. 2.

M. Bonnet's colleagues it was too late. Several of them were said to be furious. None was furious enough to resign.

After having sat all day with President Beneš and the heads of the coalition parties, the Czechoslovak Council of Ministers late in the afternoon of Tuesday, September 20, sent their reply to London and Paris. This note would normally have found place, one would suppose, in the British "White Paper" published the following week. That "White Paper" led off with the report submitted to Chamberlain by Runciman, dated September 21. This in itself was a curious chronological arrangement, and seems to give some credence to the suggestion made by American commentators that the whole Runciman report — submitted after Chamberlain's visit to Berchtesgaden, after the Anglo-French conference in London where capitulation to Hitler was decided, and after the peremptory Anglo-French demands of September 19 — was an attempt to provide *ex post facto* a convincing background for those developments. The natural document to follow the Anglo-French note would have been the reply to that note. It was a long, reasoned and strong reply, and would have made painful reading for the British and French public. It was omitted, and so far as I know has not yet been printed.

The principal points made in the note, of which I have a copy, are as follows:

The proposed partition of Czechoslovakia was contrary not only to that state's interests but also to the interests of its friends and allies and to the interests of peace in general. The Czechoslovak view had not been heard regarding the plan, though the Government had given notice it could not accept an arrangement made in its absence. Czechoslovakia was an organized democracy, and a decision like the one now demanded could not be taken except in consultation with parliament. Mutilation of the country would throw it "sooner or later under the absolute influence of Germany." The equilibrium in Europe would be altered, which would produce "consequences of wide import for all other states and notably also for France." A guarantee from the Great Powers would be greatly appreciated, once the present nationalities conflict had been regulated. Czechoslovakia had, "on the insistence of her friends," gone very far in negotiations with the Sudetens. One of the British Government's own declarations had emphasized that the solution to be found must lie "within the framework of the Czechoslovak constitution." Many Sudetens

had welcomed the Government's last proposals as genuine and sincere. Despite the revolt stirred up from outside among a section of the Sudeten population, the Government was still ready to give effect to those proposals. Czechoslovakia respected treaties — with friends, with members of the League of Nations, and with other peoples. She asked for application of the Treaty of Arbitration made between herself and Germany on October 16, 1925, "which many declarations of the present German Government have recognized as still being in effect." Czechoslovakia was ready to honor her signature to that treaty, and would abide by the result. This course would avoid conflict and bring a solution rapidly and in harmony with the dignity of the interested parties. To France she addressed a particular appeal — to France, with whom she "always had been bound by esteem and devoted friendship as well as by an alliance to which no Government and no Czechoslovak individual would ever be a traitor." She had an attachment and traditional friendship for Great Britain, growing out of their mutual efforts on behalf of peace. The Czechoslovak Government was sure the British and French Governments meant well, and thanked them. But "it addresses to them once again a supreme appeal and begs them to reconsider their point of view," in Czechoslovakia's interest but no less in their own and in the interest of the peaceful and healthy evolution of Europe. "In these crucial moments it is not merely the fate of Czechoslovakia which is at stake, but that of other nations as well, and notably that of France."

The Czech-German Treaty of Arbitration to which the Czechoslovak Government referred was made in 1925 as part of the Locarno settlement. When Hitler denounced the Treaty of Locarno he stated that the subsidiary treaties would continue in vigor. But apparently the suggestion of bringing the Arbitration Treaty into play to meet just the sort of emergency for which it was designed seemed in the jittery condition of British and French nerves too hazardous to merit serious consideration. With hardly more than a moment's interval the pressure on Prague was resumed and in much more peremptory fashion.

Before describing this new pressure we must pause for a glance at the Runciman report. The excuse for such an apparently unnatural digression is that ever since his return from Prague on September 16 Lord Runciman had been in constant consultation with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and in these fateful days his

views naturally influenced the judgments of his Government. What were those views? His report tells us.¹⁵

The report falls into several distinct parts. The first summarizes Lord Runciman's attempts to evolve a compromise, first between Henlein's "eight points" and the Government's draft Nationality Statute, then between those same Henlein demands and the so-called "Fourth Plan." He gives as his opinion that the Moravská Ostrava incident was exploited by the Sudetens as an excuse to break off the negotiations, and that the further incidents which occurred after the negotiations had been resumed were "provoked and instigated" by the Sudeten extremists for the same purpose. He states that all negotiations ended finally on the night of September 13, and that as "the dispute was no longer an internal one" his functions as a mediator were thereupon at an end. He places responsibility for the final break on Henlein and Frank.

Nevertheless, continues Lord Runciman, he has much sympathy with the German case. Czechoslovak rule in the Sudeten areas for the last twenty years, "though not actively oppressive and certainly not 'terroristic,' has been marked by tactlessness, lack of understanding, petty intolerance and discrimination." He cannot say how far the resultant Sudeten mistrust of leading Czech statesmen is merited. But other more concrete complaints he does consider justified, such as those growing out of the use of Czech officials in German districts, the settlement of Czech agricultural colonists amidst the German population following the Land Reform act, the reported preferment of Czechs to Germans in state work relief, etc.

At this point Lord Runciman makes some specific suggestions. As disturbances had died down by the time he left Prague he proposes that the Czechoslovak Government withdraw its police from the Sudeten area at once, thereby reducing the causes of wrangles and riots. Be it noted in passing that this suggestion seems incongruous with Lord Runciman's earlier statement that the disorders had been instigated by the Sudeten extremists. Withdrawal of the police would have left the non-Nazi population at the mercy of these extremists; while just across the border, as admitted by Lord Runciman, Henlein's armed legions were gathered, ready to move in at the first opportunity.

¹⁵ The report was in Chamberlain's hands on September 21. It was published in the "White Paper" on September 28.

Lord Runciman further proposes that the frontier districts "where the Sudeten population is in an important majority should be given full right of self-determination at once." He discourages a plebiscite as tending to prolong uncertainty. He notes that a "large number" of Germans would of course remain in Czechoslovakia, and a "certain number" of Czechs in areas transferred to Germany. For the Germans he recommends local autonomy on the lines of the "Fourth Plan." About the Czechs to be transferred to Germany he is silent; apparently they were to sink or swim as best they could in the Nazi sea, and the less said about them the better. His advice in this respect evidently commended itself to Chamberlain, for that was precisely the fate eventually reserved for the Czechs in Sudeten areas and for all the other political or racial minorities there. The Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia, a country whose twenty-year record for the treatment of minorities was the best in Europe, were much on Lord Runciman's mind. For almost a million Czechs, German liberals and "race enemies" whom he recommended turning over to Hitler, whose record for ferocious mistreatment of every opponent, active or passive, is without modern parallel, not a thought, not a line, not a word.

Runciman then turns to what he calls "the political side of the problem." How secure the integrity and security of the Czechoslovak Republic after she has made the sacrifices suggested? On the analogy of Switzerland, her policy should be "entirely neutral." He therefore recommends:

"(1) That those parties and persons in Czechoslovakia who have been deliberately encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czechoslovakia's neighbors should be forbidden by the Czechoslovak Government to continue their agitations; and that, if necessary, legal measures should be taken to bring such agitations to an end.

"(2) That the Czechoslovak Government should so remodel her foreign relations as to give assurances to her neighbors that she will in no circumstances attack them or enter into any aggressive action against them arising from obligations to other States.

"(3) That the principal Powers, acting in the interests of the peace of Europe, should give to Czechoslovakia guarantees of assistance in case of unprovoked aggression against her.

"(4) That a commercial treaty on preferential terms should be negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia if this seems advantageous to the economic interests of the two countries."

What Lord Runciman was in fact urging was that Czech-

oslovakia be required to abolish political liberties, suppress free speech and coördinate the press under a totalitarian régime; relinquish her ties with France and Soviet Russia; give up her responsibilities as a "grown up" member of the League of Nations; accept in return a guarantee by "the principal Powers," whoever they might be; and enter the German economic system. To keep order while this was being accomplished he suggested sending an international force into the Sudeten areas. A Commission under a neutral chairman would delimit the territory to be transferred to Germany and supervise details. As a last humiliation to the rump state remaining, he urged that the Sudeten Germans still scattered among its citizens be allotted "a permanent seat in the Czechoslovak Cabinet." A curious proposal to come from a private individual¹⁸ touching the future internal organization of a state which the Prime Minister of Great Britain was engaged in dissecting on the grounds of self-determination!

Such, then, were the views which Lord Runciman brought back with him from Prague. Or were they modified in the period between his return and the day he signed his report? Certainly they differed from what they had been in the second week of September, when he still approved the "Fourth Plan." Be that as it may, the tenor of the report as presented chimed in with Mr. Chamberlain's predispositions; and the recommendation smoothed the way for the actions which now became the inevitable sequel of the Chamberlain policy to date.

Our story has reached the evening of Tuesday, September 20. All day bitter resentment over "the great betrayal" had pervaded every section of Prague, from the anxious statesmen up in the old castle to the crowds swirling around the newspaper kiosks. Grim determination to resist, at whatever cost, if necessary even alone, had marked every official statement, every shout of defiance in the streets, every remark overheard by foreign newspapermen in any quarter, every quiet comment from Army headquarters. Now at 2:15 a.m. on Wednesday morning the British and French Ministers were hurrying up to the Hradčany to see the President. Talk at such an hour would not be about compromise. France and Britain either were against Czechoslovakia or for her. Could it be the latter? Maybe there still was time. What would the Ministers say? This, I am informed, is the substance of what they said:

¹⁸ It was not until October 31 that Lord Runciman was named Lord President of the Council.

1. Great Britain and France have the duty of preventing a European war if it is humanly possible, and thereby also the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

2. The British and French Governments want the Czechoslovak Government to realize that if it does not unconditionally accept the Anglo-French plan it will stand before the world as solely responsible for the war which will ensue.

3. Czechoslovakia by refusing will also be guilty of destroying Anglo-French solidarity, because under no condition is Great Britain going to march, even if France were to go to Czechoslovakia's help.

4. If the refusal provokes a war, France wishes to notify the Czechoslovak Government officially that she is not going to fulfil her treaty obligations.

Mr. Basil Newton, the British Minister, added that in the light of the decision enunciated by his French colleague, M. Victor Lacroix, Great Britain's policy needed no further elucidation; if Czechoslovakia insisted on maintaining her position, Great Britain would have no responsibility for the consequences. President Beneš asked for the *démarche* to be put in writing, to record the threat and register what he considered to be the plain breaking of the French treaty. He was playing for time, hoping for a revolt in the French cabinet. The Ministers stated that this was impracticable. An immediate answer was required, as Prime Minister Chamberlain was in a hurry to proceed on his trip to Godesberg. The two Ministers spoke emphatically; their tone and manner did not differ from the brusque content of their message.

Even to a devoted admirer of the French people the French Minister's warning as reported above must appear to constitute in effect what President Beneš understood it to be, namely a unilateral repudiation by France of a treaty which the French Premier and Foreign Minister had repeatedly, recently and categorically affirmed a determination to honor, and on which the Czechoslovak Republic had based its whole international policy. Let us grant the force of every extenuating plea put forward on behalf of MM. Daladier and Bonnet. War was possible; they may have thought that by now it was probable. Every humanitarian motive must have inspired them to minimize that risk — though it had been present in somewhat commensurate degree even when they were pledging fidelity to Prague during the spring and summer. They may sincerely have considered Soviet Russia

unreliable, though here their position would have been more convincing had they not kept Moscow in the dark as to their conduct of negotiations and had they not rebuffed Litvinov's suggestion of joint staff talks. Chamberlain in this phase of his policy no longer merely was refusing to commit England to support France in case a Czech rejection of any part of the Hitler demands led to instant invasion; he had been making clearer and clearer that he would keep England out of the resulting war as long as possible. But all extenuating circumstances aside, until publication of the precise instructions sent M. Lacroix from Paris and of his resulting report proves the contrary, if that be possible, I cannot on the basis of information at my disposal from highly authoritative sources interpret the *démarche* made at Prague in the early hours of September 21 otherwise than as I have stated it here.¹⁷

His proposal for arbitration brushed abruptly aside, and an ultimatum for instant surrender ringing in his ears, President Beneš sent hurriedly to get his Ministers out of their beds. Soon after three o'clock they began to arrive. They talked till dawn, and after. As they talked, foreign correspondents considered that resistance was certain. At 4 a.m. Mr. Gedye cabled the *New York Times* that if Hitler wanted to talk to Beneš in the manner he had talked to Schuschnigg he would have to come to Prague, and to get there would have to fight his way through. "The die," he wrote, "is cast." It was not, but it soon was, and in a different shape from that foreseen by some who had followed events most closely and most intelligently.

Why did so resilient and tenacious a leader as Beneš decide to yield? The friends of the Czechs had gone. They stood alone, shorn of the support on which their whole policy had been predicated. That policy had been dual — on the one hand maintenance

¹⁷ The text of the instructions sent Mr. Newton were presented to the House of Commons on October 5 by Mr. Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in an effort to end discussion as to the nature of the *démarche* made in Prague early on September 21. Sir Samuel Hoare on October 2 had characterized a summary of what Mr. Newton and M. Lacroix had said, circulated by Professor Seton-Watson and corresponding closely to the summary printed above, as "in almost every respect a totally inaccurate description." This had not caused Professor Seton-Watson to retract his statement; on the contrary, he reaffirmed its accuracy, and has done so again subsequently in an article "Munich and After" in the November *Fortnightly*. Nor do the instructions read by Mr. Butler in the House give reason to question its reliability, for they direct Mr. Newton to point out that the Czech reply "in no way meets the critical situation" and to press the Czech Government "to consider urgently and seriously before producing a situation *for which we could take no responsibility*." That threat is specific. As noted above, the parallel French instructions to M. Lacroix have not been published, nor the reports of either Mr. Newton or M. Lacroix regarding the action they took.

of a resolute front, backed by the expressed will if need be to die, against foreign threats to impose a Nazi state inside the Republic's frontiers; and concurrently a sustained effort to appease the German minority in every way possible which did not produce that same result. It was possible to maintain that front alone. The army was ready, behind strong defenses; the people were prepared for any sacrifice. Perhaps after a time France would repent and come in. Perhaps Soviet Russia would help anyway, as her Minister in Prague vowed she would. Some authorities thought that even single-handed the Czechs could withstand the German army two months; some argued that since Germany's annexation of Austria and her acquisition of a less fortified sector of frontier that sort of duel would last only three or four weeks. Much might happen in Europe — and in Germany — even in that time.

But probably these were not the considerations which weighed most in the minds of Beneš and his ministers as they argued in the high-ceilinged state chamber of the Hradčany or stood gazing from its windows over the grey city in the early morning light. They had been subject to a grinding strain for months, and were worn and weary. Probably what they thought of most was the imminent death — that night, perhaps — of thousands and thousands of persons under those quiet roofs; of hundreds of thousands more to be bombed there and in other towns and villages through successive days and nights; and of the mounting toll of tens of thousands of young soldiers from whom ought to stem the future Czech and Slovak race.

Beneš and the others were not cowards. Some of them had risked their lives over and over during the war. They had differed among themselves regarding the conduct of negotiations in the past weeks. The largest Czech party, the Agrarians of Dr. Hodža, had always tended to favor compromise with Germany more than some of the others; they favored capitulation now before *force majeure*, particularly if the alternative was to fight with the help of Soviet Russia only. Some of the military men may well have concurred. Their southern flank was exposed since the German annexation of Austria. More important, their established plan of strategy depended for success on the German Army being split between two fronts, east and west. Czechoslovakia had about 35 divisions against about 140 German divisions. But France had three times as many trained reserves as Germany.

With France an antagonist, Germany would have to keep more than half her troops in the west. Hitler then would have perhaps 60 divisions to throw against Czechoslovakia. It would not be enough. The Czech troops were as well equipped, man for man, as any army in the world, their defenses were formidable in the extreme, above all they would be fighting in defense of their own country. Russian reinforcements would also begin to arrive through Rumania. If Germany attempted to cut these off by moving through Hungary, that would automatically bring Yugoslavia into the war, and Rumania too if she were not in already. Such was the Czech program.¹⁸ It was a promising one. But it depended for success on a French offensive in the west. Beneš himself had been brought up in the political knowledge that the destinies of a small Central European state are ruled by the Great Powers. The two Great Powers who had been his mentors and friends now peremptorily told him to yield. If he refused, what was there ahead for Czechoslovakia except to be another Spain, with Britain perhaps intervening on the side of the aggressor under a cloak of non-intervention? In fine, when these men who had charge of the Republic's destinies faced the supreme decision — Peace or War? — they proved to be too much the civilized and intellectualized product of the last war, too thoroughly "men of Geneva," to be able deliberately and of their own accord to pick up a brutal bully's gage, thrown at their feet by two such messengers as these.

By nine o'clock the sense of the Cabinet was that there was no road open from the trap in which, as they considered, they had been landed by France, instigated or abetted by England. In the afternoon Messrs. Newton and Lacroix were called in by Foreign Minister Krofta and handed the Government's reply. In the streets the crowds were milling about angrily as stump speakers called on them to march on the President's Palace and force him to order resistance, or standing silent and grim, the women weeping. When evening brought news of the capitulation there was a concerted converging of the crowds towards the Palace and towards the General Staff building; but one after another the leaders of the Government begged them through loud speakers to be calm, to wait, and at last after General Syrový had added his appeal they began after midnight to disperse to their homes. In Spain, a passionately revolutionary people had forced

¹⁸ Cf. dispatch of John T. Whitaker from Prague, September 19, to *Chicago Daily News*.

a hesitant bourgeois government to fight for their liberties. The Czechs, solid in their nationality through ages of oppression, washed across by the marching armies of many generals and princes, accepted the word of their leaders and withdrew sullenly to their homes, prepared to bear the worst even though sure somehow of a different tomorrow for their sons or their sons' sons.

The reply which Mr. Krofta handed to the British and French Ministers on the 21st was not made public, and so far as I know has not until now been published. It read as follows:

“Forcé par les circonstances et les insistances excessivement pressantes et à la suite de la communication des Gouvernements français et britannique du 21 Septembre de l'année courante, dans laquelle les deux Gouvernements ont exprimé leur manière de voir au sujet de l'assistance à la Tchécoslovaquie si elle refusait d'accepter les propositions franco-britanniques et serait, à la suite de cela, attaquée par l'Allemagne, le Gouvernement de la République Tchécoslovaque accepte dans ces conditions avec des sentiments de douleur les propositions française et britannique en supposant que les deux gouvernements feront tout pour les faire appliquer avec toute sauvegarde des intérêts vitaux de l'Etat Tchécoslovaque. Il constate avec regret que les propositions ont été élaborées sans la consultation préalable du Gouvernement Tchécoslovaque.

“Regrettant profondément que sa proposition d'arbitrage n'ait pas été acceptée, il les accepte comme un tout en soulignant le principe de la garantie comme elle est formulée dans la Note et les accepte en supposant que les deux gouvernements ne toléreront pas l'invasion allemande sur le territoire tchécoslovaque qui restera tchécoslovaque jusqu'au moment où le transfert du territoire après la fixation de la frontière nouvelle par la commission internationale dont on parle dans les propositions, pourrait être effectué.

“Il est d'avis que la proposition franco-britannique suppose que tous les détails de la réalisation pratique des propositions franco-britannique seront fixés d'accord avec le Gouvernement tchécoslovaque.”

Note some key phrases in this document, for they constitute the contractual basis on which the British and French Governments proceeded to act. “Under extraordinary pressure” from the French and British Governments, wrote the Czechoslovak Government, it accepted their propositions “on the assumption that the two Governments will do everything to apply them with every safeguard for the vital interests of the Czechoslovak State.” It deplores that the propositions were worked out without consultation with Prague and it draws attention to the fact that the proposal of arbitration was rejected. It accepts the propositions “*as a whole*” and places special emphasis on the principle of the promised guarantee. It refers to its understanding that the territory to be transferred to Germany will remain Czechoslovak

until after the suggested International Commission has fixed the new frontier, and that no invasion will be tolerated.

VI. THE GODESBERG ULTIMATUM

With this Czech capitulation on certain specified conditions in his pocket, Prime Minister Chamberlain set out for Godesberg. It was Thursday, September 22; he had been delayed a day by the Czech suggestion of arbitration. He was accompanied by Sir Horace Wilson, who since 1930 had held the post of Chief Industrial Adviser to the Government and who had replaced both Sir Robert Vansittart, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government, and other principal Foreign Office officials in the most important recent diplomatic negotiations. Chamberlain's three-hour interview with Hitler took place, however, in the presence only of Hitler's German interpreter. The discussion apparently did not turn upon the substance of Hitler's demands. That — as the text of a letter from Chamberlain to Hitler the next day reveals ¹⁹ — had already been granted. Hitler was to have the "predominantly Sudeten German" areas in Czechoslovakia, and in these Chamberlain agreed there was no need to hold a plebiscite.

But Chamberlain boggled at Hitler's demand that German troops immediately march in and seize them. The two leaders separated for the night with this matter of procedure seemingly the only outstanding issue between them. In Chamberlain's eyes, though, the matter was a very important one, for he knew that to bare the deal for what it actually was — a capitulation to the threat of military force — would revolt British and French opinion, and indeed public opinion throughout the world generally. Further, the Czechs had insisted that the new frontier must be delimited by an International Commission before the occupation occurred — a not illogical condition. To let Hitler reverse the procedure and march in at once might sting the Czechs into revolt and bring on a war in spite of everything.

The next morning, then, Chamberlain sat down and wrote a letter to Hitler ratifying the Nazi claim to the predominantly German areas of Czechoslovakia and saying he was sure the Czechs would accept the German proposal for a plebiscite to determine how far the frontier need be "adjusted" beyond the predominantly German area — *i.e.* beyond what came later to be called the "50-percent line." But he asked if it would not be

¹⁹ "White Paper," Document No. 3.

satisfactory to Hitler if the areas in question became "part of the Reich at once in principle," and very shortly afterwards by formal delimitation, thus eliminating an immediate military occupation. In England that "would be condemned as an unnecessary display of force." He noted that if Hitler moved his troops the Czechs might resist, "and this would mean the destruction of the basis upon which you and I a week ago agreed to work together — an orderly settlement of this question rather than a settlement by the use of force." Pending the German occupation, he suggested that maintenance of law and order in certain agreed Sudeten German areas might be entrusted to the Sudeten Germans themselves. This was contrary to the Czech condition that the lands to be transferred should remain Czechoslovak until after delimitation of the new frontier by an International Commission. Chamberlain nevertheless offered to ask the Czechs to adopt a different course to facilitate the transfer.

The reply to these suggestions was a furious tirade.²⁰ Hitler pointed out that on February 22 he had promised to take the initiative "in putting an end to any further oppression of these Germans," and that he had reiterated that determination at Nuremberg. The situation "from day to day, and, indeed, from hour to hour, is becoming more unbearable." The Czechs had gone mad. Their German victims were fleeing the country wholesale. The situation "is unbearable, and will now be terminated by me." He implied, using President Wilson's Fourteen Points as a parallel, that any British undertakings for the future were valueless in his eyes. "What interests me, your Excellency, is not the recognition of the principle that this territory is to go to Germany, but solely the realization of this principle and the realization which both puts an end in the shortest time to the sufferings of the unhappy victims of Czech tyranny, and at the same time corresponds to the dignity of a Great Power." The Sudetens were not coming back to Germany "in virtue of the gracious or benevolent sympathy of other nations," but on the basis of the right of self-determination and "the irrevocable decision of the German Reich." He referred to his willingness to allow plebiscites to carry out "subsequent corrections" in the frontier he had laid down. The plebiscites might take place under an international commission or a mixed German-Czech commission. "During the days of the plebiscite" he would be ready to withdraw his troops

²⁰ "White Paper," Document No. 4.

from "the most disputed frontier areas." But he would not allow a territory "which must be considered as belonging to Germany" to be left without the protection of the Reich. He repudiated Chamberlain's appeal to his own agreement to achieve a settlement without the use of force. There existed "no international power or agreement," he said, "which would have the right to take precedence over German right." He referred scornfully to Chamberlain's plea that it would be difficult to recommend the German plan in London. For Chamberlain it was only a question of political imponderables, but for Germany it was a question of "primitive right" and "the national honor of a great people."

One can hardly conceive of a more flamboyant communication from the Head of one great state to the Prime Minister of another who was his guest. Chamberlain had come to Godesberg determined to have peace at almost any price. It looked as though Hitler were determined to have war at almost any price. Chamberlain could not in the circumstances abstain from letting the Czechs know that the danger of general war was now imminent; advice was sent to Prague to mobilize. A few hours were needed by Chamberlain to collect himself and swallow whatever was left of his pride. His reply was courteous but brief.²¹ He asked for a memorandum stating Hitler's demands and a map showing the areas which would be transferred subject to the proposed plebiscite. He said that he would at once forward the memorandum to Prague, with a request that the Czechoslovak Government reply to it at once. He asked that in the meanwhile Hitler renew his assurance to continue abiding by the understanding reached at Berchtesgaden on September 14,²² and just renewed the night previous, that German military forces would not take any action to prejudice the "mediation" while it was still in course. At a final meeting that night he received the memorandum and, presumably, the assurance, valid until the expiration of what was in fact an ultimatum. For not until now had Mr. Chamberlain been informed of the time limit, October 1, by which German troops would have to enter Czech territory. He was stung to "bitter reproach," in his own words of September 28. Yet, as he reported

²¹ "White Paper," Document No. 5.

²² This is the date given in the text published in the "White Paper." The actual meeting at Berchtesgaden was on September 15. Perhaps Chamberlain was referring to some unrevealed understanding of September 14 preliminary to his agreement to go to Berchtesgaden the next day.

on that later occasion, the conversation subsequently proceeded in "more friendly terms than any that had yet preceded it" — an interesting sidelight on the effectiveness of righteous indignation and plain speaking.

The Hitler memorandum, or ultimatum, was duly delivered to the Czech Minister in London by Lord Halifax the evening of the next day, September 24. He did not press for its acceptance; he simply transmitted it. It led off with a short introduction referring to the "completely intolerable" situation of the Sudeten Germans and describing briefly the map attached, on which were shown the areas to be ceded outright and occupied at once, as well as the additional areas in which a plebiscite would be held "over and above the areas to be occupied."²³ Following the preamble, the memorandum was composed of six specific proposals and an appendix, as follows:

"1. Withdrawal of the whole Czech armed forces, the police, the gendarmerie, the customs officials and the frontier guards from the area to be evacuated as designated on the attached map, this area to be handed over to Germany on the 1st October.

"2. The evacuated territory is to be handed over in its present condition (see further details in appendix). The German Government agree that a plenipotentiary representative of the Czech Government or of the Czech Army should be attached to the headquarters of the German military forces to settle the details of the modalities of the evacuation.

"3. The Czech Government discharges at once to their homes all Sudeten Germans serving in the military forces or the police anywhere in Czech State territory.

"4. The Czech Government liberates all political prisoners of German race.

"5. The German Government agrees to permit a plebiscite to take place in those areas, which will be more definitely defined, before at latest the 25th November. Alterations to the new frontier arising out of the plebiscite will be settled by a German-Czech or an international commission. The plebiscite itself will be carried out under the control of an international commission. All persons who were residing in the areas in question on the 28th October, 1918, or were born there prior to this date will be eligible to vote. A simple majority of all eligible male and female voters will determine the desire of the population to belong to either the German Reich or to the Czech State. During the plebiscite both parties will withdraw their military forces out of areas which will be defined more precisely. The date and duration will be settled by the German and Czech Governments together.

"6. The German Government proposes that an authoritative German-Czech commission should be set up to settle all further details.

²³ The map inserted at the end of the present article shows in a solid red line the limits of the area which Hitler demanded must be ceded to Germany outright, and in a broken red line the limits of the additional plebiscite areas.

"*Appendix.* The evacuated Sudeten German area is to be handed over without destroying or rendering unusable in any way military, commercial or traffic establishments (plants). These include the ground organization of the air service and all wireless stations.

"All commercial and traffic materials, especially the rolling-stock of the railway system, in the designated areas, are to be handed over undamaged. The same applies to all utility services (gas-works, power stations, etc.).

Finally, no food-stuffs, goods, cattle, raw materials, etc., are to be removed.²⁴

Prime Minister Chamberlain's report of Chancellor Hitler's attitude thoroughly alarmed both the British and French cabinets. Had so much surrender been in vain? Was it possible the man would fight about how he was going to be served the dish which he had ordered should be prepared for him free? Directions were given for the war machines on both sides of the Channel to hold themselves ready for an immediate emergency. Gas masks were distributed; trenches to serve as shelters during air-raids were started in the parks. Late in the afternoon of Sunday, September 25, Daladier and Bonnet arrived in London by air and were closeted with the British Ministers until after midnight. They had before them the reply of the Czech Government, in which General Syrový had replaced Dr. Hodža as Prime Minister.

The Czech Minister in London, transmitting the reply, wrote that his Government had accepted "the so-called Anglo-French plan for ceding parts of Czechoslovakia . . . under extreme duress," on the understanding that it was the end of the demands to be made upon it, "and because it followed from the Anglo-French pressure that these two Powers would accept responsibility for our reduced frontiers and would guarantee us their support in the event of our being feloniously attacked." The Czech Government referred to the fact that while Chamberlain was at Godesberg it had received from the British and French Ministers in Prague notification that their two Governments could no longer take the responsibility of advising the Czech Government not to mobilize. On Chamberlain's return from Godesberg, however, it had been handed a new proposition. The Minister commented:

"It is a *de facto* ultimatum of the sort usually presented to a vanquished nation and not a proposition to a sovereign State which has shown the greatest possible readiness to make sacrifices for the appeasement of Europe. Not the smallest trace of such readiness for sacrifices has as yet been manifested by Herr Hitler's Government. My Government is amazed at the contents of the

²⁴ "White Paper," Document No. 6.

memorandum. The proposals go far beyond what we agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French plan. They deprive us of every safeguard for our national existence. We are to yield up large proportions of our carefully prepared defences, and admit the German armies deep into our country before we have been able to organize it on the new basis or make any preparations for its defence. Our national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of Herr Hitler's plan. The whole process of moving the population is to be reduced to panic flight on the part of those who will not accept the German Nazi régime. They have to leave their homes without even the right to take their personal belongings or, even in the case of peasants, their cow."

The Minister declared Hitler's demands in their new form to be "absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable," and concluded:

"Against these new and cruel demands my Government feel bound to make their utmost resistance, and we shall do so, God helping. The nation of St. Wenceslas, John Hus and Thomas Masaryk will not be a nation of slaves."²⁵

What was in sober fact the difference between what Hitler demanded and Chamberlain was willing he should receive? Why had Chamberlain come back from Godesberg so solemn, why was the rhythm of war preparations being speeded more and more insistently? The British public were asking themselves this as a new week opened, a week everyone felt must be decisive in the great issue of peace versus war. They were provided with a new basis for judgment by the morning newspapers of Monday, September 26, which carried for the first time an accurate summary of the original Anglo-French plan and also the text of the Godesberg memorandum. Thus they could compare the two positions, though of course without the help of the text of the Czechoslovak note declining the original proposal, and telling why; without exact knowledge as to the sort of pressure which had been exerted in Prague in the early morning of September 21; and without knowledge of the important conditions attached to the subsequent Czechoslovak acceptance.

The Anglo-French plan had proposed the incorporation in Germany of predominantly (over 50-percent) German areas of the Czechoslovak Republic, either by a direct transfer or as a result of a plebiscite. An international body containing a Czech representative would arrange any necessary adjustments of frontiers and perhaps arrange also for the exchange of populations on the basis of a right to opt for either German or Czech nationality within a specified time-limit.

The Godesberg ultimatum required military occupation of the

²⁵ "White Paper," Document No. 7.

Sudetenland forthwith, up to a frontier shown on an accompanying map prepared by Hitler.

The Anglo-French plan had provided that when the amputation had occurred the new Czechoslovak state should receive an international guarantee, in which the British Government would join, to replace the existing military alliances with France and Soviet Russia.

The Godesberg ultimatum said nothing about a guarantee.

Such were the two main differences between the terms Hitler gave Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden and the ultimatum which he presented to him at Godesberg. They were sufficiently great so that whereas in the first instance the British and French had forced Czechoslovakia to accept by threatening to leave her alone to fight the ensuing war, in the second instance Halifax simply transmitted the ultimatum to the Czechoslovak Minister in London without exerting any pressure. In the meanwhile, Britain and France had advised Prague not to delay mobilization any longer; and in both countries war measures had been redoubled.

The situation was summed up for many Britishers in a letter printed that Monday morning in the *Times* from L. S. Amery, Colonial Secretary in the Baldwin Cabinet. "What," he asked, "has been the result of the Czechs' acceptance of what was, in effect, Herr Hitler's first ultimatum? Of recognition of their sacrifice for the sake of peace, of discussion of how the transfer of territory might be carried out in order and decency, not one word. Only fresh attacks on a peaceful State by bands organized and equipped in and by Germany, the renewed threat of imminent invasion in overwhelming force, and a campaign of abuse from the official German wireless and Government-controlled Press which for sheer beastliness has never been equalled." The Prime Minister, he said, had returned from Godesberg, "not with any agreement to settle the ways and means of carrying out the first ultimatum, but with a second ultimatum, which, in effect, means that the Czechs are to evacuate their defences and deprive themselves of all power of resistance, in order that the rest of the business of dismembering their country shall be carried out at Germany's will and pleasure." As to the meaning for Britain of this rebuke of the Prime Minister's efforts, Mr. Amery added: "Once we told the Czechs they could not expect our help if they rejected our advice we implicitly pledged our help if they accepted it. Our guarantee to them ran from that moment."

VII. SUSPENSE

Daladier and Bonnet had arrived in London on Sunday evening, September 25. They were joined on Monday by General Gamelin, who, some allege, was irked that only the more pessimistic sections of his reports on the state of the French Army had been quoted to the authorities in London, while his general conclusions that as a whole the Army was ready to fulfil its tasks successfully and win an ultimate victory were suppressed or glossed over.²⁶ We know now (Chamberlain speech of September 28) that the French Ministers stated once again that if Czechoslovakia were attacked France would fulfil her treaty obligations. In reply, Chamberlain gave them a pledge which so far as can be judged had never been given before. He said that if French forces as a result became engaged in hostilities against Germany, Britain would feel obliged to lend them support.

However, talk between the British and French representatives probably was less about how to wage a war than about how peace might yet be preserved. A conference was already in view, though of a different nature from the one which actually took place later in the week at Munich. On Sunday Mr. Chamberlain had asked the Czechoslovak Minister in London, Mr. Jan Masaryk, whether, if Hitler could be brought to agree, the Czechoslovak Government would be willing to meet German representatives and the delegates of other Powers in an international conference to consider the Anglo-French plan and the best method of bringing it into effect. On Monday Mr. Masaryk answered that his Government would be ready to take part in an international conference at which Germany and Czechoslovakia, among other nations, would be represented, to find a different method of settling the Sudeten German question from that expounded in Herr Hitler's proposals, keeping in mind the possibility of reverting to the so-called Anglo-French plan.²⁷

Hitler was to make a decisive speech Monday evening at the Sport Palace. In preparation, he had sent an envoy to consult with Mussolini and Count Ciano on Sunday on a train at Schio, in the province of Venezia, where Il Duce was busy making a series of speeches.²⁸ Did he secure a promise of immediate Italian

²⁶ Cf. "L'avis que les chefs militaires ont donné au gouvernement français," *Europe Nouvelle*, September 24.

²⁷ "White Paper," Document No. 8.

²⁸ Cf. The statement by Count Ciano in the Italian Chamber, November 30.

military support? Certainly not an enthusiastic one. But, as already remarked, the policy of neutrality planned earlier by Mussolini had become less practicable after Hitler had committed himself so far at Nuremberg and after Chamberlain's two trips to Canossa. Mussolini was being forced further and further into the German camp. He could not avoid promising help, but certainly he would try at the same time to put on the brakes; for even though Britain had not yet given France the unreserved promise of support which was forthcoming in London on Monday morning, he nevertheless realized better than Hitler that she might well decide to do so. Count Ciano has since told us (November 30) what Italy's course would have been in the event of war. In a localized German-Czech war, she would adopt a position of reserve; but in a general conflict she would consider herself threatened and would range herself on Germany's side. Obviously this is what Mussolini would have had to promise to do. What course he actually would have found expedient in a war beginning between Germany alone on one side and a most formidable coalition of Powers on the other is at least open to speculation.

London could not be sure that Hitler was aware of the grim foreboding with which his Sport Palace pronouncement was being awaited. Would the people around him — Ribbentrop who despised England, Goebbels who despised France, Himmler who hoped to clamber to new heights in times of crisis — lay the situation before him in all its gravity? After the cabinet meeting, Chamberlain decided to send the Fuehrer a personal letter of appeal and warning. He chose as messenger Sir Horace Wilson, who had been with him at Godesberg.

In his letter ²⁹ Chamberlain explained that while the Czechoslovak Government adhered to their acceptance of the Anglo-French plan, they would not evacuate the Sudeten areas and permit the immediate occupation of these by German troops in advance of settling the terms and limits of the cession. Chamberlain repeated the arguments used at Godesberg in favor of an orderly settlement instead of one imposed by force, and added that "the development of opinion since my return confirms me in the views I expressed to you in my letter and in our subsequent conversation." He told what would be the results of meeting Hitler's demands: "Czechoslovakia would be deprived of every safeguard for her national existence. She would have to yield

²⁹ "White Paper," Document No. 9.

up large proportions of her carefully prepared defenses and admit the German armies deep into her country before it had been organized on the new basis or any preparations had been made for its defense. Her national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of the German plan. The whole process of moving the population is to be reduced to panic and flight." Chamberlain then put to Hitler approximately the same proposal which he had put to Prague through Mr. Masaryk on Sunday, and to which he had received a favorable response. He asked Hitler to meet Czechoslovak representatives "with a view to settling by agreement the way in which the territory is to be handed over," and he offered to have a representative of the British Government participate. The only differences between Hitler and himself turned on the method of carrying out an agreed principle. He "most earnestly" urged the Fuehrer to accept his proposal and avoid the human misery that would follow a conflict.

In presenting this appeal Sir Horace Wilson was accompanied by Ambassador Henderson. They arrived at the Chancery about four-thirty o'clock on Monday and conversed with Hitler for an hour. Hitler informed them that departure from the terms of the Godesberg ultimatum was impossible. It is not known whether at this meeting he added the same startling information which the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Bernardo Attolico, was able to transmit to his Government at 7:30 P.M. — namely, that Hitler had determined not to wait till Saturday, October 1, but would march at 2 P.M. on Wednesday.³⁰

Shortly after seven o'clock Hitler proceeded in pomp to the Sport Palace, historic rally hall of the Nazi Party. Addressing the massed formations before him (with a group of the Sudeten "Free Corps" occupying a prominent place), and the unseen people of Germany clustered around radios and loud-speakers in homes and cafés and public squares, he stuck to his requirements. "That Beneš" must give up the Sudetenland by October 1 or have war on his hands. The German demands were final. He expressed complete disbelief in Czech promises, but he did not specifically state that if Prague failed to meet them at once he would take military action in advance of October 1. He obviously wished to keep his listeners from recognizing clearly that the German claims for the cession of the Sudetenland were no longer

³⁰ See Count Ciano's speech in the Chamber, November 30.

in practical dispute, that the only question remaining was one of timing and procedure. Nor did he give any inkling of the stiffening opposition which his demands were awakening abroad, as shown by the vast British and French military preparations. Perhaps he still was under illusions himself about the probable British course; for it was not until his second talk with Sir Horace Wilson the following morning that the latter told him "in precise terms" that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, and if France went to her help, Britain would help France.

Continuing his speech, Hitler repeated that he desired peace, and promised that "when the claims of other minorities have been satisfied we will guarantee the integrity of the Czech State." He said he had told Chamberlain this, though it does not appear in his Godesberg memorandum; also that "after the Sudeten German question is regulated we have no further territorial claims to make in Europe." There were no German claims, he said, against France or Poland. He guaranteed the inviolability of the territory of all Germany's neighbors. "This is no mere phrase. It is our holy will." French or Polish listeners, or Dutch or Swiss or Danish ones, may have withheld enthusiastic applause as these words came into their homes over the radio, thinking of similar assurances officially conveyed to the Czechoslovak Government at the moment Hitler was gobbling up Austria. But that lack was of course not registered with the throng in the great auditorium, aglare with lights, shining with banners, overflowing with what the *London Times* correspondent called "hysterical but organized devotion."

The frenzied enthusiasm increased as the Fuehrer turned to a staccato denunciation of Beneš, the Czech people, and their inhuman cruelties toward the Germans. The Czechoslovak President's name was greeted with cries of "Hang him! Hang him!" The surge of voices, as in a menagerie where all the animals have gone mad, but by some trick can still be made to bay and howl in unison, will not soon be forgotten by anyone who listened through to the end. In the opinion of connoisseurs of Hitler speeches it was not a particularly effective one. There were in it more pauses and non-sequiturs than usual, a note of shrillness, of pleading, that seemed to betray a mind hesitating and frightened to plunge ahead as recklessly as the mystic will dictated. That would have been natural. Never before had the moment for suiting the action to the word been so imminent. On the other hand, the speech was

careful and consistent in one respect already mentioned. Never by a phrase did Hitler let his hearers know that the real dispute no longer was between him and Beneš but between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other. Never did he let them guess that it was not a parade into Czechoslovakia which hung in the balance, but a European war.

After hearing Sir Horace Wilson's report of his first conference with Hitler, and after reading the Hitler speech and discussing it with the "Inner Cabinet," Chamberlain at 1 A.M. on September 27 announced his continuing hope that Berlin would not reject his proposal of a conference. "It is evident," he admitted, "that the Chancellor has no faith that the promises made will be carried out." But he pointed out that these were not Czech promises to the Germans direct, but to the British and French in the first instance. He pledged the British Government to see them carried out "with all reasonable promptitude," provided the German Government agreed to settle "terms and conditions of transfer by discussion and not by force."

This marked a new step in the effort to persuade Hitler to abide by his Berchtesgaden demands as embodied in the Anglo-French plan. Britain now underwrote Czechoslovakia's acceptance of that plan. Concurrently another method of persuasion was adopted, probably designed to give food for thought to Mussolini as well as to Hitler. An "authoritative statement" issued from the Foreign Office early in the evening of September 26 contained the following significant paragraph:

"The German claim to the transfer of the Sudeten areas has already been conceded by the French, British and Czechoslovak Governments, but if in spite of all efforts made by the British Prime Minister a German attack is made upon Czechoslovakia, the immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her assistance, and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France."⁸¹

Beyond the blunt warning here given as to Britain's procedure in case Hitler carried out his threat to march, there was the intimation that at last London was in touch with Moscow and had agreed on a course of joint action.

What did M. Bonnet, back now in Paris, think of this categorical pledge of British help, supplementing publicly the pledge given him and Daladier by Chamberlain in London that same

⁸¹ The text was printed September 27 in the *Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Manchester Guardian*, etc., and in the American press. It appeared that afternoon in the *Temps*.

morning? The two together marked a final accomplishment which so many of his predecessors at the Quai d'Orsay had worked in vain to achieve. London — pled with, prayed to, cajoled and threatened — had never said in so many words what she would do in case France became involved in a war over some problem in Central or Eastern Europe. Here, on the eve of what might be another great war arising over Czechoslovakia, Bonnet held in his hands the pledge which Poincaré and Viviani had needs do without in reaching their fateful decision in August 1914 — a pledge which at that time might even have averted the World War. Once again France stood at the parting of the ways. This time by her side she would find England from the start — reluctant, still seeking a way to save peace, not well prepared, but reconciled to accepting France's decision if in her eyes it seemed necessary to risk a possible war to win a tolerable peace.

We do not know M. Bonnet's thoughts, but the following is on record. The Havas agency in London received a typewritten copy of the communiqué from the Press Bureau of the British Foreign Office at 9.15 P.M. It transmitted the text to Paris, describing it as a "declaration of the Foreign Office." The *Action Française*, whose former devotion to monarchism has largely given way to interest in Fascism, reported that when news of the British communiqué reached Paris several deputies called on M. Bonnet at the Quai d'Orsay and asked him if he could guarantee its authenticity. Reply: "We have not received any confirmation." M. Léon Bailby's *Four*, though the communiqué was being printed as a matter of course in all the British papers, and on front pages in America, called it "most suspect." Emile Roche, in the *République*, asked if it were not being circulated in order to heighten the tension with Germany by bringing in Soviet Russia. The *Liberté*, a paper of openly Fascist tendencies, on September 30 reported an interview with Daladier. Question: "What was the origin of the unbelievable dispatch speaking of the aid which England and Russia would give France?" Answer: "From an official of no importance." The *Matin* on October 2, continuing the campaign, referred to the "soi-disant 'communiqué' of the Foreign Office" as "a clever lie."²²

As a matter of fact these and other French papers which labelled anyone accepting the communiqué as "war-mongers" went further than was necessary in their efforts to protect M.

²² These quotations are taken from *Europe Nouvelle* of October 1 and 8.

Bonnet's course from criticism. The French Foreign Minister did not himself call the British Foreign Office communiqué a lie; he simply is reported to have said it lacked confirmation. The attitude which President Beneš understood the French Minister in Prague to have stated on September 21 may not have been M. Bonnet's attitude in the new circumstances. He may really have been as firmly determined now to execute the terms of the French treaty with Czechoslovakia as he presumably had been earlier in the summer, and may have been glad at heart to hear both from Chamberlain personally and from the Foreign Office that Britain would help if the necessity arose. The quotations given here from the French press may have reported Bonnet and Daladier incorrectly. There have been previous occasions when French papers did that. What is of prime importance is the lack of enthusiasm with which Bonnet received a public statement of British policy regarding what has always been considered the essential touchstone in Anglo-French relations, and the further fact that defeatist rumors calling the statement untrue were permitted to circulate through large sections of the French press without, so far as can be found, adequate contradiction.

Later, after Munich had produced the result which MM. Daladier and Bonnet had become persuaded was advisable, the truth about the communiqué came out. Already on September 28 Chamberlain had publicly confirmed the accuracy of the British position stated in the communiqué when he said that on September 26 "we told them [Daladier and Bonnet] that if as a result of these obligations [to Czechoslovakia] French forces became actively engaged in hostilities against Germany, we should feel obliged to support them." In other words, two days before the *Liberté* reported Daladier as saying that the Foreign Office communiqué came from "an official of no importance," Chamberlain had given Daladier a similar statement of the British position. And the *Matin* spoke of the communiqué as "a clever lie" four days after Chamberlain had made public declaration of a policy identical with the one which the communiqué announced. On September 30 the British Foreign Office reaffirmed the accuracy of the communiqué, with an expression of surprise (according to the *Petit Parisien* of October 1) that such confirmation should be needed for an official British statement. On October 3, speaking in the House of Commons, Anthony Eden referred to the communiqué approvingly as one of the factors which had helped avert

hostilities. And finally, on October 4, in his official governmental declaration, M. Daladier said: "On the evening of September 26, in an official information to the press, it was stated in London that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, France would go to her aid and that 'Great Britain and Russia would certainly be on the side of France.'" (*Temps*, October 5.)

Never since the formation of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 had London been willing in time of peace to make such a promise. Historians will speculate as to the manner in which a Poincaré would have utilized that categorical pledge, even at this eleventh hour, to line up behind Britain, France and Russia so solid a coalition of powers from the Baltic to the Ægean as would have thrown Mussolini back into neutrality and called Hitler's bluff. If Hitler's threats were after all not a bluff, he would in those circumstances have had the short war and the sure defeat which some of his Reichswehr officers were hoping for as the only way of ridding Germany of him and his associates. But a Poincaré was not Foreign Minister of France.

Before quitting these important days when London was stiffening its position in a desperate effort to convince Hitler it meant business, and while the French position was what can only be described as anomalous, we must note two or three other events. On Friday, September 23, with the foreknowledge of London and Paris, the Czech Government had mobilized. But for two days Prague was almost completely cut off from the rest of the world, apart from diplomatic dispatches, and it was not till Sunday or Monday that details of the extraordinary celerity and steadiness of nerve with which the order had been obeyed began reaching foreign newspaper readers. On Monday, September 26, Mr. Chamberlain at last agreed that Parliament should be called; the notice went out for a session on Wednesday. In the early hours of the same day President Roosevelt sent an appeal for a peaceful settlement to Chancellor Hitler and President Beneš, and to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France. He asked them to remember their obligation under the Kellogg-Briand Pact not to resort to war. Britain and France replied at once with warm expressions of gratitude. Beneš cabled that for twenty years his government had followed the policy of settling international disputes by peaceful means. It would never do anything to violate the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It asked nothing better than to settle the crisis in accordance with the arbitra-

tion treaty with Germany. What Berlin thought of the Roosevelt message may be judged from the fact that no mention of it was at first allowed in the German press. Hitler's reply, dispatched a day later, uncompromisingly refused responsibility if war should come and put all responsibility on President Beneš. He did not mention the Kellogg-Briand Pact or arbitration, but instead stated ominously that "the possibilities for arriving at a just settlement are exhausted with the proposals of the German memorandum." Along with this reply, the President's appeal finally found place in the German press. One other appeal was issued on the same day as President Roosevelt's. Speaking at Verona, Mussolini called on Britain and France to abandon the Czechs before war became inevitable.

Though Tuesday, September 27, marked something of a lull so far as the British public was concerned, it was a day of great suspense in government circles. At a second interview with Hitler that morning, Sir Horace Wilson found the Fuehrer's mind unchanged. He now also was informed (if he had not already been informed the previous afternoon) that German "action" was fixed for 2 p.m. the next day, Wednesday.³³ In accordance with Chamberlain's instructions, Sir Horace thereupon told Hitler "in precise terms" just what a German attack on Czechoslovakia would involve, namely French and British military intervention. The story is that he stood up to make the statement and repeated it a second time "at dictation speed." This is said to have so enraged Hitler that the Britisher thought it best to leave the room for a few moments. On his return he found Hitler much more quiet. So far as we know, this was the second time during the crisis when Hitler had to listen to some plain talk. Once again it seems to have affected him in an interesting manner. In the afternoon Sir Horace started back by air for London.

Rumors that Hitler was threatening immediate action of course got about in Berlin. The information reaching most of the foreign correspondents was that the action planned was general mobilization, and this was the report which the British news agency, Reuter's, telegraphed from Berlin in the afternoon. It

³³ "Action" was the word used by Chamberlain on September 28. "General mobilization" was his expression on October 3. The latter does not sound very important in view of the masses of German troops already under arms. But general mobilization closes the frontiers and monopolizes rail and road transport for the army. The threat, whether of general mobilization or of "action" against Czechoslovakia, was what induced the British Embassy in Berlin on Tuesday to advise British newspapermen and other nationals to leave the country that night.

correctly stated 2 P.M. the next day as the deadline for the Czech capitulation. The Berlin correspondent of the London *Times* reported that "well-informed circles" believed general mobilization had been set for 2 P.M. the next day, and an advance against Czechoslovakia for the day following. To give color to the most serious interpretations of what was afoot, long lines of German units equipped for active service paraded silent Berlin streets during Tuesday evening and saluted Hitler as he stood on a balcony of the Chancellery. Not many outstretched arms were seen among the surprised crowds, no "heils!" were heard. "Be silent, this is serious," one old man said in the hearing of a friend of mine to an enthusiastic member of the Hitler Youth. The universal lack of enthusiasm, amounting to dismay, amazed Hitler. Doubtless it influenced him in the communications he had with London, Paris and Rome during the next twelve hours.

In the evening, possessed of the very disturbing information from Berlin, Mr. Chamberlain broadcast a message to the British public. He spoke of the letters he had been receiving from mothers and sisters of the men who would risk their lives in war. Then came a phrase which in a flash revealed for some of his listeners the theory which he had entertained for so many months as to the real nature of the problem at hand: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." In other words, Mr. Chamberlain had imagined, and despite every rude shock still imagined, that he was dealing with a frontier dispute 500 miles distant, not with the problem of German expansion and possible German hegemony on the Continent. The Prime Minister then admitted that he understood the Czech refusal to accept the Godesberg memorandum; yet he felt that "if only time were allowed" a solution could be found. But Hitler was insisting that the Sudeten territory be handed over to him immediately and be immediately occupied by German troops "without previous arrangements for safeguarding the people within the territory who were not Germans, or did not want to join the German Reich."

"I must say," Chamberlain continued, "that I find this attitude unreasonable." The British Government guaranteed the Czech Government's promise to hand over the territory as agreed. So long as a chance for peace remained, he would pursue

it, even by a third visit to Germany if that seemed likely to do any good. Meanwhile, he asked calmness in the face of the military preparations under way. War was not necessarily at hand. "However much we may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbor, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that. I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted. Under such a domination, life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living."

It was a sober, sincere speech. A single sentence betrayed a parochial view of the European situation. But the eloquent peroration revealed that another view, long articulate but always subordinate, was fighting for supremacy. Here obviously was a statesman who felt that his country was coming very close to war. He hated it, but he began to fear that his effort to give his antagonist everything he wanted was now to be defeated by that gentleman's unwillingness to wait a moment till it could be put in his hands in an orderly manner. Hitler insisted on snatching. The Czechs (rightly, Chamberlain had to confess) would then resist; and, since France still asserted that in these circumstances she would go to their aid, general war would result.

To underline the Prime Minister's gravity of tone and the seriousness of his utterance, orders were given, and published in the Wednesday morning press, to mobilize the British Fleet. About the same time — that is, after midnight — Sir Horace Wilson, just back by air from Berlin, presented to Mr. Chamberlain the text of Chancellor Hitler's reply to his latest appeal. Part of the reply had been delivered in the Sport Palace address and part to Sir Horace verbally: there was to be no Czech-German conference; the time limit stood; "action" was scheduled for 2 o'clock the coming afternoon. Hitler could not bring himself, he wrote, to admit that the Czech arguments transmitted by Chamberlain "can be regarded as seriously put forward." There was provision for a vote "under no outside influence" and for "a very wide degree of German-Czech agreement on matters of detail to be reached subsequently." The military occupation would not go beyond the red line and it "represents no more than a security

measure which is intended to guarantee a quick and smooth achievement of the final settlement." Without this "indispensable" measure, the present "unbearable circumstances" in the Sudeten territories might drag along indefinitely. Yet there was just the hint of a conciliatory note in some of the statements. It was absurd to speak of Czechoslovakia being "crippled in her national existence or in her political and economic independence." There could be no question about any "checks" to the independence of Czechoslovakia or about the "well-known fact" that after the cession Czechoslovakia "would constitute a healthier and more unified economic organism than before." In this connection he repeated formally an offer which he had brought forward in his Sport Palace speech, namely that "under the condition which I laid down [military occupation] I am even ready to give a formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia."⁸⁴

In France, meanwhile, the public had been worn down to something like resignation to the ordeal looming ahead. Hitler had written that "the inexorably deadly enemy of the German people is and will be France."⁸⁵ They were about ready to take him at his word. They were fatigued by his violence. Compromise to all reasonable limits had failed to satisfy him in this particular dispute. Perhaps even war would have compensations in comparison to life on the edge of a volcano.

The French press, however, was in a state of confusion and self-contradiction very different, according to all observers, from the sangfroid displayed by the French people. Again, as in the case of the communiqué of September 26, there were signs that political predispositions or outside pressure were leading many newspapers into extraordinary interpretations of ordinary facts. We have described what happened in Berlin on Tuesday, September 27, and the news reports which were sent from there by Reuter's and various correspondents of responsible British and American newspapers. The French agency, Havas, also had reported Hitler's warning to Sir Horace Wilson about measures to be taken "in the absence of a satisfactory answer from Prague" before 2 o'clock the next afternoon. The Havas account was milder — and less accurate, we now know — than the other reports. And all of them were less threatening than the stark truth that Hitler had issued what was in effect a definite ultimatum expiring the next

⁸⁴ "White Paper," Document No. 10.

⁸⁵ "Mein Kampf," p. 699.

day and that negotiations were almost in a deadlock. At 2:40 A.M. on Wednesday morning the official German news agency, D. N. B., denied that general mobilization was set for 2 P.M.³⁶ At once a number of French rightist papers rallied to the idea that the information of Reuter's and the others was false. The *Action Française*, accepting the Berlin denial, stated definitely that it was false, and commented: "The plot against Peace continues." The *Journal des Débats* protested against "plotters and adventurers who work with false reports." Léon Daudet in the *Action Française* on the 29th blasted the "sanglantes crapules" who spread the "false news" that Hitler had been threatening mobilization. *Europe Nouvelle* later invited M. Daudet to turn to the third page of the same edition of his paper to read Mr. Chamberlain's categorical statement of the day before — that the German Chancellor had told Sir Horace Wilson of his intention to take "action" at 2 P.M. on the Wednesday, precisely as reported in the most pessimistic Berlin dispatches of Tuesday.³⁷

We are left wondering who was spreading false news and whose was the plot. It is to the credit of the French people that with so many strange charges flying about they kept their heads and quietly and loyally obeyed the successive calls to the colors.

VIII. MUNICH

The British Parliament met at long last on Wednesday, September 28,³⁸ to receive Mr. Chamberlain's account of his steward-

³⁶ Cf. *Europe Nouvelle* of October 1. The same magazine on October 8 pointed out that meanwhile news of the mobilization of the British Fleet had reached Berlin.

³⁷ Yet the *Liberté* on September 30, two days after Chamberlain's speech, is quoted in *Europe Nouvelle* as reporting the following dialogue between M. Marin and M. Daladier. Marin: "The news of the German mobilization?" Daladier: "False." Marin: "The Reuter dispatch of that night?" Daladier: "False." And *Europe Nouvelle* quotes Marcel Déat as still speaking in the *République* of October 1 of the "invented" press reports about the "ultimatum" of September 28. Obviously *Europe Nouvelle*, the editor of which is "Pertinax," has become an indispensable guide to the nuances of French opinion. Curiously, Mr. P. J. Philip's dispatch to the *New York Times* under date of October 3, the day before Daladier went before the Chamber, stated that during the pre-Munich negotiations "denial had to be made of a statement purporting to come from the British Foreign Office that Britain and Russia would, if France became involved in a war, immediately put their whole forces at her side." Mr. Philip said Daladier would have to make clear the next day — "and Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet will be his witness" — that "at no time during the negotiations did the British Government make any unconditional promise." Mr. Philip's dispatch the next day, though it devoted over two columns of comment to Daladier's speech, did not mention the Premier's statement, already quoted, confirming that there had in fact been an official British information to the press.

³⁸ Premier Daladier succeeded in avoiding summoning the French Parliament throughout the crisis; in fact it did not meet from June 17 to October 4. The last general debate on foreign affairs in the French Chamber had been February 25-28, before the *Anschluss*.

ship and learn how, if at all, war might still be avoided. Lord Baldwin, Lord Halifax, the Archbishop of Canterbury and other peers were in their gallery, the foreign diplomats in another. The Prime Minister recapitulated the events of the summer, adding many details which have been noted in their proper place in the present account but which until then had not been made public. Coming to the letter which Sir Horace Wilson had brought back from Berlin the previous evening, he recalled how as he read it he thought that "the differences and the obscurities had been narrowed down still further to a point where really it was inconceivable that they could not be settled by negotiations." So strongly did he feel this, he said, that he had been impelled that very morning to send one more communication to the Chancellor, as follows:

"After reading your letter I feel certain that you can get all essentials without war and without delay.

"I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements for transfer with you and representatives of Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy if you desire.

"I feel convinced we could reach agreement in a week. However much you distrust Prague Government's intentions, you cannot doubt power of British and French Governments to see that promises are carried out fairly and fully and forthwith. As you know I have stated publicly that we are prepared to undertake that they shall be so carried out.

"I cannot believe that you will take responsibility of starting a world war which may end civilization for the sake of a few days' delay in settling this long-standing problem."³⁹

Note in passing that Chamberlain mentioned a discussion between Hitler, himself and representatives of the Czech Government, plus French and Italian representatives if Hitler so desired. He did not leave to Hitler the decision as to whether Czech representatives would be present: that was a condition of his proposal.

Continuing his speech, the Prime Minister said that "at the same time" as this final appeal went forward to Hitler he sent the following personal message to Mussolini:

"I have today addressed last appeal to Herr Hitler to abstain from force to settle Sudeten problem, which I feel sure can be settled by a short discussion and will give him the essential territory, population and protection for both Sudetens and Czechs during transfer. I have offered myself to go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with German and Czech representatives and, if the Chancellor desires, representatives also of Italy and France.

³⁹ Contained in a second "White Paper" (Cmd. 5848), Document No. 1.

"I trust your Excellency will inform German Chancellor that you are willing to be represented and urge him to agree to my proposal which will keep all our peoples out of war. I have already guaranteed that Czech promises shall be carried out and feel confident full agreement could be reached in a week."⁴⁰

Here, again, Mr. Chamberlain referred to a conference that would include Czech representatives.

The Prime Minister then confirmed reports of Hitler's warning to Sir Horace Wilson that German "action" would begin at 2 P.M. that same afternoon. In this connection, proceeded Mr. Chamberlain, word had just come from Rome that the Italian Ambassador in Berlin had seen Ribbentrop promptly and had requested a 24-hour delay in mobilization so that Mussolini might search for a peaceful settlement. In response (announced Mr. Chamberlain, to cheers from the House) Hitler had just agreed to the postponement.

At this point, as the London *Times* diplomatic correspondent put it, "things began to happen." A few moments before, Lord Halifax had been seen to receive a message in the Peers' Gallery. He hurried out. Two sheets of paper were soon being passed to Sir John Simon, on the Treasury Bench, but he could not for a moment or so distract the Prime Minister from his account of his "last, last effort" for peace. Seizing on a pause, Sir John pressed the papers into Mr. Chamberlain's hand. The House sat tensely silent during the full minute he took to read them. Then he said quietly that Hitler had invited him, with Mussolini and Daladier, to come to Munich the next morning. "I need not say," he added, "what my answer will be."

The House went wild. London was not going to be bombed just yet. On the Prime Minister's motion the House adjourned to Monday, October 3 — two days later than the German deadline of October 1. But before that was done the principal Opposition leaders wished the Prime Minister God-speed. "I am sure," said Mr. Atlee (Labor), "that every Member of this House is desirous of neglecting no chance of preserving peace without sacrificing principles." Sir Archibald Sinclair (Liberal) referred to the British pledge to see that the Czechs executed their acceptance of the Anglo-French plan (they had not, be it emphasized, accepted anything further, apart from expressing a willingness to meet with German representatives in an international conference); he added that he hoped the Prime Minister would go to Munich

⁴⁰ Second "White Paper," Document No. 2.

equally determined to "see that the Czechoslovak State in its new frontiers will have a chance of economic survival and complete freedom and independence."

There was no mention by the Prime Minister of his previous insistence that Czechoslovakia be represented at the new parleys. Nor did anyone else present think of inquiring about this point. The Czech Minister, Mr. Masaryk, did inquire. He telephoned the Prime Minister late in the day, and then sent him a letter. The Prime Minister's decision was not made public.

Perhaps this is as good a moment as any to refer to certain actions by President Roosevelt which seem to have played a part in producing Mussolini's intervention in Berlin and Hitler's subsequent invitation for a meeting of the "Big Four" to settle Czechoslovakia's fate. On Tuesday, September 27, Washington heard of the German plans for the next day. The President decided that the rather uncompromising response which Hitler had made to his earlier note about the Kellogg-Briand Pact could serve as an excuse now for further observations. In a new message addressed to Hitler alone Roosevelt by implication refuted the assertion that responsibility for the decision between peace and war rested entirely on Beneš. "Present negotiations still stand open," the President telegraphed. "They can be continued if you give the word." Nothing, he continued, stood in the way of widening the scope of those negotiations "into a conference of all the nations directly interested in the present controversy." If war broke out, the President had in advance pinned the responsibility where it belonged.

On Tuesday evening President Roosevelt sent a cable to Mussolini also. The inspiration for it is not known, nor have its contents been published, but a good deal of speculation has occurred as to the timing of the various events with which it was interrelated.⁴¹ It would be intensely interesting to know whether either the message to Mussolini or the second message to Hitler was sent in the knowledge that London and Paris were ready to adopt the idea of a conference in which no Czech delegate would be heard. On Sunday, Chamberlain had suggested a conference of Czech, German and other representatives on how to bring the Anglo-French plan into effect; and on Monday he had received Prague's acceptance. Thereupon, Sir Horace Wilson had proposed the idea

⁴¹ Cf. Anne O'Hare McCormick and Arthur Krock in the *New York Times*, October 31 and November 1, 1938.

to Hitler. The same sort of a conference was mentioned in the Chamberlain messages to Berlin and Rome early on Wednesday, September 28. Wasn't this what Roosevelt had in mind, rather than a conference where no Czech representative would be present? Yet preparations for the latter kind of conference (*i.e.* Munich) must already have been under way in the European capitals. We might suppose that the President felt disillusioned, judging from his scathing remarks a month later (October 26) about "peace by fear" being no better than "peace by the sword."

According to recent information, Roosevelt's message to Mussolini was transmitted informally to the Italian Foreign Office on Wednesday morning by one of the secretaries of the American Embassy, as Ambassador Phillips was absent in Florence. On his return to Rome in the afternoon, Mr. Phillips delivered a formal confirmation. Whether the message of the President or some communication from the British Prime Minister reached Mussolini first, and the consequent question of how glory and responsibility should be allocated, must be left to the historians. At any rate, there were two or more telephone calls from Rome to Berlin on the 28th. Following these, Hitler postponed military action and invited the three foreign premiers to meet him at Munich the next day. The historians will also investigate, perhaps, how Mr. Chamberlain knew when he began his speech in Parliament that Mussolini had succeeded in arranging the former but did not yet know about the latter. Perhaps (as the *New York Times* reported on November 1 from a "fully authoritative" source) Chamberlain sent two messages to Mussolini, one, unpublished, asking him to dissuade Hitler from the impending military action, the second, contained in the supplementary "White Paper," suggesting a conference.

What made Mussolini on this Wednesday morning so much more persuasive with Hitler than he had been previously?

We can choose between two theories. Mussolini had been berating the democracies as "cowards" since Berchtesgaden. Now he had learnt positively that they really were getting ready to fight. He doubtless also had heard that the French plan of campaign was to keep as large a German force as possible busy on the Maginot line and meanwhile to take the offensive against Italy. Was he forced to inform Hitler that, far from sending Italian troops to help him, he might be needing help at home?

His navy would be bottled up between Suez and Gibraltar. His food would soon run low. If he remained neutral the victory of the democracies would ruin his prestige; and even if he joined in the fight they would, as things stood, win eventually anyhow. On all counts he must favor peace. Did he imply all this over the telephone so unmistakably that Hitler, himself informed — at the eleventh hour but “in precise terms” — of Britain’s determination, felt impelled to hesitate? Or, alternatively, did Chamberlain simply turn to Mussolini as a *deus ex machina*, saying that Hitler could have the substance of everything he wanted if only Mussolini and he would devise some way of making the surrender palatable to the British and French publics? Such might have been the purport of the unpublished telegram.

Was Munich “peace by fear?” The reader will have to judge — from the record of what went before, from the text of the Agreement signed at the Fuehrerhaus early on the morning of September 30, and from what has subsequently happened.

Chamberlain had said he would resist to the last any attempt to dominate the world by force, and presumably the British public shared his determination. The *Times* correspondent in Paris telegraphed that the Chamberlain phrase summed up all the feelings of the French public as Premier Daladier prepared for his journey to Nazi headquarters. Continental France had been Germany’s next-door neighbor too long, had seen her own soil invaded too recently, to become optimistic as suddenly as did insular Britain, with her very different traditional attitude toward European happenings. Like their allies across the Channel, all Frenchmen grasped at the chance of a last-minute escape from the horrible necessity of war. Yet, as the *Times* put it, optimism was kept within sober limits, for all felt that a long and difficult negotiation was ahead.

Arriving at Munich on Thursday for this negotiation, the heads of the two great democracies found themselves in strange surroundings. Chamberlain alighted from his plane about noon to a roar of “heils!” and reviewed a troop of black-shirted Elite guards while the band played “God Save the King” and “Deutschland über Alles.” After a visit to his hotel he proceeded through crowded streets to Hitler’s personal headquarters, the Fuehrerhaus. Mussolini and his son-in-law Ciano were met by Hitler at the old Austrian frontier (shades of the *Anschluss*!). The arrangement permitted the two dictators an hour’s quiet

talk together before public appearances began and before the conference. The Duce received an ovation from the Munich crowds second in warmth only to that given Chamberlain. The British Prime Minister was the most popular; the tribute that went to him for his peace efforts was certainly sincere. It was his first meeting with Mussolini, and Daladier's first with Hitler or Mussolini. Daladier, reported by observers as looking worn and tired, was greeted cordially also; but though his presence in Germany was said to be especially welcome to the authorities it naturally awakened less interest among the populace, who thought of him as a secondary figure.

By one o'clock all the principals had assembled at the Fuehrerhaus. It was decided, on Mr. Chamberlain's suggestion, that (as Mr. Frederick T. Birchall put it in his dispatch to the *New York Times*) some Czech representatives ought to be on hand "to receive and pass on to their Government the decisions of the Conference." The Czech Minister and an official from the Czech Foreign Office therefore arrived by air late in the afternoon "to await results." Prague announced that in the event Czechoslovakia were invited to participate, former Premier Hodža would join them as chief representative. This forethought was needless. No Czech was ever admitted to the conference room. The "Big Four" worked intimately together, alone. In a separate room a corps of assistants phrased and codified the ideas agreed upon within. Preliminary decisions were over by 3 o'clock, when there was an adjournment for an hour and a half. Already newspapermen were able to report that an understanding was in sight. The second sitting adjourned for dinner at 8:30 P.M. and resumed at 10. Then came the definite information that an accord was about to be signed. At one A.M. on Friday, September 30, the statesmen affixed their signatures and parted for the night. Several correspondents who saw them emerge have described their faces. Demaree Bess (*Saturday Evening Post*, December 3) said Daladier seemed "sunk in the depths of despair," Chamberlain had his usual "poker face," while Mussolini had a "broad smile" and Hitler was "walking on air."

This was the text, dated September 29: ⁴²

"GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following

⁴² Second "White Paper," Document No. 4.

terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment: —

“1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October.

“2. The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

“3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

“4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on the 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map⁴³ will be occupied by German troops in the following order: the territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October, the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October, the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October, the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

“5. The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

“6. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

“7. There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

“8. The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.”

⁴³ The four zones indicated on the map were as follows: The first was in the south, up to the outskirts of Krumau; the second consisted of the northern salients of Rumburg and Friedland and extended far enough south to include Bodenbach and to come to the outskirts of Reichenberg; the third consisted of the western tip of Czechoslovakia as far as Kaaden, including such towns as Asch, Eger, Marienbad, Karlsbad and Joachimsthal; and the fourth was an area in the north further east than Zone II, including the Friedeberg salient and the towns of Freiwaldau, Freudenthal and Jaegerndorf. (See map inserted at the end of this article.)

There followed an Annex, signed by the four statesmen, as follows:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

"When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia."

There also were three subsidiary declarations, each similarly signed:

"The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present."

"All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission."

"The four Heads of Government here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them to-day, shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia."

The Agreement was interpreted in the German and Italian press as a victory for the dictators and vindication for their bold policy. But the first demonstrations in Munich and Berlin and in Rome, and even more, of course, the shouting crowds in the streets of the two capitals the next day, showed that relief from the sudden anxiety of the past two days was the first and dominant reaction among the general public. In London and Paris, where the markets before the close on Thursday afternoon had shot upwards on the receipt of promising news from Munich, some restraint was noticeable at first and comments even late that evening were still to the effect that rearmament must go on and mobilization continue. The universal sense of relief in Paris did not, as the *Times* correspondent there phrased it, have "anything craven about it." But it was unmistakable.

The leading editorial in the London *Times* on Friday morning was of course devoted to praise of Mr. Chamberlain's heroic and successful efforts to ward off a conflict which would have been

"both criminal and grotesque," and to approval of the Munich negotiations "as at least a step towards substituting an agreed peace for an imposed peace." Nevertheless a second editorial printed by the *Times* that same morning called for some form of "national service" on the ground that "there must be just as great a difference between our future conception of national defense and our recent conception as there was between our recent conception and the conception prevailing before 1914." Thus in the very moment when his policy was crowned with success, the editor of the *Times* showed that though he had urged it on the Government out of very lofty principles he nevertheless recognized a rather unpleasant note of compulsion about it.

On Friday morning, before leaving Munich, Mr. Chamberlain had an intimate conversation with Chancellor Hitler. Before separating they put their signatures to the following short and simple declaration:

"We, the German Führer and Chancellor and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

"We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

"We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe."

Thus the British Prime Minister sought to reap some continuing good to set beside the immediate achievement that Europe was not at war. The policy of appeasement was to continue. The Fuehrer was delighted. It was all quite in consonance with the program of "Mein Kampf" — to win England's friendship and so her tolerance towards successive phases of German expansion in the east. He had had two successes only six months apart. First Austria had been annexed, now Czechoslovakia had been successfully disintegrated and would be swiftly reduced from a sovereign to a dependent State. Lord Halifax in July had offered assurance of peace in the west, based on Anglo-German collaboration, provided Germany would assist in reaching a peaceful settlement of the Czech problem. Assistance was hardly the word for what Hitler had offered since Berchtesgaden. Yet here were the assurances he had wanted. Strange, Chamberlain did not

even seem to be indignant or rebellious at having been forced to grant Germany primacy in Europe on her own terms. He actually drafted out in his own hand Nazi Germany's *laissez-passer* for further journeys across frontiers of "faraway" lands.

Back in London after announcing the Anglo-German peace declaration, Mr. Chamberlain received a wild public ovation and the honor of stepping out onto the floodlit balcony of Buckingham Palace with his Sovereigns to acknowledge the cheers of the densely packed crowds. Leaving the Palace about seven, he went to Downing Street where he uttered some memorable words to the people who had been waiting there all afternoon. "This is the second time in our history," he said, "that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time." The women in the crowd were almost hysterical. As one observer wrote, they probably had not read the terms of the Munich Agreement, but they knew it signified peace. Before they dispersed, the crowd sang "For he's a jolly good fellow" and the National Anthem. From the Dominions congratulations flowed in. The scattered sour notes from New Zealand and Canada were not audible till later.

In Paris there were parallel evidences of popular relief, enthusiasm and thankfulness. Premier Daladier's triumphant journey from Le Bourget to the War Ministry was punctuated by cries of "Vive Daladier!" and "Vive la paix!" In the evening, at a Council of Ministers, President Lebrun thanked him for his "enlightened and practical patriotism and courage." The *Paris-Soir* began its leading editorial "Peace, peace, peace!" Almost alone among leading French political writers, "Pertinax," consistent in the opinions which over the past twenty years had led to his being at some moments called a reactionary, at others a radical, labelled Munich "the great deliquescence." Signor Mussolini's welcome home was described by the London *Times* correspondent as one of "frenzied enthusiasm." By a coincidence, it was precisely the anniversary of his return a year before from his last visit to Hitler. His success this time was even more popular. Hitler arrived in Berlin Saturday. It was not clear to the public just how or why Germany had come so near the brink of war. They still had heard nothing about Roosevelt's second message to Hitler, Chamberlain's offer to guarantee the fulfilment of Czech promises, his appeal to Mussolini, or Mussolini's intervention. Only from the Sport Palace speech on the 26th, and from the

troops parading with full equipment in the Wilhelmstrasse on the 27th, had they guessed the seriousness of Germany's plight. Yet they could unite to give the Fuehrer a tumultuous popular triumph, for he both had won what he set out to get and had won it without a fight.

Only in Prague was it different. There the response to Munich was sullen despair. Capacity for surprise or anger, even for disillusionment, was gone. The Czech representatives at Munich had been refused a hearing. When the ink was dry on the document partitioning their country the British called them in and handed them a copy. The Czech Minister to Germany said he would like to make some observations. He was told that as the matter was closed he might spare himself the trouble. In Prague, it was the German chargé (not the British or French Minister) who first went to Foreign Minister Krofta to discuss the Munich decision. He called bright and early at 6:30 A.M. on Friday morning. Later in the morning the British Minister delivered to Mr. Krofta a message from Mr. Chamberlain saying he expected to receive the Czech reply by noon. No wonder, for the German troops were to begin moving the next day. The Government protested that it was being given no time to consider a matter of historic importance involving crushing responsibility. But in face of the British insistence they had no recourse but to yield to a decision taken, as they said, "without them and against them." At 5 P.M. the full extent of the catastrophe was made known to the Czechoslovak public. Premier Syrový said over the radio: "This is the most difficult moment of my life. I have taken the decision to save life and save the nation. Superior force has compelled us to accept." He was followed by the Commander-in-Chief of the army which had not been allowed to fight. He reminded his listeners that soldiers by their oath promise unconditional obedience to the state. The true soldier, he said, must endure failure.

From the Sudetenland, meanwhile, began a panic-stricken exodus of Czechs, Jews, German Social Democrats and other non-Nazis. Where were they to find shelter and food? They could not pause to ask or plan. Whatever their eventual fate, the first thing they had to do was flee before they were beaten and put in concentration camps or shipped to western Germany for forced labor on the frontier fortifications. There was precious little time. Premier Syrový's broadcast was at 5 P.M. Friday afternoon. As the Czech police and officials withdrew, Henlein's Nazis began

mopping up in approved style. Henlein had left no doubt what would happen. Speaking on the air on Friday he said his political opponents deserved no mercy and would get none. "We shall imprison them," he said, "till they turn black." At 2 P.M. on Saturday, October 1, the day and hour Hitler had predetermined, the German troops started marching into Zone I. Zone II was occupied Sunday, and Hitler himself accompanied in triumph the army that on Monday marched into Zone III. Many who tried to flee were refused admission to Czech areas. Those who could not flee — who had no means, who had no time, or who were told by Prague to stay where they were — could stay and "turn black."

IX. THE MUNICH AGREEMENT IN PRACTICE

Chamberlain and Daladier based their stand against the Godesberg ultimatum chiefly on the fact that it abandoned the orderly method laid down in the Anglo-French plan. Readers will recall the British Prime Minister's arguments. He was against a military occupation in advance of setting its limits; against leaving Czechoslovakia without safeguards, as would happen once the frontier areas and their great fortifications had fallen into German hands; against the threat to her national and economic independence; and against subjecting the non-Nazi parts of the population to "panic flight." They will also recall how Hitler scoffed at these arguments.

The best attempt to give a reasonable defense of what was done at Munich was the speech made by Lord Halifax in the House of Lords on October 3. It parallels fairly closely the speech made the same day by the Prime Minister in the Commons, but is somewhat fuller. Some of the points made by the two government spokesmen have merit, at any rate on the assumption that on the date mentioned they still were entitled to presume — what many doubted from the moment they read the Munich text — that Czechoslovakia had not already fallen, at one blow and absolutely, under German domination and that her power of effective resistance to German demands would not go rapidly to zero. Thus, as Lord Halifax pointed out, the Godesberg memorandum envisaged occupation of possible plebiscite areas by German and Czech forces until the date of the plebiscite, whereas by the Munich Agreement these were to be occupied by an international force. Of course Lord Halifax did not know on October 3 that Germany would "persuade" Czechoslovakia of the advisability

of a direct settlement, hence that there would be no plebiscites, and hence that no international force would be called in to provide an international atmosphere. He might, as suggested above, have foreseen these developments. But he would naturally hope for the contrary; for it was on that hope, however baseless it now appears to have been, that the Chamberlain and Daladier Governments presented Munich to world opinion as an act in defense of Czechoslovakia's real interests and for the preservation of a European order founded on negotiation rather than force.

Lord Halifax also noted that the Godesberg memorandum, besides demanding that the Czechs turn over intact such things as commercial and utility plants and rolling stock in the ceded territories, also "provided that no foodstuffs, goods, cattle or raw materials were to be removed" by the Czechs; in contrast, he pointed out, the Munich Agreement merely bound the Czechoslovak Government not to damage existing "installations." Lord Halifax might have suspected that this term "installations" would lead to all sorts of disputes, and he might have foreseen, for the reasons already cited, that these disputes could only be settled (as rapidly proved to be the case) in Germany's favor. The ingenuity of whatever technician at Munich suggested the superbly ambiguous word "installations" evokes admiration. But Lord Halifax naturally did not dwell on this aspect of it in his speech. We must suppose, since he was not at Munich, that he did not understand to what extent the Agreement simply stuffed all the Godesberg demands about goods and machinery and food reserves and cattle into a single portmanteau expression.

In some relatively minor particulars Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax were entitled to praise the Munich settlement. But on the greater matters involved it is hard to accept their judgments. Appearance and substance seem too far apart.

The Munich Agreement met Hitler's Godesberg deadline: the military occupation of Sudeten territory began on the day he had fixed. The limits of the territory that must be turned over eventually were not fixed before the occupation began. Czechoslovakia was to be rendered helpless before she had a chance to decide whether the whole of what was asked of her was reasonable and acceptable.

True, there were two modifications in the Godesberg schedule. Part of the "predominantly German territory" fixed by fiat was to be absorbed by Germany in four rapid bites instead of

one; the remainder (which came to be called Zone V) was to be delimited by an International Commission "forthwith," so that it could be taken over by German troops on October 10. The Commission would designate additional territories for plebiscites. The map issued in the supplementary "White Paper" which contained the Munich Agreement naturally could show only the four zones definitely scheduled for successive occupation beginning October 1. This map was widely printed in the world press. By comparison with the Godesberg map, also inserted in the "White Paper," it looked very fine. If the reader will turn to the map at the end of this article he will see that the net result was the same as Godesberg — or, rather, more disadvantageous for Czechoslovakia.⁴⁴ Furthermore, since the arrival of the German data on which this map was compiled for FOREIGN AFFAIRS, the German occupation has been extended at several points. Chamberlain and Halifax, employing almost identical phraseology, praised the Munich Agreement for establishing as a criterion the "preponderantly German character" of the areas affected and for leaving the interpretation of that phrase to the International Commission. They compared this with the fact that the Godesberg line "took in some areas which were certainly not of a preponderantly German character." Yet the result of leaving the task of interpretation to the Commission was that the line as eventually drawn was worse for the Czechs than Godesberg. If Godesberg would admittedly have given Germany "some areas certainly not of a preponderantly German character," then Munich must have done so also — and added to the number.

How did the Munich peacemakers propose to safeguard the independence of the rump Czechoslovak state which would remain after Germans, Poles and Hungarians each had taken their slice? This question had loomed very large in Mr. Chamberlain's protests against the Godesberg procedure. As if to show the secondary importance which it occupied at Munich it was dealt with in an Annex. The British and French Governments in this Annex stated that "they stand by the offer" made in the Anglo-

⁴⁴ I shall not pause to describe economic aspects of the situation created. For these see Miss Wiskemann's article in this same issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS entitled "Czechs and Germans After Munich." The east-and-west railway connecting Bohemia and Moravia has been cut. The railway along the Moravia connecting Prague and Bratislava has been cut by giving Germany the almost purely Czech town and junction of Lundenburg (Břeclav). To mitigate some of the resulting economic distress, Mr. Chamberlain announced on October 3 that a loan of £10,000,000 would at once be made available to the Czechoslovak Government.

French plan "relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression." What was the offer by which they were standing? Under the Anglo-French plan the British Government "*would be prepared, as a contribution to the pacification of Europe, to join in an international guarantee* of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression." The words which I have italicized show how tentative the offer was. If an international guarantee did not materialize, Britain was not formally bound. In the same Annex, Germany and Italy said at Munich that they would give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia, but only after the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities had been settled. Now England and France either were not willing to share responsibility for the drawing of Czechoslovakia's new frontiers with Poland and Hungary, or were not allowed to do so.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the British guarantee to Czechoslovakia as contained in the Munich Agreement would not become formally operative until those other frontiers had been settled, until Germany and Italy declared themselves satisfied, and either announced their respective guarantees separately or, the more usual procedure, joined with England and France to embody the guarantee in a separate treaty. Indirectly, then, London added its pressure to the pressure which Berlin and Rome were exercising on Czechoslovakia to force her to yield territories to third parties not even mentioned in the Anglo-French plan or in the Godesberg memorandum. And pending the completion of that procedure no formal British guarantee existed. These considerations were not discussed in any detail by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax.

The next day Sir Thomas Inskip said in Parliament, replying to Opposition questions, that the formal Treaty of Guarantee "has yet to be drawn up and completed in the normal way, and, as the Foreign Secretary has stated in another place, there are some matters which must await settlement between the Governments concerned." He proceeded: "Until that has been done, technically the guarantee cannot be said to be in force. His Majesty's Government, however, feel under a moral obligation to Czechoslovakia to treat the guarantee as being now in force. . . . His

⁴⁵ Poland's new frontiers with Czechoslovakia were settled after a Polish ultimatum to Prague. Germany and Italy fixed the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontiers by an "arbitration award" at Vienna, November 2. In both cases certain purely strategic or economic considerations seem to have played a part. In the Teschen district, Poland acquired about 80,000 Poles, 120,000 Czechs and 30,000 Germans. But all this is another story.

Majesty's Government would certainly feel bound to take all steps in their power to see that the integrity of Czechoslovakia is preserved." Let us leave aside the fact that a verbal statement by a Minister is not, anybody will agree, as solemnly binding as a direct written guarantee incorporated in a treaty with other nations signed by a Prime Minister. Consider the matter in a more practical light. Would a Czechoslovak appeal to Britain while Poland and Hungary were annexing Czechoslovak territory in October have elicited British military help? Obviously not. Those were the other matters awaiting settlement spoken of by Sir Thomas Inskip. The guarantee, then, was to come into effect later, if and when Czechoslovakia's enemies were ready to join in. Moral obligations were, in the circumstances, cold comfort to the Czechs. They concluded that the terms of the British undertaking must either have been so inadequately considered, or the paragraph of the Annex containing it so loosely drawn, that the guarantee amounted to much less in practice than perhaps Mr. Chamberlain sincerely intended should be the case.

Mr. Chamberlain confirmed this view on November 1 when he said that the question of the guarantee could not be "cleared up" (those were his words) until the whole question of minorities in Czechoslovakia had been settled. Referring to "our original offer" to enter into a new international guarantee, he said that "what the terms of that guarantee will be and who will be partakers in that guarantee is not a question on which I can give the House any further information today." He referred to the Inskip speech, but did not repeat the Inskip statement that a moral British commitment was already in existence. He did, however, add one very important observation, namely that Britain had never given a frontier guarantee, but simply a guarantee against unprovoked aggression. That, he remarked, was "quite a different thing." It was — as different, in view of the relationship in which Czechoslovakia found herself towards her immediate neighbors, as insecurity and security, fact and fancy.

Mr. Chamberlain had protested to Hitler at the prospect of "panic flight" and in his solemn broadcast when war seemed imminent he had spoken of the necessity of safeguarding in advance those "who do not wish to join the German Reich." If he gave thought at Munich to the fate of the non-Nazis and anti-Nazis in the Sudetenland the question did not touch his imagination with any more effective result than it apparently touched Lord

Runciman's a few weeks earlier. Not one phrase in the Agreement set any limits to the action which Hitler might take against persons falling into his power. If he felt like persecuting them to pay off racial or political grudges he was free to do so. There was eventually to be a right of option as to citizenship. Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax referred to it in their formal statements of October 3, but omitted to mention that the right was to be exercised not under the supervision of the International Commission but under a German-Czech commission. The Prime Minister's speech of November 1 rectified the omission, but added nothing to refute the criticism of Mr. Attlee that the protection of the optants clause was illusory. The fact is that the details were left fluid, would be settled only after Czechoslovakia had capitulated, and then would be carried out by a commission on which the Czech member could only, in the circumstances, bow and say "yes."

Even if the right of option is ever given practical application, and even if it then does not prove a farce in view of the Nazi pressure in the annexed areas, presumably it will be available only for Czechs and Slovaks. What will happen to anti-Nazi Germans and Jews? Was it "realistic" for the British and French negotiators at Munich to imagine, if they did imagine, that the German Reich would ever willingly let a single German go, even if he was in need of a long course of regeneration in a concentration camp? And certainly Czechoslovakia was in no frame of mind to risk German anger by receiving many German refugees. She had had too much trouble with a German minority to care about building up a new one. Besides, Prague was jammed, the whole national economy was dislocated, and even some Czechs who had fled from the Sudetenland were being shipped back there. In practical fact, then, for the miserable Germans who did not wish to become Nazis, and for the Jews, no security whatsoever was provided.

Over all the faults of the Munich Agreement the British and French apologists threw the cloak of the International Commission, consisting of Baron von Weizsaecker, of the German Foreign Office, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors in Berlin, and the Czech Minister. Its wide if extremely vague powers were put forward as the principal excuse for considering that the annexation ratified at Munich was not a surrender to force but an orderly transfer under international supervision.

The correspondent in Berlin of the London *Times* reported cryptically on October 5 that "sharp differences" had occurred between the Czech and German members of the Commission as to what constituted "predominantly German" districts. Mr. Joseph Driscoll, in London, was better informed. He telegraphed to the New York *Herald-Tribune* that same day that Ribbentrop had been insisting on using for a yardstick the ethnic situation as it had been in 1918 rather than the present situation, and that he had won his point. The next day the Commission announced its findings as to Zone V — its first important public decision. Some of the areas which the Czechs were ordered to give up were very far from being "predominantly German" according to the Czechoslovak census of 1930. In desperation, the Czech Government protested directly to Mr. Chamberlain (*cf.* London *Times*, October 10). The exact terms of the telegram are not known; probably it was an appeal as well as a protest. Neither availed.

What had in fact happened was even more unfavorable to the Czechs than Mr. Driscoll had reported. Since the Germans would not accept the 1930 census figures the International Commission had fallen back on the census of 1910 — 28 years old! Their excuse was that the Munich Agreement cited the Saar 1935 plebiscite as a model for the plebiscites planned for the Sudetenland.⁴⁶ The Commission accepted the German demand that not merely the proposed plebiscites, but in addition quite different ethnic matters (even though these were covered in paragraphs of the Munich Agreement which did not mention the Saar) should also be settled on the analogy of the Saar. This was an arbitrary decision, and the way in which it was then interpreted was very curious. The Saar plebiscite was in general based on the residence of voters in the Saar on the date of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. Since there was no way of deciding the ethnic complexion of the Sudeten areas at that same moment, the Commission decided to go back to 1910, the date of the last Austrian census, rather than forward to 1930, the date of the Czechoslovak census. In vain did the Czechs point out that in prewar Austria, to which the Sudetenland belonged, the figures were rigged against them. For example, all officials unless they were one hundred percent Czech were counted as German, and all Jews were counted as

⁴⁶ Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had stated on October 3 that this meant the vote was to be taken "by small administrative areas." They said nothing to suggest that this mention of the Saar had any other applicability or referred to any other portions of the Munich Agreement.

German. In addition, since the World War, many German-speaking people, former officials and others, had left the Sudetenland for Austria; and as a result of the breaking-up of the big feudal estates, many Czech agriculturists had moved in. So the prewar census did not give anything like a fair picture of existing fact. If this was considered irrelevant, the Czechs asked why a situation existing in an area of mixed population after 20 years of Czech rule was any more open to criticism than a situation existing after 300 years of Austrian rule?

The reader's attention is directed to the map appearing at the end of this article. Since this was prepared, the final German-Czech protocol of November 20 has transferred to Germany various additional small areas, scattered along the frontier shown here. Many of these areas are purely and typically Czech. But even on our map the solid black frontier line is seen to extend beyond the red Godesberg line to include several points which are interesting strategically or economically.⁴⁷ In the end the Czech member bowed to the Committee's decision setting the 1910 census as the standard for judging the ethnic composition of disputable areas. Once that had been done there of course was no need for plebiscites. In all, when the Commission had finished delimiting the Fifth Zone, it had handed over to Germany 215 parishes which according to the 1910 Austrian census had possessed a Czech majority, or, according to the Czech 1930 census, 315 parishes.⁴⁸ Subsequently, as already stated, other changes in the frontier have occurred. The total Czech minority handed over to the Reich as a result of Munich is now estimated to number some three-quarters of a million, though Mr. Chamberlain's optimistic figure on November 1 was "something like 580,000." The Germans still living scattered through Bohemia and Moravia number about 250,000. These figures reveal once again the difficulty of drawing any satisfactory line in mixed ethnic areas. But the strong indications are that where doubt existed the Germans have in general been given the benefit of it, and that in individual cases the reasons for neglecting the ethnic line have been strategic and economic.

It was when he discovered that England and France were going to support self-determination on a 28-year-old basis rather than on the basis of current fact that President Beneš determined to

⁴⁷ Cf. Miss Wiskemann's article "Czechs and Germans After Munich" in this issue.

⁴⁸ *Central European Observer*, October 28.

resign. He announced the fact to his "dear fellow citizens and friends" on October 5. When some of his military and other counsellors had appealed to him to throw the Czechoslovak Army, even at the last minute, into a desperate and probably hopeless resistance, he had refused. He still counted — even when the surgeons were gathered around the Munich operating table — on the British and French sense of fair play. Surely, he thought, they would secure a partitionment on a strictly ethnic line. His people were sacrificing the historic Bohemian frontiers and were losing the many hundred thousands of their brothers who lived mingled with Germans in the predominantly German areas. He hoped that unnecessary grounds for Czech resentment and future irredentism would not be laid. When it appeared that this consideration would not play a very important part in the discussions of the International Commission at Berlin it was too late to resist. Before the question of the census date had arisen plainly, and been settled in Germany's favor, the German troops already were moving into the first zones. The fortifications, with all their secrets, were in the enemy's hands. Precisely the situation which the Czechoslovak Government had foreseen, and against which Mr. Chamberlain himself had protested so eloquently between Godesberg and Munich, had now occurred. The terms and limits of the cession had not been fixed in advance. Czechoslovakia was crippled and helpless. While she still was strong her friends had not felt they should or could help her. Now that she was weak they watched, silent, as the procedure to which they had consented was carried to its logically inevitable conclusion.⁴⁹

Of course President Beneš had other reasons to resign. If he remained in the office to which he had been constitutionally elected Germany could continue to penalize his country, perhaps by favoring the partition of Slovakia between Poland and Hungary. His resignation was couched in dignified terms, without rancor or reproach. He appealed for unity and quiet strength. "The crown of the tree which is our homeland has been cut off,

⁴⁹ The real implications of Munich, especially the manner in which the International Commission would function (*e.g.* choice of the 1910 census) were of course not known to the British Parliament when on October 6 it voted confidence in Mr. Chamberlain 366 to 144. Only about 20 government supporters showed their disapproval by abstaining, but among them were important leaders, including Anthony Eden, Winston Churchill, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, Brigadier-General E. L. Spears, former Colonial Secretary L. S. Amery, and Alfred Duff Cooper, who had resigned October 3 in protest against a policy of allowing one great Power "in disregard of treaty obligations, of the laws of nations and the decrees of morality to dominate by brutal force the Continent of Europe." In the House of Lords effective criticism of the policy which led to Munich was voiced by Lord Cecil, Lord Lytton and Lord Lloyd.

but the roots of the nation stand fast in the soil." He left the country by airplane on October 22. Further to mark how completely the new Czechoslovak State differed from the Republic which since the war had stood as an island of democracy in Eastern Europe, the new Foreign Minister, Dr. Chvalkovsky, hastened to Berlin. Monuments and pictures of the Republic's two Presidents began to be removed. As the Prague papers put it, "We have finished with the Western Powers."

The International Commission faded rapidly from the picture. It took, or registered, other decisions, but none comparable in importance to its acceptance of the 1910 Austrian census. The Czechs had no further hope or trust in the Commission. They must face the hard fact that they now were defenseless vassals of a mighty neighbor who could exact any economic or political concession by merely threatening to take a few more of their villages or to close their trade outlets. The Germans had no more need of the Commission. England and France were glad to let their part in it pass rapidly and quietly into obscurity.

X. AFTERMATH

So much for Czechoslovakia.

Was Munich "peace for our time"? Appeasement if it means anything means satisfaction. Is Germany satisfied with her acquisition of a territory roughly the size of Belgium, close on the heels of her acquisition of Austria? Is her ally Italy satisfied? Viewing the present state of mind in those two countries, are the British and French people satisfied? Can we say that the Europe we survey at the close of 1938 is satisfactory all-around and that there is promise of sincere reconciliation, orderly evolution and peace?

The Munich honeymooners ran rapidly into some inclement weather.

Within a few days of the signing of the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German pact the German Minister of Economics, Walther Funk, was touring the Danubian and Balkan States, cashing in economically on Germany's new pivotal position in Europe. Back in Berlin from Ankara, Sofia and Belgrade, he reported on October 17 that he had "great economic reconstruction plans" for Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey, where there would be "extensive road construction and telephone and cable installation," and outlets also for German railway and bridge

material and the products of Germany's machine and chemical industries. In return, he continued, "Southeastern Europe and Asia Minor possess almost everything Germany needs, especially ores," and he noted that they also could supply Germany with agricultural products. He had made a trade credit of 150,000,000 marks to Turkey. On October 18, still striking while the iron was hot, he extended another of about 60,000,000 marks to Poland. On October 25 the results of his visit to Belgrade materialized in a new German-Yugoslav trade treaty, planned to balance exports and imports and to fix a stable ratio between the mark and the dinar.

Obviously, it is too early to speak of complete German economic dominance in the Balkans as a foregone conclusion. Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, even Hungary, have a good deal of will and some ability to resist. But the trend is plain. Mr. Chamberlain hastened to accept as natural Dr. Funk's erection of a German commercial juggernaut in Central and Southeastern Europe. For geographic reasons, he remarked on November 1, Germany must be considered as occupying "a dominating position" in that region. But there were men both in the City and in business who were less well satisfied. And across the Channel, some Frenchmen thought indignantly of the billions of francs spent since the war on arming France's protégés so that they might continue an independent political and economic existence, and of the sums devoted in those lands to propaganda on behalf of French trade and culture.

British discontent with German trade practices found sudden expression on November 30 in a frank statement by Robert S. Hudson, Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, that they were "destroying trade throughout the world." He noted that Germany was obtaining a "stranglehold" in Central and Southeastern Europe and elsewhere by paying more than the world price for wheat, barley, eggs and other commodities and by selling in exchange machinery and other German products at less than the world price. Germany was of course carrying on this unfair competition "at the expense of her own people." This was none of Britain's affair. But the wider aspects of the procedure certainly were, and if British industries could not secure fair competitive conditions they would have to say to Germany: "We will fight you and beat you at your own game."

British opinion, divided as to the effectiveness of Mr. Cham-

berlain's course in trying to pacify the dictators by kind words, concessions and pacts, united in annoyance when Chancellor Hitler, eagerly seconded by the controlled German press, began referring to all of Mr. Chamberlain's critics as war-mongers. The Fuehrer's speech at Saarbruecken on October 9 contained two extraordinary statements. The first was that "at the beginning of this year" he had "made a decision to lead back into the Reich 10,000,000 Germans who still stood outside." That remark branded as false all the Fuehrer's own statements made subsequent to January 1938 to the effect that he would respect the integrity and independence of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The other was a warning that the present leadership in England and France must not be changed if satisfactory relations with Germany were to continue. "In England," said Hitler, "it is merely necessary that instead of Chamberlain, a Duff Cooper or an Eden or a Churchill come into power. We know that the aim of these men would be to start war." The subsequent press campaign recalled the Italian vendetta of February against Mr. Eden. But this affair was even more aggravating. Direct instruction from the head of the German Reich as to who should or should not participate in the British Government was received in London with very poor grace.

On the heels of this came reports ⁵⁰ that Germany, in return for holding to the ratio embodied in the Anglo-German naval treaty, was preparing to demand a 3-to-1 preponderance in the air. Hadn't the Anglo-German pact of September 30 referred to the naval treaty as symbolic of the desire of the two peoples never to go to war again? Would Hitler so soon call it into question by attempting to trade it off for concessions in the air? The reports were not verified, but they persisted and added to the restlessness of some sections of the British public. Nor was the sense of exacerbation diminished by fresh pressure in the German press for prompt attention to Germany's colonial demands, summed up in the October 29 statement of General von Epp, leader of the German Colonial League, that what was wanted was not a colony here and there but Germany's former colonial realm "as a whole."

In the Far East, too, Munich had repercussions. Seizing on Britain's moment of obvious weakness, the Japanese on October

⁵⁰ See, for example, the three articles by "Augur," Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., and Frederick T. Birchall in the *New York Times*, October 14 and 15.

12 landed troops in South China and attacked Canton, isolating the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong and cutting off China's last direct link with the sea. As a result, Hong Kong besides facing bankruptcy has become a liability strategically. In July both Chamberlain and Halifax had given Japan blunt warnings that British interests in China would be protected. Now all that happened when Japanese troops began operating outside Hong Kong was a "reminder" from the British Ambassador in Tokyo that Anglo-Japanese relations might be disturbed.⁵¹ The Far Eastern ally of Germany and Italy had chosen her moment well. The success enabled the Japanese extremists to settle themselves more firmly than ever in the saddle. Their next step was to slam shut the door in China which western Powers had liked to think was still ajar.

Then with a crash burst the campaign of anti-Jewish atrocities, unleashed throughout Germany at a given hour one night in retaliation for the assassination in Paris of a German diplomat by a seventeen-year-old Jewish boy who had seen his family pauperized and shunted from pillar to post by the Nazis. Horror and disgust swept in a wave across the civilized world. Nowhere was the reaction more instantaneous and sincere than in England. Even Hitler's best friends were surprised and shocked by the pogrom and by the official decrees which followed the mob violence. The Marquess of Londonderry, inveterate apologist for German actions and ambitions, denounced as "detestable" what Hitler had ordered or permitted to occur in his rigidly controlled state.⁵² He still was for peace through the establishment of personal contact between the leaders of the Four Great Powers; but he was plainly on the defensive, and stated clearly that if Britain ever were "faced with a policy of truculence and threats," and could not overcome it by the policy she had tried to follow, namely peace based on friendship and a "helping hand," then she would adopt another policy in return, namely one of truculence and vehement protestation. And Lord Baldwin, who thought on October 4 that "there was nothing else on earth" that his successor Mr. Chamberlain could have done in September except go to Berchtesgaden, expressed on December 8 what his feelings had been when "like a bolt from the blue" he found

⁵¹ *New York Times*, July 28 and October 13, 1938.

⁵² Associated Press dispatch of December 1. The word "detestable" does not appear in the *London Times* report of the proceedings in the Lords, but the substance of the speech appears.

"world misery" at "our very doors." He appealed for funds to help relieve the explosion in Germany of "man's inhumanity to man" — to help find for thousands of men, women and children "despoiled of their goods, driven from their homes" some "hiding place from the wind, a covert from the tempest." The German press replied elegantly by calling him some of the names they had called President Beneš.

In France less concern was evident, at least in the press, over the latest wave of Jewish atrocities. Traditional French hospitality to political and racial refugees, though severely strained by previous influxes of unfortunates, and dampened somewhat by the Government's quite frank desire not to offend the Reich, nevertheless still survived. There probably was no less worry in France than in England over the post-Munich international outlook. But social questions engaged public attention; and the general relief that peace had been preserved, and the abstinence of great sections of the French press from any really critical appraisal of the results of the Daladier Government's foreign policy, for a time held anxiety in check. As in England, the sponsors of the Munich Agreement kept up a good front. M. Bonnet, addressing an enthusiastic assemblage of his constituents at Périgueux on October 8, sought to allay French regrets over what had happened to Czechoslovakia. "One criticism I cannot accept," he said, "and that is that France broke her word. That is not true. We never swerved from our attitude. We said: 'If Germany resorts to force, France will carry out her pledges of assistance.' We also said we would seek by every means to avoid such a resort to force and to obtain a peaceful solution of the Sudeten German problem" (*Temps*, October 10). On October 27 M. Daladier, breaking with the more leftist sections of the former Popular Front, maintained a similar thesis: "I cannot permit anyone to speak of the capitulation of France. . . . What was done at Munich was a rational act."

On both sides of the Channel rearmament meanwhile continued, and on both sides of the Rhine. The 500,000 men engaged on work along Germany's western frontier were reported still busy with new fortifications. Along her new frontier to the east she was seizing the opportunity to test out her heaviest guns against the Czech "Maginot line" to demonstrate their efficiency in reducing modern concrete fortifications. Italy, though foreseeing a deficit of 4,755,000,000 lire in the fiscal year beginning July 1,

1939, planned expenditures on air, naval and land forces aggregating 2,485,000,000 lire more than in the current year. The new French armaments budget recommended by the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies was larger than for the preceding year. So was the naval budget, with a good part of the increase earmarked for new construction. In England, assurances were given in the House of Commons that aviation shortages and defects in anti-aircraft defenses brought to light in the September crisis would be immediately remedied. The Air Ministry announced on November 10 that it will increase its expenditures by 75 percent in the fiscal year beginning April 1, not including the sums needed for civilian defenses or anti-aircraft equipment. The prediction that Mr. Chamberlain would soon be forced to announce conscription, despite his October 6 promise never to do so in time of peace, has not been fulfilled as these lines are written; instead, a volunteer "national register" has been opened by Sir John Anderson, new Minister for Civilian Defense. It remains to be seen whether the pounding of critics like Winston Churchill and Lloyd George will finally shake the present cabinet from the lethargy which marked the rearmament activities of the Baldwin régime.⁵⁸ Some of the firm things which Mr. Chamberlain has been allowing his cabinet ministers to say recently give ground to suppose a change is on the way. For example, Earl De La Warr, President of the Board of Education, on December 4 spoke of the "deep and growing feeling" that there really was nothing Britain could do to satisfy German discontent, that "friendly words and friendly actions are mistaken for cowardice and that only armaments can speak effectively."

In November it began to be reported that France and Germany were ready to sign a pact of friendship similar to the one Chamberlain and Hitler had signed at Munich. Mussolini probably had his own opinion as to just how much that sort of a pact amounted to. But it must have seemed to him a good moment to make plain once again, in Berlin as well as in Paris and London, his high "nuisance value" as make-weight between Germany and the two great democracies. At any rate, on November 30 there suddenly exploded in Italy a great campaign for the acquisition of French territories in the Mediterranean. In a Chamber where no

⁵⁸ An official of the Home Office, Wilfrid G. Eady, was reported (*New York Times*, October 31) to have stated publicly, referring to air precautions, that "we are not prepared, we have hardly begun to prepare, we don't know how all the failures that occurred during the crisis can be avoided next time."

mouse would dare squeak without Mussolini's permission, deputies stood and shouted for several minutes on end for the annexation of Tunisia, Corsica, Nice and Savoy. Everyone in the Chamber, excepting only the Ministers on their benches and the foreign diplomats and journalists in the galleries, joined in this amazing manifestation which was started and stage-managed by Roberto Farinacci, former Secretary-General of the Fascist Party. His first cry — "Tunisia, Tunisia" — was taken up by Achille Starace, present Secretary-General of the Party, who added "Corsica" for good measure. Then came the shouts for "Nice" and "Savoy." The President of the Chamber, Admiral Ciano, father of the Foreign Minister, joined in the demonstration. Count Ciano himself on the speaker's tribune remained impassive. Premier Mussolini sat immobile, "staring straight ahead," reported Arnaldo Cortesi, "his teeth clenched and his arms crossed over his chest." The next day, the Leghorn *Telegrafo*, personal organ of Count Ciano, said over the signature of its chief writer on foreign affairs that this all was in the spirit and according to the principle of Munich. Citing Munich as precedent, the writer said injustices must be repaired and frontiers rectified so as to bring about "a better distribution of European and colonial territories." The *Corriere della Sera* announced that Munich had not resolved all Europe's problems and that "the Munich method can and should again be applied, and with equal success." Some of the additional places mentioned in the papers for attention were Jibuti, Suez and Majorca. *Lavoro Fascista* announced threateningly that "anyone wishing to be Italy's friend must repair the injuries done her." Virginio Gayda, bellwether of Italian journalists, called Munich merely the starting point of work "begun, but not finished." The Italian nation is "ready for anything," he said, even "if necessary" to march against France.

What did all this really signify? Some thought it nothing more than a diversion staged in Rome to facilitate Hitler's next drive towards the east. Danzig and Memel had been ripened in the Nazi hothouse and were about ready for plucking. The stage for larger-scale action in the same direction was being set by a German press campaign about the hardships of the Ukrainians, divided among three harsh taskmasters, Russians, Poles and Rumanians. But such an interpretation makes Signor Mussolini out more altruistic than is usually the case with dictators. Was

not Mussolini, rather, reminding Hitler that the pay-off for his acquiescence in the Austrian annexation and his help at Munich was due and overdue? Nuisance value can only be maintained if one is never too securely in any camp. Since German troops reached the Brenner, the Duce may be very much Hitler's number two. But he must seek to remind him from time to time that he might conceivably shift over if among the fruits of "appeasement" there is not some plum at last for him.

Some of the other events of the late autumn have been perplexing, especially to students of Anglo-French relations. Only two weeks after England had belatedly signed the agreement with Italy which binds both countries to respect the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean, the Italian campaign for French lands in that region was opened in the Italian Chamber. It was disavowed by the Fascist Government but continued in the government-controlled press. On December 3, accepting the disavowal, Mr. Chamberlain announced he would go to Rome in January for a talk with Signor Mussolini. Some interpreted this as a hint to Hitler that Chamberlain was just a shade disappointed at the way Germany had been living up to the spirit of Munich. Then on December 6 M. Bonnet received Herr Ribbentrop in Paris, and the two Foreign Ministers put their signatures to the following brief document:

"1. The French Government and the German Government share fully the conviction that pacific and good neighborly relations between France and Germany constitute one of the essential elements in the consolidation of the situation in Europe and the maintenance of general peace. The two governments will in consequence use their best endeavor to assure the development of relations between their two countries in this direction.

"2. The two governments take note that between their countries no question of a territorial order remains in suspense and they solemnly recognize as definitive the frontier between their two countries as it is at present established.

"3. The two governments are resolved, under the reservation of their special relations with third party powers, to remain in contact on all questions interesting their two countries and to consult together mutually in the event that any ulterior evolution of these questions might risk leading to international difficulties.

"In faith whereof the representatives of the two governments have signed the present declaration, which enters into effect immediately."

The German Foreign Minister, who had been practically smuggled into Paris, sped to the Quai d'Orsay through streets where the crowds stood stolid and silent. Not a Nazi flag flew. The cere-

mony took place in the Salon de l'Horloge. In that same room M. Briand, Mr. Kellogg and the representatives of other peace-loving states had set their hands in 1928 to a pact outlawing war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact bound its signatories to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. The Franco-German declaration of 1938 recognizes the German-French frontier as definitive and beyond that merely obligates the two countries to consult over differences which may arise, reserving by implication the right to fall back on war as a last resort. Mr. P. J. Philip certainly did not exaggerate when he telegraphed his paper that "peace between two nations was never registered more simply."

Although Mr. Chamberlain had been at pains to assure M. Daladier that the Anglo-German accord did not in the slightest degree affect the Anglo-French alliance we may not unreasonably suppose that Hitler hoped it might have precisely that effect. At least Berlin may have reasoned it would worry France into joining hands with Germany on something like Germany's own terms — first and foremost, probably, by the final annihilation of the Franco-Russian mutual assistance treaty, long Germany's No. 1 desiderata. And indeed in his tirade against the Communists on October 27 M. Daladier took a long step in that direction. Had it been one of Hitler's prerequisites to a Franco-German treaty? That treaty, in turn, may have been planned in Berlin to have a chilling effect on Anglo-French relations, or at least to worry England into slackening her criticism of some features of German domestic policy and perhaps into adopting a more helpful attitude towards Germany's colonial demands. But on the whole the Anglo-French entente does not seem so far to have suffered. It is fair to say on Daladier's behalf that in authorizing the signature of the treaty with Germany he was no more than paying back Chamberlain for the Anglo-German pact and for the Anglo-Italian Treaty of last spring, called into effect this autumn, Paris couldn't help thinking, at a rather inappropriate moment.

Above all, Berlin attempted by the Anglo-German pact to divert England from Central and Eastern Europe. And in fact, in a speech already quoted, Mr. Chamberlain did actually describe that region as one where Germany would naturally be expected to be dominant. Similarly, Berlin attempted by the Franco-German pact to divert France from Central and Eastern Europe. This was less necessary than before the eclipse of France's former protégé, Czechoslovakia, but the Soviet-French Treaty

still remains in existence, at least on paper, and its final extinction ranks high among German aims. Each of the two pacts supplements the other. Italy, meanwhile, emphasizes her nuisance value and the importance of her rôle in a possible conflict between her partner of the Rome-Berlin axis and the democracies. Still united in blackmail — as in the Ethiopian crisis, the Czech crisis and throughout the Spanish civil war — each aims at securing the maximum rewards for itself without straining the partnership too far.

What judgment is one to give, in such circumstances, on the policy of appeasement? An American, be it repeated, must try to avoid moralizing. But must he accept the policy as having been expedient? The American Ambassador at the Court of St. James' seems to do so. Urging that differences between democratic and dictator governments be not allowed to grow into "unrelenting" antagonisms, he remarked on October 19 that "after all, we have to live in the same world whether we like it or not." Observers not so close to 10 Downing Street see difficulties in a live-and-let-live policy in a world where others do not reciprocate good feelings and soft actions. Might not Mr. Chamberlain have done better to adopt a motto implying more reciprocity than "appeasement"? After all, one can feel that by September 29 something like the Munich Agreement had become the only alternative to open hostilities without feeling that the policy which pointed toward Munich necessarily was expedient in February, or in July, or in August, or when Chamberlain decided to "come across" to meet Hitler face-to-face at Berchtesgaden, or in the days immediately thereafter, or even in the more doubtful period after Godesberg. Would a bolder choice of the sort of a world in which Englishmen have traditionally shown that they do positively like to live, rather than acquiescence in the idea that they must live in a different sort of world "whether they like it or not," have won the former and staved off the latter? The possibility is suggestive for Americans who see some such eventual choice before them too.

Certain general disadvantages in the Chamberlain method which Mr. Kennedy's phrase unconsciously indicated have become even plainer since he spoke. How will what was done to Czechoslovakia at Munich affect the sanctity of international contracts, not as moral instruments but as the incarnation of a rule of law? What sort of engagements will European states

henceforth consider as possessing any particular value? What, further, becomes of the idea of sovereignty? The principle of self-determination, taken into account by the authors of the Treaty of Versailles along with historical, economic and strategic factors, often is in conflict with the concept of national sovereignty. What consequences will the recent application of the principle of self-determination have for nations like England and France, which can establish no possible ethnic claim to ownership over their far-flung possessions?

There has been no fighting — at least over Czechoslovakia, though of course in Spain and China undeclared international war has been raging as bloodily as if it had been punctiliously announced. For the avoidance of bloodshed over Czechoslovakia the peoples of Europe give thanks, and Americans with them. Furthermore, so long as a war has not actually begun it always may in some manner be avoided altogether. But viewed from the western side of the Atlantic the situation today prevailing in Europe does not seem to be so much peace as an armistice. Even Mr. Chamberlain must feel like saying with the Psalmist, "I labor for peace, but when I speak unto them thereof they make them ready to battle."

CZECHS AND GERMANS AFTER MUNICH

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

THE international significance of what the Czechs immediately designated as the *Münchener Diktat* of September 29, 1938, has been endlessly discussed, and its general consequences have, in the United States at least, been accurately appreciated. But the smaller scale results, as they must affect the lives of the Czechs and Germans themselves, have not been considered in very much detail.

It is difficult to convey to people unfamiliar with Bohemian traditions the emotional meaning of the ancient frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia. Much has been written of the emotional wound inflicted upon the Germans by the creation of the Polish "Corridor," which had been German only since Frederick the Great succeeded in manœuvring Maria Theresa and Catherine the Great into the first partition of Poland scarcely a century and a half before the Treaty of Versailles. The frontiers of Bohemia were something like a thousand years old; in all that time they remained intact — unlike Hungary's, which were obliterated by a Turkish occupation — until the German occupation of October 1938. Innumerable traditions bind the Czechs to the very districts of Bohemia which have become most preponderantly German, and, since the early mediæval kingdom of St. Wenceslas was established, the Czechs have regretted the successive waves of German immigration. The Germans showed prowess in peaceful penetration; they accepted a Bohemian domicile, but they persistently refused to speak the language of the Czechs.

But even laying all sentiment aside, in so far as the Munich frontiers are definitively drawn at the time of writing,¹ we must consider them unjustifiable from other points of view. It has become evident that they give Germany almost exactly the same total area as did the Godesberg Plan, which shocked not only liberal opinion all over the world, but also — as he himself bore witness — Mr. Chamberlain. Since the Germans rejected all postwar statistics, the new frontiers are mostly, though not entirely, based upon the last Hapsburg census figures, which are twenty-eight years old. In prewar Austria the nationality of the citizen was decided by his *Umgangssprache*, that is to say by his

¹Early November 1938.

language of everyday use. The peculiar results to which this criterion led were recently impressed upon readers of the London *Times* by a letter from Mr. Wickham Steed who in 1910 was the Vienna correspondent of that famous journal. Mr. Steed had entered himself as British on the census paper; he was thereupon visited by an Austrian official, and since in Vienna his *Umgangssprache* was German he was forced to write himself down a German. Thus he was entered as a member of the German national group in Austria, where the relative strength of national groups already decided important issues. Enormous pressure was exerted upon the Slav inhabitants of Hapsburg Austria to register as Germans, more especially since to be German was to rank as socially superior. The census was not like a secret vote, and the Czech lignite miner in North Bohemia knew that it might be as much as his job was worth to register as Czech. The lignite mines were German-owned and imposed a German *Umgangssprache*; moreover, the Bohemian Germans regarded Northern Bohemia as their own sacred soil — Czechs in that area were held to be under an obligation to get Germanized as fast as they could, an attitude kept up by the Germans throughout the postwar period, although they intensely resented the idea that Germans living in Czech majority areas should be subjected to any suggestion of Czechification. In Moravia before the war the pressure upon Czechs to register as Germans was, for various reasons, more effective still. The first Czechoslovak census in 1921 therefore revealed a transformation. It might be argued that the opposite pressure under the Czechoslovak authorities after the war was as great — indeed German propagandists like to regard it as far greater. But this is historically untrue. There were some local irregularities in 1921, but the far more satisfactory test of the citizen's mother-tongue was applied, and since the Germans tended still to be in socially superior positions there was no opportunity for the Czechs to apply the subtler forms of pressure which had been exerted in favor of the German national group in prewar days.

The application of these census figures of 1910 to the circumstances of 1938 is in any case grotesque, quite apart from the strange manner in which they often were obtained. Aside from the increase of Czech officials in predominantly German districts after the war, there was a natural tendency for Czech labor to flow towards Northern Bohemia until about 1930, and a very

strong case for the settling of Czech peasants on land which had formed part of gigantic German-owned estates. Today all this is entirely discounted. The *Münchener Diktat* has incorporated in Germany the whole lignite area in the north, including a town like Dux (Duchcov) which, in the municipal elections last June, was shown to be nearly half Czech and which has Czech villages scattered around it. Altogether, some 400,000 Germans — 60,000 in Brno, 50,000 in Prague, and about 200,000 in Slovakia — remain on Czechoslovak territory.² Against this number, over 700,000 Czechs are being handed over to the Reich, while another 120,000 Czechs have been surrendered to Poland.

The most unjustifiable territorial changes — and incidentally the most marked overstepping of the Godesberg line — have been carried out in Northern and Southern Moravia. The Czechs feel bitterly over the acquisition by Germany of the Hohenstadt (Zabřeh) district, which contains 42,000 Czechs to 26,000 Germans. It was agreed that Czechoslovakia's retention of the 16,500 Germans in the Jihlava (Iglau) district could be set against the Hohenstadt Czechs, but the Czechs point out that their people around Dux and Brůx more than balance Jihlava. Hohenstadt is, however, something like a Czech enclave, and was, therefore, quite unlikely to be saved. Flagrantly indefensible in Northern Moravia is the new frontier northeast of Hranice (Mährisch Weisskirchen) and southwest of Polička. Hranice remains in Czech hands, but seven adjoining communes have now gone to Germany; even according to the 1910 figures, these communes had 4,027 Czechs and 115 Germans! The town and district of Polička (actually just in Bohemia) were also admitted to have a Czech majority in prewar days; according to the last census taken in 1930, Polička itself had 5,891 Czech and 149 German inhabitants. Together with two further communes containing 3,619 Czechs and 34 Germans, it has now become part of the German Reich. To the south, the districts of Lundenburg (Břeclav) with 18,120 Czechs and 1,808 Germans and Mährisch Krumau (Morávský Krumlov) with 3,047 Czechs and 349 Germans have now gone to Germany.³ These are only the most strikingly unjustifiable examples of the "racial justice" which the National Socialist Government offers to Central Europe. Theoretically, frontier adjustments may yet be made; but it is safe to presume

² The figure includes a good many German-speaking Jews in Prague and Brno.

³ 1930 figures are used where not otherwise stated.

that the Czechs have nothing to hope for. M. François-Poncet the French representative on the International Commission which nominally drew the new frontiers, occasionally protested against Germany's orders, but his efforts were entirely fruitless. As the Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* has very significantly written: "The bearing of the German representatives [on the military sub-commission] . . . has only one parallel — namely the bearing of the German military chiefs at Brest-Litovsk in 1917."

And now, how does all this affect the lives of the Czechs? About three-quarters of a million of them, despite their immensely sturdy democratic traditions, are handed over to a totalitarian régime which, far from guaranteeing minority rights such as those provided by the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920, sets out to obliterate every point of view other than that of the party which dominates the state. The remaining 6½ millions are left with no strategic frontiers, with their railways cut and their economic life mutilated. The main railway lines from Plzen and Prague in Bohemia to the two big towns of Moravia, Brno and Moravská Ostrava, are cut by the new big German salient in Northern Moravia, where, incidentally, Hohenstadt is a junction of some importance; the line from Prague to Ostrava is cut twice, since Olomouc remains on Czechoslovak territory. With Lundenburg in German hands, railway communication between Moravia and the now autonomous Slovakia is cut, for all the main Moravian lines met at Lundenburg in order to proceed to Bratislava. It was interesting to see with what rapidity Polish troops occupied Bohumín, the junction northeast of Ostrava; and the line from Ostrava to Košice (Kassa) in Slovakia traverses territory now Polish in order to reach the junction of Žilina, while Košice itself has passed into the possession of Hungary.

The economic losses of the Czechs are incalculably great. The cession of Northern Bohemia deprives them of practically their whole supply of lignite — the fuel basis of their industries, of their railways and of the heating of their houses; since 1918 the house-heating system of Prague has been entirely built up upon the use of lignite. Meanwhile, the Polish occupation of the Teschen district — of which the able correspondent of *Le Temps* in Prague has written that it is "beaucoup plus riche d'industries que de Polonais" — has robbed the Czechs of the Karwina bituminous coal mines, together with the big *Berg-und Hüttenwerk* steelworks

at Třinec in which Schneider-Creusot capital is invested. The Czechs are left with the coal of Kladno near Prague, and — at present — with that of Moravská Ostrava, a city now wedged more uncomfortably than ever between Germany and Poland. The wireless station at Schönbrunn (Svinov) and the territory all around have now been included in Germany though this Czech area was not claimed at Godesberg. The Czechs still retain the gigantic Vitkovice steelworks in all but their entirety, and they still own the machine factories of Brno and the huge Škoda armaments concern at Plzeň and elsewhere. Now that Czechoslovakia has lost the only frontiers which she could have defended, it is ironic that she should own the biggest armaments works in Europe after those of Krupps; and in any case Plzeň is now virtually a frontier town, and Germany will certainly prevent Škoda from sending armaments where she does not wish them to go. Meanwhile the iron ore of Slovakia has been ceded to Hungary, so that all iron ore has now to be imported.

All the chief electric power stations of Bohemia, while supplying the Czech-speaking interior, were situated in the mountainous, mainly German-speaking districts of the pre-Munich Republic. They have now been taken by the Germans, including, for example, that of Ervěnice (near Brüx), which supplied the city of Prague and was the joint property of the Prague municipality and of the Czechoslovak State. The big chemical works of Aussig are now cut away from their headquarters in Prague and their factories in Slovakia; it is hoped to shift the center of the Czech chemical industry to Kolín just east of Prague.⁴ Many other industries have been broken up in similar fashion.

One of the virtues of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia was a nice balance between industry and agriculture, which was partly the result of the natural evolution of the economic life of Bohemia and Moravia within their ancient frontiers. Not only has a boundary now been drawn between the Czech-speaking food-producing peasants of the interior and the hungry Sudeten German factory-workers, but there is also, for example, a frontier between the hops of Saaz and the breweries of Plzeň and Budějovice (Budweis), and between many beet-growing Czech farmers and the sugar mills of Brüx and Böhmisches Leipa. Further, the china clay of the Karlsbad district is completely cut away from Czechoslovakia. The majority of the potters and porcelain-makers

⁴ See *Prager Presse*, October 21, 1938.

ers are, however, cut away too, and the industry is in any case in considerable distress. The chief glass-producing centers have gone to Germany, but there are probably enough glass-workers left in the rump of Czechoslovakia to build up a satisfactory inland glass industry. It used to be a Sudeten German grievance that the Government spent money on training centres, *e.g.* at Hradec Králové (Königgrätz) and Eisenbrod, for Czech glass-workers instead of putting all available resources at the disposal of Sudeten Germans; but today the Czechs may benefit from this.

The loss of the Karlsbad potteries or of the textile concerns of Northeastern Bohemia cannot, however, be regarded as necessarily disadvantageous. Apart from the fabric-glove industry of Asch, Sudeten German textile factories were mostly poor and on too small a scale to compete in the world market. The Czechs, moreover, have textile concerns at Hradec Králové and elsewhere. Nor can it be denied that from the economic point of view, they are well rid of the poverty-stricken Erzgebirge villages with their luxury home industries of lace-making and musical instruments. Again, the loss of the bankrupt spa towns of Karlsbad, Marienbad and Franzensbad is no economic disaster in itself; the Republic is still left with Piešťany and the other spas of Slovakia.

Above all, it is the financial losses of Czechoslovakia which are overwhelming. The Prague Government is faced with a heavy mobilization bill dating from May 21, 1938, and with a stream of refugees, including some fifty to sixty thousand jobless officials from the lost territories. On October 18, *i.e.* before the cession of territory to Hungary, the Czech Finance Minister, Dr. Kalfus, estimated the tax-paying capacity of the country to have been reduced by 40 percent. Both the State and the Czechoslovak banks have lost vast amounts of capital invested in one way or another in the territories which have been given up; the State, for example, had built innumerable schools (not all of them Czech ones), a good many roads, and of course the now abandoned fortifications. The State and the biggest Czech bank, the *Živnotenská Banka*, owned the North Bohemian lignite mines between them,⁶ and the "Živno" will have lost money invested in the Aussig chemical industry and in Sudeten German industry elsewhere. The Czechoslovak National Bank has directly and indi-

⁶ It is interesting that the Živno Bank bought up these mines as recently as June 1938 from Sudeten German Jews.

rectly helped Sudeten German banks of all kinds; the capital it has advanced must now be regarded as, at the best, frozen in Germany. Thus at the moment when credit is desperately needed in Czechoslovakia, her chief internal credit-supplying institutions are themselves all but paralyzed, and it seems inevitable that some of her banks will collapse. It had been the pride of Czechoslovakia to be relatively independent of foreign capital. To what extent the credits which have been advanced by the British Government can be devoted to the reorganization of the rump of the Republic is not, however, clear. According to the Treaty of Versailles, the Successor States had to take over portions of the National Debt of the countries from whom they inherited territory and to pay something towards the cost of the State buildings taken over; but there is no reason to presume that Berlin will now make any such offer to Prague. On the contrary it appears that Germany may claim payment from the Czechs for the Czech crowns now being converted into marks in the ceded territory. Further, there is the *Wiedergutmachung* or reparations claim first mooted by Henlein in a speech at Aussig on February 28, 1937. Instead of the Czechs receiving some compensation for their immense losses, it is suggested from Germany that they are to compensate the Sudeten Germans for losses sustained by them as the result of their incorporation in Czechoslovakia in 1919.

The Germans in prewar Austria held a privileged position. After the war the Czechoslovak Government abolished this privilege; it split up huge estates, which were nearly always the property of Germans or Hungarians, and distributed them among land-hungry Czech and Slovak peasants; in the process of doing so, as invariably happens in such circumstances, some abuses occurred, though the measure as a whole was a social necessity. But the more extreme Sudeten Germans branded the Czechoslovak Land Reform as theft (though a low rate of compensation was always in fact paid), and they claimed that the Czechs should be forced to restore the property in question. It looks very much as if the British credits will be used up in satisfying Germany's financial demands. Even if the *Wiedergutmachung* claim is not insisted upon, the postwar settlers in the territory now ruled by Germany are either lost Czechoslovak citizens or among the hordes of refugees whom the Prague Government has on its hands.

Before 1919 the Czechs as a whole lived in a condition of great

poverty. Even after Czechoslovakia had been established for some time, in spite of the equalization of wealth and many new openings, the relative poverty of middle-class officials or of working people was striking, as compared with conditions in Germany or France; indeed the willingness of Czech workmen to work for lower wages than Germans continued to aggravate Czech-German relations as it had to a greater degree before the war. It is clear that the Czech standard of living is now to fall heavily back again.

Linked with this comes political subjection to Germany. It would be absurd to deny that the Czechs have undergone a bitter disillusionment with regard to some of the principles which they had hitherto taken for granted; it is, nevertheless, evident that Czechoslovakia has had to reverse her foreign policy and suppress her Communist Party primarily at the dictation of Berlin. A new constitution is under discussion to be applied to the new federal Czech-Slovak-Ruthene state. Proportional representation is to be abolished and the number of political parties thereby reduced; it does not yet appear that it is to be reduced so far that only one Czech party shall remain, though Slovakia is completely *gleichgeschaltet* by now and this inevitably brings Czech repercussions. The Syrový Cabinet consists of men who belong neither to the Chamber of Deputies nor to the Senate. At the same time, the slogans of the moment are "renewal" and "planning," and the *Prager Presse* points out that one must learn from one's enemy.⁶ It is difficult not to wonder whether the new Supreme Economic Bureau (the N. U. H.) and the new labor camps will not also lead away from the spirit in which Masaryk founded the Republic.

So much for the Czechs. But what does Munich mean for the Sudeten Germans themselves? The young people are, as a whole, fanatical Nazis; to be annexed by Germany was their dearest wish; they will merely have to adjust themselves to post-millennium disappointments. For those over 30 it is quite another matter. When Henlein repeated to his English friends in London as late as May 1938 that he still wished for autonomy within the Czechoslovak State, whether he was speaking sincerely or not, he was expressing the wishes of a very considerable proportion of his followers. The simple unpolitically-minded Sudeten German could only tell one that he wanted to be governed by his own people, not by Czech officials; he did not contemplate adminis-

⁶ October 2, 1938.

trative annexation to the Reich. Many of Herr Henlein's closest collaborators had remained under the more Catholic, less Socialistic, influences of the Viennese Professor, Othmar Spann, who was imprisoned by the Nazi authorities when Germany annexed Austria. Sudeten German employers were mostly keen Henleinists because they welcomed Henlein as an ally against the Social Democrat Trade Unions — indeed, they forced their workmen into the Henleinist party without scruple — but they did not necessarily wish to be subjected to restrictions or large-scale competition from the Reich. The survivors of the old aristocracy were undoubtedly sincere in their profession of loyalty to Dr. Beneš in the middle of September. There was, of course, a strong Pan German tradition, especially among the German professional classes in Bohemia and Czechoslovak Silesia, who had always advocated a consistent and vigorous Germanization in Central Europe; to them the Munich Agreement represents a long step in the right direction.

In spite of vociferous Nazi propaganda by radio, in spite of the flow of intimidating rumors, in spite of pressure from employers and years of terrible slump conditions in the distressed areas of the Sudeten German country — conditions for which all its enemies unjustly held the Czechoslovak Government responsible — a democratic tradition had nevertheless survived among the Sudeten Germans. Those over 35 grew up in old Austria where democratic ideas had shown a certain vitality and Social Democracy had played a great and courageous part. It is probably accurate to consider that about half a million Germans living in the areas which have now become German had remained opposed to totalitarianism up to the last. So soon as the Czech authorities withdrew, Henleinist *Freikorps* men became free to assault these people as brutally as they wished, and with the arrival of the German authorities, they have been disappearing into *Gestapo* prisons and concentration camps. Many of those who at first escaped into Czech territory were sent back to their homes. The Munich negotiators ignored the fate of these unfortunate democrats. It would not have been difficult to arrange that some of them change places with the Germans left in predominantly Czech towns, but as yet one hears of no measures to bring this about.

While the Germans who remain in Czechoslovakia will share the fall in the Czech and Slovak standard of life, the economic

outlook for the newest subjects of the German Reich is no rosy one. At present no tariff barrier has been set up between Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten German firms. But while Asch gloves and North Bohemian stockings (which did well in Czechoslovakia) cannot possibly compete with the bigger German factories, there is certainly no more room in the world today, slump or no slump, for the more antiquated small-scale Sudeten German textile concerns than for the distressed sections of the Lancashire textile industry or South Wales mining. The same thing applies to the glass ornaments industry around Gablonz, and to lace and toy-making in the Erzgebirge. The working people concerned will have to be taken elsewhere and taught other work, and a transitional period of great difficulty is inevitable. These Bohemians are the most conservative home-lovers, and it is safe to prophesy that they will resent, not only the higher cost of living in the Reich, but also being moved into labor camps or to work on the fortifications in the west. On the other hand, some North Bohemians had already been drawn into the armaments factories which have been expanding over Saxony, and this tendency will now be sharply stimulated. The prospect for the Sudeten German porcelain-makers and lignite miners is also a fairly gloomy one. The Reich already produces a good deal of lignite and more china objects than it needs, while Czechoslovakia intends to make efforts to reduce its consumption of lignite through electrification.

From an economic point of view Germany does not at first sight appear to have gained very much. She already has something of a food problem, and has now acquired three and a half million inhabitants living within a mainly mountainous territory which cannot supply their food. She requires raw materials and skilled workers, and she has acquired antiquated textile industries dependent upon imported cotton and a number of cottagers who are accustomed to making toys and fiddles and glass beads in their homes. Her mineral acquisitions consist of the lignite coal fields, and beyond that a little copper near Karlsbad, and the radium mine at Joachimsthal which is run at a dead loss; in Komotau, Teplitz-Schönau, Bodenbach and Eger she gains a number of metal-workers. So far the bargain appears not to be a good one. But with regard to timber on the one hand and gold reserves on the other Germany's expansion in October supplements her seizure of Austria in March. What she now gains in Bohemia and Czechoslovak Silesia in forest land amplifies the

timber at her disposal in Austria, and at Krumau in Southern Bohemia she acquires the biggest paper mills in the old Hapsburg Monarchy. It would be natural to suppose that she would offer some compensation to the Czechoslovak State, which owned most of the forests; instead, she will rather demand payment for herself because they were once the property of some Austrian aristocrat — whose Hapsburg sympathies may meanwhile have sent him to Dachau! To add to the gold acquired by the Nazi régime in Vienna, Germany will now apparently demand gold payments from Prague against the substitution of the mark for the Czech crown in the Sudeten German districts, and to meet other claims. This will ease her gold situation and increase her ability to buy raw materials abroad.

So long as the old independent Czechoslovakia existed, she was the leading partner not only in a diplomatic, but also in an economic, Little Entente. She could supply Rumania and Jugoslavia with many of the manufactured goods they required; if she could not consume their foodstuffs and other raw materials, she often successfully resold them. She thus prevented these other small countries from becoming entirely dependent upon their trade with Germany. Today Czechoslovakia is too small, too weak, too dependent to fill that rôle. The Reich can dictate terms of barter to the small states of Central and Eastern Europe and, with the other Great Powers distant and half-hearted, these have no choice but to acquiesce. If Germany can draw them into a Customs Union — that *Mittel-Europa* dreamed of by the prewar and wartime Pan Germans — her own big textile industries may kill the postwar textile manufactures of Rumania and Hungary. As these have been largely produced by Jewish industrialists, the anti-Semites of Bucharest and Budapest may be willing enough. In such an event it is not inconceivable that some of the textile factories of the Sudeten German areas may in time be supplied with both raw materials and markets in sufficiency, and the Pact of Munich will then have received its economic justification.

But for the moment the importance of the *Münchener Diktat* is primarily strategic. It has been proved once again that, as Bismarck said, the master of Bohemia is veritably the master of Europe. In 1866 the Prussians invaded Bohemia and beat the Austrian army at Sadowa. Bismarck left Bohemia's frontiers intact, and on German sufferance Austria preserved the integrity of her northern provinces until the World War. In 1918

France and her friends set up a new state in Bohemia, and French engineers helped to fortify the great mountain frontiers. This bulwark lay across Adolf Hitler's path to the southeast. Now he has been able to draw the teeth of the lion of Bohemia — the poor beast having been chloroformed by its soi-disant friends. The great Czech fortifications have been surrendered to Germany.

After the Sudeten German revolt of September 13 it would have been exceedingly difficult to reestablish the administrative *status quo* in its entirety. But even if some territorial readjustment was inevitable, and even if one remembers that territorial change is certain to bring economic dislocation, anyone who knows the areas concerned at first hand finds great difficulty in taking the new frontiers altogether seriously. After the first partition of Poland in 1772, for which some ethnical justification also existed, the spoliators assured the world that Poland would "sit much prettier" within her new frontiers and had nothing more to fear. After the World War the enemies of Czechoslovakia never tired of pointing derisively at her "ludicrous" shape; on the post-Munich map it is far more ridiculous. They complained that post-St. Germain Austria could not survive — can post-Munich Czechoslovakia be expected to live? Perhaps the most extraordinary piece of new frontier is that which (since the Italo-German decision at Vienna) divides Hungary from Slovakia and from wretchedly poor Ruthenia. Apart from a violation of racial considerations — considerations which can never be logically applied in Central Europe — Slovakia and Ruthenia have been cut away from the plain which made life in their hills and mountains at all possible. The Trianon frontier was bad enough economically, but this is ten times worse, especially for Ruthenia which is left with no plain and no important railway. Since the Czechs have lost so much forest land they could make good use of Ruthenian timber were there now any way of conveying it to Moravia and Bohemia, but the rivers run in the wrong direction and Hitler and Mussolini have given the railway from Košice to Sevluš to Hungary.

Like the new frontiers of Slovakia and Ruthenia, the new Moravian frontiers are grotesque. From the Glatz salient across to Austria was never very far; but the distance between the new frontier posts at Polička and Mährisch Krumau is half as great — a matter of only 35 miles. It is here that the racial argument has been most blatantly discarded, it is here that the Godesberg line

has been most frankly overstepped. Germany's jaws are closing across the old "Moravian gateway." This is one of the old Pan German catchwords. Long before the World War, and with unmitigated persistence after it, Pan German groups, especially in Bohemia and Silesia, planned for Moravia to be the bridge between Breslau and Vienna, Prussia's route to the Danube Valley. Vigorous Germanization in alliance with the Germans of Brno and Jihlava was their program. With the "Moravian gateway" secured, they hoped to see Moravia and Bohemia become the heart of the *Mittel-Europa* of the future, a new German Empire spreading far to the east and south. It is interesting to note that they have already been forced to agree to a German roadway and canal across Moravia, forming the corridor mooted at Godesberg. The Pan Germans always regarded the German University at Prague as endowed with a mission to "recapture" Bohemia for German *kultur* and they will not altogether welcome the removal of the German University and Polytechnic from Prague to Reichenberg, nor the transference of the German Polytechnic from Brno to Linz, as is now planned at any rate by the Czechs. They will console themselves with the fact that a German minority of a quarter of a million is still distributed among the leading Czech cities and that Herr Kundt has organized a German Nazi Party in Prague.

The old Prussian invasion route which led to Sadowa in 1866 has become less practical and less popular in German military circles in recent years; invasion up the valley of the Oder was still discussed, but among soldiers the favorite plan was to cut Czechoslovakia in half across Moravia. Now that Austria is in its hands, the German General Staff has completed its geographical preparations. Indeed the map of Central Europe today looks exactly as if the Germans had fought and had won their contemplated war. If they have agreed that the Slovaks of Košice and the Ruthenes of Užhorod be given to Hungary, they took care to occupy Engerau, the valuable Bratislava bridgehead on the Danube, as quickly as the Poles occupied Bohumín, though Engerau was Hungarian before 1918.

The Pan German program, and the military plans for its realization, are an old story. Adolf Hitler's contribution lies mainly in bringing this program about through propaganda and the threat of war rather than by war itself. There is a French version of the Bismarck saying which runs "Après Sadowe, Sedan."

Were not both battles simultaneously lost a second time at Munich on September 29, 1938?

It may be hoped that *Mittel-Europa* will bring all the advantages of admirable organization and free trade to Central and Eastern Europe. But the Hitler program, like that of the pre-1914 Pan Germans, does not aim at a rise in the general standard of living; on the contrary it is based upon the assumption that the status of the Germans should always be superior to that of the Slavs. It consequently aims at the coercion of the Slavs through tariff pressure and the raising of only the German standard of life. In a century there must be 250 million Germans instead of 80 million in Europe, Herr Hitler declares in "Mein Kampf" (page 767, 1933 edition), and they must live, not like poor "colonials," but in a way which befits the German *Herrenvolk*. It would seem that this can only be brought about by the "colonial" subjection of some Slavs and the elimination of others. As Mr. Wheeler-Bennett has emphasized,⁷ it is Brest-Litovsk over again. The extraordinary frontier now established between Ruthenia and Hungary can preserve Ruthenia only as a hotbed of intrigue and as a German corridor to the Ukraine. The *Völkischer Beobachter* and those who share its views denounced Czechoslovakia, following the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935, as a Bolshevik "spearhead" or corridor to the west; yet when one looks at the map today there seems to be no other intelligible explanation of the post-Munich Czech-Slovak-Ruthene federal state than as a German corridor to the east, penetrating across the mountains right into the territory where 40 million Ukrainian Slavs live on the fertile land which spreads north from the Black Sea.

⁷ FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1938.

A TURNING POINT IN HISTORY

By Arnold J. Toynbee

THAT the public events of September 1938 have been momentous is already a commonplace. They may mark a turning point not only in British history but in world history too. By the same token, our recent experiences have been so overwhelming that it is still very difficult to see them steadily and whole. One who looks at the new international situation from a British standpoint must first ask whether the line taken by Great Britain in 1938 marks a serious departure from the traditional line of British foreign policy.

The policy of Great Britain in the past towards Europe has been, like that of the United States, to confine her intervention in Continental affairs to the minimum compatible with her own national interests as she sees them. The practical application of this fundamentally identical policy is, of course, governed by each country's particular geographical situation. The minimum to which the United States can safely reduce her intervention in Europe cannot be even approximated by an island that is separated from the Continent by the mere breadth of the Channel rather than by the Atlantic. This difference has always compelled British isolationism to stop far short of American isolationism in practice. If British isolation from the Continent has been relatively incomplete in the past, this difference between Great Britain's and America's respective situations is accentuated at the present time, when the Channel is no longer, while the Atlantic still is, an effective barrier against air attack.

In the past, what was the typical Continental situation in which the British Government and people felt themselves constrained to play a part in Continental affairs? The policy of Great Britain towards Louis XIV, Napoleon and William II seems to show that she has generally taken active steps, sooner or later, to join in resisting the domination of Europe by a single Power when there has seemed to be a serious probability that this Power would use its Continental predominance in order to threaten the independence of the British Isles and the security of British interests overseas. This qualification of the main statement is important, because there have been cases in which Great Britain has tolerated the Continental predominance of some Power that has manifestly

harbored no designs against Great Britain herself. For an example we need look no further than to the British attitude towards the Continental predominance of France between November 1918 and September 1938. Though Great Britain largely disapproved of French policy during this period, and made some perhaps rather feeble efforts to modify it, she never thought, during those years, of attempting to depose France from her postwar position. Another case, which comes nearer home to the present issue, is the attitude of Great Britain towards the advancement of Germany under the leadership of Bismarck. Great Britain took no decisive steps to prevent the rise of Prussia to dominance in Germany in 1864-1871; indeed, British policy in regard to Denmark in 1864 displays a curiously close resemblance to the policy pursued in regard to Czechoslovakia in 1938.

Now that the postwar French domination on the Continent has been brought to an end by the eventual resurgence of Germany, the question arises whether it has been replaced by a German domination; whether this German domination, if established, will prove to be different in character from the French; and finally whether, supposing that it does differ in character from the foregoing French régime, the new German domination will turn out to be of the kind against which Great Britain has always taken a stand in the past.

This is perhaps the fundamental question raised by what Great Britain did — or refrained from doing — in September. In coming to terms with Hitler at Munich, Great Britain and France went a long way, and maybe the whole way, towards giving him a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe — at least up to the western threshold of the Soviet Union. What can the German Führer make, and what will he wish to make, of this new opportunity? Will he be able now to establish a secure and lasting German predominance over that great tract of Europe that lies between the western frontier of the Soviet Union and the eastern frontier of France? If he does succeed in constructing a *Mittel-Europa* on a basis of German ascendancy, will he be tempted to use this large extension of German power as a means of making that power felt still further afield? And if he did one day use *Mittel-Europa* as a “jumping-off ground,” in which direction would he move, and how far would he aspire to go? Would he march eastwards overland into the Ukraine? Or would he seek to gain a reëntry into that overseas world from which Germany

was expelled as a result of the war of 1914-18 and the ensuing peace settlement? In the latter event, would he confine his ambitions within the limits of the colonial possessions of the West European Powers, or would he try to extend his overseas operations to Latin America?

These questions may have been at issue not only in the September crisis; they may also be involved in British (and no doubt also in Russian and American) policy now, on the morrow of the Munich Agreement, and in the future. The difficulty is that the momentous decisions which had, and have, to be taken in the light of these questions could not, and cannot, wait until the questions can be answered with any certainty. At present there are a number of possible alternative answers to each of them; and only the future course of events will reveal which answer hits the mark. This extreme uncertainty still clouds even the immediate question which the Munich Agreement raises — the question, that is, of Germany's prospects in Central and Eastern Europe.

Can Germany now succeed in bringing her neighbors in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe into a relationship with her in which they will minister to her power and serve her ends? In taking up this question at the present early stage, a British observer can do little more than set out the pros and cons.

The following points would seem to tell in Germany's favor.

First, within the circle of those European states whose populations come up to the highest standard of efficiency (as measured by education, technical ability and material equipment), Greater Germany, with now nearly 80 million inhabitants, musters almost double the population of the next most populous European Power, and almost as large a population as Great Britain and France added together.

Secondly, Germany, in combination with her Italian partner in the Berlin-Rome Axis, now insulates France and Great Britain from everything on the Continent that lies east of the eastern frontiers of the Reich and Italy. In wartime the Axis Powers would be able to cut Anglo-French communications with Eastern Europe and Russia, not only overland, but also by sea via the Baltic (certainly) and via the Mediterranean (probably).

Thirdly, in the insulated area between the eastern frontiers of the two Axis Powers and the western frontier of the Soviet Union, there are today a dozen small, young and weak states, extending from Finland to Greece, which will henceforward have a hard

struggle if they are to avoid the fate of falling under Germany's ascendancy strategically, politically and economically.

In her relations with these neighbors Germany now has so great a predominance of both military and economic power that she might be able to place them in a position in which their only chance of either security or prosperity would lie in coöperation with Germany on Germany's terms. As some of these nations have historic quarrels with one another, and as some of these quarrels have been perpetuated and embittered by the Peace Settlement of 1919, Germany might not find it difficult to play off her East European neighbors against one another: Czechoslovakia against Hungary, Hungary against Rumania, the Ukrainians against Poland, and perhaps even Jugoslavia against Italy. The minority situation in Italy and Poland today is not unlike that in Czechoslovakia before September. In each country there is both a German minority and one or more non-German minorities of a nationality which Germany might induce to make common cause with her: *i.e.* the Jugoslavs in Italy and the Ukrainians in Poland. This policy of setting her neighbors against one another could be pursued by Germany by way of support for the principle of national self-determination; and by liberating subject minorities she could weaken her stronger neighbors, while by respecting ethnic unities, as she seems now to be doing in Czechoslovakia, she would avoid driving any of these nationalities to complete despair and irreconcilable opposition to German ascendancy. If it is thus possible, as it seems to be, for Germany to gain most of her ends in Eastern Europe without ceasing to show substantial respect for national unity and autonomy, it would seem that she could in this way avoid arousing serious opposition.

Germany might also be able to find a common cause between herself and some of her East European neighbors in anti-Semitism, which is rife in Poland, Hungary and Rumania as well as in Germany, and which now shows signs of breaking out in Czechoslovakia too. Another common interest to which she might successfully appeal in addressing herself to the people now in power in the East European countries is their desire for security from subversive movements from below. As the leader of an anti-Comintern front, Germany could present herself as the guarantor of the existing social and political order. In dealing with Italy and Poland, which would be the most restive of her associates, she might appeal to their common desire for colonial expansion. In

order to consolidate her influence and control over Eastern Europe, Germany would no doubt make full use of the new technical facilities for propaganda and repression (*e.g.* the press, the cinema, the radio, the control over means of communication and discussion) which she is already using with such effect inside the Reich. In view of the dreadful nature of modern warfare at close range, together with the disparity of strength between Germany and even the strongest of her southern and eastern neighbors, these would be extremely reluctant to push to the point of armed conflict with Germany any resistance, either individual or collective, which they might attempt to make to the establishment of her ascendancy over them.

So much for the points in Germany's favor. But we can also see a number of obstacles to the establishment of German domination over Eastern Europe.

To begin with, Germany's present superiority in numbers is being diminished by the higher rate at which the population is increasing in the countries to the east. Her economic and social preponderance is in a similar way being reduced by the rapidity with which these same countries have, since the war, been developing their social and economic life. It may next be questioned whether Germany would in fact be able to exercise any effective military and economic control over the activities of these countries without seriously interfering in their internal affairs. Again, all the countries in this area are united, notwithstanding their quarrels with one another, in their common dislike and fear of Germany; and the mutual antagonisms between them make it possible that Germany, instead of being able to play off each against the others and remain friends with all, will unavoidably antagonize and drive into the opposite camp some rival country whenever she shows any favors to any particular member of this group (*e.g.*, it would be difficult for Germany to gratify simultaneously both Hungary and Czechoslovakia or both Hungary and Rumania). Moreover, owing to the rapid progress of the East European nations towards political maturity, together with the general accentuation of nationalism throughout the world, the strength of national feeling in Eastern Europe has perhaps already risen to a pitch at which these nations will insist upon enjoying a real independence and will refuse to be content with a mere existence upon sufferance under the shadow of Germany. Magyars, Slavs and Italians have struggled hard against German

domination in the past, and the taste of self-government which they have had in recent times is likely to make them more than ever unwilling to acquiesce in foreign domination. The demoniac force of the ideal of nationality has been illustrated by the resurgence of Germany since the war. Presumably the same force would produce proportionate effects in similar circumstances in adjacent parts of Europe. And even if Germany were to succeed in bringing these neighboring countries into some kind of German system, there is the possibility that within this circle a counter-group headed by Italy and Poland would form itself with the object of keeping Germany's predominance within limits.

As for the people in power in these countries, whom Germany might try to bind to herself by playing upon the precariousness of their position, these might be overthrown by popular upheavals. In both Poland and Jugoslavia the pro-German policy of the existing régimes is known to be one of the several causes of their unpopularity. Supposing that the resentment against German domination in Central and Eastern Europe did grow to such a serious extent that these countries came to think of Germany, first and foremost, as a menace to their liberties, their attitude towards the Soviet Union might change correspondingly. From having seemed a menace she might come to be thought of as a rallying point and even looked to as a savior. The Soviet Union once played this rôle towards Turkey when Turkey was at issue with the Allied and Associated Powers in 1920-22, and this though Turkey never had any inclination towards Communism.

As for the bait of colonies, the desire for colonial expansion is weak or non-existent in Central Europe (outside Italy and possibly Poland) and would have to be fanned into life by propaganda; and experience within Germany has thrown doubt upon the extent to which the technical propaganda resources of the totalitarian state can be either unlimited or permanent in their effects. Last but not least, it is questionable whether the German national temperament and political tradition (as seen in "Prussianism" as well as National Socialism) would be compatible with the establishment of German predominance in Central and Eastern Europe by the use of a minimum of force and a maximum of persuasion. Many of the arguments advanced in favor of German ability to control this area assume that Germany will in all cases be tactful and moderate; past history makes it very doubtful whether this condition can be fulfilled.

In estimating Germany's prospects in *Mittel-Europa*, we must also inquire into the solidity of the Berlin-Rome Axis. Manifestly Germany could not climb into the saddle in *Mittel-Europa* if the Axis were to give way beneath her feet. Italy today is in the unhappy position of being the weakest of the Great Powers in a world in which all Great Powers are on the verge of entering on an unlimited competition in rearmament. Will Italy's increasing relative weakness bind her more tightly than ever to her masterful German ally? Or will it drive her into some desperate effort to break loose, as a nominally equal partnership threatens to turn into a relationship rather resembling the present unequal relationship between Germany and Poland, or perhaps even that between Germany and the "new" Czechoslovakia?

It will be seen that, in trying to estimate Germany's prospect of establishing her ascendancy over Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, we are groping in the realm of conjecture. At the present stage we can see some of the factors that tell respectively for Germany and against her, without being able to cast up the balance. In a situation of extreme uncertainty and obvious danger, it would, however, be imprudent for a country in the exposed position in which Great Britain finds herself today to shrink from reckoning with the more unpleasant and unfavorable of the alternative possibilities. Suppose, then, that Germany were to succeed, after all, in shaping to her purpose all that lies between France and Russia, Italy included, how would the two West European Powers, Great Britain and France, stand in face of the new Central European Leviathan? A German-built and German-directed *Mittel-Europa*, in which more than 200,000,000 efficient people of the white race would be organized under a single command for common purposes, would be a Power of the order of politico-economic magnitude of the United States today and of the Soviet Union tomorrow (should no disaster overtake the Soviets in the meantime). In this new constellation of forces in Europe, what would be the outlook if there were a continuance of the present competition in armaments? We may hope to avert this calamity, but we cannot afford to ignore it. In an unlimited armaments competition between Great Powers, we have assumed that Italy would be outdistanced by all her three present peers in Europe. Would the same fate overtake Britain and France if they measured their strength against Germany's? Or would they be able to hold their own, at any rate in combination?

As far as concerns passive defense measures against aërial attack, time would seem to be on the West European Powers' side for two reasons: in the first place because the September crisis admittedly caught both of them unprepared, and secondly because, in organizing passive defense, there is such a thing as a minimum absolute standard of safety which is conditioned by the size and distribution of population, and the size and location of cities, ports and factories, without regard to the strength of the offensive armaments of other Powers. Unless and until this minimum standard has been attained, there is an excessive risk in the pursuit of an active policy. A prospective adversary could not, of course, count on this risk working as a prohibitive deterrent.

In September, after all, both the British and the French nation were willing in certain circumstances to go to war with Germany. There was a period of some days during which we believed that those circumstances were going to present themselves; war stared us in the face. Yet the inadequacy of our passive defenses did not drive us into dropping the "almost" out of our declared policy of "peace at almost any price." At the same time there can be no doubt that, if a similar crisis were to confront us at some future date after our passive defenses had been completed, we should be in a far better posture than in September 1938 for dealing with the situation on its political and moral merits.

When we pass from the question of passive defense to that of active resistance, the prospects are much harder to assess; for active military strength is essentially competitive and relative; and a comparison between German and Anglo-French resources in this field is obscured by a number of unknown quantities. Our inquiry here almost reduces itself to a string of open questions. Are the metropolitan resources for the manufacture of armaments in Great Britain and France greater than those of Germany and Italy? Are the resources for the manufacture of armaments upon which Great Britain can draw overseas greater than those upon which Germany can draw in *Mittel-Europa*? It may be assumed that at present seapower helps Great Britain and hinders Germany in drawing resources from overseas. How far, however, has seapower been reduced by the development of aërial warfare? How far and how soon (if at all) could Germany, provided that she succeeded in dominating Europe, outbuild the British Navy while still retaining her predominance in the air and on land? Are the psychological factors favorable or adverse to Great

Britain? Is a bigger return likely to be obtained from a system of regimentation or from one of voluntary service, assuming that both are developed to their fullest capacity? The question must also be asked how far Britain is prepared to go in the direction of regimentation if voluntary service should prove, on trial, to be incapable of competing with totalitarian methods.

Again, is Germany already approaching the point where she will be utilizing to the maximum her material and financial resources? And is she approaching the point where she will have made the fullest possible call upon the enthusiasm and the nervous energy of her people? Has Hitler, in securing satisfaction for German grievances, proportionately diminished the German people's willingness to go to war, or has he on the contrary increased his own prestige and given his people confidence for the pursuit of an aggressive policy? Is the division of opinion in Great Britain over the past and future conduct of foreign affairs likely to be as great a source of weakness as the latent opposition inside Germany and Italy to totalitarian methods of government?

Here again, we have run into a fog in which we cannot yet see beyond our noses. But, taking together the two major problems of Germany's prospects of predominance in Central and South-eastern Europe and the Western Powers' prospects of holding their own against her in the arms race, we can perhaps say that, in acquiescing in the Munich settlement, France and Britain avoided an immediate evil of appalling magnitude, for Europe as well as for themselves, at the price of accepting some very serious risks — which may or may not materialize in a future which is at present almost impenetrably veiled.

This raises the question of the reasons which made the peoples, as well as the Governments, of Great Britain and France, feel that the Munich terms represented the lesser of the two evils between which we had to choose.

The first and strongest reason was one which weighed with almost every man and woman in Great Britain and France during the crisis; and by implication this universal reason must be a simple one. While we had made up our minds to go to war if Herr Hitler insisted on imposing upon Czechoslovakia, by means of a military invasion, terms entirely dictated by Herr Hitler himself, there was perhaps no evil, short of that, which, to the minds of most of us, seemed greater than the evil of another European War under unprecedented moral and material condi-

tions. The prospect of having one's wife and children, as well as oneself, massacred under one's own roof was one which the European householder had not had to look in the face since he had seen the last of the raids of the Vikings and the Magyars. In September 1938 that experience was nearly 1,000 years back in the past. "As safe as houses!" "The Englishman's house is his castle!" These proverbial phrases have an odd ring today.¹

But the personal jeopardy to life, limb and property was not the most appalling of the features which the prospect of a European war revealed. The individual, after all, has — or at any rate thinks, beforehand, that he has — a sporting chance of surviving even the most intensive aërial bombardment. The intolerable feature in the prospect was a disaster that was, not a private probability, but a public certainty. This certainty was that, if war did come, the things that we mean by "England," "France" and "Europe" would be destroyed beyond the possibility of restoration — not just the landscape and the buildings and the inhabitants, which could all, no doubt, at least theoretically, be replaced, but the invisible things of the spirit which are the essence of a community and a civilization. It has always been true that the spiritual ravages of war are more deadly than its material destructiveness. And when war is keyed up — as it has been keyed up now — to a "totalitarian" pitch, it is the prospect of a "totalitarian" spiritual devastation that makes it morally almost impossible for civilized men and women to opt for war if there is any other alternative at all open to them. An acute personal realization of this prospect, in many millions of French and English souls, is the simple psychological explanation of the historical fact that, on their return home from Munich, Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier were welcomed by the general public with the same enthusiasm as were Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. At the moment of sudden relief there was even something like a European union of hearts, direct between people and people. The most striking outward manifestation of this astonishing psychological event was the German public's enthusiastic reception of the British Prime Minister.

The moral *impasse* with which the British and French peoples

¹ An American or Canadian reader who wants to visualize to himself the meaning of air warfare between highly efficient Powers in densely populated countries at point-blank range, can assist his imagination by the simple device of plotting out, on a piece of tracing paper, a war-map of Western Europe, and then super-imposing this on a peace-map, drawn to the same scale, of the north-eastern United States and the adjoining parts of Canada.

were confronted when they had to face the prospect of war with Germany in September 1938 comes to light in the question of the peace settlement. The peace settlement is the acid test of a war, since it is for the sake of achieving certain terms of peace that any war is fought; and, *ex hypothesi*, these terms must be of such supreme value and importance in the eyes of the belligerent as to make him feel that even a war is not too high a price to pay for obtaining them. This is eminently true if he is the citizen of a democratic state. For, in a democracy, the government can hardly venture to go to war unless it feels sure, in advance, that the people will be whole-heartedly behind it. Suppose then that in this autumn of 1938 war had broken out between Great Britain, France, the Little Entente and the Soviet Union on the one side and Germany (with or without allies) on the other side; and suppose, further, that Germany had been defeated again, as completely as she was defeated in 1918; what would have been, this time, the Allied and Associated Powers' peace terms?

Should we, once again, have taken "national self-determination" for our watchword? In that case, we should have had, at the end of a victorious war, to impose on our ally Czechoslovakia, as her reward, that very cession of territories inhabited by alien minorities that is being imposed on her now, without a war, as her penalty for having had her frontiers drawn in the peace settlement of Paris on lines which were seriously at variance with the fundamental principle on which that imperfect peace settlement was professedly based. Or should we have maintained the *status quo*? But that would have meant getting the worst of both worlds. For *ex hypothesi* and *status quo*, as had been shown by nearly twenty years' experience of its working, neither squared with the principle of nationality nor on the other hand made Germany too weak to demand, at the sword's point, as she was actually demanding in September 1938, an application of the principle for her own benefit. As a matter of fact, it can be predicted almost with certainty that our peace terms would have been quite different from either of the two alternatives just suggested. For the character of peace terms is determined, as one knows, by the character of the antecedent war; and the European war of 1938 would have been dreadful beyond precedent and even beyond imagination. In all belligerent countries, almost everyone who was not a combatant would have become a refugee, and the refugees would have suffered the heavier casualties. In all coun-

tries the survivors' minds would have been rapidly reduced to one single fixed idea on the subject of peace terms: "If we win, then this time we must make it forever utterly impossible for the enemy to inflict this torment on us again." In this mood the victors would have imposed a Carthaginian peace. But of course we should have shuddered at the thought of such a peace settlement if we had contemplated it in advance before the bombing had begun. Short of contemplating anything of the kind, many of us who were acquainted with the nationality map of Czechoslovakia and with the political and economic situation in the German-inhabited districts of that state were feeling an acute moral discomfort at the notion of fighting for the balance of power in defiance of the principle of nationality. These facts, of course, were not a matter of common knowledge among the general public; but they were verified by Lord Runciman, and we know that the French as well as the British Government was strongly influenced by the Runciman Report in concluding that the minorities problem in Czechoslovakia could not now be settled by any solution less radical than that of secession.

The principle of nationality — which first asserted itself in the modern world as a dynamic political force in 1775 — has been steadily remaking the political map of the Old World, as well as the New World, ever since. In the nineteenth century it brought a Belgium, a Germany and an Italy into existence. In the War of 1914-18 it broke up four great multi-national empires in Eastern Europe. This wave has had, and still has, such an impetus that any statesmen or states that manage to ride it can be almost certain of being carried by it to triumph. It carried the Allied and Associated Powers to triumph in 1918; it has carried Germany to triumph in 1938. But how is it that, after twenty years, Herr Hitler has been able to steal President Wilson's thunder? The answer is that, in spite of our having made the Armistice of November 1918 on the basis of the Fourteen Points, in the ensuing peace settlement we applied the principle of nationality for the benefit of every nation in Central and Eastern Europe with the exception of the three ex-enemy nations: the Germans, the Magyars and the Bulgars. It is for the sake of getting that one-sided peace settlement rectified, by an application of the nationality principle for their own benefit too, that the Germans have accepted Hitler's leadership, or submitted to his tyranny, whichever way you prefer to put it. And by whichever name

you do call Hitler, you cannot deny that he has fulfilled his mandate, however he may have acquired it, by "delivering the goods."

National unification is in fact being achieved in Central and Eastern Europe today by nations that, for the past twenty years, have been balked of it. This year ten million German ex-subjects of the defunct Hapsburg Monarchy have been incorporated into the German national state. Several hundred thousand Magyars, who were wrongfully detached from Hungary in 1921, are being restored to their mother country. Even the Ukrainians — who are the largest still wholly submerged nation in Europe — have at last secured homerule in that tiny corner of their vast patrimony that is known as "Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia." These are all measures that ought to have been taken — and would have been taken, if our professed principles had been applied impartially — by "the Big Four" at Paris in 1919. Are we wholly to regret that a different "Big Four" have applied them belatedly in 1938 at Munich? In itself this surely cannot be a matter for regret; for nationality is commonly regarded as being a good principle as far as it goes. What we have to regret — and that most bitterly — is our failure to do justice all round at Paris in 1919; our subsequent failure to make good our sins of omission belatedly at any time within a subsequent period of nearly twenty years' grace; and, last and worst, the fact that, when we have at length acquiesced in justice being done in this particular respect at the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour, our acquiescence wears the appearance of a capitulation, under an immediate threat of war, to a Nazi dictatorship.

An honest application of the principle of nationality was in any case bound to make Germany the strongest Power in Europe for simple reasons that have been mentioned already. The Germans themselves are by far the most numerous nation in Europe, and they are flanked on the east by a bevy of nations which are conspicuously small and weak. For these two reasons in combination, a political map of Europe redrawn in accordance with the principle of nationality was bound to produce a *Mittel-Europa* under German hegemony. Part of the price of our sins of omission since the Armistice of 1918 is that, instead of a democratic Germany entering into Germany's national heritage in 1920, this heritage has fallen to a Nazi Germany in 1938. Today Germany is the predominant Power in Central and Eastern Europe, as sooner or later, seemingly, she was bound to be; but it is the

tragedy of Europe, and of the whole world, that this now dominant Germany is not the Germany of Weimar but the Germany of Nuremberg. For, when the principle of nationality is applied under a fanatical totalitarian régime, it ceases to be even approximately coincident with the more rational and more humane principle of self-determination. The measure of the difference is given by the number of non-Nazi German refugees for whom life in the Sudetenland has become impossible since September.

If a dominant Nazi Germany is the positive retribution for our sins, the negative retribution is the perhaps mortal sickness of the League of Nations. It is at first sight a paradoxical fact that a moment which sees the League to all appearance *in articulo mortis* should be the very moment that has also seen the practical realization, at long last, of two League principles which hitherto, unhappily, have been virtually dead letters. One of these principles is impartial justice for all. Well, we have got the principle of nationality in Central Europe applied to both sides equally at last, but the bitter irony is that nothing but the starkest power politics has availed to bring us to this, in itself desirable, result. The second League principle which has now at last secured application is that of "peaceful change." This autumn, populations amounting in the aggregate to as much as the total population of Ireland or Switzerland, and to more than the total population of Denmark or Norway, have been transferred from Czechoslovakian sovereignty to German, Hungarian and Polish sovereignty without war. Though, of course, this has not been achieved without an extreme threat of war, it is nevertheless an unprecedented event; and it would be hard to say that it is not good. And yet the League seems to be dying of it. She is like a mother dying in childbirth because the birth is so long overdue.

Another ironical fact about the fate of the League is that the Japanese, Italian and German hands that have struck the deadly blows share the blood-guiltiness with French, British and American hands which have been professedly friendly. During the post-war years these American, British and French hands held, between them, the destinies of the world in suspense. The three Western democratic Great Powers were then in a position to make the League's fortune if they chose. And what did they do? America abandoned the League in her infancy; France compromised the League by implicating her in a mischievous and futile system of anti-German power politics; while England — knowing that

she ought both to guarantee France and to restrain her, yet not venturing to do either, and wishing that she might follow America into isolation, yet again not venturing to do that — has completed the discomfiture of the League by blowing alternately hot and cold, but almost always cold at the critical moments.

The worst of it is that the League is heir to the whole of our heritage of international coöperation; so that, if the League did die now, this heritage would be in mortal danger of perishing with her. It is true that the League is, in her most obvious aspect, an embodiment of President Wilson's ideas, and that these ideas — at any rate in the form impressed upon them by the President's personal stamp — cannot lay claim to antiquity. But there are other aspects of the League which also catch a historian's eye. For instance, the League might be described alternatively as an instrument for "putting into commission" a rudimentary, but nevertheless genuine, *Pax Britannica*, based partly on naval power and partly on money power, which Great Britain maintained unaided, out of her own national resources, during the hundred years ending in 1914. This *Pax Britannica*, in its turn, was a very imperfect and belated substitute for a mediæval *Respublica Christiana* which was founded in the eleventh century by Pope Gregory VII and which went to pieces between the death of Pope Innocent III and the outbreak of the Reformation.

Today, perhaps more than at any other moment of history since our Western civilization emerged out of the Dark Ages, there is a crying need for some kind of world order. But, if it is not to be a house built on the sands, this world order which we so urgently require must have some moral foundation. And what moral bond still holds between the armed, and ever more heavily arming, Great Powers of 1938? Common Christianity? Why, four of the Great Powers of the day — namely, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union — are avowedly dedicated to the worship of Leviathan, which is the most dangerous, as well as the most perverse, of the forms that idolatry can take. And the rest of us, if we are frank, will be constrained to confess that we honor our nominal Christianity more in the breach than in the observance. True religion may and will in the end win the hearts of mankind; but a work of conversion that must start almost from zero and that has the whole world for its field will necessarily take a proportionate length of time for its consummation. The establishment of some kind of world order is so urgent a need in an age of

Leviathan-worship and of bombing planes that mankind can hardly wait to see this need satisfied, as it might be ideally satisfied in the course of time, by the gradual triumph of Christianity.

The conversion of the modern world is therefore more likely to take place — like the conversion of the Ancient World some two thousand years back — within the framework of a provisional secular world order that will previously have been imposed by force, at the hands of some great pagan military Power. As the history of the *Pax Romana* testifies, a world order of such pagan origin is unsatisfactory and ephemeral; but for a desperately urgent necessity people will pay a heavy price. In Europe, at any rate, it seems not impossible that men and women, rather than see Europe perish, will now feel inclined to accept peace — as the Czechs have accepted it this autumn — in the form of a far-reaching submission to the harsh and brutal dictatorship that weighs, like a leaden cope, on the gigantic body of Germany.

There is one final string of questions which an Englishman today can hardly refrain from asking. In this crisis of human history, of which his own country has just felt the full force, what part are the non-European English-speaking peoples going to play? Is it true that a New World has been called into existence to redress the balance of the Old? Are the overseas countries now going to step into the breach and try to take a hand in building up our coming world order, in the hope of being able to give it, after all, something of their — and our — own democratic impress? Or are they going to recoil still further than at present into an isolation which can hardly avail to insulate them in the long run from that rising Power in the Old World with which France and Great Britain, as well as Czechoslovakia, have already had to reckon? If a Greater Germany were eventually to make it her drill-sergeant's mission to put the world in Prussian order by imposing on us all her *Pax Hitleriana*, what line would North America then take? Would she then seek, in Mr. Chamberlain's way, to come to terms with the Nazi Power, or would she take Mr. Churchill's line of bidding Nazidom defiance? And if she, in her turn, found herself at grips with Greater Germany, what then would be North America's attitude towards Great Britain? Would she think of British sea-power as an asset to be preserved? Or of the British Empire as an entanglement to be avoided? These are burning questions for an English writer to ask and for American and Canadian readers to answer.

THE WAR IN CHINA CONTINUES

By Rodney Gilbert

IT WILL soon be a year and a half since a skirmish just outside Peiping, on the left bank of the Hun River, led to armed conflict between Japan and China — a conflict which seems further from adjustment on fair terms today than it has ever been. At least three million armed men, regulars and irregulars, have at times been engaged in major and minor encounters over a territory of more than a million square miles. At least a million combatants and bystanders have lost their lives; great cities have been reduced to heaps of rubbish and huge tracts of country have been swept bare of life; there have been mass migrations of hundreds of thousands from their ancestral homes. Yet most of the correspondents in the Orient still refrain from calling these evidences of misunderstanding a war; it is still “the undeclared war in China.” Japanese official spokesmen and the whole Japanese press are even more meticulously consistent in their references to the most desperate struggle in which their nation has ever been involved: they never call it anything but “the China incident.” Laboring under their usual inhibitions, Occidental statesmen recognize the existence of nothing more than “a state of war” in China. But this is a war if there ever was one. It is the most businesslike war on Chinese soil since the Manchu conquest in the seventeenth century. And if this is an “incident” to Japan, the Russo-Japanese War was just a bit of slap-stick pleasantry, unworthy of more than casual notice in Japan’s turbulent annals. Therefore to avoid circumlocution and compromise with make-believe, I shall henceforth call this the Sino-Japanese war.

As I look back through Chinese English-language publications which appeared during the months immediately preceding the clash, it seems to me that China was just as fretful for an excuse for a showdown, for an incident that would force Chiang Kai-shek to defy Japan’s ultimata and to brace himself for a collision, as the Japanese army was. So I have never been able to attach the slightest importance to the Chinese claim that the Japanese deliberately provoked the Marco Polo clash, or to the Japanese claim that their diplomats made every effort to dispose of that clash as a local affair and that the settlement they proposed was conditioned upon no exorbitant demands. If nothing had hap-

pened on the Hun River to satisfy the craving of the Chinese public and the Japanese army for a finish fight over the question of China's administrative and territorial integrity, it would have happened elsewhere within that summer. And if Tokyo and Nanking had localized and settled that incident on fair terms, the settlement would have been so disappointing to both the Chinese people and the Japanese army that one or the other would have precipitated a more serious *casus belli* before snow had fallen.

The war began as a desperate Chinese effort to insure the survival of an independent Chinese nation. Though it continues to be that, it has also become a determined effort to break Japan. On the part of Japan it began as an effort by the army to make short work of China's independence. It continued, first as an effort to insure Japan's survival as a great military power, then as any kind of a power; and it now goes on, in so far as it is in Japan's power to say when it shall end, as an attempt to insure the survival of Japan as a nation.

It would be foolish to pretend to any exact knowledge of what either Japan or China had in readiness for this conflict when the skirmish on July 7, 1937, started it. Including perhaps 100,000 Communist guerrillas (they claimed 300,000), a million provincials under officers with elementary training, and half a million well-equipped regulars under officers who had indirect training from the Soviet and German missions, China probably had 2,500,000 men under arms of some sort. Despite strenuous efforts to build up her air force and to train fliers during the two years previous to the conflict, China's air fleet was a heterogeneous collection of craft of all types and ages; and those fit for combat or bombing were certainly outnumbered ten to one by Japan's combined army and navy fleets. Well back in the interior, China had at least 20 small arsenals equipped to manufacture small arms, machine guns, trench mortars and ammunition. She had no more than three plants equipped to turn out and repair 75-mm. artillery; and those prepared to manufacture high explosives in comforting quantities certainly did not exceed that number. Japan is said to have had at least 150,000 men in fully mechanized units in Korea, Manchuria and Jehol, 20,000 inside the Great Wall between Shanhaikwan and Peiping, a small detachment of marines ashore in Shanghai and 3,000 sailors and marines on board ship in various Chinese ports but available for landing parties. The Japanese would undoubtedly say that these esti-

mates greatly overstate their strength in China in the summer of 1937, while the Chinese would denounce them as an understatement.

I find two equally authoritative estimates of the Japanese army's and navy's reserve stores, including everything from food, clothing and small arms ammunition, through high explosives, to transport equipment, coal and gasoline. One of these gives the Japanese enough ("without the expenditure of one sen") to wage war for one year on the mainland with a major Power (contemplating a Russo-Japanese conflict, no doubt). The other estimate credits them with enough, including raw materials this time, for two years. Since no figures of any kind are quoted, these estimates may be nothing more than measures of the optimism of army publicists; but I think we can safely assume that, except for motor transport and machine tools for converted industries, the Japanese army was prepared for at least a year's war with Russia — with, let us say, 1,800,000 men in the field — in the summer of 1937 and that most of the gold shipped abroad since then has been spent to make good these deficiencies in transport and machinery. When Finance Minister Takahashi declared that Japan could not finance a full-dress war for more than six months he probably had no idea what the army and navy had in reserve, for it must always have been the particular business of their lobbyists to convince the civil authorities of their desperate poverty. Thus, the army and navy were certainly equipped for at least a year's big-scale warfare with Soviet Russia when they started what they thought was just a muscle-limbering campaign in China. Their equipment and the training of their personnel were therefore infinitely superior to China's at the outset.

These advantages certainly seemed overwhelming during the first six months of the war in North China. After twenty days of dickering about the rights and wrongs of the Lukouchiao incident, it became clear enough to both the Japanese commanders and the browbeaten Chinese officials that Chiang Kai-shek would rather go to war than abide by any local adjustment detrimental to China's sovereignty in the five foredoomed provinces; so the Japanese started moving troops up the railroad from Tientsin towards Peiping. Although a garrison revolt in Tientsin and a massacre of Japanese in Tungchow, 111 miles east of Peiping, were ominous notices to Japan that her further advances would be over many dead bodies, there was no effective resistance to the

Japanese occupation of Peiping. Before the end of July they were in full possession of North China's only important port, Tientsin, were pushing cautiously southward along the Tientsin-Pukow (Nanking) Railway, held Peiping and were routing the old capital's garrison divisions out of the western hills and pursuing them in two directions. One was down the Peiping-Hankow Line, southwestward, where bad weather, bad roads and some poorly organized but obstinate resistance kept them busy for some weeks. The other was northwestward to the Nankow Pass (20 miles from Peiping) which covered China's readiest trans-desert communications with Outer Mongolia and Soviet Russia, and where the Chinese had geographical advantages which should have made the capture of the pass ruinously expensive to Japan.

Actually, the pass was cleared by August 12, 1937, by one of the few brilliant Japanese ventures that have taken place in this war away from railway roadbeds. It was outflanked, and after that achievement the progress of Japan's several expeditionary forces into the northwest — southwestward to Shansi's eastern gate and northwestward to Shansi's northern gate — entailed more conflicts with bad roads and inadequate railroad stock than with Chinese armies. By the middle of October 1937, the Japanese had been through Suiyuan and had reached the end of rail communications by taking Paotouchen, jumping-off place for Central Asiatic caravans and adventures. By October they had set up and left to its own devices a puppet Mongol Empire in those parts, which has since taken care of itself, and had come part way back towards Peiping for a drive from the north on Taiyuanfu, capital of Shansi (one of the five doomed provinces), while a rival Japanese expedition was romping towards Taiyuanfu through the mountain passes on the east. Both forces got there on or about November 9, 1937, and hilarious Nipponese raiding parties went out westward and southwestward through every mountain gully to find the Communists of the northwest who had sworn to be all over the North China plain whenever Japan started things. By midwinter they had penetrated to the Yellow River on the west and south, through every negotiable valley; but there they are now and no further, wasting ammunition on real or imaginary concentrations of Reds at various points across the river, cursing effective guerrilla operations against their lines of communication, and sending back to Nippon great consignments of those little white boxes in which the ashes of Japanese heroes travel.

Shansi was the end of one of those long limbs along which Japan climbed at more cost than profit. There are many others.

During this same period—that is, between the Japanese capture of Nankow Pass on August 12 and the capture of Taiyuanfu on November 9, 1937—a far more spectacular and important struggle had been going on in and about Shanghai. There were no Japanese land forces in the vicinity of Shanghai at the outset of this struggle. The army's self-appointed job was to conquer and control the five northern provinces and it was confining itself to that. The navy had some marines ashore in Hongkew, the quarter of the International Settlement in which Japanese residents are most numerous and their investments heaviest. After fighting spread from Tientsin and Peiping to the interior in the north, the Japanese Government, believing that other ports as well as Yangtze valley settlements were indefensible by gunboats against Chinese artillery, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents and mobile wealth to Shanghai. As this progressed there was a heavy concentration of Japanese war craft, big and little, in the vicinity of China's commercial metropolis. It was stipulated in the peace agreement of 1932 that no Chinese military units were to be quartered in the environs of Shanghai. But as the Japanese naval units assembled there, Chiang Kai-shek's best infantry units closed in on the city.

There was a prelude of provocative little incidents, each productive of much ill-will but none calling for more than inquiry, arbitration and adjustment. But the infiltration of big bodies of Chinese troops (15,000 prior to August 12, it is claimed) into Greater Shanghai prompted the Japanese to land more marines and sailors in Hongkew and to prepare for that district's defense—or it may have been the other way 'round, as the Chinese claimed. Here again the "war guilt" problem has had much more attention than it merits. This is because there was much resentment against Chiang Kai-shek in the Occidental community for bringing a most destructive war onto Shanghai's doorstep in the obvious hope of involving one or all of the Western powers in his feud with the Japanese, when he could just as well have forced them to meet him elsewhere. Apart from this consideration, there was no reason why Chiang Kai-shek should not move against the Japanese in Shanghai and force the Japanese army to meet him there, instead of sending his crack units into North China to support a cause that was already lost there. At

any rate, proximity brought the unavoidable collisions on August 13 and 14, and the Japanese navy's landing parties were immediately in such hot water that there was nothing for the Japanese army to do but prepare for a big-scale Yangtze campaign.

During the second half of August, the battle was largely between ever-increasing Chinese forces, with all the modern equipment in Chiang Kai-shek's possession, and the Japanese naval forces supported by the guns and planes of the war vessels that lay in the Whangpoo River and off its mouth. There were times when the weight of Chiang Kai-shek's numbers all but carried the Japanese marines and sailors into the Whangpoo and if the Chinese had made effective use of their planes and guns the withdrawal of the Japanese fighting craft, and their landing parties with them, would have been forced within a few days. The very poor marksmanship of the Chinese planes and guns made it possible for the Japanese naval gunners and fliers to support the defense of Hongkew and Yangtzepoo, then to cover the first landings of regular army units at the mouth of the Whangpoo and at points on the Yangtze where they were at once a threat to the Chinese flank, and then to go on contributing heavily to the punishment which the Chinese infantry took throughout September, October and the early days of November when the retreat towards the over-advertised "Hindenburg line" began. Even after the Chinese had succeeded in planting batteries of six-inch howitzers in Pootung, across the river from Shanghai, which had several dozen Japanese craft of various kinds within easy range, the Chinese artillery added very little to the discomfiture of Japan's forces and it has played no important part in the several great battles in which the Chinese infantry, in man to man fighting, showed itself superior to the Japanese.

Although the Chinese finally had to give way at Shanghai before superior equipment and more skillful use of guns and planes, and though they failed to make another determined stand in defense of their capital at Nanking, they displayed qualities as fighting men which they had so rarely exhibited in their civil wars that their existence was not suspected by China's best friends. Their prowess came as unpleasant and often mortifying surprises to the Japanese militarists. First of all, Chinese officers, nearly always the first to run in their internecine feuds, showed no such inclination in this conflict and had the complete confidence of their men. Under bombardment the men showed a gay fortitude

and, in hand-to-hand conflict, such individual dash and ingenuity as made the doggedly brave but unimaginative Japanese conscripts look like wooden soldiers. And finally, when they came to yield their positions, the whole Chinese force, almost without exception, showed that Chinese soldiers could retreat, without shedding arms and equipment and making full speed for the hinterland and without yielding to panic. For an orderly retreat there were almost no precedents in modern Chinese history prior to this withdrawal from Shanghai, but there have been no disorderly flights of big bodies of troops since then.

When the Japanese entered upon this war and predicted that it would be won and settled within a few months they counted heavily on the demoralizing effect of a few overwhelming victories. They have had their victories but none that has prompted any great numbers of Chinese to abandon the struggle and none that has brought suitors for peace on Japan's terms from among the Chinese commanders. Nor have there been any wholesale surrenders. After each such conspicuous achievement as the capture of Shanghai, Nanking, Suchow, Kiukiang, Canton and Hankow, the Japanese have proclaimed that they were surrounding and were about to capture tens of thousands of the scattered and broken-spirited enemy. They never did. These either slipped through the Japanese net to rejoin their main bodies or simply went inland from the railroads for a few miles, to remain there, harass Japanese communications and force the invaders to use fully as many men keeping their lines open as were engaged in frontal attacks. China's poverty in good modern roads and Japan's shortage of motor transport have combined to limit Japanese operations to the web of railroads and navigable waterways. Departure from these has meant irregular supplies and many minor disasters.

But to get back to the sequence of events: China's loss of Shanghai was followed within a few weeks by the loss of Nanking (on December 13, 1937) and almost simultaneously by the loss of Wuhu. Chiang Kai-shek's army had undoubtedly overstayed its time at Shanghai. The stock of ammunition immediately available was about exhausted. Great numbers of the best-schooled officers had been killed, the best-trained units had been decimated and the men were tired. Many Occidental military observers felt that the Chinese should not have challenged the Japanese to formal combat where the latter's transports could land reinforce-

ments and unlimited supplies within a mile or so of their front lines. It has been frequently said that Chiang Kai-shek's German advisers were of this opinion and that they counselled a withdrawal to a line fifty miles back where lakes, canals and hills provided natural defenses, as soon as the superiority of Japanese naval guns, artillery and planes made further Chinese resistance an expensive show of bravado. Whatever chagrin the stout resistance at Shanghai had caused the Japanese gave way to exultation in General Matsui's camp and in Tokyo when Chiang Kai-shek failed to make an effective defense of his capital. But since Wuhu was the end of rail transport up the Yangtze valley, it was also the end of Japanese operations in the direction of Hankow until the late spring of 1938. For scarcely had Nanking fallen than the Chinese retired to Suchow, far from waterborne transport this time, and challenged the Japanese to take it.

While the Occident's whole attention and most of Japan's interest were concentrated upon the capture of Shanghai and Nanking, the small Japanese expeditionary forces that were following the several railroads in North China had plodded cautiously along the Tientsin-Pukow line southward from Tientsin, along the Peiping-Hankow line southwestward from Peiping and along a narrow-gauge line running southwestward from Taiyuanfu, until all had reached, or were within striking distances of, the same obstacle, the Yellow River. At all the western points on the river the Chinese defenders had made it impassable, and the Japanese let it go at that. But immediately after the fall of Nanking General Matsui's army crossed the Yangtze River and pushed a little way up the Tientsin line; it then became incumbent upon Count Terauchi in the north to get his forces across the Yellow River on the same line and move to meet his colleague in the south. At the same time a small force was transported from Tientsin to the port of Tsingtao, from which the former German railroad runs westward through Shantung province to Tsinan, its capital, on this same Tientsin-Pukow railroad. Although the Tsingtao garrison destroyed all Japanese industrial establishments in the port before it retreated, it did retreat without doing battle with the invader. And when the southward-moving Japanese force on the Tientsin-Pukow line crossed the Yellow River at several points and converged on Tsinan, Governor General Han Fu-chu and his armies withdrew and left all of Shantung but the extreme south for the Japanese to occupy at their leisure. For this

he was subsequently shot; because, had the Japanese been fully aware of Chiang Kai-shek's plan to make Suchow the base for a big defensive struggle, they might have descended on that city before the armies which were sent there from all quarters of China had time to reach it. As it happened, the Chinese were well enough prepared by the time Terauchi's vanguards reached the fringes of Suchow's defenses in southern Shantung, to inflict upon them the most thorough and humiliating defeat a Japanese army has suffered on any field.

The series of reverses suffered early in April by Japanese columns in the Taierschwang area of southern Shantung, where they had rashly ventured away from the railway lightly equipped in their haste to get to the east of Suchow on the Lung-Hai line, showed what a similarly equipped Chinese force could do to a detached and unsupported Japanese force. This experience not only instilled into the Japanese a new respect for the resistance they were meeting and forced them to revise their appraisal of the job they had taken on, but brought their whole campaign to a standstill for some weeks. General Matsui, whose troops had made almost no headway after they crossed the Yangtze at Nanking, was recalled. Heavy replacements and reinforcements were sent into Shantung from the north. The armies in occupation of Shansi and of the northern half of the Peiping-Hankow line were reduced to skeleton police forces and Japan put into the Suchow campaign an army of perhaps 300,000 men with all the artillery, tanks, armored cars and trains that the transportation facilities permitted. The Chinese also mustered all they had within reach and were at the time believed to have had 750,000 men operating within fifty miles north, south and east of Suchow when the Japanese closed in at the end of May. The struggle ended with a Chinese evacuation that was dangerously near a collapse, it being subsequently rumored that the commanders lost their nerve at the end and led rather than ordered the retreat. The majority of the defeated troops moved westward along the Lung-Hai line towards its junction with the Peiping-Hankow line at Chengchow. They were followed so hotly by the Japanese in three parallel columns that though they fought back, they had no opportunity to organize a united stand and seemed about to give the Japanese army access to the Peiping-Hankow railway and a fair start towards Hankow, when the swollen Yellow River broke through its dikes at several points in the

path of the Japanese columns. Rolling southeastward in an old bed, the river put an end for many months to the Japanese movement on Hankow from the north. Whether this break was the Dragon King's timely intervention on behalf of the Chinese army, as the latter claimed, or whether the soldiery deliberately cut the banks, as their spokesmen vigorously denied, is not yet clear. But the results were immediately appreciated in Japan where it caused much consternation. The end of the war looked further away in the middle of June than it had in January and the high hope of a whirlwind finish, which the rapid advance after Suchow had engendered, was dead.

The only course left open to Hankow was straight up the swampy, malarial, all but roadless and tropically hot Yangtze valley. With summer coming on a Yangtze campaign was anything but a pleasant outlook for the army; and the navy had every reason to doubt that it could cover forces advancing along the river banks if the Chinese made even halfway efficient use of their land batteries. There was a pause of several weeks, during which the Japanese commanders were evidently pondering these unpleasant facts, during which the Chinese were too busy reassembling their scattered army on their side of the Yellow River flood to issue bulletins on their own prospects, but during which the guerrillas, probably because their forces were augmented by stray units of regulars who could not rejoin the main body and by farmers who had picked up abandoned equipment after the great battles in the Suchow area, became exceedingly active from northern Shansi to Hangchow Bay. As reinforcements were later needed to support Japan's Yangtze campaign, guerrilla operations forced all Japanese forces in North China to stick to the railway zones. This situation has not greatly changed since then.

The Yangtze campaign began with an advance early in June from Wuhu to Anking by a small force with a small naval escort; but the surprising ease with which the capital of Anhwei province was taken and held, emboldened the Japanese to carry on after the Yellow River flood and to risk more men on the venture. Their objective was Hukow, an old fortified town commanding the entrance to Poyang Lake, which stands on the first patch of high, dry land above Anking. To get there they had to traverse 70 miles of valley in which the dikes provide the only roadways though a country which, on both sides of the river, is a maze of waterways, lakes, swamps and flooded rice fields. Throughout

this land a great variety of diseases are endemic. Despite the terrain and the climate and because the Chinese high command at Hankow made no effort worth mentioning to stop them, the Japanese took Hukow in three weeks and were in command of one bank of the narrow passage through which Poyang Lake empties into the Yangtze. The opposite side of the passage was guarded by high hills on one of which, Lion Hill, the Chinese had made preparations to dispute the capture of the city of Kiukiang. Here again, however, Chinese artillery proved no obstacle to Japanese naval manœuvres, and all the vantage points between Hukow and Kiukiang were cleared of Chinese defenders by naval gunfire and aërial bombing in a few days. The capture of Kiukiang was, however, the last spectacular Japanese achievement between the third week in July 1938, and the all but unopposed occupation of Canton in the third week of October.

By the time the Japanese began to move on from Kiukiang the Chinese were ready for them. Upriver from that city the banks were again flanked by so much flooded marsh land that no advance was possible with anything but the lightest equipment — and the Chinese had no difficulty in stopping lightly equipped troops. A Japanese force that crossed the Yangtze with the idea of following the north bank had to go 20 miles inland before it found firm footing. A force that entered Poyang Lake with the idea of landing on its west shore and cutting the railroad between Kiukiang and Nanchang was at once mired and became a target for Chinese forces on high ground to the westward. The major drive up the south bank of the Yangtze had to depart from the river and push straight westward, with a point on the Canton-Hankow railway, 70 miles southwest of Hankow instead of the city itself, as its objective. A fifth expedition had meanwhile set out through Anhwei and was following the north slope of the Yangtze-Yellow River watershed westward towards the Peiping-Hankow line, but this caused no serious diversion of Chiang Kai-shek's attention from the major scene of action.

Throughout August and September the Japanese advances were so inconsequential that it began to be doubtful whether they would ever reach Hankow. Sickness and effective Chinese resistance decimated their ranks on all fronts, and there was a constant parade of Japanese transports up the river, bringing reinforcements and supplies and taking out the casualties. Foreign observers at Kiukiang have expressed the belief that the

killed, wounded and sick totalled 400,000. This seems like a fantastic figure; but the losses were undoubtedly heavy, for officers returning to Japan on sick leave testified eloquently to the effect of heat and sickness on the spirits of the troops. Official Japanese comments on the progress of the war were exceedingly modest. Rumors of peace negotiations were constantly current and Japanese military spokesmen in Shanghai were of the opinion, for publication, that when the army took Hankow it would be content to leave the rest of China to Chiang Kai-shek, consolidate its gains within the network of railways that it controlled and hasten demobilization of as many of the reservists as possible.

It was during this period also that the army spokesmen became most outspokenly resentful of the assistance which China was getting from abroad through Hong Kong in the form of munitions and supplies. Up until it became clear to the whole world, in the latter part of September, that the governments of Great Britain and France prized peace far above prestige, the Japanese thought they could do nothing about this constant flow of comfort from Hong Kong to Central China, except to cut the line of communications at some point between Canton and Hankow. It was feared that Britain would be bitterly and perhaps dangerously resentful of Japanese operations in the vicinity of Hong Kong. Munich completely altered this situation, and the expedition against Canton which it prompted, radically changed the whole character of the war in China.

Without previous warning a fleet of Japanese transports with a naval escort entered Bias Bay, a few miles from British mainland territory, and on October 12 discharged over 30,000 fresh and well-furnished troops. Within a few days one detachment had cut the railroad connecting Hong Kong harbor at Shameen with Canton, 15 miles west of the British-Chinese boundary; and within ten days, the expedition's motorized vanguard rumbled into the city of Canton without firing a shot. Here and there odd Chinese units had offered stiff resistance, but it was unorganized and undirected; because, after the cutting of the railway, there was no one left in Canton with authority to direct it. The best troops and all available supplies had been consistently forwarded to Central China and the Japanese expedition came as such a complete surprise that Chiang Kai-shek had no chance to move to Canton's rescue.

After the fall of Canton whatever supplies the Generalissimo

had accumulated at Hankow were the last he could expect to get from abroad in sufficient quantities to offer the Japanese formal battle, and when they were gone positional warfare would be at an end. There was no further point in wasting men or time, or in exhausting supplies in the defense of Hankow. The time would be better employed preparing for the evacuation of the city and getting the army ready for a new type of warfare — a campaign of provocative raids, retreats and ambushes, such as the guerrillas were carrying on with great success in every allegedly “conquered” province, only on a much larger scale. Between the fall of Canton on October 21 and the Japanese occupation of Hankow on October 25 Chinese resistance slackened, the Japanese hastened their pace, correspondents were invited to fly from Shanghai and see the Chinese getting out, and the tone of Japanese publicity became not only exultant but took on that truculent note which has since characterized Tokyo’s diplomatic correspondence. Though army spokesmen had, a few weeks before, predicted that the army would be content to take Hankow, General Hata, directing operations against Hankow, now prophesied that victorious Nippon would chase Chiang Kai-shek to China’s frontiers if she had to and would crush resistance in the remotest corners of the republic.

Since the capture of Hankow the Japanese military have been busy with the task of clearing the Canton-Hankow and the Peiping-Hankow railroads of Chinese forces. They are finding this no easy matter. In the meantime light naval craft have advanced another hundred miles or so up the Yangtze and the Japanese air force has been busier than usual bombing remote centers of population. An expedition into northwest China, where the former Red armies still hold Shensi province and where Kansu serves as a distributing depot for such supplies as come from Russia by truck, has been announced but has not yet been organized as I write. Guerrillas still operate along almost every mile of Japanese communications in China and the population of vast blocks of territory between these lines has not yet seen a Japanese uniform.

So the war is not over, although it is not likely to be punctuated again by such great protracted positional struggles as the Japanese campaigns against Shanghai, Suchow and Hankow. Japan has not won; and whether she does eventually win now depends little upon the driving power of her military machine, but rather

upon the survival of the fighting spirit among the Chinese people on the one hand, and upon the economic staying power of the Japanese nation on the other. The Chinese people have only to remain "non-coöperative" — at which they are masters — and to keep a few millions of their armed men engaged in active sabotage, thereby tying up at least half a million Japanese soldiery. If they can do this, they can impose an economic strain on Japan which in a few years will lower her vitality to the breaking point; a resurgence of active rebellion might then result in as complete an evacuation of China as that of the Mongols at the end of their conquering career.

Six months ago it was declared on Chinese military authority that Japan had 1,500,000 men in China. This probably included garrison troops in Manchuria and Jehol, and was an exaggeration at that. But, in discussing the war, highly-placed Japanese have several times since then spoken casually of the million men in China. This probably means 800,000 in China proper; and, since there is no reason to believe that more than 300,000 have been engaged in actual warfare at any one time, and since big engagements have always been accompanied by the withdrawal of men from remote outposts, we have pretty good reason to believe that half a million Japanese soldiery, apart from the navy's contributions to waterway patrol, are at all times engaged in guarding captured cities and other bases, as well as the railroads and minor waterways which are subject to constant interruption by Chinese irregulars. Certainly this vigilance cannot be relaxed if the army is to hold its own over all the territory that it has traversed. And just as certainly none of these police forces can yet attempt to patrol the big blocks of "non-coöperative" territory between the trunk railroads. How long Japan can support a police force of at least half a million men in China — at, let us say, \$700,000,000 a year — is purely a matter of speculation, a fact abundantly proved by the great diversity of published estimates of Japan's financial resources. I have just read a dozen or more which I had put away at different times for comparison; and all they agree on is that Japan has gotten rid of her free gold, has dipped into her currency reserves and that, though she has achieved a trade balance, she has no prospect of financing a protracted war out of her exports. The maintenance of an unprofitable state of war in China probably depends a good deal more upon the degree of privation to which the Japanese people can be reduced than upon foreign

credits. The strongest argument used by certain Japanese to persuade their countrymen that a totalitarian government is necessary is that the drain upon Japan's internal resources and a check on the discontent of the people can in that way be more scientifically imposed. Very few Occidentals who have lived among the Japanese people believe that revolution could ever come before exhaustion, no matter how ruthlessly the country were bled to keep the army in the field. On that I am not competent to pass an opinion. I only believe that the Chinese can, if they will, keep up the strain indefinitely without yielding the conqueror enough loot to relieve it materially.

As for China's material resources: there appeared to be no limit to her credit abroad while she had a port open to foreign purchases; and now that she has none through which more than dribblets can come in, her need of credits is all but gone. Her normal sources of revenue are all in Japanese hands, or in the hands of the so-called puppet governments; but large forces can live off the land without pay and without imposing any unusual burdens on the population, as the great armies of the warlords have done for years at a stretch in even the poorest provinces. For the kind of hit-and-run warfare to which China must now resign herself little is needed but small arms and ammunition, gasoline and high explosives. The guerrillas supply themselves from Japanese stores; a number of small arsenals still operate behind the Chinese lines; and for the rest one must assume that, slow and unsatisfactory as shipments from Burma and Soviet Russia are by truck, the volume of such shipments will now increase to the maximum capacity of the roads.

The physical expulsion of the Japanese by Chinese armies so meagerly and irregularly supplied is, of course, out of the question. The only thing now that could give China command of the situation and a chance to regain lost territory is the evolution of an air force much superior to Japan's. While there are periodical reports of fresh Soviet contributions to Chiang Kai-shek's air fleet, there is no certainty that even the entire Soviet air force could clear China's skies of Japanese war planes. Nothing, in short, is left to China but the prospect of wearing Japan down, and this is just as good as the Chinese have the stamina to make it.

THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN THE LEVANT

By Tomaso Sillani

THE datum point from which any discussion of Near Eastern affairs must proceed is Italy's firm determination to defend and to exploit her new empire in East Africa. Ethiopia is an indispensable element in the future of Italy, the greatest of her hopes. More than that, Italy feels honor-bound before the world to develop and civilize Ethiopia in order to prove that its conquest was a just and necessary measure.

As a result of that conquest the focus of Italy's foreign policy has shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean. Italy, now more than ever before, must insist upon the freedom of the Mediterranean, for through that sea lies her only route to Ethiopia. This does not mean that Italy desires to monopolize the Mediterranean: her policy remains what it has always been ever since the *Risorgimento* — the preservation of the *status quo*, or if that proves impossible, the creation of a Mediterranean equilibrium in which Italy has a place corresponding to her importance and to her vital interests. The common defense of this principle was one of the cornerstones of that Anglo-Italian diplomatic coöperation which endured the vicissitudes of fifty years, only to end with Britain's overt and intransigent opposition to Italy's liquidation of the Ethiopian problem, an opposition that for a time seemed to be leading the two nations to armed conflict. Indeed, that there was no such conflict was due to Il Duce's firm resolve to prevent the outbreak of a general European war.


I need not remind my readers that the Mediterranean and Red Seas — with their connecting link, the Suez Canal — also form a vital link in the imperial communications of Great Britain. But whereas Britain may use other ways to reach her Eastern possessions, for Italy there is no alternative. If the Suez Canal and its approaches are closed to her, she is completely cut off from her East African empire. The mortal dangers of her position in the Mediterranean, particularly in its eastern end, were dramatically brought home to Italy during the 241 days of economic siege applied against her by the League of Nations. She saw the *status quo* gravely disturbed by the agreements of mutual assistance between England on the one hand and Yugoslavia, Greece and

Turkey on the other, by which the latter in effect put their ports at Britain's disposal. She also saw that through this combination she might have to bear even heavier sanctions — the loss of her oil supply or the blocking of the Suez Canal. In other words, she saw the spectre of that very territorial and naval hegemony in the Mediterranean she had always striven to prevent.

At the same time, sanctions showed Italy that her position had certain advantages. She discovered that she could cut Britain's Mediterranean communications, and that Britain's naval bases in that sea were no longer invulnerable.

Leaving aside the imponderables — for the effect of these can never be foreseen — what are the relative military positions of England and Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean? Italy failed to make good her wartime aspirations in Anatolia; she therefore possesses, in addition to the homeland, only Libya and the Dodecanese, neither of which she won in the World War. England, on the other hand, greatly expanded her Near Eastern domain after the war by forming a compact complex of allies, mandates, tributary states and crown colonies between the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Because of her responsibilities to these allied or subject peoples, England cannot limit her action in the Mediterranean to closing its two ends at Suez and Gibraltar without greatly damaging her prestige and her interests. Responsible British statesmen, such as Sir Samuel Hoare, have themselves clearly indicated that they have no intention of renouncing the British position in that sea by, for instance, abandoning the naval base at Malta. Though their strategic situation has been altered by the strengthening of potentially hostile naval bases and air fleets, the British continue to trust in the magnitude of their own forces, in their carefully prepared political arrangements, and in those complicated plans for the defense of maritime traffic in closed seas which the Admiralty declares it has already made.

What, in concrete terms, is the state of Italy's naval preparedness in the Eastern Mediterranean? Her most important naval arsenal, located at Taranto, lies on the shores of that sea. Further, there are on the east coast of Sicily the bases of Messina and Augusta, in Libya the ports of Tripoli and Bengasi and the base at Tobruk, and in the Ægean Islands the base at Leros. To this well-planned network must be added the naval base at Brindisi, which controls the Strait of Otranto, and the port of Trapani,



which, together with the recently fortified island of Pantelleria, dominates the Strait of Sicily. The peculiar formation of the floor of this Strait affords especially favorable conditions for the use of insidious weapons such as mines and submarines. Further, the Strait can easily be controlled from the air bases of Sicily, Sardinia and Libya. These circumstances explain why several British naval and aeronautical experts have pronounced Malta untenable, lying as it does only fifty miles from Italian airfields, and why the Admiralty has on more than one occasion seriously considered basing its Eastern Mediterranean fleet at a less exposed place. With Egyptian consent this could be Alexandria, though that city at present lacks the necessary military and naval apparatus for a base. Haifa, another suitable spot, is not supposed to be put to military purposes since it lies in mandated territory. Cyprus has an ideal location, but its coasts offer absolutely no sites for the creation of a naval base worthy of the name.

In so far as the relative strength of the Italian and British fleets is concerned, it might not be amiss to make a rapid comparison of the two. Today Italy has in service or being thoroughly refitted four capital ships, while England has fifteen. She has in the advanced stages of construction two others of 35,000 tons each, similar to five English vessels also being built. To these must be added two more of like tonnage recently started, for which there are five English counterparts. In this category Italy tends to maintain the now defunct ratios set up in the Washington Treaty.

In the cruiser class Italy has seven heavy and twelve light units, all modern, which are comparable in type to the sixteen heavy and forty-five light cruisers in the British Navy. Italy has in construction twelve light cruisers of limited size but of great speed — her “oceanic” cruisers — whereas England is building twenty-eight, larger but slower. Among the smaller craft Italy has, in the water or shortly to be launched, sixty-three destroyers and thirty-two large torpedo boats, together with numerous small and antiquated but still useful vessels. In this class Britain possesses some two hundred units in service or on the ways.

Italy has no airplane carriers because the entire Mediterranean is within range of her air bases; Britain has seven in use and seven building. On the other hand, the Italian Navy sets great store on its submarines, of which it has more than a hundred, while England has fifty-six (plus seventeen in construction). Upon the occasion of Hitler's recent visit to Italy, eighty-two Italian

submarines manœuvred in formation on and below the waters of the Bay of Naples.

And lastly, both navies have developed those small torpedo-carrying motorboats (known in Italy as the MAS), used with such success by the Italian Navy in the Adriatic during the World War.

The following table gives the official figures, as of October 1, 1938, for the Italian, French and British fleets. Those for the French Navy have been included in order that the reader may gauge the magnitude of Italy's naval progress.

COMPARATIVE NAVAL TONNAGES OF THE THREE PRINCIPAL
MEDITERRANEAN POWERS

CLASSIFICATION	ITALY	FRANCE	GREAT BRITAIN
Overage.....	47,965	915	191,300
Underage.....	412,703	510,550	1,126,808
In construction	167,128	139,266	441,980
Projected.....	51,380	135,100	165,260
Totals.....	679,176	785,831	1,925,348

The figures cited above are in themselves misleading unless interpreted in the light of the strategic situation in which each country finds itself, or might find itself in the event of a general European war. Italy, for instance, is so located geographically that she is literally in a closed sea, the three outlets of which lie in the hands of others. It is easy to see why many British naval experts were, at the time of the Ethiopian War, of the opinion that Italy could be forced to surrender merely by closing these outlets without waging war against her in the Central Mediterranean. This danger for Italy, however real it may have been three years ago, will in the future become less serious as her policy of autarchy advances towards success and as closer relations with her friends in Central and Eastern Europe are developed.

There remains, furthermore, the fundamental fact, already alluded to, that by commanding the Strait of Sicily Italy is able to cut the Mediterranean into two parts and thus oblige the British, if they wish to exert effective and continuous pressure on the Italian Peninsula, to keep two fleets in that sea — one based on Gibraltar and one based on Alexandria or Haifa. Operating in its own waters and making full use of the Strait of Messina, the Italian Navy can, with support from the air, oblige any adversary to employ a tremendous display of force. And since Britain has commitments all over the world, the disproportion between the

two navies is not as great as the figures of tonnage and of units, taken by themselves, might indicate.

Turning to the Red Sea, strategically an integral part of the Eastern Mediterranean, we find that the conquest of Ethiopia has freed Italian naval positions in those waters from that fear of an Abyssinian attack which in the past rendered their use precarious. Today the Italian naval bases at Massaua and Assab enjoy the necessary freedom of action; and, because of local hydrographic conditions, they are practically unassailable. When we remember that farther south, in Somalia, Italy possesses other bases for operations, especially for aviation, it is clear that henceforth it will not be difficult for her to block the lower entrance to the Red Sea — and thus to the Mediterranean. A flotilla of light ships and submarines, supported from the air and technically prepared to operate in tropical seas, would be more than sufficient to bar the passage of that sea.

From the foregoing remarks three obvious conclusions are to be drawn: (1) Great Britain and Italy have a common vital interest in maintaining the freedom of their imperial communications through the Mediterranean and Red Seas; (2) each is in a position seriously to hinder the other's access to certain zones along this route; (3) a war in which one sought to overthrow the other would therefore present for both of them incalculable, perhaps mortal, dangers. It is with full consciousness of these inescapable facts that the governments of the two nations have, ever since July 1936, been groping towards an understanding. These attempts, after meeting various setbacks, finally led to the signature of the Anglo-Italian Agreements and accompanying Declarations on April 16, 1938. Even then, another seven months elapsed before these documents were to be made effective by the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from both sides in Spain.

Naturally, relations between Rome and London were very strained as long as the League's sanctions were enforced and as long as Britain upheld the naval agreements she had made with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. The League's vote on July 16, 1936, to revoke sanctions and Foreign Minister Eden's declaration three weeks later that the pacts of guarantee between Britain and the three Eastern Mediterranean Powers had outlived their usefulness, opened the way for a *détente* in Anglo-Italian relations. Even during the dark days of the Ethiopian War, Mussolini had repeatedly asserted that Italy's policy did not menace British

imperial interests and that it was highly regrettable that their differences had developed into a bitter diplomatic conflict.

Mussolini therefore welcomed the promise of a better understanding. In his speech to the people of Milan on November 1, 1936, he took up the question of Anglo-Italian relations. He pointed out that if the Mediterranean was for England a route — a “short cut” — to her eastern empire, for Italy it was life itself. However, he went on to say that Italy does “not intend to menace that route. We do not propose to cut it, but in return we demand that our rights and vital interests be respected.” Continuing, he declared that “there are no alternatives: the rational brains in the British Empire must realize the irrevocable and accomplished fact; and the sooner the better. A bilateral clash is unthinkable, and even less one that from bilateral might become a general European conflict. There is therefore only one solution: a straightforward, rapid, complete understanding based on the recognition of reciprocal interests.” These ideas he reiterated a few days later in an interview with Ward Price of the *Daily Mail*. “Anglo-Italian interests in the Mediterranean,” he declared, “are not conflicting but complementary. Neither of our two nations can permit itself the luxury of being hostile to the other.”

These categorical statements were soon followed by concrete actions. On November 6 an accord was signed renewing commercial relations between the two countries and liquidating the Italian commercial debts to England, frozen during sanctions. This paved the way for the Gentlemen’s Agreement signed at Rome on January 2, 1937. In this document the two Powers recognized that “the freedom of entry into, exit from, and transit through, the Mediterranean is a vital interest both to the different parts of the British Empire and to Italy, and that these interests are in no way inconsistent with each other,” and agreed to “disclaim any desire to modify, or, so far as they are concerned, to see modified, the *status quo* as regards national sovereignty of territory in the Mediterranean area.”

The favorable effects of this declaration were not slow in appearing. On January 15, Italy gave her preliminary adhesion to the decisions of the 1936 London Naval Conference. On January 27, though Great Britain still refused to recognize Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia, Italy signed conventions with her which regulated the water and pasturage rights of the natives along the frontier between Ethiopia and British Somaliland, as well as the

transit traffic between the British ports of Zeila and Berbera and the Ethiopian hinterland.

But this auspicious start towards Anglo-Italian coöperation was soon to receive a severe setback as a result of the Civil War in Spain. It was inevitable that Italy should look with the utmost disfavor on the creation of an anti-Fascist, and therefore anti-Italian, régime in Spain. Yet, the generous help given General Franco by Italy has not been for the purpose of upsetting the *status quo* in the Mediterranean: the Italian Government has never thought of modifying the territorial integrity of continental, insular or colonial Spain, or of reaping for itself political and economic advantages in that country. Its sole object has been to prevent the Madrid-Valencia Government from destroying the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean by endangering Italy's freedom of passage through the Strait of Gibraltar.

But the coherence of Italy's Spanish policy came to be appreciated in England only very gradually, and the hopes engendered by the Gentlemen's Agreement were therefore slow of fulfilment. It was only with Mr. Neville Chamberlain's accession to power that British policy was divorced from the complicated system of Geneva and placed on the firm ground of historical reality and the substantial interests of the empire. Thereafter Anglo-Italian conciliation moved forward. Mr. Eden's resignation as Foreign Minister in February 1938, due to his disagreement with Mr. Chamberlain over the advisability of a *rapprochement* with Italy, finally cleared the tracks for a liquidation of all disputes between the two countries about Mediterranean and Near Eastern affairs. The terms of this *rapprochement* were embodied in the various accords signed, as remarked above, at Rome on April 16, 1938.

The Gentlemen's Agreement of January 1937 had dealt only with the Mediterranean and was very brief and general in its terms. In sharp contrast, the April 1938 accords are comprehensive, detailed and exact, and their scope is not confined to the Mediterranean. They go to the root of all Anglo-Italian questions regardless of how delicate they may be. And they settle them concretely, leaving nothing to chance or to uncertainty. Above all, these documents establish the moral parity of the two nations. This in itself is an historic fact. The traditional British-Italian relationship, after having long been one between the strong and the weak, has now become one between full-fledged equals: in each of the agreements and accompanying declarations every

clause accepted by Italy has its counterpart in one accepted by Britain. In this wise the guarantees are given, not unilaterally, but reciprocally. Let us examine the contents of these documents.

First of all, the Gentlemen's Agreement of the previous year is confirmed. Second, the two parties agree to exchange certain broad categories of information about their land, sea and air forces in their territories (including mandates and protectorates) on the Mediterranean and Red Seas, the Gulf of Aden and in certain adjacent parts of Africa. Each also agrees to notify the other in advance of any decision relative to the establishment of new naval or air bases in the Mediterranean east of the nineteenth meridian, in the Red Sea or on the approaches thereto.

More significant are the documents which follow this: the "Anglo-Italian Agreement Regarding Certain Areas in the Middle East" and its five subsidiary Declarations. Taken together they constitute a species of "constitution" determining the new balance of power in the Red Sea region. As early as 1926 the Fascist Government had affirmed Italy's status as a Great Power in that area by being the first to recognize the independence of the Yemen. Shortly thereafter, the British Government indicated that it wished to discuss with Italy, in a spirit of understanding and collaboration, the situation created in the Red Sea — probably the most delicate segment in Britain's imperial communications — by the changes which had taken place there since the World War: the consolidation of the Yemenite state, the rise of Ibn Saud as a major factor in Arabian politics; the uncertain future of 'Asir; and the poorly defined legal status of the islands along the Arabian coast surrendered by Turkey. From the conversations held at Rome in 1927 there emerged certain understandings which, in spite of their rather generic nature, regulated Italo-British affairs in that zone for a decade.

In the years following 1927 further changes took place: Ibn Saud's creation of Saudi Arabia by the annexation of 'Asir and the Farasan Islands, formerly belonging to Turkey; the pact of "Arab Brotherhood" made between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen after their brief war; the elevation of Aden to the rank of a crown colony and the expansion of the Aden Protectorate to include the Hadhramaut; and lastly the creation of an Italian empire in East Africa. These circumstances rendered inevitable a revision of the obligations assumed in 1927.

In the Red Sea, perhaps even more than in the Mediterranean,

the primary object of each party to the *rapprochement* of April 1938 was to insure the freedom of its imperial communications. This is the principal reason why both undertake to respect, and to oblige third Powers to respect, the territorial integrity and the independence of the Yemen and of Saudi Arabia. To give effect to this pledge they agree to abstain not merely from occupying territory but from every form of action which might lead to their acquiring privileged political positions in those countries.

Equally important are the stipulations in regard to the islands in the Red Sea. Nothing is said about the Farasan Islands — or about 'Asir on the mainland — indicating that the two Powers officially recognize their annexation to Saudi Arabia. As for the Kamaran Islands, Italy promises not to oppose the presence there of a British sanitary station, in return for which England will not oppose the admission of an Italian medical officer to the station. Next are mentioned Great and Little Hanish Islands and Jebel Zukur, on which it is provided that Italian officials may reside to protect the fishermen who frequent those waters, and Abu Ail, Centre Peak and Jebel Teir, on which a mixed British and Italian personnel will operate the lighthouses. The importance of these arrangements resides in the fact that they do not affect the sovereignty of the islands.

Italy declares that in that part of the Arabian Peninsula lying east and south of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen she "will not seek to acquire any political influence." For their part, the British promise not to take any action infringing on the independence or integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen; not to undertake, or cause to be undertaken, any military works in that zone except those necessary for the defense of the area or of "the communications between different parts of the British Empire;" not to enroll, or allow to be enrolled, natives of that zone "in any military forces other than forces designed and suited solely for the preservation of order and for local defense." The British further declare it their intention to maintain the autonomy of the Arab rulers under their protection, though they reserve "the liberty to take in these territories such steps as may be necessary for the preservation of order and the development of the country." They also stipulate that Italian subjects can, in accord with local regulations, freely enter, move about, dwell and do business in the Aden Protectorate.

Supplementing this Agreement there are five Declarations, of

which only two need be enlarged upon. In one Italy renews her assurance, previously made to the League of Nations on June 29, 1936, that the natives of Italian East Africa will not "be compelled to undertake military duties other than local policing and territorial defense." The second deals with the Suez Canal and will be discussed a little later.¹

What effect do all these contractual obligations have on the interests and policies of the two Powers?

Let us begin with the southern end of the Red Sea, where certain observers may have gained the impression that, by accepting the *status quo* in Southern Arabia, Italy has bowed before British hegemony. In reality, a careful examination of the documents will show that there has been a loyal recognition of reciprocal interests and rights by both governments. Their interests, here as elsewhere in the Red Sea or in the Mediterranean, are "complementary" — to borrow Mussolini's formula. The fact that British imperial interests are more extensive and complex in comparison to those of Italy has no importance. What is important is that the two empires have found it expedient in certain sectors where they have vital interests in common to come to terms on a basis of equality.

The strategic situation now governing the Red Sea would, in any case, militate against either Power's seeking to impose its hegemony there: the vast naval resources of Britain are well-known, while Italy's forces are, as was indicated above, in a position to carry out whatever operations, defensive or offensive, may prove to be necessary in those waters. As for the Indian Ocean, which in certain circumstances might be used in conjunction with the Red Sea, Italy still regards it as a British sea. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that when the ports on the inhospitable coast of Somalia have been completed, Italian vessels will be able to operate in the Indian Ocean.

The question of the Suez Canal should be examined with the same criteria that we have applied to the Eastern Mediterranean and to the Red Seas. Our approach to it depends, of course, on whether we presuppose rivalry or collaboration between Italy and England. In the first case, no protocol or declaration, no matter how explicit, can prevent England — due to the privileged status she has won for herself, in particular by means of the military and

¹ The other three Declarations deal with propaganda, Lake Tsana and "the free exercise of religion and the treatment of British religious bodies in Italian East Africa."

aërial clauses in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, 1936 — from exercising “decisive” pressure on the Canal. The Constantinople Convention of October 29, 1888, with which the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is in substantial contradiction, would thus become a purely platonic instrument in spite of the precedents set during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 — upon all of which occasions the freedom of the Canal was preserved in consonance with Article I of the Constantinople Convention. If, on the other hand, there is Anglo-Italian coöperation instead of hostility, the question of free transit does not even arise. By registering each Power’s promise to respect the terms of the 1888 Convention, the April 1938 Declaration should prove to be a definite settlement of this problem, the more so since Egypt, in her new quality as an independent state, has adhered to it.

The relations between Italy and Egypt have at several moments given rise to diffidence. This diffidence has always been of Egyptian origin, much to the surprise of the Italian Government, which at all times has sought to prove its sincere friendship for the Egyptian people — as, for instance, at the Montreux Conference for the abolition of the capitulations. Italy has a large and active colony in Egypt, where indeed for a considerable period during the nineteenth century the Italian language and Italian officials occupied a privileged position in the government and in business. All that Italy desires from Egypt is good political and economic relations, and mutual understanding and respect.

Egypt’s suspicions towards Italy arose at the time of the Ethiopian War, when certain amateur strategists proclaimed that Italian troop movements in Libya, which in reality were purely defensive, represented preparations for an attack upon Alexandria, to be carried out in unison with an Italian invasion of the Sudan from Ethiopia. These strategists did not reflect that any such action would have meant not only a war with England but, as Mussolini himself declared, a general European conflict. Since it is not hard to imagine on which side France would have been in such a war, one can readily see in what a precarious position Libya would have been. Be that as it may, the Rome negotiations of April 1938 led to two measures clarifying the situation: the agreement of *bon voisinage* between Great Britain and Egypt on one hand and Italy on the other, and Italy’s pledge to reduce her

effectives in Libya to a peace footing — equivalent to half the number stationed there in the winter of 1938.

Palestine is popularly believed to be another locus of friction between Italy and Great Britain. Let it therefore be said immediately that in Palestine, as in Syria and 'Iraq, Italy has no interests other than the preservation of the Mediterranean *status quo* and the defense of the principle of the Open Door as applied to the economic and cultural position she has already acquired there. Certainly, Italy does not regard the situation in those countries with entire satisfaction, particularly in so far as recent events in Syria and Palestine have not been in keeping with the concept of the *status quo*. In the Sanjak of Alexandretta, France, the mandatory Power for Syria, not long ago placated the Turkish Government by accepting its military assistance in policing the contested territory, and this against the will of the Syrians. In return for this favor she induced the Turks to enter a treaty of friendship, which created in that sector of the Near East a singular political situation — a development in which Britain seems to have had a hand.

The British mandatory government in Palestine, instead of resolutely confronting the situation caused by its Zionist policy, has apparently been content to keep agitation and terrorism alive by proposing one solution after another, the only upshot of which is the further exasperation of Palestinian nationalist elements. Some observers hold that England has dragged out the pacification of Palestine in order to have an excuse for keeping an imposing array of military force in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this connection it is interesting to note that the British Government's determination to inject real energy into its military operations in Palestine followed the meeting at Munich and its own decision to put the Anglo-Italian Agreements into effect.

There is no foundation for the rumors that accuse Italy of secretly aiding the Arab nationalist movement. Italian opinion concerning the Arabs is that they ought to be permitted as far as possible to choose their own destiny. For this reason it has always regarded the institution of the Jewish "Homeland" as an abuse of power. Italy's friendly policy towards the Arab-Moslem world is an old and firm tradition. Since the conquest of Ethiopia the necessity for this attitude has been intensified by the fact that several million Mohammedans live in Italian Africa and because of the existence of Moslem countries on all sides of the Empire.

If we keep these facts clearly in mind, we see why the statement made by Il Duce during his last trip to Libya — that he wished to be the “Protector of Islam” — has a precise meaning, clearly understood by the Moslem world with the exception of a few envious religious personalities interested in giving it a literal interpretation. The Arab world is far from being solidly in favor of Arab unity, and this applies particularly to Pan Islamic circles. As Sheik Mohammed Mustafa el-Maraghi, Rector of the famous religious University of el-Azhar at Cairo, declared not long ago, “Islam is opposed to the spirit of race; it makes no distinction between the Arab and the non-Arab, because it starts from a concept of the Islamic community in which there is no discrimination between races. The ulemas and Moslems in general should strive for Islamic unity and not concern themselves with Arab unity.”² How could Mussolini, one of the most realistic statesmen in Europe, have had in mind any possibilities beyond these well-known and clearly defined limits? And in any event, did not the Interparliamentary Congress of the Arab states recently held at Cairo, by its conclusions and by the pro-British sympathies of its leading personalities, reveal itself to be a secret Pan Arab manœuvre for the creation of a united Arab kingdom which would be under Britain’s tutelage, and which would thus reënforce Britain’s monopoly over the Arab world?

Italy nevertheless confidently awaits the beneficial results of her *rapprochement* with Great Britain, even as regards the Arab countries, the more so because she has no special concessions to ask beyond those which naturally inhere in her position as a Mediterranean nation. Only one right of a highly spiritual character does she reaffirm, and that is her right to preserve the Latinity of the Holy Land, won through eight crusades. This right Italy can exercise only if she has the custody of the sanctuaries built there during the two centuries of Latin rule. In particular, she asks the possession of the *Cænaculum* in Jerusalem, which the King of Italy has inherited from the House of Anjou, to which it once belonged. Italy is sure that a friendly England will not continue indefinitely to refuse to accord her these rights over the *Cænaculum* which even the Sultan recognized were hers.

This brings us to the final point of friction in Anglo-Italian relations — the economic agreement made between England and Turkey on May 27, 1938. In some quarters this is regarded as

² Letter published in *Al-Misri* of Cairo on May 31, 1938.

being injurious to Italian interests. By its terms Turkey's foreign trade is for practical purposes placed under British supervision, a supervision which might become a real monopoly. The intimacy and vastness of the economic relationships thus created explain why suspicions as to their political and military implications have arisen. In the meantime, a partially equalizing factor has been introduced into the situation by the economic accords entered into by Turkey and Germany in October 1938.

In fairness it must be said that Turkish animosity toward Italy has no need of British stimulation. This unfriendly attitude is one of the most incomprehensible phenomena which have ever confronted Italian diplomacy. Italy has always done everything possible to put her relations with Turkey on a cordial basis. She hoped that the treaty which she made with Turkey on May 30, 1928, would conduce to this end. Instead, the possibility of such friendly relations is continually frustrated by the fact that Turkey attributes to Italy all sorts of sinister designs. The truth of the matter is that Italy has long since relegated her ambitions of 1917-18 to the dusty archives of history — and the writer can say this with full knowledge whereof he speaks, for during the World War he was among those who most ardently urged Italian expansion in Asia Minor. No less irrational appear Turkish fears in regard to the Italian islands in the *Ægean*. The fortifications on these islands, far from having been conceived with any specific anti-Turkish function in mind, were created as a natural part of Italy's Mediterranean defenses, and as such are linked with the rest of her strategic system in that sea.

Will peace in the Mediterranean also mean cordial relations between Italy and Turkey? Italy hopes so. In the meantime she has adhered to the Montreux Convention permitting the rearming of the Straits — an adhesion which she certainly could not have conceded in July of 1936 (the date of its signature) when the pacts of mutual assistance in the Mediterranean aimed against her were still in force. Militarily, that Convention contains few innovations; and, in any case, Turkey will continue to possess, as she has possessed in the past, the *de facto* control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. What really counts, then, is the attitude which Turkey may adopt in the event of a war — Convention or no Convention.

WHAT FRANCE MEANS TO ENGLAND

By Harold Nicolson

POLITICAL alliances are not, as Herr Hitler rightly remarked, concluded upon a basis of compatibility of temper; they are concluded for the purpose of assuring certain common ends. The history of Anglo-French relations during the last thirty-five years is a proof of that aphorism. Our national characters, and at moments our immediate national aims, have proved incompatible; it is because we have throughout been faced by a basic common danger that we have been obliged, in spite of many quarrels, to retain our connection.

The American people have a congenital sympathy for France. To the great mass of Americans, France signifies a fellow Republic inspired by a common faith in the rights of man. Gratitude to Lafayette is even today a constantly renewed inspiration and the American schoolboy learns to look upon France as a hereditary friend. Contacts between the two countries are sentimental rather than actual, and those richer Americans who visit France are charmed by the luxuries and elegances of her ancient civilization. True, the war and its aftermath have done much to diminish this sentimental legend; yet the feeling is there; it is vague but widespread; it might at any moment again become operative.

The British people do not share these sympathies. It is not only that our history books indicate that France has for centuries been hostile towards us, it is that the two national characters are diametrically opposed. The average Englishman (and most Englishmen are extremely true to type) is slow, unintellectual and puritan. He regards Frenchmen as vivacious, and therefore volatile; as nimble-witted, and therefore unreliable; as hedonistic, and therefore profligate. He mistrusts their politicians, whom he regards as treacherous and corrupt. He is irritated by their press polemics, which he attributes, and not without reason, to foreign subventions. And he dislikes their foreign policy, which jars on his isolationist feelings and makes him dread lest we be dragged into trouble "at the coat-tails of France."

These instinctive prejudices are not mitigated by personal contacts. Neither the French nor the British are good linguists, and the uneducated Englishmen who in their thousands visit France during the holidays are distressed and humiliated by their

incapacity to make themselves understood. The French, for their part, are not fond of foreigners and are apt to adopt towards the incursions of us barbarians a purely commercial point of view. The Englishman thus feels that he is being exploited by people who are both ill-mannered and acquisitive. And it must be confessed that the French do not always display that good humor or patience which we ourselves try to show visitors from overseas.

The Germans, on the other hand, manage these things better. The English visitor to Germany is welcomed with open arms; he is spoken to in his own language and is assured on every hand how the great heart of Germany beats in unison with that of her British cousins. The similarity of physical type, the German interest in sport and bodily prowess, the extreme politeness of the German officials, all combine to impress the Englishman with the fiction that the Germans are essentially like ourselves. Upon such superficial impressions rests the strong pro-German feeling which, even today, animates large sections of Britain.

There is another point which is worth noting. The great majority of Englishmen who have knowledge of France or Germany acquired that knowledge very young. It is customary for many young Englishmen on leaving college to spend some months abroad, either in a French or in a German family. The impressions which they derive from such sojourns remain with them as profound convictions all their lives. The contacts which they have formed have generally been with younger people and owing to this circumstance the French are at a disadvantage. The German of eighteen or nineteen years of age is almost invariably a delightful human being; it is only when he reaches middle age that the German's less attractive qualities become apparent. Conversely, the young Frenchman of the same age is passing through an unattractive phase, and is all too often vain, arrogant and sensual. It is with middle age that the more solid and magnificent virtues of the French race come to the surface.

Thus whereas the virtues of the Germans are apparent to the youngest and most superficial observer, the virtues of the French are disclosed only to more adult or more studious minds. A man must have reached a certain standard of experience and culture before he is able to recognize that the merits of the French transcend any faults which they may possess. Let us admit that the French people are arrogant, insular, narrow, acquisitive, ill-tempered and suspicious. Let us also admit that they possess

superb courage, amazing taste and extreme determination. Above all, let us admire the lucidity of the French mind and the brilliance of their attainments. Those of us who, as myself, have more affection for France than for any other European country, must realize that the pleasure we derive from the French genius is predominantly an intellectual or æsthetic pleasure. It is as such esoteric. It is not shared by, and cannot be communicated to, those who have little appreciation of literature, art or elegance. The intellectuals of England are a tiny group of eccentrics. The great mass of the people are impervious to the charm of the French mind. And it thus arises that, whereas the French are angered by our failure to appreciate their magnificent intellect, we are hurt by their tendency to describe our muddle-headed and often timid idealism as "Anglo-Saxon cant."

I have often sought to mitigate this incompatibility of temper by begging my French friends to concentrate upon our feminine characteristics, upon our gentleness, our tolerance and our kindness; and by begging my own countrymen to pay more attention to the virile qualities of France, to her energy, her endurance and her courage. I cannot say that I have been very successful. The fact remains that most Englishmen dislike the French and that most Frenchmen dislike the English. How comes it therefore that so uncongenial a relationship has survived all these years?

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the friction between France and Great Britain became so acute that they found themselves at moments on the brink of war. We squabbled about Egypt, about Muscat, about Siam, about the Somali coast, about the Newfoundland fisheries, about the New Hebrides. The Fashoda incident all but provoked a conflict, and our humiliation of the admirable Major Marchand aroused feelings of vindictive bitterness in every French heart. During the Boer War the French public were solidly anti-British and some of the caricatures of Queen Victoria published during that period filled the British people with angered disgust. We retaliated by adopting at the time of the Dreyfus Case an attitude of unctuous self-complacency and by refusing to extend to France the slightest benefit of the doubt. An observer in 1900 would have asserted that any understanding between the two peoples was an impossibility.

During the years between 1895 and 1900 a change had, however, come over British policy. On the one hand the conquest of the Sudan and the impending conquest of the Transvaal and the

Orange Free State produced a reaction against aggressive imperialism. Great Britain felt that it was high time that she became a satisfied and static Power. On the other hand the hostility aroused against us in Europe by the Boer War convinced our statesmen that we could not permanently maintain our "splendid isolation" or remain for ever estranged from the whole world. Early in 1898, therefore, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain opened tentative conversations with Germany. These overtures were treated with a dilatoriness which amounted almost to a rebuff. They were resumed in November 1899 during the visit of the Emperor William II to Windsor. On that occasion the Emperor appeared willing to consider an alliance and urged Mr. Chamberlain to advocate it openly. He did so in a famous speech delivered at Leicester ten days later. On December 11 following, Count Bülow responded to this speech in terms which startled Europe. Not only did he ostentatiously ignore the offer made by Chamberlain in his Leicester speech, but he reaffirmed in ardent terms the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and concluded his speech with an undisguised menace. "It is exactly," he said, "because our international position is now favorable that we must utilize it to make ourselves secure for the future." He then proceeded to advocate the strengthening of the German Navy: "Without power, without a strong army and a strong navy, there can be no welfare for us. . . . In the coming century the German nation will be either the hammer or the anvil."

Mr. Joseph Chamberlain decided to swallow this almost intolerable affront. He continued, through the intermediacy of Baron von Eckardstein, his tentative conversations with the German Government. These conversations were not assisted by the violent anti-British propaganda of the German press. Gradually British opinion came to realize that the most dangerous menace came, not from Paris, but from Berlin. Our Government began to seek friends elsewhere. Negotiations were opened for a Treaty of Alliance with Japan, which was concluded on January 30, 1902. Several weeks later Eckardstein, paying a farewell visit to Windsor, observed Mr. Chamberlain in close conversation with the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon. He approached as close as he dared. The ominous word "Morocco" caught his ear.

From that moment Anglo-German relations rapidly deteriorated. There was the dispute regarding Venezuela, the beginnings

of the conflict over the Baghdad Railway, a controversy over Canadian preference, and a growing sense of commercial rivalry. These causes of conflict were aggravated by the new German program of naval construction. The German Navy Law of 1900 convinced British opinion that the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz were determined to challenge our command of the seas. Our own navy was rapidly reorganized and redistributed by Sir John Fisher. In October 1905 the first *Dreadnought* was laid down.

This short narrative of Anglo-German tension between 1896 and 1902 has been necessary in order to show how the British Government was edged into an understanding with France owing to the rejection of their overtures to Germany and the menacing attitude of the German Emperor and Navy League.

In July 1902 Lord Salisbury (who had a patrician distrust of French politicians) was succeeded in the control of foreign policy by Lord Lansdowne, who had French blood in his veins and who possessed a deep knowledge of French ways of thought. M. Paul Cambon played his cards with consummate skill. He opened tentative conversations with the Foreign Secretary and he enlisted the ready sympathies of King Edward VII. In May 1903 came that convivial monarch's famous state visit to Paris. With a single speech he wiped away all the bitterness of twenty years. The *Entente Cordiale* was born.

It was not sufficient, however, to have aroused some common sentiment, to have recognized a common interest, and to have sensed a common danger. Some more concrete elimination of differences was needed. An opportunity was provided by the British desire to dispose of the surplus funds of the Egyptian *Caisse de la Dette* and the French desire to establish a protectorate over Morocco. The agreement of April 8, 1904, provided for mutual concession on these two points. It also eliminated differences which had arisen regarding Siam, Madagascar, the Newfoundland fisheries and the New Hebrides. All outstanding controversies were, by this agreement, allayed.

It is interesting to consider what would have happened to the *Entente Cordiale* had not Germany reacted to it with her usual ineptitude. Although not unpopular in England, the 1904 agreement was regarded in France as a deplorably bad bargain. Had Germany behaved with skill and forbearance, it is more than probable that the *Entente* would have drained away into the sands of unpopularity. By taking immediate and forcible steps to

break the Entente, Germany succeeded in welding it into something approaching an alliance.

Her first action was to despatch the unfortunate Emperor upon a sudden and dramatic visit to Tangier. By this means it was hoped to demonstrate to the world that Germany would never recognize a French protectorate over Morocco. "It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent sovereign that I am paying my visit today," he declared upon his arrival. The British public was not at the time incensed by this dramatic intervention. They felt indeed that M. Delcassé had made an error in ignoring Germany and that the Emperor's visit was a not unjustified reminder and rebuke. But when they learnt that a special German mission under the formidable Count Tattenbach was being sent to Fez, their anxieties became aroused. These anxieties were turned into indignation when the German Government brought about the dismissal of M. Delcassé. It was felt that France was in danger of losing her status as an independent Power and that, unless resistance were offered, Germany would dominate the continent of Europe. The French Government for their part were convinced that Germany was about to threaten war. They appealed to Sir Edward Grey, who had by then succeeded Lord Lansdowne, asking him what, in that event, would be the attitude of the British Government. Sir Edward refused to commit himself; he did, however, allow staff conversations between Generals Grierson and Huguot; these conversations, which were expressly stated not to bind the governments, continued until 1914.

Meanwhile on the diplomatic front the solidity of the Franco-British Entente had been demonstrated at the Algeciras Conference, at which Great Britain had resisted all attempts on the part of Germany to drive a wedge between her and France. The Entente was still further strengthened by the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the strong support given to France by Great Britain during the Agadir crisis of 1911. By that time it was generally recognized that Europe was divided into two opposing camps: on the one side, France, Russia and England; on the other, Germany and Austria, with Italy as a somewhat volatile element between the two.

What, then, did France mean to us in those all-important years between 1904 and 1914? The agreement of 1904 had at first been regarded as little more than the removal of a tiresome controversy between powerful neighbors. Germany's attempt to force

us by menaces to abandon this new-found friend added to what was mere negative appeasement the more positive factors of pride and loyalty. It was not love of France which cemented the Entente, it was a growing fear of Germany and an increasing dislike of her violent methods. We entered the war of 1914-1918 in a mood which was not so much pro-French as anti-German.

The tribulations of that great ordeal left Great Britain (as they left the United States) in a mood of disillusioned isolationism. They left France in a mood of nervous vindictiveness. Great Britain, having joined with the United States in refusing France the Rhine frontier, also followed the American example in repudiating the guarantee which we had offered as an alternative to that drastic measure of security. This was a grave error on our part. While it increased the isolationist feeling in England, while it deprived us of any justification for influencing French postwar policy, it encouraged the French in their desire to destroy Republican Germany economically and in their policy of encircling her by a ring of eastern allies.

Great Britain, during that period, assumed an attitude of somewhat sulky aloofness. We bickered with France over reparations and over the Arab question. We took a stand upon the Ruhr occupation which was just strong enough to excite her bitter indignation and not strong enough to restrain her from that cruel enterprise. The personal animosity between Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré added acerbity to this conflict. And then arose the Turkish question over which the Anglo-French Entente almost split.

It is not necessary to enter into the details of that unhappy wrangle. The British Government supported the Greeks. The French Government, while pretending to support the Greeks, entered through the intermediacy of M. Franklin-Bouillon into secret arrangement with the Turks. Denunciations and invective passed between London and Paris. On one occasion, at a Conference in the Quai d'Orsay, Lord Curzon burst into threats of mortification and rage. And in the end we were faced with a situation in which our troops at Chanak were menaced by the Turkish army and our allies the French threatened to abandon us to our fate. It was at this moment that the memories of a past danger endured in common were revived. The French General Staff did not relish the prospect of seeing British troops massacred while the French looked on. At the Conferences of Lausanne, which settled the Turkish question, Anglo-French amity was re-

stored. The period from 1923 to 1930 was a period of comparative coöperation and calm. Locarno appeared to all of us to have settled the triangular problem of France, Germany and Great Britain in a reasonable way.

It would be impossible to understand these fluctuations in Anglo-French relations without realizing the difference which exists between the respective concepts of policy. The French have a constant directive in their policy, namely the fear of Germany; their eyes are forever fixed upon the blue line of the Vosges. With us, policy is a far less stable affair. We have no hereditary enemies and all we aim at is to prevent any one Power in Europe achieving such dominance as to reduce us to a position of subservience. We know that our vital organs are exposed to attack to a degree which the vital organs of France and Germany are not exposed to attack. You may defeat Germany or France and they will still remain Germany and France; if Great Britain were defeated, she would cease to exist as an independent Power. This intense vulnerability imposes upon us a certain empiricism in foreign policy.

The fact that we can never allow ourselves to become the inferior of any continental state obliges us to resist European domination. This principle is called "The Balance of Power." In the old days we sought to achieve that balance by forging armed alliances. After the war, we hoped to achieve it by the League of Nations. Unfortunately, the governing classes in Great Britain failed to realize that the League was a direct British interest. They imagined that it was a fantastic invention of President Wilson which bore but slight relation to our own security and might in fact imperil it. Thus, although the British public had vast sympathy with the ideal of the League, they failed to understand that it was essentially realistic. To them the phrase "collective security" was a mere electoral slogan without meaning other than that we might be drawn into the quarrels of the continent. This was a grave error.

It thus came about that Anglo-French relations, having survived the war, the Ruhr, Chanak and Lausanne, came into conflict over this League conception. For whereas we regarded the League as a valuable ideal which might become dangerous, the French regarded it as an instrument which might prove useful. They took the League too narrowly and we took it too vaguely. If their conception had been less precise and ours more realistic the League might have survived. In making it an instrument of

policy, the French destroyed its moral efficiency; in regarding it as a desirable but rather imaginative theory we destroyed its practical effect.

At the time, for instance, of the Corfu incident of 1923, the British Government were anxious to demonstrate that the League could be efficacious against a Great Power. Our statesmen, as distinct from our public opinion, saw that this was an occasion on which it would be valuable to emphasize the League's functions in the Balance of Power. The French, being always obsessed by the monomania over Germany, imagined that action over the Corfu crisis would further weaken Italy. They thus manœuvred the Corfu incident out of the hands of the League and into the hands of the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, with the result that it was settled in terms of the old diplomacy and not in terms of the League idea. That was a lamentable episode.

Almost exactly the same conditions arose over the Ethiopian crisis. M. Laval, thinking only of combinations against Germany, had in January 1933 made overtures to Mussolini and promised him, in return for Italian "friendship," a free hand in Ethiopia. The British Government (then under the influence of Anthony Eden) saw that the Ethiopian question would become the final test case of League authority. We desired to reaffirm the Balance of Power — an expression which causes the lip of any good American to curl in scorn, but which in fact means "preponderance of power as against aggressive states." Unfortunately, Mr. Eden did not receive the support in the country or the Cabinet to which he was entitled. Although, at some risk, we could have overthrown Mussolini, the majority of the Cabinet preferred to capitulate. France and Great Britain became, for the first time, partners in disgrace. This partnership appears today indissoluble.

A similar trend of development has occurred over this Czechoslovak crisis. British opinion was divided into two camps. On the one hand there were those who foresaw that the destruction of Czechoslovakia by Germany would lead to German domination over Europe and the complete reversal of the Balance of Power. On the other hand there were those who believed in "appeasement," namely in the policy of conciliating Germany and Italy by concessions irrespective of their moral justification. The former school pointed out that such methods would destroy the Balance of Power, hand over all the small countries to German domina-

tion, leave Germany still unsatisfied and even more ambitious, and alienate democratic opinion throughout the New and the Old World. Such people were called "war-mongers."

It was curious, none the less, to observe how the Czechoslovak crisis cemented Anglo-French relations. In the earlier stages there was a feeling in this country that our relations with France were a danger to the Empire and that France was certain to drag us into a war over the Sudeten Germans. So soon, however, as it became apparent that the French were even more anxious to surrender to Hitler than we were ourselves, the feeling changed. On the one hand, we eased our conscience by the consideration that France had behaved with even greater treachery and cowardice than we had; on the other hand, France was delighted to discharge upon the broad back of Mr. Chamberlain the onus of defeat. A certain identity of feeling was thereby achieved. We both felt equally guilty; we both felt equally frightened; we both felt equally ashamed; we now both feel equally menaced.

Whether any firm basis for future coöperation can be found upon an equal sense of humiliation and of fear remains to be seen. There was a tendency at one stage for each side to blame the other. This tendency was short-lived. The linen on either side was so stained with dishonor that we each tacitly agreed to bundle it back into the clothes basket. It is probable that the Entente Cordiale will now be reformed again on a basis of joint ignominy and fear. It will be called "The Defense of the West."

It should be noted also that the British attitude towards France has been profoundly altered by the progress of aviation. London is extremely vulnerable to air attack and we well know that it is difficult for us to detect and prevent aircraft descending almost suddenly upon our docks and harbors from over the sea. France has therefore become for us a vital strategic feature; were France to become either an enemy herself or in possession of an enemy, our air defense would be immensely complicated. Conversely it is only by close coöperation between the British and French air staffs that the superiority of German aviation can be mitigated. This important consideration renders France more necessary to us than ever before.

What, then, do the French mean to us? To me they mean that lovely cultured country, the lush meadows of the Seine, the balance and beauty of French intelligence, the art of life. I fear that I am in a minority. I fear that to the French we mean a

regrettable necessity and that to us the French mean unwelcome companions in adversity. We find ourselves in the same dug-out with the shells screaming around. That I suppose creates a certain sullen solidarity. It may be that when British opinion fully realizes what was lost at Munich, a great movement of national revival will occur. It may mean that when the French realize what Laval and Bonnet have done to them a similar outburst of indignant energy will take place. If that happens, then indeed the Entente will again live as the expression of all that is most virile and most idealistic in the two peoples. But if it does not happen, then we shall be united only by a slinking sense of shame.

Let me summarize my conclusions. The Entente in its origin was not a spontaneous understanding between two neighboring countries. It was born of a sense of weakness in face of the German menace. It began by a desire on our part at least to diminish the number of our enemies. Owing to German provocation this negative aspiration became a positive desire for coöperation. Gradually this crystallized into a united front against Germany, a front which triumphed in the World War. Thereafter came isolationism on our part, and on the part of the French a frantic search for security. In that search they organized future difficulties and created immediate problems which complicated our relations. Finally, when the swastika flung its shadow over our uneasy somnolence, we cowered close together as two orphans in a storm.

Is this too cynical a picture? As regards the politicians and the statesmen I do not think I have drawn it in too sombre a light. With the peoples it is different. Each feels that something has happened which is unworthy of itself. Each feels that — deep below the superficial differences of character, aims and temperament — there are basic ideals which we hold in common. We both hate cruelty, violence and untruth. Under all the diplomatic falsities of the Entente these fundamental verities are beginning to pierce. I believe that out of this disaster will grow an understanding between the two peoples which may be inarticulate, which may be intermittent, but which represents in the last resort an identity, not of interest only — certainly not only of diplomatic manœuvre — but of fundamental democratic determination.

WHAT ENGLAND MEANS TO FRANCE

By André Géraud

("Pertinax")

THE traditional conception of England among average Frenchmen is expressed in the words "perfidious Albion." Some years ago I made an effort to run down the source of the term. I failed. One meets it in the songs and epigrams of the French Revolution and in the political writings of the eighteenth century; it was used in the days of the Great King; but its origin is lost in the mists of time. Its modern currency goes back to the "treachery" that imprisoned Napoleon on St. Helena and allowed him to die there. I remember a remark of M. Laval in 1935 when the Ethiopian affair had divided the French people into "Anglophiles" and "Italophiles" and Henri Béraud had published his scandalous article, "England Must Be Reduced To Slavery." Said M. Laval to me: "The French people will never forget the Emperor's wretched end."

The epithet "perfidious Albion" is first of all to be explained by the continuous and often painful contact between the two peoples. In the Middle Ages the French and the English together made up a world apart. They did not yet think of themselves as two separate nations; in fact, it was during their never-ending struggles that each began to be aware of a feeling of patriotism. Under the feudal system French and English intermingled freely on French soil. Do not forget that for three centuries — from the middle of the twelfth to the middle of the fifteenth — Aquitaine was a dependency of the British crown. England was the only enemy that the French masses knew at first hand; on England was bestowed the hatred which must forever be the lot of an invader. And this hostility was reciprocated — one need only read Shakespeare to perceive how cordially. Later on, the sentimental relations between France and England were seriously affected by the execution of Charles I, the husband of a French princess. That was a hard pill for the subjects of Louis XIV to swallow, and a generation later, when James II was in exile on the Continent, Bossuet was still talking of "the perfidious English." It was of little use to point out that during the sixteenth century some Frenchmen had excused regicide and that Mazarin, realist that he was, had struck an alliance with Cromwell. In the

two centuries that followed, France had to win her national frontiers in the face of bitter resistance from England. And it was England who mothered the great coalitions formed against France from the day of Louis XIV down to Napoleon, and who always opposed French colonial ventures most fiercely.

But why the recurring allegation of treachery, of disregard for the plighted word? It probably is attributable to the balance-of-power policy deliberately followed by England. That policy implied frequent reversals of alliances, whereby the enemy of yesterday was shamelessly and unhesitatingly embraced in a new alliance. It implied conduct utterly divorced from moral considerations, a resort to any means that happened to prove convenient. It implied mercantilism and the quest for immediate and individual profit. In a word, it implied that empiricism which was to create the British Empire of the nineteenth century. The French, meantime, were obsessed by the metaphysics of divine right, in the international as well as in the domestic sphere. For them the gradual expansion of France to her "natural" frontiers invariably presented the same problems, to be solved by the same methods, generation after generation.

The constant squabbling in the British Parliament, the bitter struggles between the English parties, the frequent changes of ministry, the debates and pamphlets in which anything whatever could be said however much it might embarrass a ministry even in moments of dire national peril — all these seemed to presage an early fall for the British state. The view that England was on its last legs was commonplace in France during the eighteenth century. Yet in the end victory never failed her — except when the American "rebels" revolted. England went on annexing territories, seizing islands, fortifying straits. And what a contrast between the results she achieved and the effort she expended! The English were so disorderly, there was so little apparent coherence between their principles and their acts! They were forever "muddling along" — yet with what persistence, what dogged obstinacy! It was all very bewildering to the French.

On the Continent the English put all sorts of obstacles in the way of France. She made a buffer state of Holland and forced the closing of the port of Antwerp. She vetoed the election of the Duc de Nemours, a son of Louis Philippe, to the throne of Belgium. She robbed France of her first colonial empire — Canada and India — and did all she could to prevent her building a second.

The Holy Alliance, first set up in 1815 and later revived at crucial moments in the form of close coöperation between Russia, Prussia and Austria, was of little avail in bringing the two liberal powers of the West together. Memories of the past and, worse, the colonial disputes which arose at regular intervals, continued to keep them apart. There was a first *Entente Cordiale* in 1831, engineered by Talleyrand, but it was soured by every sort of discord. A decade later, water-front brawls between sailors and distant bickerings between missionaries were enough to bring the two countries toe to toe with knives drawn. "Understanding but not intimacy," said Guizot, and he proceeded to spoil the possibility of any understanding with the affair of the Spanish marriage.

The second *Entente Cordiale*, that of Napoleon III, lasted five short years — from the Crimean War (1854–1856), when England and France fought together against Russia, down to the French annexation of Savoy (1861). It was ended by a sudden outburst of the traditional animosity; and from its end Prussia was to profit. To anyone who wishes to study these old dissensions I recommend the memoirs of Hyde de Neuville, French Ambassador at Lisbon under Louis XVIII, or the letters of Louis Blanc, an exile of '48, who predicted the fall of England. Blanc, heir of the revolutionary tradition and of the men who insulted and denounced Pitt in 1792, had no conception of the British aristocracy as a bulwark of liberty, as the guardian of a sane and moderate democracy, one that has never found a sure foothold in France. He hated the "London oligarchy" as Napoleon had hated it. Blanc's anti-English prejudice exemplified the traditional attitude of the average Frenchman. Hyde de Neuville voiced rather the antipathy of the French upper classes, conservative and royalist. In the end, France and England became aware of their deep-reaching community of interests only when they saw their position in Europe compromised by the numerically expanding populations of the German and Slavic worlds. The *Entente Cordiale* of 1904, which for a time ripened into an alliance for war and which today is again becoming strong, is the measure of these changed circumstances.

Such, then, is the background, the inheritance from the past. It must be mentioned, and not too softly either, for it still comes into evidence from time to time. Even today in the remoter country districts one can find some old magistrate, loyal to the notions of his forebears, who will exclaim in comment on the

Anglo-French alliance: "The English, sir, will always bear watching!" During the war, German propaganda played on the motif that England had found in France the continental soldier that she had always needed. That contention made little impression upon educated minds. Yet its influence was not negligible during the years after the peace treaties when Mr. Lloyd George took fright at French preponderance in Europe, though he must have known full well that it could at best be only momentary. In Paris today one can count on one's fingers the men in public life who cherish any dislike for England. None the less, they can draw upon an ancient fund of hostility when they consider it useful to do so.

As against this heritage from the past, one should note that Frenchmen who go to England, not for a weekend, but to live there for some years, receive an indelible stamp from the country and come to think of it as their second homeland. I know Frenchmen who have grown so accustomed to London society that they no longer feel at ease in a French environment. They are perhaps extreme cases, but they are representatives of a new French inclination to appreciate, and even to love, English civilization and to fall in with its characteristic ideas and atmosphere.

There have always been "Anglomaniacs" in France — those who loved horses, sports, English gardens and country life and, above all, clothes. Toward the end of the past century it was customary to say of ultra-fashionable Parisians that "they had their laundry done in London." That ideas and habits have so evolved as to make England particularly understandable to the better class Frenchman there can be no doubt. What in a day gone by was the idiosyncrasy or the "whim" of an individual has now become the fixed trait of a whole group. Not so long ago there was no end to French cartoons representing "the Englishman at home," "the Englishman abroad," "the English statesman." One sees few such caricatures in the papers today. And, let me say, attitudes have changed just as radically across the Channel. One has but to read Sterne's "Sentimental Journey" to discover what English travellers thought about their neighbors two hundred years ago. They found them superficial, frivolous, ready with fair words for any occasion, but stifling all sincere and humane sentiments under conventional poses. How could they have judged us otherwise? On leaving ship at Calais or Boulogne they were pounced upon, pursued, pillaged by a ravenous horde of porters

and tavern-keepers who held in reserve for them every possible variation of the game of love and chance.

Down to the end of the nineteenth century many, perhaps most, Englishmen thought of a Frenchman as a cavalry officer with a monocle entering a café, whip in hand, picking a quarrel first with one person and then with another and finally stalking out leaving all the glassware broken. And the Englishman was paid back in the same coin. He was pictured in France as a sort of uncombed and unkempt bear, who was a stranger to all polite conventions and expressed his unpleasant personality by being rude to everybody whom he encountered. After those summary characterizations had been bandied back and forth for some generations, there came a time when they began to lose their freshness and, whatever the appearances to the contrary, to lose their vogue. That time came during the French Revolution when the two countries were at war but when French exiles in large numbers were residing in England. The émigrés discovered an England that was hospitable and generous to the unfortunate, that harbored amiable and cultivated women, that in public life exhibited a beautiful and powerful sense of freedom. The English, for their part, came to appreciate the more serious sides of French character.

Interesting to dwell upon might be the case of M. Aimé de Fleuriau, who died in 1938 after living for thirty years in London, first as Secretary to the French Embassy, then as Counsellor, and finally, from 1924-1933, as Ambassador. Aimé de Fleuriau was a Frenchman of the old school. He always wore a large, dotted bow tie and his suits were cut to an exquisitely French line. Fleuriau, and for that matter M. Paul Cambon, the great Ambassador to whom Fleuriau was long bound in intimate friendship and whom he finally succeeded, were never once known to enter a London haberdashery. Fleuriau came of a line of navy men. One of his grandfathers had been made a prisoner during the wars of the First Empire and had long groaned in duress on one of the scows into which the hereditary enemy packed such Frenchmen as the fortunes of war threw into his clutches. With a sixteenth century warrior's head, just made for a steel helmet but perched upon a body far too frail for it; with his formal manners that smacked of the old France; with a fondness for writing to his superiors in a style that he offered as a genuine reproduction of Saint-Evremond's; with his quickness to wrath;

with his broken English which, far from improving, grew steadily worse over a quarter century — Aimé de Fleuriau was born to be the most typical Anglophobe. And yet there is no doubt whatever that he eventually discovered across the Channel a climate that was wholly congenial to his mind and to his heart. After his retirement he was never able really to think of Paris as his home, and he fled to England every summer to pass a lonely vacation at Brighton.

Fleuriau's case is not exceptional. I shall never forget a despondent remark of Paul Cambon himself, when recalled from his London ambassadorship in 1921: "How painful it is to leave this charming society!" One could mention a long list of Frenchmen of one era or another whom England annexed body and soul. The late M. Gavard, who represented France at the Court of St. James after the war of 1870, left a volume of letters which Fleuriau might well have written. No end of names occur to one from the remoter past: Napoleon III, Chateaubriand, Voltaire; or going still farther back, the poet, Charles d'Orléans and John II ("the Good"), who was taken prisoner at Poitiers and passed a very agreeable captivity at Windsor and in the Tower of London. All these Frenchmen grew so accustomed to the London fog and to British ale that they quite forgot the brighter skies and the more enticing wines of their homeland.

This love of England is not merely a matter of individual temperament. There is at least one community on French soil which has never thought of the British Isles as entirely foreign. I am referring to Bordeaux. Bordeaux was taken from the English in 1543 by Charles VII of France. The city nevertheless revolted three times in the hope of returning to the British crown, probably because the English had taken good care of the vineyards and the customers of Bordeaux wine merchants. For a long time English and the local patois were the only languages known by the bourgeoisie of Bordeaux. To this day, on the tip of the "Great Belltower" there, an English leopard can be seen glistening in the sunlight. In 1814, when Wellington was advancing on Bordeaux after his victory at Toulouse, the mayor, an Irishman named Lynch, came out to meet him, bearing the keys of the city on a cushion. Had Lynch been born in Ireland a few generations later, he might have hated the English cordially enough to have won the fate of Sir Roger Casement. But having been born in Bordeaux he was an admirer and lover of England. He was

made a count by Louis XVIII and each year, till his death, he gave a banquet on the anniversary of the arrival of the "Iron Duke" at Bordeaux.

A number of relics have come down to us from the time when Aquitaine was English. Back in the region between the Garonne and the Dordogne, I once knew a peasant who had risen to be assistant to the mayor of an obscure town. His name was Nelson Légglise! What more could one ask for? In Bordeaux society one is certain to be introduced to some such person as "John Dupont," for English first names are in high favor. It is also amusing to notice in the streets of that city any number of faces which could take the place of Lord Derby's as John Bull. The châteaux along the old Anglo-French frontier in Périgord and the Limousin all have English epochs in their histories.

I have wandered among these random memories in order to counteract the feeling, which one notes in many people, that the incompatibility of the French and English temperaments is irremediable. It is true that there are great differences between the two peoples as regards the way they bring up their young. No two things could be less alike than an English public school and a French *lycée*, though the recent growth of interest in sports and out-of-door life among Frenchmen may change that. It is likewise true that the average Frenchman complains of the commonplace and not very intellectual conversation of his British neighbor, whom he finds naïve and incurably satisfied with his own opinions. More, the Frenchman is usually pained to detect in the Britisher a certain air of social superiority which he takes to be aristocratic; he therefore finds personal relations easier with the German or the Italian, who are inclined to be more offhand, or if one will, more common. Paul Cambon used to say: "You can't imagine how arrogant the English diplomats were just before the Boer War. That brought the fragility of the Empire's foundations home to them. After the crisis had passed, their manner changed again!"

Parisian society, it must be admitted, is not what it used to be. The grand style of earlier days has vanished along with the magnificent châteaux and town houses of the old families. Entertaining is rare, and seldom sumptuous: it is frequently stingy to the point of being ungracious. Conversation is often gossipy and venomous, with no benefit of doubt accorded to the victim. Parisian society has come to have a decidedly bourgeois flavor,

which naturally has little attraction for the Londoner. The social ties that were established between the two capitals in the day of Edward VII have now been stretched until they have all but snapped. On the other hand, since the war throngs of English people have been spending their vacations in France where they have become infatuated with the landscape, with our little towns, our rural taverns. The French better classes have not reciprocated these visits. The men, and especially the women, of French society have never fallen under the spell of London's social prestige. What is the reason for this? What does England really mean to the élite of France?

In the first place, the alliance with England (a defensive alliance has existed since the German reoccupation of the Rhineland) is the one element in French security that inspires a relatively abiding confidence. True, there is some dissatisfaction that England should have disarmed so completely after the victory, that her rearmament is now proceeding so slowly, that compulsory military service has not yet been instituted, that with her powerful industrial equipment England should not have managed to produce an air force capable of measuring up to Germany's and so failed to fill one striking gap in French military preparations. There is some resentment toward the many Englishmen who take it for granted that the French Army alone should man the forts and trenches while the nobler tasks on land and sea are reserved for them. English diplomacy is continually criticized — and I am not referring to *l'expérience Chamberlain*, for that was approved by the French conservatives who had been so impressed by the propaganda of Mussolini and Hitler that they feared the social revolution and "interference from Moscow" much more than the Pan German menace. Ever since 1904 England's foreign policy has been denounced as weak and shortsighted. There is regret that it is no longer so tenacious as it once was. England is reproached for having fought French supremacy on the Continent after Versailles: she should have seen that French preponderance would have helped consolidate the defenses of the New Europe, and that, unlike the "organic" imperialism of the Germans, the hegemony of France could not, by the very nature of things, last long. The French like to quote Lord Tyrrell's epigram that "the real defect in English policy since 1918 has been to mistake the Germans for Englishmen and the French for Germans."

Yet in spite of everything, there can be no doubt that French public opinion would regard an attack upon English territory as equivalent to an attack upon France. The average Frenchman, in order to screw up his courage and to forget the too-often shortsighted realism of British diplomacy, repeats to himself that the English have won all the wars in which they have participated — all except the one with the American colonies. It took the manipulations and subsidies of M. Laval and Signor Mussolini to work up a wave of anti-English feeling in France during the summer of 1935. For more than thirty years every single French cabinet has publicly declared that agreement with England must be the cornerstone of French policy. During the Czechoslovak crisis in September Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax showed themselves, despite serious mistakes, as on the whole more resolute than MM. Daladier and Bonnet. Unfortunately, government propaganda has prevented that fact from becoming more generally known. Meantime, with Central and Eastern Europe lost, or all but lost, the common interests of the West become all the more clearly evident.

In the second place, the French are aware that the British monarchy, and the democratic parliamentary system to which it is bound, are the chief pillars of liberal civilization in the world today. British institutions offer the one emphatic refutation to the claims of the *Fuehrer* and the *Duce* that they have discovered the governmental machine best calculated to develop a nation's power. By their permanence and their smooth working, by the astonishing success with which they turn out capable governments without in any way restricting or curtailing freedom or criticism, British political institutions bear witness that it is not necessary for men to sell their souls in order to build a community strong and ready for any sacrifice. A leader who respects human dignity strikes all level-headed Frenchmen as superior to a *Fuehrer*. Whether this feeling will endure, even in the immediate future, is a matter of some doubt. Will mere "leaders" find a way to prepare their countries for the totalitarian war? The pictures of Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare, to say nothing of Mr. Chamberlain with his faithful umbrella, are not such as to inspire conviction.

The French admire the British aristocracy because it is always in the process of rejuvenation, because it is always at the service of the state, and because it is always popular. All trace of such a

thing has vanished in France, probably because of the servitude to Versailles that was thrust upon the turbulent French nobility by Louis XIV. To plumb the depths of this French admiration, one has only to turn to pages written by the Comte de Montalembert around 1850 on "The Future of England." Says Montalembert: "Socialists and absolutists are both praying for the downfall of England because she has too long confounded them both. Her ever-growing power, her unabridged freedom, her incomparable prosperity, provide formidable answers both to Socialist demagoguery, which would strain everything through the sieve of a savage equality, and to monarchical theory, which can conceive of preserving the masses from disorder and fear only by thrusting them down into silence and insignificance. England has offered honest people her own glorious example of the way to escape from such a disgraceful dilemma. Since the failure, or abdication, of continental liberalism, England stands alone in the world. On all sides one senses the secret impatience of those who are wondering: When will the world be relieved of this nightmare? Who will free us of this covey of obstinate aristocrats and out-moded liberals? When will there be a humbling of the pride of this people that defies the laws of logic, that makes bold to believe both in tradition and progress, to retain royalty, reject revolution and eschew despotism? This eager waiting on a neighbor's mishap finds the most disparate mouthpieces. It besets the defenders of the repressions in Naples as well as the eulogists of the spoliations in Madrid. 'Thou art wounded even as are we. Thou art like unto us. How art thou fallen from Heaven, O Lucifer, who didst harass the peoples?'" One should note that Montalembert goes on to condemn severely the policy of the Foreign Office, the premium placed on revolution, the order of St. George, the unbearable arrogance of the English, and so on.

And indeed, what a lesson the "Mother of Parliaments" can give the Popular Front in France: a legislative power which exercises rigorous control over the executive, but which never distracts Parliament from its real task of supervision by setting up committees that encroach upon the executive power or embarrass its functioning; a majority that never abuses its power, a minority that never forgets the responsibilities which it may be called upon at any moment to assume, and a predisposition on the part of both majority and minority to avoid extremes and observe a certain continuity; the feeling on the part of each individual that

his rights are limited by those of other people; a monetary and financial administration that knew how to adapt itself to facts after 1931 and to revise sacrosanct principles of dogma when necessary; a severe discipline of public opinion; a press that is inclined on the whole to respect the truth and is immune, except by accident, to foreign propaganda; labor unions which are required by law to have a sense of their responsibilities; public officials that are almost above reproach; courts of justice that are invariably independent. It was amusing to watch the members of the French Parliament after the war when they were brought into contact with their English colleagues, particularly on those occasions when the Socialists were attending congresses in London. They were like fish out of water. Whenever anybody finds fault with the French system of government, he takes the British system as a basis for comparison.

But England influences the Frenchman whom she touches in other ways than in politics. She influences his conceptions of the life of the individual. Not that the conventions of the English — their fictions of one sort or another, their moral prohibitions and inhibitions, their narrow-minded taboos, their preoccupation with respectability — overawe the Frenchman. Quite the contrary, these irritate and anger him. But he none the less falls under the spell of that model human being, the “gentleman.” He appreciates, moreover, those exceptional individuals, men of energy or originality, sometimes absurd, who in England perhaps more frequently than in other countries stand out from the common run of people, manifesting a complete disregard for the judgment others may pass upon them and demonstrating the greatest independence in thought and action. “The Englishman, like a free man, goes to heaven by the way which pleases him,” wrote Voltaire. In France, where there is greater freedom in manners and morals and where the word “cant” is intranslatable, general ideas exercise a more tyrannical sway, circulating rapidly as small change, harmful to those who use them without adding anything of their own. The leveling of social classes tends much more noticeably in France than in England to end in a leveling of personalities.

To complete the picture one must not forget what may be called the romantic side of the English people. This aspect of English character, as it stands revealed in daily life, is not visible to every observer. Almost all foreigners are repelled by certain

disagreeable traits in the general conduct of the English — their humanitarian outlook, for example, which is often a flimsy mask for selfishness. At times it seems as though in England general principles are set up only to permit the triumph of momentary and quite mundane interests. Still unforgotten is the rebuke that one of Gladstone's adversaries addressed to that statesman: "I do not mind your playing with a card up your sleeve. What I object to is your pretending that God put it there."

In that regard the history of the League of Nations offers no end of pertinent examples. Talking of eternal things with an eye to one's own business — that was a failing commonly attributed to the English delegations. Rebukes from "old maids and Oxford students," to use an expression of Henri Béraud, and the very peculiar direction that the English give to certain movements of opinion, exasperate the French. But, apart from such shortcomings, not a few Englishmen manifest, in common with their love of country life and rural solitude, an inclination toward solitary meditation, a taste for secret hermitage, a disdain for conventions, for ready-made phrases, for beaten paths, a yearning for sincerity with oneself and with others whereby human feelings break free from all prejudices and formulas and explode with as much force and freshness as if the world were born but yesterday. One has only to think of what the discovery of Shakespeare meant to Frenchmen imbued with the classical tradition. But I must not linger on this aspect of England's influence upon the French, for it is confined to a very small number of individuals. M. Poincaré was astonished one day, on opening a book that Ramsay MacDonald had dedicated to his wife, to fall upon the passage where MacDonald declares that a sunset is for him the most moving of spectacles. "An Englishman fond of nature!" M. Poincaré exclaimed to me. "Imagine that!"

I draw no formal conclusion from all that I have been saying. I have simply been trying to show that in spite of their temperamental differences the French and English peoples are pretty well able to get along together. For all of their quarrels, mistakes, strayings, mutual fault-findings, they realize that if their cause, with all that is bound up with it, were to fail, life would not be worth living any more. Only negligence on the part of the French Government can destroy this profound solidarity.

LATIN AMERICA, GERMANY AND THE HULL PROGRAM

By Percy W. Bidwell

THE spectacular expansion of German trade in Latin America and southeastern Europe since 1933 has caused a rather general reëxamination of our own trade policy. What does the German "threat" mean to the export and import trade of the United States? What action, if any, should we take?

In the trade of southeastern Europe the United States is not greatly concerned. Our imports from Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and Turkey include no items of critical importance; taken together they make up less than two percent of our total import trade. It may be that our active and increasing trade with what was Austria and with Czechoslovakia will shrink as a result of German annexations. But that milk is spilled, unless perchance we succeed in establishing better trade relations with Greater Germany. This possibility is discussed later. But when Germany with her new barter deals and compensation agreements makes sudden inroads into the Latin American market, that is a horse of another color. Our trade interests are much larger in that area. Besides, the traditional interpretation given to the Monroe Doctrine makes it difficult to divorce economic from political considerations.

In considering Latin American trade, we must be on our guard against what Röpke has called "geographical romanticism." We must not confuse square miles with purchasing power. The area occupied by the twenty republics is indeed enormous; Brazil alone is ten percent larger than the continental United States. But the populations of our neighbors to the south are small, they are dispersed and, in the mass, they are poor. The entire import trade of Latin America in 1936 had a value less than that of France, while Latin American exports were only slightly larger than the exports from the Greater Reich. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that Latin America ranks far ahead of southeastern Europe, both as a market for finished products and as a source of foodstuffs and raw materials. The imports of Argentina alone in 1936 were valued at three times the imports of Hungary, four times those of Rumania and five times those of Turkey.

More significant for the present discussion, Latin America in 1935 purchased over one-half of our exports of cotton goods and steel mill products; one-third of our exports of leather goods, silk goods, advanced manufactures of iron and steel, electrical and industrial machinery, manufactures of rubber and paper; and over a fifth of our exports of automobiles, their parts and equipment.¹ Taking all shipments together, we send each year to Latin America between 15 and 20 percent of our exports, and in return purchase from that region 25 to 30 percent of all our imports. Under these circumstances, sensational reports of German success in winning markets in our "sister republics" and in extending over them a species of economic domination naturally arouse our apprehension.

The trade figures, as usually presented, are startling.² For example in 1933, Germany supplied only 12 percent of all the foreign goods brought into Brazil, while in 1937 the percentage was 24. In Chile the German gain in the same period was from 11.4 to 26 percent; in Peru from 10.3 to 19.7 percent. But a closer view of the statistics as shown in the following table reveals that the German gains were unevenly distributed:

I. IMPORTS OF NINE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FROM GERMANY

(Percentages of total imports)

	1913	1929	1933	1937
Argentina.....	16.9	11.5	10.0	10.3
Brazil.....	17.5	12.7	12.0	23.9
Chile.....	24.6	15.5	11.4	26.0
Colombia.....	14.1	14.4	17.8	13.4
Guatemala.....	20.3	14.2	12.3	32.4
Mexico.....	13.1	8.0	12.3	15.6
Peru.....	17.3	10.0	10.3	19.7
Uruguay.....	15.5	10.2	8.6	11.1
Venezuela.....	14.4	9.2	11.4	13.6

In the Argentine, Latin America's largest market, German aggressiveness seems to have produced no trade diversion. Note also that in several important markets, such as those of Chile and Mexico, the extraordinary efforts put forth by Germany since

¹ "Trade Rivalries in Latin America," by Howard J. Trueblood. *Foreign Policy Reports*, September 15, 1937.

² The statistics quoted in this article have been taken principally from reports of the United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce which in turn compiled them from the official data of the Latin American countries. In some cases this information has been supplemented from the official German trade returns. The reader should bear in mind that in addition to the

1934 succeeded in bettering her prewar position only slightly. In the markets of Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay, Germany had not in 1937 been able to recover the share of trade enjoyed before the war.

It is true that the dependence of the export industries of certain Latin American countries (Brazil, Colombia and Peru) on German markets has greatly increased since 1933. But Argentina, the greatest exporter of all, was less dependent on Germany in 1937 than in 1933, 1929 or in 1913. The following table gives the details:

II. EXPORTS OF NINE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO GERMANY

(Percentages of total exports)

	1913	1929	1933	1937
Argentina.....	12.0	10.0	7.7	6.8
Brazil.....	14.0	8.8	8.2	17.1
Chile.....	21.5	11.0	6.9	9.5
Colombia.....	9.4	2.1	5.0	12.6
Guatemala.....	53.0	39.8	35.5	17.4
Mexico.....	5.5	7.6	9.6	9.4
Peru.....	6.7	6.1	7.7	13.7
Uruguay.....	19.5	14.9	14.8	13.2
Venezuela.....	18.9	4.7	1.4	2.4

What, meanwhile, has been happening to the trade of these countries with the United States? Have the German gains been made at our expense? Instances can be cited aplenty in which certain American firms have lost business to German firms, but these losses seem to have been compensated, or more than compensated, by the gains of other American firms in the same or in other lines. Complaints have been numerous that in the allocation of exchange certain countries have discriminated against the United States. But handicaps such as these must in some fashion or other have been overcome, for painstaking analysis both of our own commercial statistics and those of leading Latin American republics fails to show any general deterioration since 1933 in our competitive position.

Latin American trade is particularly responsive to the fluctuations in the business cycle. In years of prosperity, when the prices

usual inaccuracies in the reporting of imports and exports there has appeared in the years under consideration a new source of inaccuracy, *viz.*, the existence in some countries of both an official and a free rate of exchange, the variation between which may amount to as much as 50 percent. Nevertheless, it is believed that these figures furnish the best indication now available of the changes which are taking place in Latin American trade.

of Argentine wheat and flaxseed, Brazilian coffee, Uruguayan hides and meat are high and foreign sales are expanding, the proceeds are spent lavishly on American automobiles, refrigerators, radios, etc. Sales of American luxury goods of this type expand more rapidly than sales of cheaper German and Japanese goods. As a result, American exports to Latin American countries rise in periods of prosperity, not only in absolute values, but *in proportion to exports from competing countries*. But when hard times come, as from 1929 to 1934, and there is a general decline in trade, American trade suffers more than proportionately.

The following table shows what our sales to Latin America and our imports from that region have been during the period of intensified German competition:

III. U. S. EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA

(In millions of dollars)

	Exports	Imports
1933.....	240	329
1934.....	340	390
1935.....	376	483
1936.....	429	529
1937.....	640	705

The present year, judged by eight months' figures, will show declines on both the export and import sides. Exports in the January-August period of 1937 were \$404,000,000, in comparison with \$377,000,000 during the same period of 1938. Imports in that period of 1937 were \$539,000,000, against \$334,000,000 in 1938.

Are the Germans responsible? On the import side the answer is "no." Our 1938 imports from all countries are still showing the results of the 1937 business recession. Imports from Latin America have been affected, but not more than total imports. On the export side, the answer is not so simple. Here German aggression supplies a partial (not a complete) explanation.

Aggregates are impressive, but not always instructive. We can get closer to the truth by examining the trade statistics country by country. For this purpose we shall again select the nine leading countries, excluding Cuba and the colonies of European nations. Germany's exports to these nine countries in the first seven months of 1938 (according to German statistics) were Rm. 348,700,000, a gain of Rm. 39,000,000, or 12.5 percent over the same months in 1937. Our exports, on the other hand, fell from \$265,000,000 to \$241,000,000, a loss of 9 percent. This looks bad. But

almost the entire American loss was concentrated in our trade with one country, Mexico. The decline in American exports to that country from \$73,900,000 in January–August 1937 to \$42,000,000 in the same months of the current year is to be ascribed, moreover, not to the success of the German policy, but to increased Mexican tariffs, the devaluation of the peso, and disturbances following the expropriation of American oil companies.*

Trade statistics of eight Latin American countries for the first six months of the current year, presented below in Table IV, give a somewhat different view of the situation. The comparison of 1938 with 1937 shows no startling changes. Germany, according to these figures, considerably improved her relative position in the markets of Mexico, Colombia and Uruguay. The United States improved its position in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.

IV. PERCENTAGE SHARES OF THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN TOTAL IMPORTS OF EIGHT
LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS

	1933	1937	1937 <i>January–June</i>	1938 <i>January–June</i>
Argentina				
United States.....	12.7	16.4	16.3	19.2
Germany.....	10.8	10.3	10.9	10.1
United Kingdom.....	21.4	18.9	19.9	18.8
Brazil				
United States.....	21.0	23.1	21.9	24.6
Germany.....	12.1	23.9	24.0	24.1
United Kingdom.....	19.4	12.1	12.3	8.6
Chile				
United States.....	22.5	29.1	28.1	29.5
Germany.....	11.4	26.0	25.8	24.2
United Kingdom.....	12.2	10.9	11.1	11.3
Colombia				
United States.....	36.8	48.4	49.1	47.2
Germany.....	17.8	13.4	12.6	18.0
United Kingdom.....	21.8	18.9	18.3	13.3
Guatemala				
United States.....	51.0	45.3	46.4	45.8
Germany.....	12.5	32.4	30.6	33.6
United Kingdom.....	13.1	8.3	7.9	6.8

* The bartering of Mexican oil for German and Italian manufactures, which has recently been reported, did not involve, in the first six months of the current year, sums which are large relative to Mexico's total trade. They will probably assume larger importance in the second half-year.

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	1933	1937	1937 <i>January-June</i>	1938
Mexico				
United States.....	59.9	62.8	66.4	58.5
Germany.....	12.0	15.6	14.9	19.9
United Kingdom.....	8.9	4.6	4.5	5.2
Peru				
United States.....	27.4	35.4	34.0	36.2
Germany.....	9.6	19.7	19.2	20.1
United Kingdom.....	18.0	10.3	11.6	9.3
Uruguay				
United States.....	9.2	13.6	13.1	12.8
Germany.....	9.0	11.1	10.8	15.6
United Kingdom.....	20.0	16.8	15.4	21.5

Taking the most recent figures in conjunction with those of 1933 and 1937, we may draw the following conclusions:

- (1) The United States has suffered no serious reversals except in Mexico.
- (2) American goods continue to dominate the markets of Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru.
- (3) American exporters are giving the English a stiff run for their money in Argentina.
- (4) Germany is challenging American trade in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.
- (5) The German gains in practically all cases have been made at the expense of the United Kingdom, or some other country, rather than at the expense of the United States.

The Latin American region is an important source of raw materials and foodstuffs — wheat, coffee, sugar, oil, copper, silver, lead, hides, flaxseed, cotton and many others. In general, the best market for Latin American exports is still found in the United States, although German policy has diverted some of the trade to her markets. In some cases there were corresponding losses in the proportion of the trade going to the United States, but in no instance is there indication that a German trade monopoly may deprive us of essential raw materials or foodstuffs.

But why, the reader will inquire, is there so much excitement if there is really no German threat to American trade? Where there is so much smoke, must there not be some fire? Some fire there is, but not a conflagration. The causes of the exaggerated fear aroused by German trade policies seem to be (1) the bewildering variety of methods used; (2) the ruthlessness with which they have

been applied; and (3) the fear that Germany's trade expansion in southeastern Europe and in Latin America is only part of a plan for the political domination of those regions. The last of these considerations lies outside the scope of this essay. Fears on this score may or may not be justified; recent events in Europe give ammunition for those who hold the affirmative view.

Foreign critics have flattered the Germans by discovering in their trade policy, with its use of export subsidies, blocked marks, barter deals and clearing agreements, evidences of an integrated, long-range plan. A closer reading of history,⁴ however, reveals evidence of lack of plan, of a clever opportunism which with ready ingenuity has made the best of situations forced upon the Germans by pressure of outside events, particularly the policies adopted by Germany's creditors. The system of bilateral trade balancing through clearing agreements, one of the most effective features of German policy, was not originated by Germany, but by her creditors. Since Germany exported more to certain of these creditor countries than she bought from them, they were able to capture the surplus of payments due Germany through the device of the clearing agreement. But the creditor countries soon found a flaw in this method of debt collection. Germany's exports to them decreased, and their surplus of imports over exports tended to disappear. Thus the clearing agreements help to explain the diversion of German trade from western Europe to southeastern Europe and Latin America.

The anxiety of German creditors to realize, even at a considerable loss, on their blocked mark accounts was ingeniously exploited by Dr. Schacht and his successors to subsidize German exports. The principle of the scheme, the details of which soon developed with bewildering intricacy, was that mark credits held in Germany for the account of certain foreigners might be sold by them to other foreigners wishing to buy German goods. As *The Economist* of London wrote on November 5, 1938, in the article already cited:

Permission was given to spend the various types of blocked marks on the purchase and export of certain types of goods which in the ordinary course could not have been marketable abroad. In effect, for export purposes — but for export only — the mark was depreciated to a fraction of its official value.

⁴ See "Germany's Foreign Indebtedness," by C. R. S. Harris. London: Oxford University Press, 1935. "Problems of German-American Foreign Relations," by Paul B. Taylor. *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 15, 1938. "Germany's Trade Offensive," in *The Economist*, November 5, 1938, p. 262-267.

Germany got the advantage of a low-value currency for her exports and of a high-value currency for her imports, at the expense of the foreign owners of blocked marks. The range of goods which were allowed to be exported by such means has, however, tended to become narrower and narrower. At present the use of blocked marks in payment for German exports has almost completely ceased, although a large part of German trade with Latin America is paid for with the so-called Aski marks or compensation marks. These are not blocked marks proper; they are received by Latin-American exporters in payment for goods sold to Germany, and can be used in payment for German goods imported into the same country. Since Aski marks are always quoted at big discount, this method amounts to one more of the many disguised forms of currency depreciation.

German trade policy is usually described as autarchic; the objective is said to be economic self-sufficiency. If this were literally true, if the Germans could reach a situation where they would need no imports from the outside world, then the German trade menace would have disappeared. For not even the Germans would be able to export without importing. Even granting their recent progress in producing (at high costs) synthetic rubber, wool and petroleum, their ability to export industrial products must still depend for generations to come upon the import of raw materials. The fact is that Germany has not succeeded in establishing a closed economy. Her imports have not disappeared. Under the Hitler régime they have averaged about 4.5 billion reichsmarks per year, and the tendency is rather upward than downward. The 1937 imports were 5,468 million reichsmarks, a larger figure than in any year since 1931.

Imports have changed in character in accordance with the policy of restricting purchases of foreign goods to essential raw materials and foodstuffs. But these purchases are still substantial and Germany is still vitally dependent on the outside world despite the much-publicized campaign for "autarchy." As late as July of this year, the German Institute for Business Research estimated that out of total raw material consumption of between 8.4 and 8.5 billion reichsmarks, fully 35 percent was imported. The addition of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia will help only in part to solve Germany's raw material problem. From Austria comes iron ore, wood pulp, timber and oil, magnesite and lead. But even if exploited to the limit and monopolized, these resources would not make the Greater Reich self-sufficient. On the other hand, the *Anschluss* will aggravate the problem of attaining self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, for Austria was even less able to

feed itself than was the old Reich. Even if Germany were able to extend her economic hegemony over southeastern Europe, she would still lack sufficient supplies of copper, lead, tin, manganese, hides and skins, wool and vegetable oils.

Economic self-sufficiency cannot be accepted, therefore, in any real sense as the goal of German policy. Dire necessity, the necessity of protecting the national banking and credit structure, forced Bruening to initiate his policy of restricting imports. Restriction, like the subsequent measures of business regimentation, had unpleasant results. Food became scarce, substitutes appeared, consumers were rationed, business men lost profits. In this situation, those in authority made a virtue of necessity. Clothing its horrid skeleton in the garments of economic mysticism, they called it Autarchy and enthroned it in the temple of Nazi ideology.

The political objectives connected with Nazi trade policy, whatever they may be, form a subject outside the scope of this paper. On the economic side, the fundamental aim is probably little different from that of British, French or American policy, *viz.* to restore and safeguard national prosperity. It is the means which are radically different. In this country, and in England and France, foreign trade is far from free; it is encumbered and impeded by tariffs, quotas and the like; but it is still predominantly a matter of private enterprise. In Germany, foreign trade as well as domestic business is so thoroughly regimented as to constitute for all practical purposes a phase of government activity. The threatening aspects of German trade policy are very largely the result of the fear that the economic objectives will be smothered, and that trade control will be utilized for a political end which may endanger the peace of the whole world.

Under these circumstances, what should America do? Three courses are open: (1) to scrap the Hull policy and, imitating German methods, to try to assure ourselves a market in that foreign area in which our political prestige is greatest, that is to say in Latin America; (2) to sit tight and hope that the German threat will disappear; or (3) to pursue our present policy more vigorously, more courageously.

The American trade agreements program, it is true, has lacked the spectacular features, the kaleidoscopic variety, in which German policy abounds. The twenty agreements⁶ concluded in the past four years have not given us a monopoly of any foreign

⁶ Including two agreements concluded with Canada.

markets, nor exclusive control over any foreign sources of raw materials. The deliberate procedure and the delays inherent in tariff bargaining and the cautious approach to major tariff problems have irritated the program's staunchest supporters. Some of them, convinced that Munich spelled the victory of totalitarian methods, have openly deserted, turning their backs on the Hull policy, which they now describe as "chimerical." But the signature, on November 17 of this year, of the agreement with the United Kingdom, the most substantial achievement of the entire program, shows their change of front to have been precipitate.

Like its predecessors, the agreement with the United Kingdom constitutes no sharp break with American protectionist tradition; nor does it restore free trade in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it provides a clear justification of the Hull program, and may be adjudged a landmark in our commercial history. The reduction in both tariffs on hundreds of items, even if individually many of them are insignificant, definitely liberalizes the conditions of trade between the world's greatest trading nations. The relaxation of British import quotas indicates that England's policy of agricultural protection is capable of modification. The abolition of the English duty on American wheat and the reduction of the duty on softwood lumber show that the system of imperial preference set up at Ottawa is not irrefragable. The admission of American goods to English colonies on terms nearer a parity with English goods gives reason for hope that the process of closing the Open Door into England's colonial empire may have been stayed. Finally, the extension of the tariff "concessions" by each country to third countries is a reaffirmation on a grand scale of faith in the democratic policy of equality of treatment.

Shall we now ditch this policy and go in for a series of special agreements on the German model, attempting to balance our imports and exports with each foreign country in turn? The proposal is not new; it has been in the wind ever since the earliest days of the Hull program. Its ablest proponent, Mr. George N. Peek, resigned his position in the Administration because of his failure to persuade the President of the soundness of his ideas. At intervals in the four years since then the proposal has reappeared, usually sponsored by those whose attitude in the past has been strongly protectionist. But Secretary Hull, Mr. Sayre and others in the Department of State have insisted that the equality of treatment principle must be retained. They have argued that if

the United States gets into the business of granting special favors in the way of quotas, lower duties, etc., it sacrifices its power of effective protest about similar discrimination against American trade. Bilateral trade balancing is rejected, first, because it involves regimentation of imports and exports, and secondly, because it of necessity reduces (or checks the increase of) world trade in general and hence, inevitably, the trade of the United States.

Such a policy could not work in any other way. In 1937, United States imports and exports and trade balances with leading commercial countries were as follows:

V. THE TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH LEADING NATIONS
IN 1937

(In millions of dollars)

	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Trade Balances</i>
United Kingdom.....	535	203	+332
Canada.....	510	399	+111
France.....	164	76	+88
Germany.....	124	93	+31
Brazil.....	69	121	-52
Argentina.....	94	139	-45
Cuba.....	92	148	-56
Japan.....	288	204	+84

How are we going to even up our trade with the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Germany — by increasing our imports of their products, or by restricting our exports to them? Either of these solutions would meet serious opposition from American farmers and industrialists. Nor is the task much easier with respect to countries with which our balance is passive. Can we persuade Brazil to add 52 millions of dollars to its purchases of American wheat and sugar-mill machinery, or Argentina to buy 45 millions of airplanes, adding machines and tractors? The obvious answer to those who object is that the German bilateral balancing of trade succeeded. But Germany was in a position to work her clearing agreements effectively only because the entire control of her trade, both domestic and foreign, was in the hands of the German Government. Germany was thus able to threaten to reduce imports of Brazilian cotton, cacao or coffee, of Turkish tobacco and Hungarian horses, unless corresponding purchases were made of German goods. The conclusion is that only if we are willing to adopt German methods *in toto* can we expect German results.

Also, we must remember that the German policy has attained only a qualified success. Trade diversion is not the same thing as trade expansion; in fact the two are antithetical. German trade gains in southeastern Europe and in Latin America have been largely offset by losses in western Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia. The net result is only a moderate gain in German foreign trade. The shares of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States in world exports are shown below:

VI. PERCENTAGE SHARES OF GERMANY, THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD EXPORTS

	<i>Germany</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>
1929.....	9.7	15.6	10.8
1932.....	10.6	12.2	9.9
1933.....	9.9	10.9	10.4
1934.....	8.7	11.1	10.5
1935.....	8.9	11.6	10.8
1936.....	9.0	11.4	10.3
1937.....	9.2	12.7	9.9

Even if we did succeed somewhat in extending our trade in Latin America by German methods, there is no guarantee that the gains would be permanent or that they would offset losses which we might sustain elsewhere. A large part of American trade is normally multilateral. Brazil uses her dollar exchange balance to purchase goods in Europe. The result is that Europe has surplus dollars with which it buys American goods. The attempt to replace this sort of triangular trade with strictly bilateral dealings must inevitably result in the reduction of the total volume of world trade. Unless we were willing to adopt the degree of regimentation which the Germans seem to enjoy, we would be handicapped to begin with; and there is no prospect that we would secure an increased share in the reduced world total.

American export trade might be given "a shot in the arm" by export subsidies. When other countries apply this method of stimulating their sales in American markets, we raise our hands in holy horror — and we punish the offending nation by applying additional duties to the goods so subsidized. Yet we ourselves have already embarked on a plan to subsidize wheat exports, by which Mr. Wallace hopes to relieve the American market of 100,000,000 bushels. The operations of the Import-Export Bank in putting government credit behind sales to Latin American countries might easily become a mild form of export subsidy. The argu-

ments against subsidies are familiar. Retaliation by other countries can easily deprive such measures of their effectiveness. If they are effective, subsidies result in giving away a portion of our national wealth which in reality we can ill afford to lose. While there are hundreds of thousands of American families undernourished and ill-clad, it hardly seems in the national interest to sell our wheat and cotton at bargain rates, making up the difference at the expense of the American taxpayer.

"Sitting tight" seems unsatisfactory to those whose emotions demand action. But it is not without logical justification. In the first place, it may be argued that the German bolt is shot. Sudden spurts in trade activity often result from the sharp stimulus of a new commercial policy, for example from export subsidies. Germany, by these and other means, may increase her share in the markets of Yugoslavia or Chile from 10 to 20 percent, or from 20 to 30 percent within a few years. But to assume that a proportionate or even an equal gain can be achieved by the same methods in the next few years is probably a gross error. The curve of German gains already shows signs of flattening out. Eventually, and in the not distant future, Germany's ability to export and import will depend on her underlying economic position, upon her ability to produce well and cheaply.

There is no opportunity here to analyze at length German economic conditions as they have developed under the Nazi régime. The abolition of unemployment, and the rise in the index of production both give the impression of growing economic power. But the lengthening of hours of labor and the falling standard of living, the necessity of rationing food supplies and the increasing burden of taxation, despite deficit financing and credit inflation, give rise at least to reasonable doubt. Much depends on the point of view. A firm believer in the efficacy of economic planning will undoubtedly find encouraging items in the German scene; but those who cling to the remnants of liberal tradition will remain skeptical. They will demand more proof than is now offered before believing that the ruthless regimentation of business plus the skill of German chemists has wrought an economic miracle, turning scarcity of raw materials and food supplies into such plenty that, dispensing with imports, Germany can threaten to submerge all foreign markets with her exports.

Still other arguments can be adduced in favor of the policy of watchful waiting. Two cardinal features of German policy, clear-

ing agreements and the use of blocked marks to subsidize exports, depend upon Germany's external indebtedness. Since 1933 this indebtedness has been cut in half. As it declines, the threat of Nazi economic penetration is reduced.

Finally, it should be noted that probably none of Germany's so-called vassal states enjoy their condition of servitude. They would prefer, if markets were open to them, to sell their raw materials and foodstuffs for free exchange rather than to barter them for German harmonicas, warships or railroad equipment. German policy attained its amazing initial successes during a period of deep depression in the prices of primary products. Recovery and rising prices in free markets would much weaken German control. Already there have been signs — in Brazil, Turkey and elsewhere — that the close economic alliance with Germany is galling.

There remains the third alternative: more vigorous prosecution of our own policies, dealing with all countries equally, and reducing tariff barriers by the method of reciprocal trade agreements. To date we have made reciprocal tariff bargains with 19 countries. The easiest agreements, naturally, came first. Countries remaining outside the fold present some thorny problems. Critics of the Hull program have contended that further agreements are impossible because the only outsiders of any importance belong to one or the other of two groups, either the totalitarian states or the British Commonwealth of Nations. They say that with neither of these blocs can we negotiate successfully. There is some measure of truth here, but also enough falsehood to make the statement misleading. It is true that the obligations of the Ottawa Agreements complicate negotiations between its signatories and the United States. But Mr. Hull's success in the agreements with the United Kingdom and Canada gives color to the assumption that similar agreements with Australia, India, New Zealand and South Africa are not beyond the realm of possibility.

The negotiation of trade agreements with the so-called "dictator" countries — Japan, Italy, Russia and Germany — presents greater difficulties. There is, of course, the political obstacle in the case of Japan and Germany, the horror aroused throughout the United States by Japan's aggression in China and by Germany's persecution of the Jews and other domestic "enemies." In the field of commercial policy, however, there is no "irreconcilable conflict" between the democracies and the totalitarian

states. The United Kingdom has signed commercial agreements with Germany, Italy and Russia. We ourselves found it possible several years ago to conclude a commercial treaty granting most-favored-nation treatment to Russia. More recently we signed an agreement with Italy on the same basis. Germany, since October 15, 1935, has been on our blacklist. Her administration of exchange restrictions and import quotas having been adjudged discriminatory against American commerce, Germany was deprived of most-favored-nation treatment. Practically, this has meant that millions of dollars' worth of imports from Germany have not benefited from the tariff reductions which we conceded in agreements with Switzerland, Belgium, France, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and other countries. The Germans have not enjoyed this treatment. With each successive agreement made by the United States with one of Germany's competitors, they enjoy it less. On various occasions, Nazi officials have suggested that an agreement be made restoring equal treatment to German goods. When it became evident that the conclusion of an agreement with the United Kingdom was imminent, their importunities increased. But thus far these advances have been rejected. Our State Department has insisted that Germany, like Italy and Brazil, agree to supply foreign exchange in payment for American goods in accordance with most-favored-nation treatment. Germany refuses to limit her freedom of action to this extent, and there the matter rests.

Both Germany and the United States have much to gain from better trade relations. The astonishing decline in the value and the volume of German-American trade, which was in process as early as 1928, has been accentuated by our unofficial boycott of German goods, and by the German policy of bilateral trade balancing. In 1933, Germany bought American goods to the value of Rm. 482,800,000, or 11.5 percent of all its foreign purchases; in 1937, the corresponding figures were Rm. 282,000,000 or 5.2 percent of the total. Our export statistics (which include shipments destined for reexport as well as for consumption in Germany) show that in 1933 our sales to Germany were valued at \$140,024,000 (8.4 percent of our total exports), while in 1937 they were of a value of \$125,884,000 (3.8 of our total exports). Cotton exports furnish an excellent example of what has happened. In 1927, the United States supplied 80 percent of German imports of raw cotton; ten years later the figure was 26 percent. For this

change our cotton restriction program must bear partial responsibility; but much is also attributable to Germany's policy of shifting her purchases of raw materials (copper and mineral oils as well as cotton) from the United States to countries with which she can make clearing and barter agreements. Germany last year took only 294,000 bales of raw cotton from the United States, but bought 360,000 bales from Brazil.

A possible exit from the impasse is to treat Germany as we did the Soviet Union. We recognized that in dealing with a nation which conducted import trade as a state monopoly, bargaining about import duties was obviously impracticable. Hence we demanded and received from Russia a pledge to buy each year a specified amount of American products. Our State Department might require, in return for the most-favored-nation treatment which Germany covets, that she set aside specified amounts of free exchange each year for the purchase of American cotton, wheat, petroleum, copper, etc. The practical circumstance which for the moment would limit Germany's ability to comply is that she has so little free exchange. Even after Germany had drastically reduced her purchases from the United States, those for 1937 still exceeded her sales to us by \$33,240,000. Under present circumstances the only practicable way of selling more to Germany lies in buying more from her. If we should accord to Germany the lower tariff rates enjoyed by France, Switzerland, Belgium and the United Kingdom, German structural steel, dyes, watches, cutlery, laces, chinaware, might be sold more cheaply in American markets. But would American consumers on that account buy more of them? In other words, how effective is the boycott? Will it be strengthened by the events of the past few months?

Turning to Latin America, we find that we have made no trade agreement with Argentina or with Mexico. Both countries are large purchasers of American goods and important suppliers of American imports, but with neither of them are our commercial relations satisfactory. Argentina discriminates against the United States in the allocation of exchange; we in our turn apply an indefensibly drastic embargo on two of Argentina's principal products, livestock and meat. Until these points of conflict can be removed, there seems little prospect of a trade agreement. Mexico's expropriation of American landowners and oil companies furnishes a stumbling-block to negotiations with that country.

However, the successful expansion of the Hull program in Latin America, in Europe, or elsewhere, encounters a difficulty more fundamental than any of those catalogued above, namely, our fear of increased imports. Economists have supported the policy of tariff bargaining because it provided the only practical method of reducing the excessive rates of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, of increasing imports so as to restore to equilibrium our lopsided balance of payments. These objectives have been attained only to a limited degree. Tariff reduction has proceeded with great circumspection; imports have increased somewhat since 1934, but exports have gained even more rapidly. As a result the active trade balance has not disappeared. Already this year the surplus of exports amounts to over 900 million dollars and a round billion is in prospect when the twelve months' figures are in. Under these circumstances, the Hull program contributes little to stem the flow of gold from Europe, where it is bitterly needed, to the United States, where we can do nothing with it except to bury it at Fort Knox. The real threat to the Hull program comes not from the dictatorships, but from our own timidity in applying it.

The conclusion of the matter seems to be that German policy presents no threat to American trade, or American economy generally, of a kind which requires revolutionary change in our own policies. Germany's aggressive use of clearing agreements, blocked marks, barter deals and export subsidies, as far as we can judge from commercial statistics, has not deprived the United States of any important markets nor has it cut us off from any source of critical raw materials. German successes, at the expense of other nations than the United States, have been won by intelligent exploitation of short-run situations. In the long run, probably in the next few years, Germany's competitive ability in foreign trade will depend on the productive capacity of German industry. There seems no reason for believing that this capacity has been raised by the controls introduced under the Hitler régime. Under the circumstances, there seems to be no justification for a *volte face* in American policy. The German aggression is a challenge. But it should be met, not by imitating German policies, but by applying our own more boldly and more effectively.

RACISM IN ITALY

By Martin Agronsky

ITALY is one of the last countries in Europe where anti-Semitism might normally be expected to gain much headway. Roughly estimated, one Italian out of a thousand is Jewish — an exceedingly small proportion when compared for instance with the situation in Poland, where the ratio is one in ten, or in pre-Nazi Germany, where it was one in a hundred. Consequently, the relentless “race” campaign inaugurated by the Fascist Government early last summer surprised and puzzled Italians and non-Italians, Jews and non-Jews.

The first overt official step was taken on July 1 when the Italian Government issued a decree forbidding the public sale of translations of books by foreign Jews. Italian Jews were, for the moment, still allowed to publish books, but under such restrictions that their literary and scholarly output was sure to decline materially. Prior to the promulgation of this decree the government had avoided sensational acts, confining itself to the elimination of individual Jews from public office. With the July 1 decree, however, a period of active anti-Semitism began.

That the Fascists were preparing for more drastic measures was indicated on July 14 by the publication of a report, prepared for the Ministry of Popular Culture, laying down the “scientific bases” for an “Aryan” racial policy in Italy. This report, drawn up by a number of Italian university professors, sought to establish ten propositions, of which the following two will suffice to give the general tenor:

Seventh: *It is time that the Italians frankly proclaimed themselves to be racists.* All that the Régime has done in Italy has a racial foundation. The Chief [Capo] has very frequently had occasion in his speeches to refer to the concept of race. The question of racism in Italy must be treated from the purely biological point of view without philosophical or religious implications. The concept of race in Italy must be essentially Italian and Aryan-Nordic in trend. This does not mean that German racial theories should be introduced into Italy as they are, nor is it to affirm that Italians and Scandinavians are the same thing. Its only object is to hold up for Italians a physical and above all a psychological model of the human race which, by its purely European characteristics, is completely separated from all extra-European races. This means elevating Italians to an ideal of superior consciousness of themselves and of their greater responsibility.

Ninth: *Jews do not belong to the Italian race.* Of the Semites who have landed

on the sacred soil of our Fatherland in the course of centuries, nothing in general has remained. Even the Arab occupation of Sicily left nothing except the memory of a few names, and in any case the process of assimilation has always been very rapid in Italy. Jews represent only that part of the population of Italy which has never been assimilated, because it is made up of non-European racial elements differing absolutely from the elements from which the Italians originated.

The remainder of the report was in similar vein. It naturally received instant approbation in the Nazi press. Indeed, many observers believed that the whole thing was another of Mussolini's "stunts" to demonstrate his solidarity with Hitler, and that in a short while he would drop it.

Support for this belief rapidly dwindled as one prominent Fascist spokesman after another made anti-Semitic pronouncements. On July 25, for example, the Secretary General of the Fascist Party, Achille Starace, praised the above-quoted report and declared that it had been adopted as the basis for official action. According to Starace, the principal task of the Ministry of Popular Culture for 1939 would be the "elaboration and discussion of Fascist race principles."

After such categorical assertions as this — and they were paraphrased by other prominent Fascists such as Virginio Gayda, editor of the authoritative *Giornale d'Italia*, and Roberto Farinacci, former Secretary General of the Party — it should have been obvious to all that the Government was committed to a full-fledged campaign of "racial purity."

Under this belief I visited Italy in August to see what effect the policy was having on Italian Jewry. To my surprise I found that most Italian Jews still hugged the fond delusion that anti-Semitism would disappear as unaccountably as it had appeared. During the last two weeks of August I spoke with Jewish leaders in Rome, Milan, Florence, Trieste and Turin, the centers of Jewish population. Each assured me that they were confident that the Government's actions were the product of diplomatic expediency. Italian anti-Semitism, they insisted, was merely Mussolini's way of showing his solidarity with Berlin. They were certain that it would stop with journalistic polemics. Neither the August 3 decree excluding all foreign Jews from Italian schools nor the census taken of the Jewish population on August 23 shook them in this belief. No more than two hundred Jews left Italy in order to escape anti-Semitism before September 1, 1938.

The Italian Jewish community was finally jolted out of this

complacent attitude on September 1. According to a decree published on that date all persons whose fathers and mothers were Jewish, and who had settled in Italy or the Italian colonies (except Ethiopia) since 1919, must leave the country within six months, or become subject to expulsion. Profession of Christianity or any other non-Jewish religion was no ground for exception. Those affected, to the approximate number of 15,000, immediately lost their Italian citizenship — and that at a time when the plight of the stateless refugee was becoming increasingly acute. By March 12, 1939, they will be homeless, jobless and, unless the stringent currency exportation laws are waived in their behalf (which is extremely unlikely), almost penniless, for legally they may take out of the country only 2,500 lire (about \$130). Especially unfortunate is the plight of the five thousand Jewish refugees who fled to Italy from Germany and Austria, for they will now lose the meagre savings which they managed to bring with them. Once again they must begin life anew elsewhere.

On September 2, the native-born Italian Jews, who had hoped against hope that their turn would not come, fell victims to a new anti-Jewish decree. A few weeks earlier a manifesto excluding foreign Jewish students from Italian universities had been issued. The September 2 decree excluded all Jewish teachers and students from every university and school in Italy after October 16, 1938. A single exception was made in favor of native-born Jewish university students, who were permitted to finish their studies. This decree affected some 10,000 Jewish students and more than 500 Jewish teachers, of whom about 270 are university professors or instructors. Jewish members of academies, institutes, and scientific, literary or artistic associations were likewise informed that their resignations had been accepted.

At a meeting of Jewish professors which I attended in Florence it was estimated that the small elementary schools of the Jewish communities in Florence, Rome, Turin, Milan and Trieste, which in the past had accommodated about 1,200 pupils, might be extended to care for 2,000. The blow was softened somewhat by the subsequent announcement that the state would bear the cost of establishing Jewish elementary and secondary schools. These, however, cannot possibly cope with the educational needs of the Jewish community, now or in the near future. By this decree of September 2 what amounts to a Jewish scholastic ghetto was set up. The normal mixing of Jewish and Italian children has been

eliminated, and the Jews will become a people apart. All Jewish-written textbooks, even those "influenced by a Jewish trend of thought," have been banned from Italian schools. The work of educating Italian children to a hatred of the Jew will undoubtedly be the next step. Within the next few years a generation to whom the Jew is a "parasitic growth" and a "human toad" will grow up in Italy, as it already has in Germany.

The decrees of September 1 and 2 were hailed in the Fascist press as necessary measures of racial and social defense and as a noble contribution to civilization. The *Tribuna* of Rome commented that "Italy, whose present action is approved and commended by all nations and all political currents in the world which have not lost their sense of personal dignity, is offering to history a great example of spiritual resurrection and reorganization." The press further announced that there were in store other decrees which would eventually result in the almost total exclusion of Jews from the social, economic and political life of the nation. Events during the succeeding weeks only too faithfully proved the accuracy of this prediction.

In his Trieste speech of September 18 Mussolini declared: "Jews of Italian citizenship who have unquestioned military or civil merit in the eyes of Italy and the régime will find justice and understanding. As to others, a policy of separation will be followed. In the end, the world will perhaps be more astounded by our generosity than by our rigor, at least unless Semites beyond the frontier and, above all, their unexpected friends who defend them from too many chairs of learning, compel us to change our course radically."

This declaration, half-promise and half-threat, was amplified by a number of decisions reached by the Fascist Grand Council at its session of October 6. In the first place, the Council decided that a person was to be regarded as a Jew if both parents were Jewish, if his father was Jewish and his mother a foreigner, or if he was born of a mixed marriage and professed the Jewish religion. (On November 10 the Fascist Cabinet added another category — those who "in any other way show Jewish characteristics.") The Council then went on to decree an unconditional prohibition of marriages between "Italians" on the one hand and Jews and other "non-Aryans" on the other. Marriages between Italians and foreigners, even if Aryans, were also forbidden without the express consent of the Ministry of the Interior. The

Council also ratified the decrees expelling foreign Jews and stopping further Jewish immigration. However, as a token of Il Duce's generosity, various classes of Jews were expressly exempted from all discriminatory legislation (except that forbidding them to teach in Italian schools). These exemptions applied to the families of men killed or wounded in combat (including the Fascist Revolution) or who had "deserved well of the nation or of the Fascist régime." The number of Jewish families within these categories was officially announced on November 5 as being 3,522.

These concessions proved to be quite illusory. On November 10 the Cabinet decreed that no Jew, without any exception whatsoever, could be employed by the Government, the Party, the local administrative bodies, the labor syndicates, public and semi-public bodies of any kind, private institutions partly supported by the state, industrial and commercial enterprises in which the state supplies 50 percent of the capital, and banks of national importance. All Jews so employed were to be dismissed within three months. Only in the insurance business were the exemptions forecast by the Grand Council still valid. On November 19 it was reported that 15,000 Jews — practically all those gainfully employed — had been discharged.

But not only did the Fascist Government deprive the Jews of their jobs; it proceeded to take their property. The decree of November 10 also forbade Jews to own or manage establishments affecting the national defense or employing more than 100 employees, or to own land having a taxable income of more than 5,000 lire a year or residential property having a taxable income of more than 20,000 lire a year. All sales by Jews having in the meantime been forbidden, the decree amounted to the expropriation of no less than 70 percent of all Jewish property, estimated by the Government to total about 10 billion lire, though this figure may be excessive. The Government will probably pay the Jews with long-term, low-rate, non-transferable bonds. Thus a novel way will have been found to balance the budget. It is clear that financial considerations played no small rôle in the sudden outburst of Italian anti-Semitism.

One wonders at the capacity for understatement of the foreign press which even today writes about Mussolini's "mild" anti-Semitic measures. And the end is plainly not yet. Step by step the process of segregation proceeds towards the revival of the mediæval ghetto in Italy. Small wonder then that the Italian Jewish

community is thoroughly panic-stricken. The Pope, it is true, has repeatedly condemned "racial" doctrines, whether Nazi or Fascist, declaring them contrary to Christian teachings and a denial of the Church's right to carry on missionary work. But these pronouncements have apparently had little effect.

What occasioned this thoroughgoing campaign for Italian racial purity? Most Italians were as surprised as outsiders to learn that the tiny Jewish minority had so suddenly been found to be unassimilable — to be, in the words of Signor Gayda, "in but not of Italy." Mussolini's record is not that of an anti-Semite. The Italian Jews agree that he is much too intelligent to believe all that he causes to be printed about them. Some of his closest collaborators in creating the Fascist state were Jews. Prior to 1938 he had shown no particular animus against them. Indeed, upon several occasions he went on record as being opposed to anti-Semitism. On May 29, 1932, he wrote in his personal organ *Il Popolo d'Italia*: "The frequency of 'mixed marriages' in Italy¹ should be welcomed with satisfaction by all good and sincere Italians, for it constitutes a proof of the perfect civic, political and, above all, moral equality enjoyed by all Italians, whatever their distant origin."²

In the spring of 1932, during his famous "conversations" with Emil Ludwig, Mussolini declared:

"Of course there are no pure races left; not even the Jews have kept their blood unmingled. Successful crossings have often promoted the energy and the beauty of a nation. Race! It is a feeling, not a reality; ninety-five percent, at least, is a feeling. Nothing will ever make me believe that biologically pure races can be shown to exist to-day. . . . No such doctrine will ever find wide acceptance here in Italy. . . . National pride has no need of the delirium of race."

"That is the best argument against anti-Semitism," said I [*i. e.* Mr. Ludwig].

"Anti-Semitism does not exist in Italy," answered Mussolini. "Italians of Jewish birth have shown themselves good citizens, and they fought bravely in the war. Many of them occupy leading positions in the universities, in the army, in the banks."³

As recently as February 1938 the Italian Foreign Office declared that "a specific Jewish problem does not exist in Italy" and that "the Fascist Government has no intention whatsoever

¹ Of the approximately 400 marriages involving Jews every year, about 100 are between Jews and non-Jews.

² Paolo Orano: "Gli Ebrei in Italia" ("The Jews in Italy"), p. 124-125. This book, published in 1937, has become the bible of Italy's "scientific" anti-Semites.

³ Emil Ludwig: "Talks with Mussolini." Boston: Little, Brown, 1933, p. 69-70.

of taking political, economic or moral measures against Jews, except such as are hostile to the régime."

That was in February. In July came the proclamation that "the time has come for Italians frankly to proclaim themselves racists." It is beyond the bounds of reason to suppose that during the few months between February to July the attitude of the Italian Jews could have undergone such a complete change as to necessitate their exclusion from political and economic life for "the good of the state." They could not all, in so short a time, have become "hostile to the régime." What had changed so suddenly was the attitude of the Government.

The most striking feature of Italian anti-Semitism is its artificiality. If there are 70,000 Jews in Italy, as the Government now claims on the basis of its recent census, this number is hardly an economic problem in a nation of 44,000,000. The pressure of numbers, which the Nazis have always given as a reason for anti-Semitism in Germany, does not exist in Italy.

The Fascists assert that Italian Jews occupying important posts in the army, navy, government and finance were deliberately leading the country to ruin. To demonstrate the utter improbability of this we have but to note that the number of Jews in such positions was minute. At the time the racist campaign was inaugurated, no Jew occupied an important post in the Fascist Party or in the diplomatic service. The only Jew who ever sat in the Fascist cabinet, Guido Jung, resigned as Minister of Finance five years ago — and to the accompaniment of laudatory editorials in the Fascist press. Though Mussolini has appointed fourteen "non-Aryans" to the Senate since he came to power, the functions of Senators are now largely ornamental. Of the Jewish Senators inherited from the pre-Fascist era, only about six are still living and of these the youngest is 78 years old. According to army and navy officers with whom I spoke, there were no more than eleven Jews of high military rank and about four or five of high naval rank. Among the latter is Admiral Moroni, who received the highest decorations during the Libyan and World Wars and who at the time of his recall in September was on active service in the Balearic Islands.

Furthermore, Jews held but 15 percent of the seats on the Italian stock exchanges. Only in the insurance field, where Jews directed the powerful Assicurazioni Generali of Venice and Trieste and controlled a number of smaller companies, and in the

textile industry, was their influence of great importance. I found it impossible to secure accurate figures on the number of Jews who were professional men, such as doctors, lawyers and engineers. But since the majority of Italian Jews are in trade, their proportional representation in the professions cannot really have been called a serious problem, though it is estimated that some six hundred doctors and lawyers were among the Jewish refugees who had entered Italy from Germany and Austria since 1933.

The Jewish minority in Italy has over the course of time been remarkably static. The great majority of the 50,000 native-born Italian Jews trace their ancestry back over a thousand years — there have been Jews in Italy ever since 139 B.C. And they have been a loyal minority. Their officially-acknowledged services to the nation during the *Risorgimento* and the World War need not be dwelt upon here. I cannot, however, refrain from citing a particularly poignant example of their patriotism. When the Treaty of Rapallo was concluded between Italy and Jugoslavia on November 12, 1920, the Italians living in Dalmatia were given the option of retaining or dropping their Italian citizenship. Of those who remained Italian, the majority were Jewish. Later on, however, life in Jugoslavia became impossible for these Italians and they were forced to emigrate to Italy. The reward for those among them who were Jews has been, under the terms of the September 1 decree, the annulment of their Italian citizenship. It is more difficult to feel sorry for the Jewish Fascists who once denounced as “enemies of Fascism” all of their fellow Jews whom they suspected of Zionist leanings. In Turin a group of these Jewish super-Fascists even went so far as to establish a weekly paper devoted to the castigation of whatever Jews they regarded as not sufficiently loyal to the Fascist state.

Mussolini's contention, as set forth in his Trieste speech, is that his racial program is entirely original with him and not borrowed from Germany. The validity of this claim is a matter for debate in Italy as well as elsewhere. In one of his utterances condemning racial persecution the Pope implied that the Italian dictator was imitating Hitler. This naturally annoyed Il Duce, who has no desire to be pictured as trailing in the wake of his German colleague. He has, in fact, been quite definite on this point, for at Trieste he declared that “those who pretend that we have imitated — or worse, have obeyed suggestions — are indeed poor half-wits on whom we hardly know whether to bestow our con-

tempt or our pity." Some observers hold that he was converted to anti-Semitism in order to insure the solidity of the Rome-Berlin Axis. According to this theory Hitler promised to help Mussolini in Spain, if in return Italy would officially adopt an anti-Jewish policy. It is also said that the anti-Semitic campaign was undertaken in order to placate Hitler for Italy's alleged lukewarm support in the early stages of the Czechoslovak crisis. As announced by Mussolini himself, at Trieste, Italy's racial problem "is related to the conquest of the empire; for history teaches us that empires are conquered with arms but are held by prestige. And prestige demands a clear and severe consciousness of race which establishes not only differences but the sharpest superiorities." Unquestionably, the acquisition of Ethiopia and the decision to colonize it with Italians raised the race problem in an acute form. The Fascist Government is determined to keep the hundreds of thousands of white colonists which it hopes to settle in Ethiopia (and in Libya, too) from interbreeding with the natives. Stringent regulations have repeatedly been issued forbidding not only miscegenation but various sorts of social intercourse between whites and natives. To carry out this policy of white superiority the Italian people must be made race-conscious. Articles "in defense of the race" are being published in Italy by the dozen. On August 5 there appeared a new semi-monthly periodical *La Difesa della Razza*. The pages of this lavishly illustrated review are given over to pseudo-science, "interpreted" history, appeals to race prejudice and editorial admonitions against racial cross-breeding. In the anti-Semitic articles, which occupy at least half of each number, the Jews are portrayed as conspirators against the Fascist state (whether as Communists, Masons, international bankers or Zionists) and as moral and physical degenerates.

The Fascist Government is toying with the idea of opening Ethiopia to Jewish settlement, though such a proposal seems hardly consistent with its efforts to protect "Aryan" colonists from "racial defilement." For centuries a body of Jews, known as the Falasha, has dwelt in northwest Ethiopia and it is now proposed that Jews expelled from Italy be sent there. An American Pro-Falasha Committee has been formed to further this project. If Mussolini can send to Ethiopia the 20,000 Jews who must leave Italy by March 12, 1939, he will have accomplished the twofold object of getting rid of these "undesirables" and of providing a body of high-grade colonists for his new empire.

The charge that the Jews in Italy have been carrying on propaganda and engaging in conspiracies against the Government is merely the Italian variant of the universal anti-Semitic accusation that Jews are everywhere traitors to whatever state gives them its hospitality. A few of the liberals who left Italy early in the Fascist era to carry on anti-Fascist activities abroad were Jews, men such as Modigliani and Treves, Socialist leaders, and the Rosselli brothers, assassinated in France by Fascist-hired *Cagoula* last year. Since the beginning of the anti-Semitic campaign a number of Jews in Italy have been charged with sedition and conspiracy. The Fascist press has also discovered that the imposition of sanctions during the Ethiopian War was the work of "international Jewry." Italian Jews must pay for this "stab in the back." Mussolini ascribes his failure to obtain loans in France, England or the United States to the hostility of Jews there, and he is said to have vowed that the Italian Jews must pay for the trouble these have caused him.

Fascist opposition to Zionism stems in part from the fact that the latter is an "international" movement. That this opposition also pleases the Arabs is, in Fascist eyes, a fortunate coincidence. But this is not the principal cause for the onslaught on the Jews. The primary motives originated in the necessities of Italy's domestic, not her international situation. One of the characteristics of a Fascist dictatorship is that the dictator must periodically divert the attention of his people from his failure to improve their economic and social conditions. This he does by embarking on some spectacular enterprise. The attack upon the Jews comes under this head, for the internal situation in Italy clearly is going from bad to worse. Ethiopia, far from having proved a boon, is a permanent drain on Italy's financial vitality. The civil war in Spain, continuing far longer than the Fascists had anticipated, is a running sore on the country's economy, already weakened by the irrational effort to achieve national autarchy.

More important as a motive was the desire of the Fascist Government to deprive the Jews of their property and their jobs. I have already dwelt on the measures by which Jewish property is being taken over. But the ousting of Jews from their means of livelihood is no less significant. The Fascist hierarchs are faced with the urgent necessity of finding places for the younger generation of Fascists — places in the government services, in the professions and in business. In the early years after the March on

Rome, jobs for deserving Fascisti could be found by ousting incumbents appointed during the preceding liberal era or by fitting them into the expanding framework of the Fascist Party and its subsidiary organizations, civil and military. But by the early thirties there were very few non-Fascists who could be displaced; and as for the Party, it was already overloaded with officials and hangers-on of countless species. What then was to be done with the young Fascists, raised in the cult of violence and taught that to youth belonged the Revolution and the State it had created? The Ethiopian and Spanish Wars have served to give occupation to many of them. But this has not been enough, for they want soft, "respectable" jobs in Italy, not the hardships of pioneering in a refractory land or death as mercenaries. To the Fascist hierarchs who must take care of these young bloods the idea of dismissing the Jews from government service must have been very welcome. The "Aryan" competitors of Jewish tradesmen, doctors, lawyers, professors, civil servants and others, would be less than human were they not pleased to receive the increased income which the anti-Semitic campaign will bring them.

But, clearing out the Jews will make room for only a part of the young men whose idleness is a danger to the régime. The rest must be taken care of otherwise, and this is being done by the enforced displacement of women by men. In a decree published along with the anti-Jewish edicts, the number of posts which women may henceforth occupy in the public services or in the offices of private concerns was limited to ten percent of the total. No limitation was imposed on the number who do the disagreeable work in factory or in field. Only those holding less toilsome posts must make way for the new generation of Fascist youth.

Probably no single one of the motives I have just enumerated would in itself have sufficed to launch anti-Semitism as an official policy in Italy. It was the conjunction of several or all of them that determined Mussolini, ever the arch-opportunist, to seize the occasion while it offered. That the Rome-Berlin axis might be strengthened and the Arabs pleased were for him happy by-products. But at bottom, anti-Semitism, like so many other of the strange phenomena of Fascism, represents just another stop-gap to hide the internal contradictions of the Fascist State. In any event, the anti-Semitic campaign can be counted on to occupy public attention for only a few months. In the near future Mussolini will have to invent some new diversion.

A POLICY OF NEUTRALITY FOR CANADA

By F. R. Scott

ONE of the by-products of the diplomatic revolution of the 1930's has been to make Canadians turn increasingly away from a policy of participation in European wars. Until 1931, when the Conservative Party in England began its profound changes in British foreign policy, few Canadians had seriously considered such a possibility. Canada was the last important portion of the Americas to pass through the colonial stage; in her people (apart from the French Canadians) had survived longest the unquestioned acceptance of the obligation to provide military assistance to the European mother country. Hence Canadians, with more loyalty to Britain than to democracy, helped to subjugate the Boers in 1899; hence they accepted the automatic belligerency imposed upon them in 1914 without a murmur. Even the growth of "Dominion status" in the 1920's did not make them reconsider their European commitments, for then the League of Nations was in existence. In the collective system, as Mr. Stimson once pointed out in a memorable speech, no state can be neutral in the event of war, and the laws of neutrality, presupposing international anarchy and unfettered state sovereignty, become obsolete. Like the other Dominions, Canada achieved her full nationhood only after the Great War and under the cover of the League; she emerged from colonial subordination, not to walk into an unfriendly world, but to join an association of states with wider ideals and higher purposes than the Empire to which previously she had been exclusively attached. Membership in the Commonwealth was submerged (though not obliterated) in a larger alliance, which also, be it noted, involved intervention in European affairs and hence no change in the traditional foreign policy of Canada in this regard.

Since the beginning of the present decade, however, the international order which nourished Canadian autonomy has steadily crumbled away. The members of the League, amongst whom Great Britain and France have always been dominant, have either been unable or unwilling to prevent a change back from League methods to power methods of settling disputes, and European diplomacy resumes its habitual course. The attempt of the

British Conservatives to prevent Europe from being divided into two ideological camps has merely resulted in the Fascists having a strong camp and the democracies no camp at all. Since September 1938 even the most optimistic idealist must realize the impossibility of any further talk about "collective" security; there is no longer any collectivity. Moreover, plans for the reestablishment of the League do not now seem to form part of the foreign policy of a single European government. Canadians therefore face a totally new situation. International anarchy they have known before, but then they were part of a single empire. Now they are citizens of a full-grown Dominion, free to choose its own foreign policy. They find that the League obligation to take part in foreign wars has gone, that the colonial obligation of the old British Empire has likewise gone. Nothing remains today but racial sentiment or self-interest to prop up for them a policy of intervention in external war. They are asking themselves whether either of these motives, or even both combined, justify keeping Canadian policy in a power-politics world the same as it was under the League or under the pre-League Empire.

In all the British Dominions similar questions are being raised for a similar reason. But in Canada the discussion goes deeper and ranges more freely, for the alternatives that present themselves are more numerous — and easier — than those facing any other part of the Commonwealth. Canada is not, like Ireland, a strategic and economic part of the British Isles; she is not, like South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, in an exposed part of the globe far removed from any other defender. She is the neighbor of the United States — a nation of great military power, interested in defending her from invasion, and with a traditional policy of isolation from external adventures. It would be difficult to imagine anything more impregnable against attack than a military alliance between Canada and the United States. In the two Americas are to be found numerous countries, many of them democracies, all of them former colonies of Europe, amongst whom the idea of a regional system of security is growing, and which have already created, in the Pan American Union, the nucleus of an inter-continental league. Even a policy of complete political isolation for Canada is conceivable, for she does not lie in the path or orbit of any aggressor nation, and geography has given her a coast line easy to defend as well as remoteness from the centers of world conflict. Moreover, the Canadian people now number 11,000,000,

with resources sufficient to supply most of their own basic needs. They can afford to rely upon themselves to a greater degree than can any of their sister Dominions.

The new concepts of equality within the British Commonwealth, evolved during the past twenty years, have also tended to make Canadians more ready to face alternatives in their international relations. So long as the constitutional unity of the old Empire remained, British foreign policy was accepted as Canadian foreign policy almost without question. There was only one king, one group of subjects, one position in international law. Canada took the lead, amongst the Dominions, in freeing herself from this subservience. It was in the nature of things that the change should come, for British people love their liberty as much in Manitoba as they do in Manchester, and to Canadians, British-government is no substitute for self-government. Canadian autonomy naturally came first in the domestic sphere, with responsible government and control over tariffs. It was not until after the war of 1914 that the Dominions acquired an international personality distinct from that of Great Britain. Then came separate membership in the League of Nations, the right to negotiate treaties, the building of a Canadian diplomatic corps, the publication of the doctrine of equality of status, the attack upon the legal concept of British parliamentary sovereignty in the Statute of Westminster, the growth of the doctrine of personal union under the Crown. So far has this last theory evolved that Canadians are solemnly debating, at this moment, whether the human being called George VI, when he visits Washington next summer, will do so in his capacity as King of England or as King of Canada; for though his outward appearance will be the same in either event, the inner international man would represent all England and the dependent colonies in the one case, but only 11,000,000 Canadians in the other. Thus the popular ideas, the "folklore" of the Commonwealth, are changing still, and all in the direction of greater independence for the states composing it. Under the new concepts a policy of neutrality for Canada need not legally involve secession from the Commonwealth, for the multiple personality of the King would enable him to follow different policies in his separate countries, without breach of constitutional or international law.

Against this background the plea of the imperialists in Canada, who now argue that the disappearance of the League makes close collaboration with Great Britain and the Commonwealth essen-

tial, has not the weight of former years. Such a policy means that Canada must maintain a military alliance with a Great Power on a distant continent. Since that Power is vastly more important in world affairs, and has interests to be defended all over the globe, its government will in effect determine all major issues of policy.

Canada has no vote in the formation of that policy. There is in London no imperial cabinet representing all the Dominions, no group machinery for arriving at joint action after discussion. The Canadian Government, of course, communicates with the British Government either by direct conversation between premiers or through the channel of the Dominions' Office or the Canadian High Commissioner in London. Dispatches are sent to Ottawa giving information about British movements in the diplomatic field. But this exchange of information is in no way comparable to the deliberation of an executive body. If the British Commonwealth is a League of Nations, it is a League without either a Council or an Assembly. However much the talk of autonomy may continue, the maintenance of a military alliance with Great Britain ultimately results in giving the British Government a blank check in every crisis. Indeed, if power to influence policy be a test, France is probably a closer member of the Commonwealth than is Canada. Logically a "united British front" policy requires some form of imperial federation if any pretense of democratic control is to be conceded to the Dominions.

All attempts at creating such a political unity, however, have broken down, through a tenacious belief in the Dominion that it would increase their obligations without effectively increasing their influence. In Canada it is safe to say that no new attempt to create inter-Commonwealth executive machinery stands the remotest chance of success. No political party would dare to advocate it. This being so, the traditional policy of automatic intervention in external wars on behalf of Great Britain becomes mere colonialism once more. It means that the Canadian people evade the responsibility of choosing and defending their own code of international behavior. While the League was functioning there was no conflict of this kind, for Canada has always been represented in the Assembly and has been elected to the Council. League decisions were thus Canadian decisions, to a greater degree than, for instance, the British Government decisions in September 1938 could be said to be. The voter in Kent or Liverpool can cast a ballot for or against Mr. Chamberlain, but the

voter in Quebec or Saskatchewan has no such right. Hence the imperialist in Canada today finds that his policy meets opposition from two sources: from all those who want a permanent withdrawal from European commitments, and from the self-respecting Canadian nationalists who want Canada first of all to have complete control over the major issues of peace and war, whatever path she may choose to follow in the future.

These are general reasons prompting Canadians to question the traditional Canadian policy of European intervention. There are, in addition, special reasons which are making Canadians turn away from such a policy. In the first place, the population of Canada is now only half of British origin. In the census of 1931, the persons of British descent (*i.e.* whose fathers were English, Scotch, Welsh or Irish) numbered 51.86 percent, those of French descent 28.22 percent, and the "others" 19.93 percent. The French and "others" have a much higher rate of natural increase than the British, so by now they have almost certainly outnumbered them. It has been estimated that by 1971 the French Canadians alone will be larger than the total of those with British ancestry. Thus for half the Canadians allegiance to the British Commonwealth is a political idea with no racial basis. This does not mean that the non-British groups dislike the British connection or wish to secede: the French Canadians have learned to accept it as part of their destiny, and the other settlers as an existing fact in the land of their choice. It does mean, however, that this half of Canada is free to view without misgiving a foreign policy which runs counter to a purely racial loyalty to Britain.

In the second place — and partly as a consequence of the racial divisions — Canada today is seriously concerned over the problem of maintaining her national unity. Centrifugal forces have steadily increased in the past ten years. To the economic stresses disclosed by the great depression of 1929, and latent in any society which combines a protected industrialism with the large-scale export of agricultural produce to world markets, have been added contemporary political and ideological conflicts and a constitutional deadlock created by the interpretations of the Canadian constitution by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (still used as the highest court of law for Canada) greatly expanding "provincial rights" at the expense of the Federal Government. The separatist movement in French Canada, and the recent revival of secessionist talk in the Canadian West, are sur-

face showings of the underlying uncertainty as to the future. Anyone reading Canadian periodicals today will be struck by the number of discussions on the problem of national unity. A Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, under the chairmanship of the Honorable Newton W. Rowell, has been sitting for many months receiving evidence from every corner of Canada as to the ills to be remedied and the reforms to be adopted. Not since the Dominion was formed in 1867 have issues so serious confronted the country.

Whatever may be the recommendations of the Royal Commission when it reports in 1939, the problem of getting Canadians to agree on a national plan of action will still remain. And in the attempt to secure that unity of purpose, the relations between French and British Canadians will prove of paramount importance. More and more it is becoming clear that either the two major races must coöperate in solving national problems or they will not be solved at all. No government at Ottawa can survive without considerable support from French Canada. Both races have inherited from the past certain attitudes which render difficult the attainment of national unity. The British Canadian until recently has tended to put loyalty to Great Britain ahead of loyalty to Canada, and, while liking the French Canadian well enough, has never really accepted the idea of a Canada having a dual culture. He has always thought of Canada as a "British" country, when in fact it can never be really so. The French Canadian, on the other hand, largely because he has had to fight for nearly two centuries to preserve his racial identity and to win equality, has always had a narrow, almost provincial patriotism that does not embrace the entire Dominion as readily as does the loyalty of the English Canadian. He has also acquired a suspicion of all invitations to concede greater powers to the national parliament, for he fears that he will lose control of his cherished laws and institutions. Thus the two races have remained side by side yet poles apart, with no common center for their allegiance. Neither of them has been wholeheartedly Canadian, the loyalty of the one being too scattered, and of the other, too narrow.

If an idea is to be found great enough to evoke a common loyalty amongst all races in Canada and to overcome their differences sufficiently to make stable political union possible, it can only be found in the idea of Canada, the nation. The building of an orderly and just society within this vast territory, the elimination

of poverty and insecurity through a wise utilization of natural resources, the development of arts and sciences, of political liberty and spiritual freedom — all of this while maintaining a fair balance between the claims of racial and religious minorities — that is a task worthy of any group of human beings, regardless of their origins. It is a task that can hardly be achieved, however, except at the expense of the old imperialist foreign policy. For French Canada has always been, and still is, isolationist at heart; it bitterly fought conscription in 1917, and feels no obligation to take part in any military operations except for the defense of Canadian shores. While not indifferent to world problems, French Canadians quite naturally cannot approve of a Canadian foreign policy based on an assumed identity of interest in time of war between Canada and the United Kingdom. The imperial bond has helped in the past to unify Canadians of British blood, because it gave them all a common — if remote — center for their loyalties, but it has kept them divided from their French fellow citizens and made them unsympathetic to the latter's racial aspirations. Today Empire sentiment has become decidedly weakened as a unifying principle even amongst the British Canadians, who have transplanted the greater part of their loyalty; while the complete inadequacy (to use the mildest term) of Imperialism as a rallying cry for coöperation from Quebec, in the midst of the contemporary movement of French Canadian nationalism, need hardly be stressed. The internal unity which is a vital necessity if Canada is to meet her economic and constitutional problems can only be secured, in the opinion of a growing number of Canadians, by the adoption of an independent foreign policy based on Canada's needs as a North American state.

Because of the increasing inadequacy of the racial appeal as a support for Canada's traditional foreign policy, defenders of that policy are now shifting their argument to new grounds. They contend that Canada's own national interests require that she should continue to intervene in European wars. Just what these interests are is never clearly defined, but they seem to include such things as democracy, trade and defense. The first answer to this suggestion is that no one, now that the League system has gone, ever proposes that this intervention should take place unless Great Britain is at war also. Obviously, therefore, Canada's interests in Europe are in some way thought to be dependent upon the belligerency of England. According to this argument, the

support of democracy, so frequently urged upon Canadians, is not a Canadian interest, but only the support of such democracies as the British Government of any given day is prepared to fight for. Otherwise Canada should have been willing to aid Czechoslovakia in September 1938, or the Spanish Government in the civil war, regardless of what Britain intended to do. And in fact, Canada, with the complete approval of the imperialists, showed herself to be concerned only with British policy towards those countries and not with the countries themselves.

So, too, if the preservation of democracy against aggression is a Canadian interest justifying military support in the present world, the principle can scarcely be geographically limited to Europe. It should apply also in the Far East, where a nascent Chinese democracy is being destroyed by Japanese militarism. Japan seems just as great a potential menace to Canada as does Germany. Yet Canada has followed the British policy of non-intervention in China at every step, and continues to sell essential raw materials to the Japanese without the least compunction. The attempt to justify Canadian intervention in overseas wars on the grounds that her self-interest requires her to save democracy and uphold international law and justice thus squares neither with the facts of existing Canadian policy nor with the desires of most of those who use this argument. Peeled of its ethical phraseology, it appears as simple colonialism and race loyalty: a policy of "England right or wrong." Only when a League collective system functions again will Canada be able to make an effective contribution to the security of peace-loving nations in all parts of the world. While international anarchy exists, a policy of armed support from a small North American country for every foreign democracy being attacked is quixotic folly. No other American democracies, and not even the Scandinavian ones, feel it necessary to have a military alliance with any European Power, yet their interest in peace and democracy is just as great as Canada's.

There is another form of the "save democracy" policy which is frequently met. Canada should not support all democracies, it is claimed, but only Great Britain, since she is the leading democracy of Europe. So long as Britain remains, hope for democracy remains; if she is lost, all is lost. This appeal probably reaches a greater number of Canadians than any other, and it is fortified by pressure from left-wing groups who wish to provide the Soviet Union with allies in the prophesied attack upon her. The non-in-

terventionists counter it by saying that if Britain really wishes to save democracy — a proposition which Mr. Chamberlain's policy makes it difficult to uphold — then she can only do it by finding her allies in Europe. The British Commonwealth by itself is helpless in the present world: one Great Power and five small ones cannot win a world war. Nothing is more dangerous for Great Britain than to feel that because she can always count on America to save her, she need not therefore mind what happens in Europe. A great many Canadians feel that it is the duty of Great Britain, if she feels insecure, to organize and lead, through the League machinery, all those Powers in Europe who will support the principles of non-aggression and peaceful change of treaties. She has not done so, she does not pretend she wants to do so, and she has prevented or backed out of every previous attempt to do so since 1931. Of the British governing class it may be said: *Quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat*. This being so, Canada's self-interest in Europe is hard to trace. It is difficult to believe that if England and France won another war they would substitute, for the balance of power diplomacy they prefer, the League system they have abandoned. Canada is thus powerless either to prevent a war or to dictate a just peace. Her best contribution to civilization in the event of another conflict might well be to join the American nations on a Non-intervention Committee. One thing seems plain: there will be no powerful victors after the destruction wrought by another European war, so that the interests of self-defense do not require the Americas to place their frontier on the Rhine.

A further reason frequently advanced in support of Canada's traditional policy is that her trade relations make it impossible for her to be independent of Great Britain in wartime. All ethical considerations, it will be seen, are dismissed by this argument, for to start killing Europeans in order to preserve a market for commodities can hardly be described as an ethical activity. If the argument from trade statistics is sound, then Canada's dependence must first be on the United States rather than on Britain, for Canada's total trade with the United States is considerably greater than her trade with Britain. The British market, however, is admittedly of great importance, particularly for certain sections of Canada such as the prairie provinces and British Columbia. The United Kingdom took 40 percent of Canada's exports in the twelve months ending August 31, 1938. British plans for converting Canada into the "arsenal of the Empire," if carried out, will

greatly increase the importance of that market. The question remains, therefore, one of deciding first, whether the markets would be lost, or partly lost, in the event of Canada's neutrality in a British war, and secondly, whether that loss in itself justifies the expense of going to war. Obviously, in terms of dollars and cents, it is not good business to spend more money fighting the war than the market is worth.

Now as regards the loss of the market, it is fairly clear that there could be no total loss for the very good reason that Britain needs to buy Canadian produce very nearly as much as Canada needs to sell it. One can hardly conceive of a British Government going to the inconvenience and danger of trying to find new sources of supply for food and raw materials at the outbreak of a war. No other trade route for British imports is as secure as the North Atlantic. The laws of neutrality would not oblige Canadians to stop selling foodstuffs and munitions to Great Britain. Ships carrying Canadian produce would no doubt be attacked, but it so happens that these ships are nearly all non-Canadian. Canada has practically no merchant marine on the high seas: in 1936 only about 15 percent of her external trade was carried in Canadian bottoms. A *de facto* cash-and-carry principle applies to Canadian trade: other nations' ships come to her shores, buy her goods and depart. An enemy of Great Britain may try to attack Canadian ports to stop supplies, but this is less likely to happen if Canada is neutral than if she is belligerent. It is also much less likely to happen if Canada refuses to become a large-scale producer of arms; those who urge Canada to help Britain by making planes and munitions are asking her to develop the kind of foreign trade most likely to invite attacks and reprisals when war breaks out.

As regards the other side of the argument, a comparison between the relative costs of fighting a European war and giving up the British market leaves only one answer. Even if half the total trade were lost by neutrality, it would cost Canada, on the basis of the average total trade with Great Britain during the past four years, about \$225,000,000 a year. War expenditures for 1916-17, not the most expensive year of the last war, were \$321,864,160. The next war will be far more costly. And it is more reasonable to suppose that in the next war, Canada's trade with Britain will increase enormously regardless of her neutrality, exactly as did that of the United States from 1914-1917. It is therefore difficult to use Canada's large foreign trade as a basis for a policy of intervention.

Even less valid under examination is the argument based on Canada's need of defense. The popular idea, sedulously fostered by the imperialist school, is that the defense of Canada rests upon the British Navy. This is true if Canada is fighting on the side of Great Britain — though even then the French army and any other forces allied with Great Britain are also Canada's defenders. But if Canada is only brought into the war because she is in military alliance with Britain, and for no other reason, then obviously, from the point of view of her own interests, a policy of neutrality is a much better protection than the British Navy. Sweden would have been defended by the British Navy had she entered the last war, but she avoided all need for this defense by remaining at peace. True, her shipping suffered some damage and her nationals some insults, but these were not comparable to the cost of a war. Canadians are beginning to see that a military alliance with Great Britain means that they contribute all the defense and receive no security in return. All they get out of it is a constant danger of war. In so far as they continue the alliance, it is because they wish to defend Britain, not because they need her to defend them. No single Power threatens to attack Canada at the moment or is likely to do so unless she allows herself to be drawn into somebody else's war. In terms of purely Canadian needs, her utmost security would be achieved by a policy of neutrality coupled with reasonable coastal defenses and a close military understanding with the United States. Since President Roosevelt's recent warning to the world that the Monroe Doctrine applies to Canada, the likelihood that foreign Powers would risk war with Canada and the United States by violating Canadian neutrality is highly remote. Canada is quite capable of protecting herself against all minor attacks upon her ports.

These are the principal influences and reasons acting on the Canadian people today, and making for a new Canadian foreign policy. Not yet, however, has the tide of public feeling turned sufficiently to make a policy of neutrality dominant in the country. Tradition and sentiment die hard, and might not have died at all under any shocks less severe than the upheavals of the past decade. Opinions have changed most amongst the unimportant people, and it is difficult to estimate more than approximately the strength of the respective camps.¹ But whereas before the

¹ For further analysis of Canadian opinion see "Canada Looks Abroad," by MacKay and Rogers, and "Canada Today," second edition, by F. R. Scott.

Munich settlement there were three main groups of opinion in Canada — imperialist, collectivist, and isolationist or Canadian nationalist — two of which advocated Canada's participation in external wars, today there are only two groups, only one of them willing to intervene in Europe. The former collectivists must now decide whether they will ally themselves with the imperialists or join the Canadian school. Many of them are undoubtedly choosing the latter course, though perhaps a larger number find that the call of the blood is still stronger than any vision of Canada as a North American nation. To a large extent, amongst British Canadians there is an evident age-line, the younger men being less willing than their elders to rally to the well-worn slogans. The coming royal visit may stir the ancient loyalties in many, but amongst others it is being openly talked of as an attempt to cement a weakening alliance.

In the country at large the French Canadian group is almost entirely isolationist. Britain is not of their race, and France has been too irreligious to evoke their active loyalty. Twenty percent of the Canadian population is non-British, non-French, and at least a majority of these will require something more than a purely British appeal for aid to make them desire intervention in Europe. Amongst the British Canadians a new nationalist school is growing, whose position is so close to that of the French Canadians that a real rapprochement seems possible at last. Most of these supported the League, but looked upon it as the only valid justification for a policy of intervention in Europe. Since Munich they are necessarily in favor of Canadian neutrality.

The imperialist school remains strongest in the Maritime provinces, in Ontario and in British Columbia, with important groups elsewhere, chiefly in the cities. There is a fairly close relation, outside French Canada, between economic status and imperialist sentiment; the higher the income, the stronger the old loyalty. Moreover, the imperialists control most of the important agencies for influencing public opinion in English-speaking Canada, and occupy the leading posts in finance and industry throughout the country. After the announcement last spring of the British Government's intention to place large contracts in Canada for planes and other war materials, *Canadian Business*, official organ of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, openly announced that if Canadians are to derive large financial benefits from British munitions-making "Canada must be prepared to act

promptly behind Britain whenever the latter is confronted with an emergency.”² So too the supporters of the “British Front” policy dominate the higher command in the military forces and in the veterans associations such as the Canadian Legion and the Canadian Corps Association. Mr. Ian Mackenzie, Minister of National Defense, and the most energetic occupant of that office since the last war, is not a Canadian but a Scot by birth.

Thus Canadian opinion is sharply divided, with the weight of influence still in the hands of the interventionists. A measure of the political strength of the non-interventionist opinion, however, is seen in the programs of the political parties. The clearest statement of it is found in the Canadian farmer-labor party, the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation, which, though willing to support collective security, stands opposed to any participation in imperialist wars and demands a right of neutrality for Canada. Though still a minority third party, it has now almost as large a representation in the four western provinces as has the Conservative Party. The latter party, traditionally the reservoir of the purest form of imperialist sentiment, adopted a new program at its Convention last July, reaffirming the principle of maintaining “the ties which bind the British Commonwealth of Nations,” and stating that the defense of Canada can best be promoted “by consultation and coöperation between all the members” of the Commonwealth. Though this leans toward the imperialist position, there is no definite commitment to a policy of intervention, and during the crisis of last September, Dr. Manion, the new Conservative leader, was careful not to bind his party in advance. Mr. Mackenzie King has never budged from his declared policy of “no commitments” and “parliament will decide,” and last September despite great pressure from the imperialists in his party and in the country, he refused to follow the lead of Australia and New Zealand in promising full support to Mr. Chamberlain. Thus none of the three political parties in Canada advocates a policy of automatic military support to Great Britain in the event of her going to war. Nevertheless, informed opinion is agreed that had war occurred last September, Canada would have been involved from the start, and the “deciding” of the Canadian Parliament would have been limited to defining the initial extent of participation. Isolationist sentiment was still unorganized while interventionists occupied the key positions. Moreover, all

² *Canadian Business*, July 1938, p. 34.

through the crisis there seemed to be the possibility of action which might reasonably have been called "collective," so that all imperialists and most collectivists would have supported the war.

On the legal side, a policy of neutrality for Canada raises two problems. The first relates to the question of the constitutional right to neutrality. There seems little doubt that since the Statute of Westminster of 1931, Canada may enact legislation conferring upon the Governor-General in Council the sole power to sign all treaties for Canada and to issue declarations of peace and war. Such legislation could also vary or abrogate the existing agreement under which the harbors of Halifax and Esquimaux are made available for the use of the Royal Navy. Since Canada has this power, she may be considered to have the right to neutrality. But until she exercises the power, foreign countries would seem to be free to consider that the former position remains unchanged, and that a declaration of war by Great Britain automatically makes Canada a belligerent. Hence there is an existing legal impediment to a policy of neutrality, but an impediment that Canada herself can remove. It is likely that an attempt to clarify the situation will be made at the next session of the Dominion Parliament, though it is not to be supposed that Mr. King will take the only step which would make his policy of "let Parliament decide" mean anything. Even many opponents of neutrality will agree that complete freedom of choice on matters of peace and war is part of Dominion status, and that the present automatic nature of Canada's commitment to war is contrary to all ideas of responsible government. Canada would not be the first Dominion to establish a right to neutrality: the new Irish constitution gives the Irish Government, with the assent of the Legislature, the sole power to declare war for Ireland, and South Africa, since its legislation of 1934, appears to have the right also.

The other legal question arises in regard to what is called "neutrality legislation," arming the executive with power to control exports to belligerents and to guard against involuntary entanglements. Here Canada seems to be supplied already with ample authority under two principal statutes. One is the Customs Act, which was amended in 1937 so as to give the Government discretionary power to " . . . prohibit, restrict or control the exportation, generally or to any destination, directly or indirectly, or the carrying coastwise or by inland navigation, of arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war, military, naval or air

stores, or any articles deemed capable of being converted thereinto or made useful in the production thereof, or provisions or any sort of victuals which may be used as food by man or beast . . .”

The other is the War Measures Act, a permanent statute which can be brought into operation by a simple declaration by the executive that a state of war, insurrection, or invasion, “real or apprehended,” exists. Once this statute is in force, the Dominion Government has the powers of a dictatorship, both in domestic and foreign affairs. Censorship, deportation, control of transport, production and foreign trade are all provided for. Canada’s Foreign Enlistment Act of 1937 presumably does not apply to the British Army, but toleration of private enlistment is not a breach of neutrality. Hence any government that really intended to keep Canada neutral, should need no further legislative powers.

It must not be supposed that the supporters of a policy of neutrality for Canada are simply pacifists unwilling to take part in any war, or a narrow and uncoöperative group who do not recognize the world’s crying need for international law and order. A few are pacifists, and some are people with no broad vision. But the largest single factor moving British Canadians into the new position has been precisely their keen sense of internationalism. They have been so frequently disillusioned by the policy of the British Government that they have come to believe that the British Conservative Party prefers secret diplomacy, balance-of-power manœuvres and gentlemen’s agreements, to the kind of world which the first collective system foreshadowed. To borrow a phrase from a recent New Zealand writer, “Imperial loyalty is complicated by international morality.”³ Periodic intervention in Europe on power politics terms is just not possible as a national Canadian policy. What does hold out hope is the idea of a regional system of security in the two Americas, and a direct result of the Canadian trend away from Europe is a revival of interest in the Pan American Union. At least in this part of the world it should be possible to place international law on a firm foundation. When Europe achieves a new settlement of her own regional problems, when the Chamberlain policy produces the general appeasement it claims to be reaching, then the Americas will be free to assume military responsibilities under a new agreement for the preservation of world peace.

³ Dr. J. C. Beaglehole, in *Contemporary New Zealand*, p. 7. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1938.

SIAM, THE INCREDIBLE KINGDOM

By John Gunther

SIAM, about the size of France, is a country of rice, rubber, fourteen million good-natured peasants and a boy king. On the map it looks rather like an octopus with one tentacle dangling into Malaya toward Singapore. It is the country where no one needs to work more than three or four months a year because the climate is so propitious and rice so abundant, where the pronunciation of names is fantastically at variance with their spelling, where there are 17,408 Buddhist temples and 150,000 priests, and where white elephants are sacred. It is also a country where Japanese influence is increasingly active.

Aside from what is left of China, Siam is the only independent country in Asia between Japan and Iran, the only eastern territory that did not become the booty of the Great Powers during the imperialist expansion of the nineteenth century. The Siamese call their country "Muang-Thai," which means land of the free. They have been an independent state since about 1350, and originally their kingdom extended to the Yangtze. The Siamese form a distinct racial and linguistic group; but they also show very marked affiliations with China, as well as Malay admixtures. They performed the miracle of surviving as an independent kingdom partly because their territory, half of which is even today unexplored jungle, was hard to penetrate and conquer, partly because it was convenient for both Britain and France to have a buffer state between Burma, Malaya and Indo-China.

But Siam may not remain an independent state forever — if the acknowledged Japanese dream of domination over "East Asia" becomes a reality.

Siam was — and is — not only an independent country; until 1932 it was one of the last absolute monarchies remaining in the world. Since 1782 it has been ruled by members of the staggeringly prolific Chakri dynasty. Until 1932 it was a backwater, a stagnant and not unhappy land where the monarch, although with absolute powers, chose as a rule to govern mildly. There was no constitution, no judicial system, no legislature, until 1932. Siam was a remnant, picturesque in the extreme, of Oriental mediævalism. Then the first flush of modern ideas reached Siam. The flush spread and became a fermentation. The people de-

manded reforms and the extension of governmental institutions. So in June 1932 a bloodless revolution took place. But the Siamese are mild people. The only casualty was one general wounded in the leg.

King Prajadhipok, a small smiling man with great subtlety of mind and an astute sense of humor, promptly accepted the ultimatum of the revolutionaries. There was no need even to declare martial law. The revolutionaries apologized for the bluntness of their first manifesto, which had attacked the king, and prepared a provisional constitution, which was followed by another one. The movement was directed mostly against the topheavy clique of royal princes and noblemen who monopolized political power and economic privileges. The king was permitted to remain.

The revolution was made by a group of officers and students who had strong Leftist tendencies. They wanted to democratize Siam. But soon a split came, and in June 1933 occurred another *coup d'état*. The first prime minister of the revolution, Phya Manopakarana, fled to Penang, and was succeeded by an army officer with a more forthright policy, Colonel Phahol Pholphayuha Sena. Then in October 1933 came an attempt at counter-revolution. Several disgruntled noblemen and landowners, led by a Prince Bovaradej (who is now an exile in French Indo-China), sought to overthrow the new régime. The revolt, after allowing for the extreme difference between Spanish and Siamese character, was strikingly similar to that of General Franco in Spain. The propertied classes and aristocrats had been ejected from domination over the government. They refused to stay ejected; they rose against the revolution, and were put down. They were put down largely because the counter-revolutionary leader, gentle like almost all Siamese, refused to take the responsibility for further bloodshed when fighting began.

The government passed death sentences on several of the captured counter-revolutionaries. King Prajadhipok meantime had begun a long trip around the world searching for relief from eye trouble. It became clear that he did not want to return to Siam, though the government insisted that it had only the friendliest feelings toward him and would treat him with respect if he remained faithful to the new constitution. The crisis came when royal assent was necessary for the execution of the rebels. The King refused this assent — this was in 1935 — and therefore abdicated. He was in London at the time: the abdication was by

mail. (Incidentally, the rebels who were executed were shot, Siamese fashion, through a curtain; the firing squad does not see whom it shoots.)

The quality of Siamese political life before the revolution may be judged from the fact that a great many words not existing in Siamese had to be invented to express the ideals of the movement. A brilliant young Siamese, Prince Varnvaidykara Varavarn, who chose to side with the new government despite his royal blood, and who had studied philology at Balliol, had the task of creating words hitherto unknown to the Siamese language such as: constitution, political science, reform, civil list, revolution, proletariat, political party. These concepts had never found expression before in Siamese. On the other hand, words did exist before 1932 for such terms as democracy, privy purse, cabinet, education, taxes and legislature.

A revolution may be judged by two things: first, its transfer of political power; second, its transfer of economic power. As regards the first, the Siamese revolution is complete. A legislature functions, an independent judiciary has been set up, and the paraphernalia of western democracy is closely imitated. Power is in the hands of the Peoples Party, an outgrowth of the original revolutionary clique. Economically the revolution is not complete. Beginnings have been made towards equalizing taxation and distributing wealth, and a social reform program of some consequence has been inaugurated; but Siam still has a long way to go before it becomes an integrated people's state.

The actual technique of the revolution was unusual. It was a technological *coup d'état* of an advanced type. Its chief authors had read Trotsky and Curzio Malaparte. They acquired power not by force of arms but by seizing the sources of power — the telephones, the power plants, the railway, and so on. Also the Siamese revolution differs from many others in that there was no punitive assault on the class represented by the previous régime. Most of the princes and aristocrats continued to live in peace: they were not eliminated, even after their attempt at counter-revolution. Their privileges, however, were severely curtailed. Before 1932 the royal princes usurped a tremendous proportion of the national revenue. Now the civil list, which includes the expenses of the regency, is only 455,200 ticals out of a total budget of 104,891,144, or .4 percent. (A tical is worth 45 cents.)

King Prajadhipok continued after his abdication to live in

England. His successor was his nephew, the boy Ananda. Because Siam is still a kingdom and because the princes of royal blood may some day choose to reassert themselves, let me interpolate a word about what by all odds is as improbable and ornate a group of characters as the Asian world can show.

The great Siamese King Phra Paramindr Maha Chulalongkorn, the most impressive figure in Siamese history, ruled from 1868 to 1910. It was during this long reign that Siam heard the first enticing whispers of the modern world outside. Chulalongkorn was an enlightened despot. Railways came; so did posts and telegraphs; so did treaties with foreign nations. But the most interesting thing about him was his family. Reputedly he had 84 wives and 362 children. In the current "Directory of Siam" nine and a half pages are necessary merely to list the male descendants of Chulalongkorn who survive today. They are grouped in twenty-five main families, presumably the offspring of the twenty-five chief royal wives.

In a polygamous country like Siam, if more kings came with the vitality of Chulalongkorn, practically the entire population would in time become admixed with royal blood. So the Siamese invented a unique system whereby the progeny of kings gradually resume the status of commoners. Thus the son of a Siamese monarch is known as a Royal Highness; the grandson is merely a "Mom Chao" or Serene Highness; the great grandson is a "Momrajawong" or Lord; the great-great-grandson is plain Mister.¹ Even this gradual but drastic de-royalizing of royalty did not seem a sufficient precaution in view of the inordinate number of surviving princes; therefore a law was passed inflicting monogamy on the Siamese monarch. Moreover, it has become a custom that the monarch — if he can find anyone — should marry someone not of royal blood.

The marital affairs of King Chulalongkorn, quite apart from the number of his wives, were extraordinarily complicated. Incidentally his senior wife, known now as the Dowager Consort, is still alive; she prays daily in the great temple of the Emerald Buddha and is the richest person in Siam. King Chulalongkorn's first wife had two sons. The king then married in turn three sisters. The third sister had six sons. She had great influence over him, and persuaded him to skip the second son by his first wife

¹ There are, however, several categories of minor nobility in Siamese; a man may successively be a "Luang," a "Phra," a "Phya" and a "Chaophya."

when arranging the succession, in favor of her own first son and then her other sons. Another complication is that the three wives who followed the first wife were not only sisters, but moreover were half-sisters of the king himself. All had the same father (the previous king) though the mothers were different.

So King Chulalongkorn's heir was his eldest son by his first queen; he reigned from 1910 to 1925 as King Rama VI. He was an exceptionally engaging creature, a spendthrift and wonderful gambler. He translated Shakespeare into Siamese, wrote plays, and acted in them. According to King Chulalongkorn's rule of succession, Rama should have been followed by his eldest half-brother whose name was Mahidol. But Mahidol was far from being interested in kingship and refused the succession. He went instead to Harvard and Johns Hopkins, became an excellent doctor and married — in Albany, New York — a Siamese girl who was a nurse in a hospital. The succession then passed to Mahidol's next brother Prajadhipok. When Prajadhipok abdicated, the next heir was adjudged to be Ananda, the son of Mahidol.

Ananda, born abroad in 1925, is being educated in Switzerland. Recently, in November 1938, he visited his kingdom for the first time. He reaches his majority (at sixteen) in 1941, when he will be bathed, anointed and crowned in a picturesque ceremony. Three regents were appointed in 1935 for the period of Ananda's minority. They are Prince Aditya (pronounced "Odit"), a cousin of King Prajadhipok's, who represents royalty; Chao Phya Yomaraj, of humble birth, who was a monk for many years and who represents the government; and General Chao Bijayendra Yodhin who represents the army.

Of the great mass of survivors of King Chulalongkorn who are still Royal or Serene Highnesses very few occupy conspicuous positions today. By the terms of the new constitution none are allowed to become government ministers, though they may be advisers or department heads. The most noteworthy of them lives in Java. He is Prince Nagor Svarga (pronounced "Nakan Sawan"), who was King Prajadhipok's uncle and minister of the interior, and who was called the power behind the throne until 1932. He has pledged himself never to return to Siam.

Siam today is ruled by a junta of 30 or 40 men who are the nucleus of the Peoples Party and all of whom were active conspirators in the 1932 *coup d'état*. These men who were young-

ish officers or students at the time of the coup, are bound by an oath of blood brotherhood. Most of the cabinet ministers are under 45. In effect they rule Siam; yet Siam is not a dictatorship. The ambition of the junta is to create a Siamese democracy, though in the present transition period only one political party is allowed and half the members of the legislature are appointed. Even so, opposition may at times be spirited: for instance, it took the government three months to hammer the 1938 budget through the chamber.

Three men dominate the junta: the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the minister of defense. Of these the foreign minister, Luang Pradist Manudharm, is probably the most interesting. He is a shy, chunky man of 36 with a shrewd peasant's face; he is partly Chinese in origin, and has the familiar Chinese characteristic of looking younger than he is. Pradist was a poor boy who struggled for education: he won a scholarship maintained by the old government, and went to Paris to study law. Returning to Siam he became a teacher and then entered politics. Pradist (some spellings of his name omit the "s" and he is pronounced merely "Pradit") was the civilian organizer of the *coup d'état*. A convinced radical, he agitated for agrarian coöperatives, land reform and educational advances; his colleagues thought that he was going too fast and he was eliminated from the first government soon after it was formed. He went into exile for a time, visiting Japan, Britain and the United States. He was accused of being a Communist, a charge of which he was ultimately cleared by a parliamentary committee. In 1934 he returned to Siam to be the left-wing leader of the junta and foreign minister in the government.

The prime minister, Colonel Phya Phahol Pholphayuha Sena (pronounced simply "Pa-Hoon"), is an older man with considerable force of character, whose function seems to be that of arbiter between his brilliant and radical foreign minister and the minister of defense, who is on the conservative side. Phahol was educated first in Denmark, then Germany. An army man, he went to the same cadet school as did General Goering, who was a class ahead of him. His nickname is "the Buffalo." When I saw him he made a great point of the liberalism of Siam. He scoffed at the idea that the government should take more stringent steps to protect itself against the possibility of counter-revolution. He took a glass of water from the table, and tipped it first one way, then the other,

without spilling. That, he indicated, was the path of moderation Siam was following. The budget for education, he said, had jumped from about 2,500,000 ticals before 1932 to 12,000,000 now. He said that national defense absorbed one-quarter of the total revenue, and denied vigorously that his country could ever become a vassal of Japan.

The defense minister, Colonel Luang Bipul Songgram, is called the "strong man" of the régime. His enemies are apt to say, first that he has totalitarian ambitions *à la* Mussolini, second that he is not likely to achieve them because he is not strong enough. What power he has comes from the fact that he controls the army, especially the new mechanized units. The colonel is a quiet and retiring individual, educated in France. Some people say he is pro-Japanese.

These are the Siamese triplets who rule the country. Other politicians of consequence are the minister of public instruction, Captain Luang Sindhu Songgyamay, who is also chief of the naval general staff; the minister of the interior (also a naval officer), Lieutenant Commander Luang Dhamrong; and the chief of police, Colonel Luang Atuldej Charas. Colonel Song Suradej, one of the original leaders of the *coup d'état*, left Bangkok in disgust at the foreign minister's radicalism, and is now in charge of military training in northern Siam. He is regarded as an important person.

Siam is not a rich country. Only 30 people in the kingdom pay a tax on incomes greater than \$10,000 per year. There is no middle class and feudalism has disappeared; the great bulk of the population consists of peasantry. Siam lives on rice, the principal article both of consumption and export; teak and tin are its other important resources, most of which are controlled by British capital. The British also hold the small foreign debt. A future problem is bound to be that of foreign capital. The Siamese want keenly to develop their country, but they cannot do it alone, and they remain suspicious of outside help. Yet Siam has great untapped possibilities of wealth; it is one of the few countries left in the world with a vast public domain; perhaps fifty percent of the country is still not surveyed. It covers about 200,000 square miles, yet contains only 14,500,000 people; it is practically a vacuum compared to the suffocatingly crowded provinces of China and India nearby.

Though Siam is not rich, her finances are admirably in order.

The trade balance is always favorable, and the budget has never been out of balance. The public debt is small and the currency cover is no less than 114 percent. A foreign expert recently said that he has never known a sounder financial state. There is, however, a very considerable agricultural debt, since the peasants borrow against their crops as in China, and the moneylenders try to suck them dry. Siam's best customer is Malaya; while most of her imports come from Japan.

The Isthmus of Kra, as one may readily see from any map, is the narrow bridge of land near the junction of Siam and Burma. For several years this otherwise unremarkable strip of rock, swamp and jungle has been responsible for a plentiful crop of rumors to the effect that the Japanese are building a canal there. London newspapers have printed picturesque stories about Japanese laborers already at work, assiduously digging from sea to sea. There is no foundation whatever to these rumors — at least not yet. The Kra Canal is purely a myth at present, though conceivably it might be a reality at some future date. The reason for this Kra legend is, of course, that a canal at the isthmus would permit the ships of Japan — or any other nation — to go from European or Indian ports to China or Japan without passing Singapore. It would short-circuit the Singapore naval base which the British have just completed at such great cost. Technical experts disagree as to its feasibility. Though the canal would be only 33 miles long, difficulties of construction are believed to be formidable. A not unimportant point is that the western end of the canal, should it be built, would be directly adjacent to British territory in Burma, which could easily be fortified. The canal would cost about \$30,000,000 according to engineers who have inspected the site.

The foreign policy of Mr. Pradist in particular and of Siam in general is strict neutrality, with no external engagements or entanglements. The Siamese are an independent nation, and want to remain so. The greatest care is taken to steer a neutral course. For instance, Siam employs several foreign experts: an American is chosen by tradition as adviser in the foreign office, an Englishman in the ministry of finance, a Frenchman in the judiciary, and so on. Siamese nationalism has recently found expression in many small particulars; for instance, government reports, hitherto always written in English, now appear in Siamese.

Siam and China are good friends, although curiously enough

there have been no diplomatic relations between the two countries for several hundred years. This is because the Chinese insist on claiming Chinese nationality for children born of Chinese parents no matter where they live. There is a very large and powerful Chinese community in Siam, probably numbering 2,500,000 in all, and the Siamese cannot accept the thesis that those of them born in Siam are Chinese by nationality.

Obviously the war in China and the steady growth of Japanese influence in southeastern Asia constitute a serious problem for Siam. The country has a certain strategic importance in that it lies between Burma and Singapore; the Siamese know this — and so does Japan. Siam does not dare to offend Japan (yet the considerable Chinese population of Siam maintains an unofficial boycott of Japanese goods), and she must base all her calculations on the assumption that Japan may some day become an enemy. So Siamese policy is double-edged, a kind of wary friendliness — fear of Japanese aggression combined with cautious attempt to buy it off. The Japanese have gone far with economic penetration. For instance, Japanese shipping does a thriving Siamese business and new units of the Siamese fleet have been purchased from Japan. Yet to state that Japan dominates Siamese policy would be an exaggeration.

AGRARIAN UNREST IN JAPAN

By W. Ladejinsky

THOUGH Japan's industrial revolution began only towards the end of the nineteenth century, her progress since then has been remarkable. Within a relatively short time she has succeeded not only in assimilating but in some respects in improving upon the industrial and commercial technique of the West. In the eyes of the outside world this has tended to minimize the importance of agriculture in Japan's national economy. In reality, the cultivation of the soil still remains her leading industry. As one writer has put it, "Japanese agriculture employs nearly half of our population, occupies a substantial part of the land area of the country, has invested in it nearly half of the nation's industrial capital, an amount more than half as much again as that invested in manufacturing industry and commerce together, is an important factor in foreign trade, and is an almost exclusive provider of the nation's staple food."¹

If Japanese agriculture were as prosperous as it is vital to the nation, it would be a thriving industry indeed. Actually, rural Japan cannot lay claim either to prosperity or progress. Long before the industrial slump of recent years the farmers found themselves in the throes of depression. In the early thirties, when Japan's industry and foreign trade scored some of their most notable advances, the countryside presented a picture of impoverishment, distress and social unrest. All this is to be attributed to the fact that agriculture in Japan "does not pay."

The outstanding natural factor that has given rise to Japan's agricultural crisis is the scarcity of land fit for cultivation. Less than 15,000,000 acres, or not quite 16 percent of her total area, are under crops. Despite the efforts of the last fifty years, the area under cultivation has increased by only about 25 percent while the population practically doubled. At present there is only a small amount of undeveloped land suitable for agricultural production: however hard the farmers may try they cannot appreciably increase the cultivated acreage.

The industrialization of Japan has absorbed many people from the rural districts, but not in sufficient numbers to relieve the pressure against the land. In 1936, 5,597,465 families, constituting

¹ Shiguchi Mayeda: "Our Stricken Agriculture," *Contemporary Japan*, September 1932, p. 269.

an aggregate rural population of 27,000,000, were living on the land. The data on the areas cultivated by each family clearly indicate how land-hungry the Japanese farmers are. Nearly 69 percent of all the farm households cultivate less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres per family, comprising a total of 33 percent of the arable land. On the other end of the scale there are 204,000 families, or less than four percent of the total, who cultivate 23 percent of the entire crop area.

Absentee landownership is very extensive in Japan, and for this reason the size of a holding which a farmer owns bears little relation to the land he cultivates. Thus half of the land is owned by $7\frac{1}{2}$ percent of all the landowners, while one half of the landowners own but nine percent of the land. As a result of this unequal distribution of landownership, there are many farmers who own no land at all and must cultivate that of someone else; still others own so little land that in order to improve their economic position they must rent additional ground. Hence the widespread development of tenancy in Japan. In 1936 farm households cultivating their own land constituted 31 percent of the total number of farm families; 27 percent rented all the land they cultivated; and 42 percent was made up of those who were part-tenants and part-owners. The last two groups rent from the landowners a total of 7,200,000 acres, or 48 percent of Japan's total arable land.

The outstanding feature of the Japanese tenancy system is that the shortage of land and lack of alternative occupations bind the tenant to the land. The relations between landlord and tenant are largely determined by this fact. For this reason the competition for the limited agricultural area is so strong that rents have been pushed very high. Rents for rice lands are usually paid in kind and for the most part the amount is calculated on the basis of a given number of bushels of rice per unit of land. This throws the full burden of loss from a poor harvest upon the tenant unless he can obtain a reduction in his rent. In general the minimum rental for a one-crop field is about 55 percent of the crop, and for a two-crop field, 60 percent. The plight of the tenant is aggravated by the fact that the landlord's only responsibility is, generally speaking, to supply the land and pay the land tax; all expenditures connected with raising the crop, such as outlays for equipment, the all-important fertilizer, farm buildings and numerous other items, must be covered by the tenant, with the result that very

often his net share amounts to not more than a third of the crop.

Though the tenants have never been satisfied with their economic status, up to the World War their conservatism and ingrained feudal subservience to landlords kept friction at a minimum. During the last twenty years, however, this relationship has undergone a radical change, and the number of disputes has increased from 85 to nearly 6,000 a year. The underlying causes for this are manifold, of which two in particular must be noted: in the twenties it was due to excessive rents, more recently to the attempts of landlords to terminate leases and evict tenants from the land. In Japan the struggle between landlord and tenant has gradually centered upon the vital question of the tenant's right to cultivate the land. Upon the maintenance of this right — not a legal one, to be sure, but one well established by custom — depends the very existence of the tenant.

The unequal distribution of the land is not the only source of weakness in Japan's agricultural economy; the manner in which the land is utilized has its shortcomings as well.

In the main, Japanese agricultural income depends upon two products — rice and cocoons — both of which are subject to considerable price fluctuations. More than half of the entire arable land of Japan is under rice. During some sixty years the area under this crop increased over one-fifth, while the output practically doubled. This vast augmentation of the rice supply was chiefly the result of more intensive cultivation through the application of very expensive chemical fertilizers. However, during the past decade there has been no noticeable increase in rice yields despite the ever-growing utilization of these fertilizers. Japanese agriculture is thus proving to be a testing ground for the operation of the law of diminishing returns.

Foreign rice is sold in Japan at prices considerably lower than those of the domestic product, but it is so unpalatable to the Japanese that only the very poor eat it. The inelastic demand for the home product, the size of the crop, the difficulty of controlling imports from Korea and Formosa, and the inability to market any surplus abroad at a profit, all cause wide fluctuations in the price. The sharp decline in prices after the huge crop of 1930-31 intensified the distress of the Japanese rice producers; yet the very high prices following the poor crop of 1918 occasioned the "rice riots," considered to be among the most serious popular outbreaks that have ever occurred in Japan.

The divergence of interests between domestic producers and consumers with respect to the price of rice is largely absent in the case of cocoon prices, since 70 percent of the silk is sold abroad. Here the demand, as far as the producer is concerned, is all for high prices, since cocoon raising is one of the principal sources of cash income for more than a third of Japanese farmers. The fundamental difficulty, however, is that the price of cocoons is determined by the price of silk in one market, the United States, where over 90 percent of Japanese raw silk exports are sold and where silk prices fluctuate with business conditions. It is significant therefore that one of the two chief pillars of Japan's agricultural economy is at the mercy of forces over which the farmers, or for that matter the Japanese Government, have no control.

Japanese farmers have always groaned under a heavy tax load. It is generally agreed that taxation in Japan has not been equitably distributed, that it weighs more heavily on the land than on the mobile wealth of industry and trade. The industrialization of Japan was brought about in no small degree through government assistance. But this was done largely at the expense of agriculture, since it took the form of high tariffs and heavy taxes. Furthermore, this policy still continues despite the fact that Japan is long past the stage of industrial "infancy." According to an investigation made by the Imperial Agricultural Society in 1934, on an annual income of 300 yen a farmer paid 35 percent in taxes, a merchant 12½ percent, and a manufacturer only 1½ percent. These figures reveal the extent to which Japan's stricken agricultural economy is discriminated against in favor of her prosperous and expanding industry and trade.

Among the Japanese farmer's heavy burdens a close second to the tax load is the huge indebtedness under which he struggles. Prior to the World War the total was but 750 million yen, or 135 yen per household. Since then, and particularly since the early twenties, farm indebtedness has increased by leaps and bounds. Estimates of the total farm debt vary, but it is generally conceded that in 1936 it amounted to not less than six billion yen, or over 1000 yen per household. Worse still, interest rates are usurious, seven percent being the exception rather than the rule. According to official estimates the rates of interest being paid on an agricultural indebtedness amounting to over four billion yen are: 43 percent was contracted at a rate ranging from seven to ten percent, 51 percent at a rate from 10 to 15 percent, while six per-

cent carries over 15 percent. There is evidence, however, that real rates are considerably above these official estimates. But even assuming that the total farm indebtedness is carried at an average interest rate of not more than ten percent, the yearly charge is around 600 million yen, or 31 percent of the net annual (average) value of agricultural production during the years 1931-1935.

For many years prior to the depression of the late twenties and thirties Japanese agriculture labored under severe strains and stresses, the full effect of which was not revealed, chiefly because of the relatively high prices for rice and cocoons. The first downward tendency was noted in 1926, and during the following years prices declined so sharply that Japan's agriculture reached a critical stage. By 1931 the value of her farm products had slumped to 2,046 million yen, as against 3,521 million yen in 1929. Prices registered a marked rise in 1935 and particularly in 1936, the total value of agricultural products in the latter year being estimated at 3½ billion yen. Though this was equal to the 1929 level, it was nearly a billion yen less than that of 1925. But, though this advance in prices attenuated the acuteness of some of the problems created by the depression, it was obviously insufficient to alleviate all the basic difficulties to which Japanese agriculture has been subjected for many years.

The currency devaluation in 1932 failed to cause an immediate rise in agricultural prices comparable with that in industrial prices: the marked advance of the former occurred only in 1935. Furthermore, whereas depreciation of currency, low wages and a highly rationalized industrial organization have given Japanese exports an important price advantage in foreign markets, there has been no such escape for agriculture. In fact, agriculture has failed to benefit even indirectly from this expansion of manufacturing and trade because those exports which have risen rapidly are cotton goods, rayon and a variety of miscellaneous manufactured articles, the raw materials for which are imported.

The significance of these difficulties in terms of the farmers' economic well-being was revealed in a survey of farm incomes for the period 1913-1934. This survey brought out that "with the single exception of 1913, agricultural receipts fell short of meeting household expenditures, *i.e.*, cost of living, and forced the farmers to fall back upon nonagricultural income to make up the deficit." *

* Hidetashi Isobe: "Labor Conditions in Japanese Agriculture," *Bulletin of the Utsunomiya Agricultural College*, Section B, vol. 2, no. 1, 1937, p. 66.

In many cases, however, the income from all sources was less than expenditures. When one considers also that a farmer's budget does not always include even the bare necessities — the exception being such inelastic items as taxes, rents and fertilizer costs — it is apparent that he lives in a state of destitution.

While the importance of relieving agricultural distress has been recognized for some time, the need for immediate action became obvious only after the affair of May 15, 1932, when a group of army officers put Premier Inukai to death. The seething discontent in rural Japan and the fact that more than half of the army, both officers and men, come from the villages played no small part in the violent outbreak. Agricultural reform became the watchword of every important group in Japan. The army wanted a contented and peaceful village, not only because of the close ties binding the two, but also because, as General Araki put it, "the agricultural population constitutes Japan's first line of defense." The manufacturing interests also realized that they too were suffering as a result of the sharp decline in the farmer's purchasing power and therefore approved agricultural reform, the more so because they wanted to dispel the belief that industrial progress had been achieved at the expense of agriculture.

Numerous programs were therefore drawn up to ease the farmers' lot. These plans called for such fundamental reforms as the readjustment of prices for agricultural products, the equalization of the tax burden and the reduction of farm indebtedness and land tenancy. But efforts to assist the farmers through price control were only partially successful. Despite the heavy financial loss sustained by the government in the attempt to maintain the price of rice within a fixed range, rice prices were often insufficient to cover costs of production, much less to leave a margin of profit. Even less successful were its attempts to raise the price of cocoons. Such devices as loans, subsidies, government purchases of raw silk and restrictions on silk output failed to raise prices for either cocoons or silk. The principal factor that can bring prosperity to Japanese sericulturists would still seem to be a rising curve of economic activity in the United States.

Most observers believe that agricultural recovery in Japan depends on a downward adjustment of farm indebtedness. Yet the government has confined itself to settling a relatively small portion of the farm debt — the financial assistance which it has rendered in the form of loans amounts to only 200 million yen.

In the end the government's principal contribution has been to advise that debts be scaled down by "making a more active use of the tradition of neighborly fellowship and mutual aid."³ But this assumption that creditors would become so imbued with good will toward the debtors that debt settlements would take place without ado had no basis in fact. On March 30, 1936, debts actually adjusted amounted to 157 million yen, or only three percent of the total estimated farm debt. Considering also the fact that the contemplated reorganization of the country's taxation system, with the object of equalizing its burden, did not go through, it would be difficult to underestimate the seriousness of the financial plight of Japanese farmers.

Overshadowing all other agricultural problems with which the Japanese Government must cope is the land tenure system. Much of the social unrest that has pervaded rural Japan, especially in recent years when the depression fell heaviest upon the tenant farmers, may be attributed to this cause. Out of the welter of discussions, disputes, charges and countercharges, two measures finally emerged. One, the Conciliation of Tenancy Disputes Act of 1924, provides for the settlement of conflicts between landlords and tenants through an arbitration committee. More than 60 percent of these disputes are now settled this way. The other and more fundamental measure aims gradually to eradicate tenancy by helping tenants to become proprietors through subsidies granted from the State Life Insurance reserve fund. During the years 1926-33 nearly 120,000 tenants were aided in buying 126,000 acres, or slightly over one acre per tenant. But the land thus acquired represented less than one percent of the entire rented area.

Realizing that at such a rate it would take several centuries to convert all the tenants into landed proprietors, the Japanese Government in 1932 drew up another plan on a larger scale and embodied it in a Peasant Proprietors' Agricultural Land Bill. This called for an expenditure of 2.8 billion yen with which to purchase, during a period of 35 years, nearly one-third of the land now rented. This bill failed to pass. We may therefore say that to date no significant reform has been made in the tenancy system. Conciliation boards help to settle disputes after they arise, but little has been done to remedy the causes underlying

³ Yoshinosuke Yagi: "The Problem of Farm Debt Adjustment," *Kyoto University Economic Review*, July 1937, p. 65.

the conflicts. Any attempt to convert the tenants into independent farmers calls for great concessions on the part of the landlords or larger expenditures by the government, or both. Neither, however, is willing or financially able to undertake such a task.

Japan's agrarian crisis is not a depression phenomenon that can be cured by makeshift measures. The depression merely brought into sharp relief forces that have been undermining the country's agricultural economy for many years. It is apparent that the government cannot bring radical and sudden relief to the problem of "many men on little land." Manchuria, with its vast tracts still unoccupied, is not likely to relieve population pressure in the home country since Japanese farmers have shown little, if any, inclination to migrate to the continent. The rural population is thus bound to grow and hence to reduce the size of the average farm unit still further, and along with it the already notoriously low standard of living.

Nevertheless, in spite of all these discouraging tendencies, some of the burdens under which Japanese agriculture suffers could be removed or at least eased to a considerable degree. But to do this calls for a recognition by the government that the farmers cannot bring about economic rehabilitation unaided. A reduction in the debt burden, establishment of better credit facilities, changes in the discriminatory taxation system, and a real attempt to solve the tenancy problem — all involve huge outlays, which the farmers are in no position to supply. The government, since 1931 hard-pressed for funds to further its expansionist policy in Manchuria and China, is also unable to undertake large expenditures to safeguard the country's agricultural economy.

Yet one wonders if a realistic approach to Japan's agrarian problem can be postponed indefinitely. Rural unrest indicates that the farmers are not in a mood to go on accepting indefinitely the lowly status of "perpetual poor relations in the national family." The government is well aware of this as was shown by the remark of the present Premier of Japan — "How can the army be indifferent to farmers' difficulties when it is largely composed of farmers' sons?" Obviously, it cannot. And when one considers the importance of the army in the national scheme of things, the Japanese Government may yet be compelled to treat the country's agricultural economy, the backbone of its economic and political life, with the care and consideration it deserves.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

PEACE WITH THE DICTATORS? BY NORMAN ANGELL. New York: Harper, 1938, 291 p. \$3.00.

An attempt by the author of "The Great Illusion" to bring out the important issues in the world today through the device of an imaginary symposium between a German, an Italian, an Englishman and an American. After stating their respective points of view with his customary brilliance, Sir Norman presents his own arguments against totalitarian doctrines, against those among his compatriots who want to give in to the dictators, and against the pacifists. His conclusion is an impressive statement of the case for collective security and is the best part of the book.

POWER: A NEW SOCIAL ANALYSIS. BY BERTRAND RUSSELL. New York: Norton, 1938, 305 p. \$3.00.

The famous English philosopher finds that power is "the fundamental concept in social science." On this premise he generalizes and particularizes on political history and phenomena. His ideas, though provocative as one would expect, will in some cases appear to readers to be highly debatable.

THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY. BY F. ELWYN JONES. New York: Dutton, 1938, 352 p. \$2.50.

A young British labor attorney, author of "Hitler's Drive to the East," exposes the techniques, overt and covert, by which the two great Fascist Powers are undermining democracy throughout the world. Mr. Jones' method appears strictly factual though his account is of necessity somewhat sketchy. There are also chapters on the "subversive" movements inside Germany and Italy.

THE MIDDLE WAY. BY HAROLD MACMILLAN. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 382 p. \$2.50.

The dangers to liberty and democracy, says the author, are poverty and insecurity. To abolish these there now exist, he reminds us, the necessary technical means if only we can find a socio-political system that will permit them to be fully utilized. *Laissez-faire* he rejects as not only inadequate but harmful. The major portion of his book is occupied with an able presentation of what he holds to be a feasible program.

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY. BY WILLIAM E. RAPPARD. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, 288 p. \$2.50.

The Harris Lectures for 1938 in which the Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva examines the rise of democracy and its prospects for the future.

THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION. BY CRANE BRINTON. New York: Norton, 1938, 326 p. \$3.00.

A professor of history at Harvard University distills the essence out of four successful revolutions in his search for their uniformities.

LA CRISE DE LA DÉMOCRATIE ET LE RENFORCEMENT DU POUVOIR EXÉCUTIF. By ÉMILE GIRAUD. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 184 p. Fr. 40.

A sound analysis of the causes for the decline of the democratic idea, with an investigation into the increasing power of the executive in all the principal countries.

REFUGEES. By SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 233 p. \$1.25.

"A preliminary report of a survey" being prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, containing detailed information on the origins of the present refugee problem and on the situation in certain countries of refuge, together with some concrete proposals for solving the problem.

THE GATEWAY TO HISTORY. By ALLAN NEVINS. New York: Appleton-Century, 1938, 412 p. \$4.00.

One of America's foremost historians and biographers gives some sound advice on how to rescue history-writing from the monograph-compilers.

DAS POLITISCHE ANTLITZ DER ERDE: EIN WELTPOLITISCHER ATLAS. By WALTHER PAHL. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1938, 234 p. M. 6.80.

A very useful cartographic presentation of the leading problems of international politics, similar to that adopted by J. F. Horrabin only more detailed. One page of text faces each map, of which there are approximately a hundred.

TWENTY YEARS' ARMISTICE: 1918-1938. By WILLIAM ORTON. New York: Farrar, 1938, 308 p. \$1.90.

The author says that recent European events urgently require civilized people to take stock. This timely book is not "objective history," for it is written with a point of view. Mr. Orton's narrative concludes with the Munich "peace."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1919-1937. By E. L. HASLUCK. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 347 p. \$2.50.

A mediocre compilation of facts and pseudo-facts that will bewilder the general reader and enrage the expert.

LABYRINT MÍRU. By RUDOLF PROCHÁZKA. Prague: Orbis, 1938, 443 p. Kč.60.

A survey of international events between 1920-1930.

L'EUROPE ET LA QUESTION COLONIALE. By GILBERT MAROGER. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 464 p. Fr. 55.

A useful compilation of material on the legal, political and administrative problems raised by Germany's colonial demands. Poland's colonial aspirations are also discussed.

MEDITERRANEAN CROSS-CURRENTS. By MARGRET BOVERI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 451 p. \$5.00.

A well-informed and on the whole reliable survey of Mediterranean problems. The author, an Italian-born foreign editor of a leading German newspaper, devotes more attention to the African and Asiatic shores of the Mediterranean than to the European. In general she is critical of Britain and well-disposed towards Il Duce.

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN POWER POLITICS. By ELIZABETH MONROE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 259 p. \$4.00.

Though not so detailed an account as Miss Boveri's, this book covers the same field. Miss Monroe's outlook is that of a moderate British imperialist.

ENTRETIENS SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABE (2^e ANNÉE). Paris: Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1938, 159 p. Fr. 15.

Papers on several Islamic topics, political and cultural.

ACROSS THE FRONTIERS. BY PHILIP GIBBS. New York: Doubleday, 1938, 309 p. \$3.00.

The famous war correspondent, reporting on the state of Europe, finds the outlook for peace and democracy and decent civilized life dark indeed. Yet he pleads for a more tolerant attitude towards Nazism. This is another book typical of the state of confusion, one might say funk, into which so many Englishmen have fallen.

WORLD OF ACTION. BY VALENTINE WILLIAMS. Boston: Houghton, 1938, 430 p. \$3.50.

Observations on personages and events by a widely-travelled British journalist.

PAGES AFRICAINES ET ASIATIQUES. BY M. MONCHARVILLE. Paris: Pedone, 1938, 302 p. Fr. 50.

Reminiscences on the author's connection with the Permanent Mandates Commission, French North Africa and the Manchurian "incident" of 1931-32.

GEOGRAFIA UNIVERSALE. Volumes II, IV and VII. Turin: Torinese, 1935-1938, L. 440.

These are the latest additions to a masterly work on the human geography of the world. Volume II deals with the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, Russia and the Polar Regions and is the work of Professors Pullè and Almagià. Volume IV covers Asia and was written by Dr. Gribaudo and Professors Malesani and Vacca. Volume VII on South America, by Professors Riccardi and Malesani, is perhaps the one that will be found most useful by Americans. Each volume is beautifully printed and magnificently illustrated with a profusion of photographs and maps.

HOCHSCHULE FÜR POLITIK: JAHRBUCH, 1938. EDITED BY PAUL MEIER-BENNECKENSTEIN. Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1938, 388 p.

The maiden issue of a new annual containing a score of monographs.

PEACE AND REARMAMENT. COMPILED BY JULIA E. JOHNSON. New York: Wilson, 1938, 226 p. 90 cents.

Significant documents, speeches and articles, with an extensive bibliography.

DER TECHNISCHE KRIEG IM SPIEGELBILD DER KRIEGSERFAHRUNGEN UND DER WELTPRESSE. BY KARL JUSTROW. Berlin: Claassen, 1938, 128 p. M. 2.60.

The experience of the World War used, with the aid of numerous illustrations and diagrams, to explain the technical problems involved in military strategy.

LES FORCES AÉRIENNES MONDIALES. BY PIERRE BARJOT. Paris: Gigord, 1938, 188 p. Fr. 18.

A quantitative and qualitative description of the military air services of the world, illustrated with many photographs, diagrams and maps.

LA RÉGLEMENTATION ADMINISTRATIVE DE LA PRESSE DANS LES PRINCIPAUX PAYS. BY GUSTAVE CHAUDET. Vevey: Marchino, 1938, 158 p.

A comparative legal study covering Italy, Germany, France, Britain, the United States and Switzerland.

SYSTEM DES INTERNATIONALEN MINDERHEITENRECHTES. Volume I. BY ERNST FLACHBARTH. Budapest: R. Gergely Verlag, 1937, 475 p. M. 15.

An historical and legal study on the international protection of minorities.

THE WORLD COURT: 1921-1938. BY MANLEY O. HUDSON. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1938, 345 p. 75 cents.

A standard reference work brought up to date.

LE DIPLOMATE ET SES FONCTIONS. BY ERNST WOLGAST. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 128 p.

Legal studies with an extensive bibliography.

THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1938. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 316 p. \$5.50.

Legal monographs on several current topics.

KEY TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENTS PLACED ON PUBLIC SALE, 1934-1936. BY MARIE J. CARROLL. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, 188 p. \$4.75.

This fourth supplement to "Key to League of Nations Documents, 1920-1929," with its complete indices, makes League source material accessible to the research worker, student and librarian. References to elusive documentation on committees, commissions and conferences are of particular value.

General: Economic and Social

SLUMP AND RECOVERY, 1929-1937. BY H. V. HODSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 484 p. \$4.25.

This book is based on Mr. Hodson's contributions to the last seven volumes of the Royal Institute's "Survey of International Affairs." It is probably the best synthesis and interpretation of the last decade in world economics that we have.

WORLD FINANCE, 1937-1938. BY PAUL EINZIG. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 336 p. \$3.00.

The third volume in a series.

THE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RAW MATERIALS. BY HERMAN KRANOLD. London: Routledge, 1938, 269 p. 15/.

A real contribution, especially welcome for its seventy pages of statistical tables.

THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCE CAPITALISM. BY GEORGE W. EDWARDS. New York: Longmans, 1938, 429 p. \$4.00.

A development of the theme that there is an ever-expanding difference between finance and industrial capitalism.

THE CRUMBLING OF EMPIRE. BY M. J. BONN. London: Allen and Unwin, 1938, 432 p. 15/.

An authority on international economics finds that the value of colonies has been overrated, especially in a politically and economically disintegrating world.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE. BY JOHN PARKE YOUNG. New York: Ronald, 1938, 526 p. \$4.00.

A systematic treatise, useful for reference.

TARIFF LEVELS AND THE ECONOMIC UNITY OF EUROPE. BY HEINZ LIEPMANN. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 424 p. \$6.00.

An industrious analysis of the statistics concerning tariff policies and export movements from 1913 to 1931.

KAPITALIZM I SOTSIALIZM ZA 20 LET. BY E. VARGA. Moscow: Partizdat, 1938, 231 p. 40 cents.

A comparison of the development of Russia under Communism with the evolution of the capitalist world, by a leading Soviet economist and publicist.

LA SITUATION ÉCONOMIQUE DES JUIFS DANS LE MONDE. Volume I. Paris: Congrès Juif Mondial, 1938, 325 p. Fr. 35.

Facts and figures concerning Jewish minorities, arranged by country.

I CONTROLLI DELLO STATO SULLA PRODUZIONE INDUSTRIALE. BY LIONELLO R. LEVI. Milan: Giuffrè, 1938, 130 p. L. 18.

A theoretical treatise with special reference to Italian experience.

ESSAIS SUR LE CORPORATISME. BY GAETAN PIROU. Paris: Sirey, 1938, 172 p. Fr. 22.

A penetrating analysis, by a well-known French economist, of the corporative state in Italy and Germany, which he finds to be a mere façade for unrestricted state control.

TOMORROW'S WAR. BY STEPHEN POSSONY. London: Hodge, 1938, 255 p. 8/6.

A comprehensive work, translated from the German, on the economic considerations that will govern the preparations for and the conduct of another large-scale war.

WHAT ARE WE TO DO? BY JOHN STRACHEY. New York: Random House, 1938, 339 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Strachey is probably the most lucid of present-day expounders of Marxism. In this book he criticizes the British and American labor movements for their failure to take full advantage of their opportunities to overthrow capitalist society. He favors putting up a fight instead of following the Fabian policy of hoping that capitalism will destroy itself in the course of time.

EUROPE RE-HOUSED. BY ELIZABETH DENBY. New York: Norton, 1938, 284 p. \$3.50.

One of the great, and in the United States neglected, problems of our age is that of housing. Here we have an excellent description of what the European countries have done along this line. The author was for some time associated with slum clearance in London and has extensively investigated continental housing projects. Numerous illustrations and diagrams add to the book's interest.

THE NEXT BRITISH EMPIRE. BY R. A. PIDDINGTON. London: Murray, 1938, 294 p. 6/.

A thought-provoking, somewhat boisterous book on how England is going to become a small Power unless she alters her population policy.

MY LIFE AS A REBEL. BY ANGELICA BALABANOFF. New York: Harper, 1938, 324 p. \$3.75.

Angelica Balabanoff was one of the leading lights in the international Socialist movement before and during the World War and was the first Secretary of the Communist International. These memoirs not only make delightful reading but have great historical importance due to the author's close association with two generations of Socialist and Communist leaders in many countries. Her reminiscences on Mussolini in his Socialist phase and on Lenin are particularly enlightening.

The World War

JULES CAMBON, PAR L'UN DES SIENS. BY GENEVIÈVE TABOUIS. Paris: Payot, 1938, 394 p. Fr. 40.

The career of one of France's outstanding diplomats related by an oft-quoted commentator on international affairs. Cambon was Ambassador successively at Washington, Madrid and Berlin — where he served from 1907 to 1914.

GESCHICHTE DER PREUSSISCHEN HEERESVERWALTUNG. BY HANS HELFRITZ. Berlin: Heymann, 1938, 400 p. M. 11.

A comprehensive history of the Prussian military administration up to the World War, by a professor of law at the University of Breslau.

VOM GEIST DEUTSCHER FELDHERREN. BY SIGFRID METTE. Zürich: Scientia, 1938, 296 p. Swiss Fr. 13.

A pseudo-scholarly study on the strategy of the younger Moltke, Falkenhayn and the Hindenburg-Ludendorff combination.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN FORCES IN THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1919, Volume I. BY COLONEL A. FORTESCUE DUGUID. Ottawa: Department of National Defense, 1938, 596 p. in text and 464 p. and 14 maps in separately bound appendix, \$3.50.

The opening volume of an ambitious record of Canada's participation in the World War. The period from August 1914 to September 1915 is covered here. The author is Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian General Staff.

NOTITE ZILNICE DIN RAZBOIU. BY ALEXANDRU AVERESCU. Bucharest: "Apollo," 1937, 2 v.

Rumania's part in the World War told by the late Marshal.

SAVANORIU ZGYIAI: NEPRIKLAUSOMYBĖS KARU ATSIMINIMAI. BY PETRAS RUSECKAS. Kaunas: Lietuvos Kariuomenės kurėju Iavanoriu Sajunga, 1937, 352 p.

Military reminiscences on Lithuania's war for independence.

DOBROVOLJCI KLADIVARJI JUGOSLAVIJE, 1912-1918. BY ERNEST TURK AND OTHERS. Ljubljana: Srpske organizacije saveza ratnih dobrovoljaca kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1937, 800 p. Dinars 145.

Numerous individual memoirs illustrating the contribution of Slovene volunteers to the Montenegrin, Serbian, Russian and Italian armies.

ERZERUMSKAYA OPERATSIYA NA KAVKAZSKOM FRONTE MIROVOY VOYNY V 1915-1916 GG. BY N. KORSUN. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1938, 179 p. 80 cents.

A military history of the Russian campaign in Armenia 1915-1916.

ALLIED PROPAGANDA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE IN 1918. BY GEORGE G. BRUNTZ. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1938, 246 p. \$3.50.

Abundantly documented scholarship on the destructive effects of allied propaganda.

WITH THE RED CROSS IN EUROPE, 1917-1922. BY ERNEST P. BICKNELL. Washington: American National Red Cross, 1938, 506 p. \$1.50.

The memoirs of an American Red Cross official, a sequel to his "In War's Wake," full of illuminating sidelights on war and postwar Europe.

The United States

ELIHU ROOT. BY PHILIP C. JESSUP. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938, 2 v. \$7.50.

Elihu Root, who during his later years was universally referred to as "America's elder statesman," enjoyed a longer public life than almost any man in American history. From a highly successful career in law he entered national political life in the late nineties and thenceforward — whether as Secretary of War, Secretary of State or in numerous other official and unofficial capacities — he served the American people. In preparing this work Professor Jessup had the advantage not only of access to Mr. Root's papers but of long personal conversations with Mr. Root himself. The two volumes therefore constitute his authorized biography. Since Professor Jessup also is a lawyer, we might suspect him of building up a case for his subject. Yet this is no *ex parte* plea; Mr. Root needs none, for his large niche in American history was carved long before his death last year. One of the enduring values of this work consists in the frequent but judicious quotations from Root's own words with which the author has interlarded his

text. The chapters especially interesting to students of contemporary international relations are the concluding ones in which is discussed Mr. Root's part in shaping American policy towards Russia, the League of Nations, the World Court and disarmament.

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD ORGANIZATION, 1920-1933. By DENNA FRANK FLEMING. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, 569 p. \$4.00.

A history of the part played by the United States in the various international efforts made during the fifteen years following the war to organize peace on a stable basis. A scholarly, readable narrative.

AMERICA AND THE STRIFE OF EUROPE. By J. FRED RIPPY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, 264 p. \$2.00.

The historical background of the conflict between isolationism, expansionist sentiment and the desire for coöperation in determining American foreign policy.

BRITISH-AMERICAN ALLIANCE. EDITED BY E. C. BUEHLER. New York: Noble, 1938, 389 p. \$2.00.

Speeches and articles on Anglo-American relations, with critical bibliography.

L'OPINION AMÉRICAINNE ET LA FRANCE. By JACQUES OUDIETTE. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1938, 97 p. Fr. 15.

A report by a group of Frenchmen and Americans headed by André Siegfried.

A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM. By NICHOLAS ROOSEVELT. New York: Scribner, 1938, 274 p. \$2.50.

The American people are losing their ancient virtues of self-reliance and personal courage, avers Mr. Roosevelt of the editorial staff of the *New York Herald Tribune*. Mr. Roosevelt's remedies include decentralization — to curb the federal bureaucracy and to encourage those bulwarks of democracy, the local political units.

THE PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By GEORGE S. COUNTS. New York: Day, 1938, 370 p. \$3.00.

In spite of the many setbacks met by democracy throughout the world, Professor Counts (of Columbia University) believes that at least in the United States it is still a living force worth fighting to preserve. Among his suggestions is one that we adopt a thoroughgoing reform in our educational program.

THE PERIL OF FASCISM: THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By ABRAHAM B. MAGIL AND HENRY STEVENS. New York: International Publishers, 1938, 319 p. \$2.50.

A Communist view of the reactionary forces undermining American democracy.

POSLEVOYENNAYA AMERIKA: ZAGNIVANIE AMERIKANSKOGO KAPITALIZMA. By E. GURVICH. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1938, 479 p. \$1.00.

The decay of American capitalism viewed by a Soviet publicist.

LABOR ON THE MARCH. By EDWARD LEVINSON. New York: Harper, 1938, 325 p. \$3.00.

The latest developments on the American labor front colorfully set forth.

AMERICA FACES A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS. By WILLIAM J. BAXTER. New York: International Economic Research Bureau, 1938, 67 p. \$1.50.

A blunt and pessimistic prognosis for American capitalism.

AMERICAN REGIONALISM. By HOWARD W. ODUM AND HARRY ESTILL MOORE. New York: Holt, 1938, 693 p. \$3.80.

A compilation of important facts on the political, economic and social bases for the "regions" into which the United States has come to be divided in the course of time.

SCHOOL HISTORIES AT WAR. BY ARTHUR WALWORTH. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938, 92 p. \$1.25.

How American history texts have treated the nation's wars.

STATI UNITI DALLA GUERRA CIVILE AL "NUOVO TRATTAMENTO." BY BENIAMINO DE RITIS. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1938, 366 p. L. 18.

The last century of American history interpreted for Italian consumption.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. BY WILLIAM ANDERSON. New York: Holt, 1938, 1080 p. \$5.00.

A functional description, readable and up-to-date.

Western Europe

UNTO CAESAR. BY F. A. VOIGT. New York: Putnam, 1938, 303 p. \$3.00.

The author of this provocative but somewhat baffling book is the diplomatic correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*. In his opening chapters he gives us a mercilessly keen and destructive analysis of the philosophy and practice of Marxism and Fascism (more particularly National Socialism, for he scarcely notices Mussolini and Italian Fascism), both of which he hates with unstinted fervor. In the second part he takes up Britain's foreign policy: what it has been since the World War and what it must be if England is to continue to play a world rôle — and he insists that she will be either a World Power or nothing. Mr. Voigt makes no attempt to be persuasive; he hammers home his points with bald, but not necessarily convincing, assertions. His prose is stark and violent, sometimes leaving the reader more incensed than enlightened. Yet withal, the book contains brilliant passages, studded with quotable aphorisms.

INSANITY FAIR: A EUROPEAN CAVALCADE. BY DOUGLAS REED. New York: Covici Friede, 1938, 420 p. \$3.00.

Well-written and well-informed chapters from the life of a British journalist who has served in many parts of Europe. The section on the last years of the Weimar Republic are the most valuable.

LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE EN DANGER. BY GENERAL H. MORDACQ. Paris: Éditions de France, 1938, 114 p. Fr. 9.

A call to France to reform its military machine in face of the German threat.

LA DÉMOCRATIE EN FRANCE. BY LOUIS REYNAUD. Paris: Flammarion, 1938, 218 p. Fr. 18.

An ordinary résumé of French history unworthy of its pretentious title. In his conclusion the author evinces admiration for the dictators.

DE JAURÈS À LÉON BLUM. BY HUBERT BOURGIN. Paris: Fayard, 1938, 519 p. Fr. 30.

Commentaries on forty years of French Socialist history.

SYNDICALISME ET CAPITALISME. BY FRANÇOIS PERROUX. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1938, 58 p. Fr. 9.

A stimulating essay on French trade-unions. The author, professor of law at the University of Paris, prefers that trade-unionism retain its present scope and not try to replace the capitalist system in the management of the national economy.

FINANSOVY KAPITAL VO FRANTSII. BY A. I. SHNEERSON. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1938, 320 p. 80 cents.

A Soviet study of financial capitalism in contemporary France.

LES OCCUPATIONS D'USINES EN ITALIE ET EN FRANCE (1920-1936). By HENRI PROUTEAU. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1938, 243 p. Fr. 25.

A parallel rather than comparative study. Useful bibliography.

LA POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1930. By JACQUES FOUCHET. Paris: Pedone, 1938, 226 p. Fr. 40.

A legal study of recent French trade and tariff policy.

LYAUTEY, DU TONKIN AU MAROC PAR MADAGASCAR ET LE SUD-ORANAIS. By SONIA E. HOWE. Paris: Malfère, 1938, 368 p. Fr. 24.

A comprehensive biography of the great colonial soldier and administrator.

LE RELÈVEMENT DE L'ALLEMAGNE, 1918-1938. By ALBERT RIVAUD. Paris: Colin, 1938, 418 p.

The author, professor at the Sorbonne and the École des Sciences Politiques in Paris, is supposedly one of the leading French authorities on Germany. The present book, however, is full of annoying mistakes of fact and typography and on the whole shows that the author has taken the Nazis too much at their face value.

THE WAR AGAINST THE WEST. By AUREL KOLNAT. New York: Viking, 1938, 711 p. \$4.00.

An Austrian Catholic finds Nazi philosophy the antithesis of western civilization.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF GERMANY FROM WILLIAM II TO HITLER, 1888-1938: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. By W. F. BRUCK. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 292 p. \$4.50.

The author was formerly professor of political economy at the University of Münster. Though his book is not particularly readable it deserves attention because, by placing the economic policies of postwar and Nazi Germany in their proper historical perspective, it shows that present tendencies, which seem to us so revolutionary, are in reality only stages in a process that began with German political unity, if not before.

DER GRIFF NACH ÖSTERREICH. By ROBERT INGRIM. Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1938, 179 p. Swiss Fr. 4.

Austria's road to tragedy from St. Germain to Berchtesgaden narrated by an Austrian who is critical of both Socialist and Christian-Socialist policy.

DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK. VOLUME V. VON DER GROSS-MACHT ZUR WELTMACHT, 1937. COMPILED BY HANS VOLZ. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938, 468 p.

This compilation contains the texts of the important German speeches, decrees and laws of 1937, and of significant documents relating to foreign policy and new developments in German law, economics and culture.

NAZI GERMANY: ITS WOMEN AND FAMILY LIFE. By CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938, 353 p. \$3.00.

An American sociologist finds that the status and activities of German women have not changed during the last six years as much as we might have thought.

THE UNDERGROUND STRUGGLE IN GERMANY. By EVELYN LEND. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1938, 64 p. 15 cents.

The activities of the anti-Nazi movements inside Germany.

L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE L'HISTOIRE CONTEMPORAINE ET LES MANUELS SCOLAIRES ALLEMANDS. Paris: Costes, 1938, 104 p. Fr. 8.

A report on how Franco-German relations are dealt with in German textbooks.

SCHOOL FOR BARBARIANS. BY ERIKA MANN. New York: Modern Age Books, 1938, 159 p. 50 cents.

What the Nazis have done to primary education in Germany told in colorful detail by the daughter of Thomas Mann.

THE NAZI PRIMER. New York: Harper, 1938, 280 p. \$1.75.

A complete translation of the official handbook used by the seven million children of the Hitler *Jugend* in which they are indoctrinated with the Nazi Weltanschauung.

HISTOIRE DE L'ARMÉE ALLEMANDE (1919-1936). VOLUME II. DE LA REICHSWEHR À L'ARMÉE NATIONALE. BY BENOIST-MÉCHIN. Paris: Michel, 1938, 696 p. Fr. 40.

The author, a former French officer, has amassed a quantity of data which he has not evaluated critically or digested thoroughly.

DAS ENDE DES LIBERALISMUS IN DER WIRTSCHAFT. BY HERBERT BACKE. Berlin: Reichsnährstand Verlagsgesellschaft, 1938, 160 p. M. 2.50.

Speeches and articles outlining Nazi agricultural policy.

HERMANN GÖRING: WERK UND MENSCH. BY ERICH GRITZBACH. Munich: Eher, 1938, 345 p. M. 6.50.

How the master of Germany's economic life attained power and how he now exercises it, as told by one of his collaborators.

THIS IS DEMOCRACY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SCANDINAVIA. BY MARQUIS W. CHILDS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938, 169 p. \$2.50.

This sequel to "Sweden: The Middle Way" describes the operation of those democratic devices — in particular, collective bargaining — which help preserve industrial peace in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Mr. Childs makes it plain however that mere devices are not enough, that even more important is the tradition of tolerance and fair play peculiar to Scandinavia.

NORWAY TO-DAY. EDITED BY KARL FISCHER. Oslo: Grundt Tanum, 1937, 159 p.

Glimpses into the life of Europe's most democratic people.

DANISH AGRICULTURE: ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. BY E. JENSEN. Copenhagen: Schultz, 1937, 417 p. \$3.75.

An economic history covering the free trade epoch from 1870 to 1930.

ITALY AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. BY RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, 575 p. \$5.25.

A scholarly narrative, illustrated with some fifty documents.

MUSSOLINI'S ROMAN EMPIRE. BY GEOFFREY T. GARRATT. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938, 310 p. \$2.50.

The author, who was a civil servant in India before the World War, served as *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Ethiopia during the recent war and in 1937 helped evacuate children from Madrid. Though a Britisher, Mr. Garratt has many harsh things to say about the foreign policy his government has followed since the Manchurian affair of 1931. He finds Britain's behavior not only immoral but lacking in common sense, not only a betrayal of democracy but of the British Empire. The result of this mistaken policy has been, he holds, to give Mussolini the empire he coveted.

MUSSOLINI CONTRE HITLER. EDITED BY PHILIPPE DE ZARA. Paris: Sorlot, 1938, 125 p. Fr. 10.

Excerpts from Il Duce's speeches and writings (since 1914) showing his long hostility to German expansion. The selections have been made in order to prove the compiler's thesis that the interest of France is to come to terms with Mussolini in order to preserve Latin culture in Europe.

THE CLASS CONFLICT IN ITALY. BY KARL WALTER. London: King, 1938, 137 p. 5/.

A pro-Fascist history of labor under Mussolini.

L'AGRICOLTURA ITALIANA E L'AUTARCHIA. BY ARTURO MARESCALCHI. Turin: Einaudi, 1938, 140 p. L. 12.

The rôle of agriculture in Italy's closed economy set forth by a former Undersecretary at the Ministry of Agriculture.

THE MARTYRDOM OF SPAIN. BY ALFRED MENDIZABAL. New York: Scribner, 1938, 277 p. \$3.00.

A history of Spain from Primo de Rivera to the Popular Front victory in February 1936, by a former professor of the philosophy of law at the University of Oviedo. Though a Catholic, the author preserves an objective tone, the principal shortcoming of his approach being that it is almost wholly political. Jacques Maritain, the French Catholic writer, contributes a cogent and important 50-page introduction.

SEARCHLIGHT ON SPAIN. BY THE DUCHESS OF ATHOLL. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938, 280 p. 6d.

A Conservative M. P. tells of her visit to Loyalist Spain, as a result of which she resigned as a Tory whip because of disagreement with her party's Spanish policy.

HISTOIRE SECRÈTE DE LA RÉVOLUTION ESPAGNOLE. BY LÉON DE PONCINS. Paris: Beauchesne, 1938, 273 p. Fr. 20.

Thinly disguised Rebel propaganda. Many of the "secret" documents are excerpts from newspapers and reports of the Cortes, while the rest are of dubious origin.

EN EL AMANECER DE ESPAÑA: DOCTRINO Y REALIDAD DEL MOVIMIENTO NACIONAL. BY FERNANDO GARCIA MONTOTO. Tetuan: 1938, 193 p. Ptas. 4.

Speeches defining Franco's aims, broadcast from Tetuan early in the rebellion.

ZA SHTO BORETSYA ISPANSKOYE KRESTYANSTVO. BY A. V. VOLKOV. Moscow: Selkhozgiz, 1938, 154 p. 15 cents.

A Soviet examination into the aspirations of the Spanish peasantry.

ESCRITORS DE LA REVOLUCIÓ. Barcelona: Grup Sindical d'Escriptors Catalans, 1937, 161 p. Ptas. 5.

Catalonia's Anarcho-Syndicalist writers outline the program of their movement.

ARGENTINA ESPAÑA, 1936-1937. BY FRANCISCO CASARES. Buenos Aires: Poblet, 1937, 286 p. \$4.00.

A one-time Republican journalist, who allied himself with the Clerical Party of Gil Robles and who later, after Franco's failure to take Madrid, took refuge in the Argentine Embassy there, tells of the civil war as seen from the virtual rebel enclaves which many embassies in that city became.

IL BATTAGLIONE GARIBALDI. BY RANDOLFO PACCIARDI. Lugano: Capolago, 1938, 255 p. Swiss Fr. 3.

The story of the Garibaldi (anti-Fascist Italian) battalion — and of the battle of Guadalajara — told by the battalion's organizer and commander.

MALLORCA: POR QUÉ FUIMOS Y POR QUÉ LA ABANDONAMOS. BY FRANCISCO DE FRANCISCO SORIA. Barcelona: Maucci, 1937, 143 p. Ptas. 4.50.

The story of the abortive attempt by the Republican militia to land on Majorca.

FRANCO, MOLA, VARELA. BY RAFAEL FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO Y PEDREGA. Melilla: Artes Graficas Postal Exprès, 1938, 313 p. Ptas. 5.

This official and detailed account of the careers of the three generals most active in the Nationalist Movement in Spain gives unpublished details concerning the careful preparations made during the spring of 1936 for the military rising in July.

LE CLERGÉ BASQUE: RAPPORTS PRÉSENTÉS PAR DES PRÊTRES BASQUES AUX AUTORITÉS ECCLÉSIASTIQUES. Paris: Peyre, 1938, 158 p. Fr. 10.

Basque priests relate the consequences of their loyalty to the Spanish Republic when Franco took the Basque provinces.

ONESIMA REDONDO. Valladolid: Libertad, 1937, 225 p. Ptas. 5.

The biography of a young leader in the *Falange*, notable for the light it sheds on the rôle of Fascist terrorism in preparing the way for the military rebellion.

57 SEMANAS DE ANGUSTIA. By JOSÉ JOAQUIN MAZORRA SEPTIEN. Santander: Maestro, 1937, 227 p. Ptas. 6.

What happened in the province of Santander when the military rebellion failed, told by a Rebel sympathizer who survived the ensuing terror.

Eastern Europe

PROTIV AGRESSII. By M. LITVINOV. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1938, 112 p. 15 cents.

Recent speeches by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

SOVIET TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION. By LEONARD E. HUBBARD. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 381 p. \$5.00.

A companion volume to the author's "Soviet Money and Finance."

TERROR IN RUSSIA? TWO VIEWS. By UPTON SINCLAIR AND EUGENE LYONS. New York: Smith, 1938, 63 p. \$1.00.

Does the end justify the means? Mr. Sinclair says "Yes," Mr. Lyons "No."

NOT GUILTY. By JOHN DEWEY AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1938, 422 p. \$2.75.

The final report of the commission that went to Mexico to investigate the charges made against Trotsky in the Moscow trials.

TSEKOV I SHPIONAZH: ONEKOTORYKH FANTAKH KONTRREVOLYUTSIONNOY I SHPIONSKOY DEYATELNOSTI RELIGIOZNYKH ORGANIZATSIY. By BORIS KANDILOV. Moscow: Gaiz, 1938, 120 p. 15 cents.

An attack on the alleged espionage activities of religious bodies within Russia.

IN SEARCH OF SOVIET GOLD. By JOHN D. LITTLEPAGE AND DEMAREE BESS. New York: Harcourt, 1938, 310 p. \$2.75.

What befell an American engineer during the ten years he served the Soviet Gold Trust, of which he eventually became chief engineer.

ON TOP OF THE WORLD. By LAZAR BRONTMAN. New York: Covici Friede, 1938, 343 p. \$3.00.

The *Pravda* correspondent's personal account of the Soviet scientific expedition to the North Pole in 1937-38.

THE BALTIC STATES. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 194 p. \$3.00.

"A survey of the political and economic structure and the foreign relations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania" prepared by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

COMMENT ON FAIT UN ÉTAT: LETTONIE, 1938. By JEAN-R. MIÉDAN. Paris: Corrêa, 1938, 159 p. Fr. 15.

Latvia's postwar history and present state informally described.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: KEYSTONE OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY. By LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER EDGAR P. YOUNG. London: Gollancz, 1938, 400 p. 12/6.

Though written before Munich, this book contains useful information on Czechoslovakia's economic and social structure, political life and minorities problems.

AT THE CROSS-ROADS OF EUROPE. BY KAREL CAPEK AND OTHERS. Prague: P.E.N. Club, 1938, 275 p.

The historical background of Czechoslovakia's democratic traditions.

GEOPOLITICKÉ ZÁKLADY ČESKOSLOVENSKA. BY JAROMÍR KOŘČÁK. Prague: Orbis, 1938, 171 p. Kč. 19.

An attempt to prove that pre-Munich Czechoslovakia was justified geopolitically.

NÁRODNOSTNÍ VÝVOJ ČESKOSLOVENSKÁ REPUBLIKY. BY VLADIMÍR SLAMINKA. Vyskov: Obzina, 1938, 126 p. Kč. 20.

An analysis of the national groups in Czechoslovakia.

KONRAD HENLEINS REDE IN KARLSBAD: MEMORANDUM. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938, 67 p.

The texts of Henlein's famous speech of April 24, 1938, and of the Memorandum presented by his Sudeten Party to the Czech authorities on June 7.

GERMANY PUSHES SOUTH-EAST. BY GERHARD SCHACHER. London: Hurst, 1937, 263 p. 7/6.

A searchlight on the methods by which the Nazis have revived and extended the old Pan German program for creating a German-controlled *Mittleuropa*.

DEUTSCHLANDS NACHBARN IM SÜDOSTEN: VÖLKER UND MÄCHTE IM DONAURAUM. BY RUDOLF DAMMERT. Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1938, 390 p. M. 4.80.

A survey of the recent history of the Danubian and Balkan peoples.

PEOPLE AT BAY: THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE. BY OSCAR I. JANOWSKY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 193 p. \$1.75.

A circumstantial account of oppression.

BULGARIENS AGRARKRISE UND AGRARVERSCHULDUNG. BY ANDREAS PIPEROW. Berlin: Parey, 1938, 77 p. M. 7.80.

Copious statistics arranged and interpreted.

SHQIPENIJA ME 1937: VEPRIONI SHETNOR GJAT NJEZET E PESE VJATEVE TË PARË VETGEVERRIONIT. Volume I. COMPILED BY DEMETRIO BERATTI. Tirana: 1937, 272 p.

The achievements of Albania since 1912 and its present government described by the Secretary General of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

THE TRAGIC PENINSULA: A HISTORY OF THE MACEDONIAN MOVEMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE SINCE 1878. BY CHRIST ANASTASOFF. St. Louis: Author, 1938, 369 p. \$3.00.

The modern history of Macedonia and of its independence movements, secret and otherwise, by a native Macedonian who is naturally hostile to Greece and Jugoslavia.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

WHILE ENGLAND SLEPT. BY WINSTON CHURCHILL. New York: Putnam, 1938, 404 p. \$4.00.

This is a compilation of some forty speeches, delivered mostly in the House of Commons between 1932 and March 1938. Mr. Churchill began, even before the advent of Hitler, to warn his countrymen against the danger of a Germany rearmed and determined to reassert her claims to world power. At the time he was not listened to; yet history has proven him remarkably correct in his prophecies.

THE PUBLIC CORPORATION IN GREAT BRITAIN. BY LINCOLN GORDON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 351 p. \$3.50.

How four of Britain's great publicly-controlled bodies like the B. B. C. operate.

BRITISH UNEMPLOYMENT POLICY: THE MODERN PHASE SINCE 1930. BY RONALD C. DAVISON. New York: Longmans, 1938, 136 p. \$3.00.

The transformation in Britain's public policy since the economic collapse of 1930.

THE LAW OF TREATIES: BRITISH PRACTICE AND OPINIONS. By Arnold Duncan McNair. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, 578 p. \$7.50.

Cases, law officers' reports and treaties arranged and interpreted.

THE MOST POWERFUL MAN IN THE WORLD: THE LIFE OF SIR HENRI DETERDING. BY GLYN ROBERTS. New York: Covici Friede, 1938, 448 p. \$3.00.

A Leftist biography of Sir Henri Deterding, the Dutchman who organized the British oil industry on its present world-wide scale. A success story in which the hero is portrayed as a pro-Fascist villain.

EDUCATION IN THE COLONIAL EMPIRE. BY ARTHUR MAYHEW. New York: Longmans, 1938, 291 p. \$2.50.

The evolution of educational policy in the empire, with special reference to tropical Africa, Malaya, the South Seas and the West Indies.

CANADA AND HER GREAT NEIGHBOR. EDITED BY H. F. ANGUS. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938, 451 p. \$3.75.

The content and approach of this volume is indicated by its subtitle: "Sociological surveys of opinions and attitudes in Canada concerning the United States."

CANADA TODAY. BY F. R. SCOTT. Toronto: Oxford University Press, for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1938, 163 p. \$1.25.

An admirably lucid and realistic study of the bases on which Canada's national, imperial and international policies rest, by one of her most brilliant young scholars, a professor of law at McGill University.

CANADA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS. EDITED BY NORMAN MACKENZIE AND LIONEL H. LAING. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938, 567 p. \$4.00.

"A selection of cases in international law, affecting Canada or Canadians, decided by Canadian courts, by certain of the higher courts in the United States and Great Britain and by international tribunals."

A HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN CANADA. BY G. P. DE T. GLAZEBROOK. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938, 475 p. \$4.00.

The evolution of travel from pirogue to airplane recounted in scientific detail.

THE LAW OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. BY M. RAMASWAMY. New York: Longmans, 1938, 450 p. \$8.40.

A legal and constitutional interpretation of the Government of India Act of 1935.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAND OF CEYLON AND THE CASE FOR THE REFORM OF ITS CONSTITUTION. BY N. D. A. SILVA WIJAYASINGHE AND THE HON. SIR DON BARON JAYATILAKA. London: Murray, 1938, 143 p. 3/6.

Two opposing views on the need for reforming Ceylon's constitution.

The Near East

FRANCO-BRITISH RIVALRY IN THE POST-WAR NEAR EAST. BY HENRY H. CUMMING. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 229 p. \$3.00.

A diplomatic history (to 1924) stressing the decline of French influence.

DAS SCHWERT DES ISLAM. BY OTHMAR KRAINZ. Leipzig: Deutscher Hort Verlag, 1938, 153 p. M. 4.80.

A distorted picture of Zionism, Pan Arabism and British Near East policy.

TÜRKİYE DEVLETİNİN DIŞ SIYASASI. BY YUSUF HİKMET BAYUR. Istanbul: Istanbul University, 1938, 180 p. Ltq. 0.30.

Turkey's foreign policy with special attention to the Lausanne and Montreux Conferences and to the question of Mosul.

COLLECTIVE ADVENTURE. BY MAURICE PEARLMAN. London: Heinemann, 1938, 291 p. 10/6.

An account of the history and problems of collectivist colonization in Palestine.

ENGLÄNDER, JUDEN, ARABER IN PALÄSTINA. BY GISELHER WIRSING. Jena: Diederich, 1938, 279 p. M. 6.50.

A German view, superficial and without real appreciation of the issues at stake.

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF PALESTINE. BY DAVID HOROWITZ AND RITA HINDEN. Tel Aviv: Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency, 1938, 214 p.

A broad survey of Palestine's economy, including an account of her trade relations with the surrounding countries.

LES COURANTS ÉCONOMIQUES COMPARÉS DU CANAL DE SUEZ ET DU CANAL DE PANAMA. BY Hassan Hussein Issa. Geneva: Jullien, 1938, 198 p. Fr. 6.

The two canals compared historically, technically and economically.

ALONE THROUGH THE FORBIDDEN LAND. BY GUSTAV KRIST. New York: Harcourt, 1938, 271 p. \$3.50.

Travels in seldom-visited Turkestan and an evaluation of Soviet influence there.

Africa

ORAGE SUR L'AFRIQUE DU NORD. Paris: Médicis, 1938, 144 p. Fr. 6.50.

A high French official, writing anonymously, inveighs against the lackadaisical policy being pursued by his government in North Africa.

THE COAST OF BARBARY. BY JANE SOAMES. London: Cape, 1938, 286 p. 10/6.

North African history and current problems painted with broad but deft sweeps.

DIE KOLONIALE ENTWICKLUNG DES ANGLO-ÄGYPTISCHEN SUDANS. BY WALTER KRÄMER. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938, 239 p. M. 10.50.

A politico-economic survey prepared for the Leipzig Institute of Colonial Geography.

STORIA DI ABISSINIA. BY LUCA DEI SABELLI. Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1936-1938, 4 v. L. 80.

A history of Ethiopia from the earliest times to the Italian conquest, useful because of the dearth of comprehensive works on this subject.

LA CAMPAGNA ITALO-ETIOPICA NELLA STAMPA MILITARE ESTERA. BY GENERAL AMBROGIO BOLLATI. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1938, 149 p. L. 10.

Comments in European military journals on the Ethiopian War.

L'IMPERO (A. O. I.). COMPILED BY TOMASO SILLANI. Rome: *La Rassegna Italiana*, 1937, 324 p. L. 35.

Papers by some twenty authoritative Italians on the new empire's conquest, social and political organization, and economic problems, illustrated by a dozen maps.

POLITICA ECONOMICA FASCISTA IN AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA. BY RENATO TREVISANI. Rome: Edizioni di "Politica Sociale," 1937, 117 p. L. 10.

The outline of a program for the future rather than a record of accomplishments.

WEISSES REICH IM SCHWARZEN ERDTEIL. BY ERNST WIESE. Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1938, 200 p. M. 4.20.

An illustrated, matter-of-fact report on Italian colonization and exploitation in Ethiopia by a Viennese journalist.

LA COLONISATION EUROPÉENNE AU KENYA. BY MAX SALVADORI. Paris: Larose, 1938, 227 p.

An excellent historical, economic and sociological treatise, applicable in its conclusions to other African areas where conditions for white settlements are analogous.

DAS MANDATSRECHT IN DEN DEUTSCHEN KOLONIEN. BY FREIHERRN VON FREYTAGH-LORINGHOVEN. Munich: Duncker und Humblot, 1938, 845 p. M. 30.

Documents arranged by subject and given in their original language.

DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEUTSCH-OSTAFRIKA UNTER BRITISCHEM MANDAT. BY THEODOR GUNZERT. Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1938, 135 p. M. 4.

A legal study on one of Germany's lost colonies.

THE GOLD COAST YESTERDAY AND TODAY. BY PAUL REDMAYNE. London: Chatto and Windus, 1938, 128 p. 10/6.

Descriptive text and photographs on one of Britain's more prosperous colonies.

The Far East

THE FAR EAST. BY HAROLD S. QUIGLEY AND GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1938, 353 p. 75 cents.

An authoritative outline of international rivalries in the Orient.

CHINESE-JAPANESE WAR, 1937-. COMPILED BY JULIA E. JOHNSON. New York: Wilson, 1938, 257 p. 90 cents.

Selected articles representing diverse points of view, with bibliography.

THE CASE AGAINST JAPAN. BY CHARLES R. SHEPHERD. New York: Daniel Ryerson, 1938, 242 p. \$2.50.

The antecedents of the present conflict viewed from the Chinese standpoint.

LA CRISI DELLA CINA (ORIGINI E SVILUPPI ATTUALI 1842-1938). BY DOMENICO BARTOLI. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1938, 300 p. L. 18.

Text and maps on the genesis of the Far Eastern conflict.

WHAT WAR MEANS: THE JAPANESE TERROR IN CHINA. EDITED BY H. J. TIMPERLEY. London: Gollancz, 1938, 288 p. 7/6.

A documentary record, compiled by the China correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* on the basis of eye-witness accounts.

GOVERNMENT IN REPUBLICAN CHINA. BY PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938, 203 p. \$1.50.

China's political experience since 1912 analyzed by a member of the political science faculty of Duke University.

THE PAGEANT OF JAPANESE HISTORY. BY MARION MAY DILTS. New York: Longmans, 1938, 380 p. \$3.00.

A good, simply-written history of Japan, interestingly illustrated.

JAPAN: THE HUNGRY GUEST. BY G. C. ALLEN. New York: Dutton, 1938, 261 p. \$3.00.

The effects of the present war on Japan's traditional social policy and economy.

JAPANS SEEMACHT. BY GUSTAV JENSEN. Berlin: Siegmund, 1938, 379 p. M. 8.

A scholarly history of Japan's rise as a maritime power with an appendix containing detailed statistics on her present naval strength.

JAPÃO QUE AVANÇA. BY AMANDO MENDES. São Paulo: Livraria Editora Record, 1937, 322 p.

A member of a Brazilian economic mission to Japan reports on the latter's economic progress and on the possibilities of trade between that country and his own.

SECRET AGENT OF JAPAN. BY AMLETO VESPA. Boston: Little, Brown, 1938, 301 p. \$3.00.

The incredible, but supposedly authentic story of an Italian-born Chinese citizen who acted as a secret agent for the Japanese in Manchukuo. A hair-raising indictment of the brutality of Japanese imperialism.

BURIAT-MONGOLS KAYA A S S R. BY M. I. POMUS. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1938, 395 p. 90 cents.

A detailed description of the Buriat-Mongol Republic.

Latin America

THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR LATIN AMERICA. BY CARLETON BEALS. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1938, 401 p. \$3.00.

In this latest of his journalistic surveys of the Latin American scene Mr. Beals finds that our neighbors to the south had better watch out or the totalitarian goblins will get them — and that if this happens, the United States will be the principal loser.

MEXIKO IST ANDERS: EINE REISE INS LAND DER AZTEKEN. BY JOSEF MARIA FRANK. Berlin: Universitas Verlag, 1938, 354 p. M. 7.50.

A German novelist and globe-trotter explores Mexico and its socio-political problems.

CARIBBEE CRUISE. BY JOHN W. VANDERCOOK. New York: Reynal, 1938, 349 p. \$3.50.

The peoples of the West Indies, their problems and how they live, pleasantly described by one who knows them well.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS. BY J. ANTONIO JARVIS. Charlotte Amalie (Virgin Islands): The Art Shop, 1938, 258 p. \$3.00.

From Columbus to the New Deal.

SÜDAMERIKA: ROHSTOFFKAMMER UND ABSATZKONTINENT. BY OTTO ERNST PAUL. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1937, 232 p. M. 6.50.

An economic geography of South America's resources written in a popular vein.

HISTORY OF COLOMBIA. BY JESÚS MARÍA HENAO AND GERARDO ARRUBLA. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938, 578 p. \$5.00.

A translation by Professor J. Fred Rippy of the most complete and scholarly history of Colombia. The narrative comes down to the 1920's.

DEUTSCHE HEIMAT IN BRASILIEN. BY MARIA KAHLE. Berlin: Grenze und Ausland, 1937, 151 p. M. 2.70.

A representative of the League for Germans Abroad reports on her visit to the German settlements in Brazil but says nothing about German political ambitions there.

A QUESTÃO JUDÁICA. BY J. CABRAL. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Globo, 1937, 243 p. Milreis 8.

An anti-Semitic diatribe aimed particularly at the Jews of Brazil. The author is a Catholic priest and the book bears the *nihil obstat* of his Church.

ARGENTINE MEAT AND THE BRITISH MARKET. BY SIMON G. HANSON. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1938, 294 p. \$3.50.

A study on an important phase of Argentina's foreign trade.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

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Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Library of Information, 270 Madison Ave., New York. *France*: Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIV^e. *League of Nations*, *Perm. Court of Int. Justice*, *Int. Institute of Intellectual Cooperation*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations*.

AMERICAN CONFERENCE, EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL

SPECIAL Handbook for the use of delegates. Washington, Pan American Union, 1938. 168 p. 23½ cm.

BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE

An ECONOMIC SURVEY of the Colonial Empire (1936). London, 1938. vi, 639 p. incl. tables. 32½ cm. (Colonial No. 149.) £1 7s. 6d.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSIT

COMMITTEE for communications and transit. PASSPORT system. Replies from governments to the enquiry on the application of the recommendations of the passport conference of 1926. Geneva, 1937. 17 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.356.M.241.1937.VIII. Addendum. [C.C.T.652 (a).].3.)

COMMITTEE for communications and transit. RECORDS of the work of the twenty-first session. Held at Geneva from August 1st to 4th, 1938. Geneva, 1938. 91 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.266.M.159.1938.VIII.[C.C.T./21st Session/P.V.].4.)

ORGANISATION for Communications and Transit. Committee on ROAD traffic. Report on the twelfth session of the committee. Held at Geneva from April 25th to 30th, 1938. Geneva, 1938. 38 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.203.M.111.1938.VIII.[C.C.T./C.R.137(1).].)

COURTS, INTERNATIONAL

FOURTEENTH ANNUAL report of the Permanent Court of International Justice (June 15th, 1937-June 15th, 1938). Leyden, 1938. 353 p. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series E., No. 14.)

INDEXES to the Statute and Rules of Court (Preparation and revision — 1920-1936). Leyden, 1938. 127 p. 24½ cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series F. — No. 4.)

ARBITRATION of a difference relating to payment for certain military supplies. Convention between the United States of America and the Netherlands. Signed at Washington March 18, 1938. 5 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series No. 935.) 5c.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CORRESPONDENCE respecting Czechoslovakia, September 1938. London, 1938. 22 p. map. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 7 (1938), Cmd. 5847.) 3d.

DOCUMENTS relating to the German-Czechoslovak Crisis, September 1938. Published by authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada. Ottawa, 1938. 24 p. 25 cm. 10c.

FURTHER DOCUMENTS respecting Czechoslovakia including the agreement concluded at Munich on September 29, 1938. London, 1938. 6 p., map. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 8 (1938), Cmd. 5848.) 2d.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

REPORT on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the ARGENTINE Republic, by Stanley G. Irving . . . April 1938. London, 1938. xvi, 196 p. incl. tables. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 705.) 3s. 6d.

REPORT on economic and commercial conditions in the BELGIAN CONGO and the Territories of Ruanda-Urundi, by Harold C. Swan, O.B.E., lately His Majesty's Consul-General, Leopoldville to May 1938. London, 1938. viii, 54 p. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 707.) 1s.

REPORT on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the DOMINICAN Republic, by A. S. Paterson . . . and in the Republic of Haiti, by W. R. Mackness . . . March 1938. London, 1938. xii, 47 p. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 704.)

REPORT on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, by G. N. Carey . . . with an Annex, by H. Bruce Henderson . . . On Trade Conditions in the East Coast of Sumatra 1936-1937. London, 1938. xviii, 125 p. with tables. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 703.) 2s. 6d.

REPORT on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the Republic of PANAMA and the Panama Canal Zone, by C. F. W. Andrews . . . and in the Republic of Costa Rica, by F. N. Cox . . . (1936-37). London, 1938. x, 56 p. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 708.) 1s.

REPORT on economic and commercial conditions in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, by Stanley Wyatt-Smith, acting British Consul-General at Manila, June 1938. London, 1938. vii, 44 p. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 711.) 9d.

REPORT on economic and commercial conditions in POLAND, by A. F. Merry, M.C., recently acting Commercial Counsellor to His Majesty's Embassy at Warsaw, June 1938. London, 1938. xii, 52 p. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 712.) 1s.

REPORT on Economic and Commercial Conditions in SWITZERLAND, by H. L. Setchell . . . May 1938. London, 1938. x, 75 p. incl. tables. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 706.) 1s. 3d.

REPORT on economic and commercial conditions in YUGOSLAVIA, by H. N. Sturrock, O.B.E., Commercial Secretary to His Majesty's Legation at Belgrade. July 1938. London, 1938. x, 43 p. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 709.) 1s.

REPORT on economic and commercial conditions in SYRIA and the LEBANON, by G. T. Havard, C.M.G., His Majesty's Consul-General, Beirut, in collaboration with F. C. Ogden, His Majesty's Vice-Consul, Damascus, 1936-1938. London, 1938. viii, 35 p. 24½ cm. (Department of Overseas Trade No. 710.) 9d.

ECONOMIC REVIEWS

ECONOMIC review of foreign countries, 1937. Washington, 1938. (Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Economic series no. 2.)

ECONOMIC Intelligence Service. World economic survey. Seventh year 1937/38. Geneva, 1938. 244 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, II.A.13.)

ECONOMIC Intelligence Service. World production and prices, 1937/38. Geneva, 1938. 137 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations.)

FINANCIAL Committee. Report to the Council on the work of the sixty-sixth session of the committee. (Geneva, July 4th-9th, 1938.) I. Some observations on the general situation. Geneva, 1938. 31 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.227.M.129.1938.II.A.[Pt.II].9.)

EXCHANGE CONTROL

REPORT ON EXCHANGE CONTROL submitted by a committee composed of members of the economic and the financial committees. Geneva, 1938. 53 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.232.M.131.1938.II.A.10.)

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

INTERNATIONAL convention for the protection of industrial property, London, June 2, 1934. London, 1938. 37 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 55 (1938), Cmd. 5833.) 9d.

INTERNATIONAL agreement regarding false indications of origin on goods, London, June 2, 1934. London, 1938. 11 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 54 (1938), Cmd. 5832.) 2d.

Both in force August 1, 1938, superseding 1925 revisions.

IRELAND

AGREEMENTS between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Eire signed at London on April 25th, 1938. London, 1938. 23 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5728.) 4d.

JAPAN'S "CHINA INCIDENT"

THE CONFERENCE OF BRUSSELS November 3-24, 1937 convened in virtue of Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of 1922. Washington, 1938. iv, 82 p. 23 cm. (Department of State, Publication 1232, Conference Series 37.) 15c.

LABOR QUESTIONS

INTERNATIONAL SURVEY of legal decisions on labour law 1936-37. (Twelfth year.) Geneva, 1938. lviii 533 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.) \$2.50.

LABOUR COURTS, an international survey of judicial systems for the settlement of disputes. Geneva, 1938. v. 220 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports Series A (Industrial Relations) No. 40.) \$1.25.

YEAR-BOOK of labour statistics. Third year of issue. Geneva, 1938. viii 267 p. 24½ cm. (International Labour Office.) \$1.50.

QUESTIONNAIRE I. International Labour Conference. Twenty-fifth session, Geneva, 1939. Technical and vocational education and apprenticeship. First item on the agenda. Geneva, 1938. 46 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.)

QUESTIONNAIRE II. International Labour Conference. Twenty-fifth session, Geneva, 1939. Regulation of employment of indigenous workers. Second item on the agenda. Geneva, 1938. 78 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.)

QUESTIONNAIRE III. International Labour Conference. Twenty-fifth session, Geneva, 1939.

Recruiting, placing and conditions of labour (equality of treatment) of migrant workers. Third item on the agenda. Geneva, 1938. 42 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.)

QUESTIONNAIRE IV. International Labour Conference. Twenty-fifth session, Geneva, 1939. Regulation of hours of work and rest periods of professional drivers (and their assistants) of vehicles engaged in road transport. Fourth item on the agenda. Geneva, 1938. 80 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.)

QUESTIONNAIRE V. International Labour Conference. Twenty-fifth session, Geneva, 1939. Generalization of the reduction of hours of work in industry, commerce and offices. Fifth item on the agenda. Geneva, 1938. 87 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.)

QUESTIONNAIRE VI. International Labour Conference. Twenty-fifth session, Geneva, 1939. Reduction of hours of work in coal mines. Sixth item on the agenda. Geneva, 1938. 153 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office.)

MOROCCO

TREATY between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the President of the French Republic acting on behalf of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco regarding Commercial Relations between the United Kingdom and the French and Tangier Zones of the Shereefian Empire (with protocol of signature and exchange of notes), Paris, July 18, 1938. London, 1938. 55 p. 24½ cm. (Morocco No. 1 (1938) Cmd. 5823.) 1s.

MOTION PICTURES

CONFERENCE on the application of the convention for facilitating the international circulation of films of an educational character. (Geneva, September 10th–12th, 1938.) Final Act. Geneva, 1938. 6 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.303.M.178.1938.XII.A.6.)

PROCES-VERBAL concerning the application of Articles IV, V, VI, VII, IX, XII, and XIII of the convention of October 11th, 1933, for facilitating the international circulation of films of an educational character. (Geneva, September 12th, 1938.) Geneva, 1938. 3 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.302.M.177.1938.XII.A.5.)

MOTION PICTURE films. Agreement between the United States of America and Czechoslovakia. Effected by exchange of notes. Signed May 18, 1938 . . . and related notes. Washington, 1938. 8 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 126.) 5c.

ADVISORY committee on social questions. The recreational cinema and the young. Geneva, 1938. 31 p. 21½ cm. (League of Nations, C.256.M.152.1938.IV.13.)

NAVAL

LIMITATION of naval armament. Protocol between the United States of America, the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland modifying the treaty of March 25, 1936 (Treaty Series No. 919). Signed at London, June 30, 1938. Washington, 1938. 3 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 127.) 5c.

PROTOCOL modifying the Anglo-German Agreement of July 17, 1937, for the Limitation of Naval Armament, London, June 30, 1938. London, 1938. [3] p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 56 (1938) Cmd. 5834.) 1d.

OPIUM

ADVISORY COMMITTEE on traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. Minutes of the twenty-third session. Held at Geneva from June 7th to 24th, 1938. Geneva, 1938. 146 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.249.M.147.1938.XI.4.)

— ANNUAL REPORT of Governments on the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs for the year 1936. I. Analytical study. II. General survey of the situation in regard to world manufacture and use of narcotic drugs in 1936. III. Synoptic statistical tables. Geneva, 1938. 76 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.241.M.140.1938.XI.3.)

— REPORT to the Council concerning the preparatory work for a conference to consider the possibility of limiting and controlling the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of raw opium and controlling other raw materials for the manufacture of opium alkaloids. Drawn up by the advisory committee at its twenty-third session (May–June 1938). Geneva, 1938. 48 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.221.M.123.1938.XI.1.)

— REPORT to the Council on the work of the twenty-third session. Held at Geneva from June 7th to 24th, 1938. Geneva, 1938. 41 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.237.M.136.1938.XI.2.)

PROSTITUTION

ADVISORY COMMITTEE on social questions. Enquiry into measures of rehabilitation of prostitutes (Part I). Prostitutes: their early lives. Geneva, 1938. 140 p. 21½ cm. (League of Nations, C.218.M.120.1938.IV.11.)

SUPPRESSION of the exploitation of the prostitution of others. Further government answers received. Geneva, 1938. 4 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.13.1938.IV. Addendum.12.)

PUBLIC FINANCE

ECONOMIC Intelligence Service. Public Finance 1928-1937. XLII. Dominican Republic. Geneva, 1938. 7 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations.)

— LX Siam. Geneva, 1938. 11 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations.)

— XLI. Cuba. Geneva, 1938. 7 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations.)

HAITIAN Finances. Supplementary Agreement between the United States of America and Haiti further Modifying the Agreement of August 7, 1933. . . . Signed July 1, 1938. Washington, 1938. 2 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 128.) 5c.

REFUGEES

CONVENTION concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany. (Geneva, February 10th, 1938.) Geneva, 1938. 14 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.75(1).M.30(1).1938.XII.B.1.)

INTERNATIONAL assistance to refugees. Geneva, 1938. 9 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.27.1938.XII.B.3.)

NANSEN International Office for Refugees (under the authority of the League of Nations). Report of the governing body for the year ending June 30th, 1938 on the Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, Saar and Turkish refugee problems. Geneva, 1938. 20 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.21.1938.XII.B.2.)

TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL international coöperation with regard to migration for settlement. Technical conference of experts. Geneva, 1938. vii 180 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series O (Migration) No. 7.) \$1.00.

STANDARD OF LIVING

ECONOMIC committee. Preliminary investigation into measures of a national or international character for raising the STANDARD OF LIVING. Memorandum prepared by Mr. N. F. Hall, formerly Professor of Political Economy in the University of London (University College), Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, Geneva, 1938. 91 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, A.18.1938.II.B.4.)

THE WORKERS standard of living. Geneva, 1938. 101 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series B (Economic Conditions) No. 30.) 50c.

STATISTICS

COMMITTEE of statistical experts. Report to the Council on the work of the seventh session. (Held in Geneva from July 4th to 9th, 1938.) Geneva, 1938. 28 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.226.M.128.1938.II.A.7.)


MINIMUM list of commodities for international trade statistics. (Communicated to the Council and the Members of the League.) Studies and reports on statistical methods No. 2. Revised edition prepared by the committee of statistical experts. Geneva, 1938. 62 p. 27½ cm. (League of Nations, C.226.M.128.1938.II.A.[C.E.S.127.]. Appendix III.)

STATISTICS of the gainfully-occupied POPULATION. Definitions and classifications recommended by the committee of statistical experts. Geneva, 1938. 32 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, Studies and Reports on Statistical Methods, No. 1, C.226.M.128.1938.II.A.[C.E.S.127.]. Appendix I.)

STATISTICS relating to CAPITAL formation. A note on methods by the committee of statistical experts. Geneva, 1938. 22 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, Studies and Reports on Statistical Methods, No. 4, C.226.M.128.1938.II.A.[C.E.S.127.]. Appendix VI.)

TIMBER statistics. A minimum programme of timber statistics drawn up by the committee of statistical experts. Geneva, 1938. 17 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, Studies and Reports on Statistical Methods, No. 3, C.226.M.128.1938.II.A.[C.E.S.127.]. Appendix V.)

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT statistics. Geneva, 1938. 129 p. 24 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports Series N (Statistics) No. 22.) \$1.00.



GERMANY'S ANNEXATION OF CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY

The area tinted yellow is that in which 50 percent or more of the population was German according to the Czechoslovak census of 1930.

The old frontiers of Czechoslovakia are shown by a dot-and-dash line.

The solid red line is the so-called "Godesberg line," as marked on the map handed to Chamberlain by Hitler at Godesberg on Sep-

tember 23, 1938. Hitler's accompanying memorandum demanded that the Czechoslovak territory up to this line be turned over for German military occupation by October 1. The broken red line indicates additional areas in which Hitler demanded that plebiscites be held.

The solid black line gives the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia

as established following Munich. These frontiers are shown as of about November 1, 1938 (Stieler's "Handatlas"). There have been slight modifications subsequently, but precise information as to these is still lacking. Further modifications may also occur.

In the Teschen region, the boundary given shows the territory ceded by Czechoslovakia to Poland. Here, again, changes may occur.